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Abstract 
Over the last decade, studies of trans people have somewhat shifted away from 
essentialising and pathologising narratives, whilst recognition of gender plurality has 
grown. However to date, gender identities outside of the binary of male/female have 
received little specific sociological attention. This thesis considers negotiation of non-
binary gender identities, in a UK context. Examining how non-binary individuals are 
involved with and integrated into LGBTQ communities exposes important nuances. 
This is also true regarding the negotiation of medical practice by non-binary people in 
relation to gender transitions, and more generally. 
Eighteen participants with non-binary gender identities were recruited to record ‘mixed 
media diaries’ for a four month period. These diaries allowed participants to use any 
methods they wished to express themselves. Follow-up semi-structured interviews 
were then conducted with the same participants in order to discuss their experiences 
and views, relating to broad conceptions of queer communities and medical practice. 
The objectives were to understand how non-binary people are integrated into queer 
communities and negotiate medical practice, as well as what the emergence of non-
binary gender identities implies for these contexts.  
Symbolic interactionism provided the project’s theoretical framework, as this effectively 
allowed space for a multiplicity of participant interpretations resulting from interactions 
with the social world. The findings of this study illustrate both commonalities and 
difference between binary and non-binary trans experiences. Non-binary identities can 
present in static or fluidic forms, which may be associated with differential needs. 
Access to gender affirming medical services is varied, and not always pursued. Non-
binary identities may be associated with discourses and practices of reduced 
legitimisation in both medical contexts and some queer communities. The study 
concludes that the improvement of a wide range of medical policies and practice is 
needed, together with community support initiatives to better recognise and serve non-
binary people.  
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Introduction  
 
Figure 1: Annemarie à Berlin. Annemarie Schwartzenbach, taken by Marianne 
Breslauer, 1931. 
Breslauer who said of [Schwartzenbach], “She was neither a man nor 
a woman, but an angel, an archangel”. 
(Hotz, 2016, no pagination) 
Because third-gender spaces exist in other cultures, many wonder 
whether U.S. culture is too rigid to allow for a third (or fourth) gender – 
forcing people to locate in one or the other of the two main genders – or 
whether people actually chose to identify with the main genders. The 
biggest difficulty with affirming a third-gender category is knowing what 
that means.  
(Roughgarden, 2013, p. 393) 
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Voices from Beyond the Gender Binary 
In 2002, Joan Nestle, Clare Howell, and Riki Wilchins edited a collection comprised of 
Wilchins’ essays and short community pieces titled Genderqueer: Voices from Beyond 
the Sexual Binary (2002). This was remarkable at the time not only because of its 
bottom-up centralisation of marginalised voices, but because of the very explicit nature 
of its central premise: individuals, whose genders are neither male nor female, exist. 
Whilst the essays within Nestle’s, Howell’s, and Wilchins’ collection certainly 
recognised the sexual, their focus was not in terms of sexuality, but rather, in terms of 
gender.  
Such experiences of gender have been recognised both historically and cross-culturally 
(Herdt, 1993). However, identification outside of the gender binary has also been 
clearly articulated within modern, Western contexts (Feinberg, 1996). Whilst predating 
the conceptualisation of the identity category ‘non-binary’ in and of itself, the French 
artist Claude Cahun expressed both identity and presentation that went beyond the 
limitations of masculinity, femininity, maleness and femaleness – conveyed through 
photographic self-portraiture in the 1920s and 1930s.  
The gender identities of such individuals cannot be subject to revisionism on the basis 
of new categories of identification and understanding now being available (as with 
sexuality, in historical contexts prior to conceptualisation of ‘the homosexual’, for 
example). There is contemporary political resonance to this history however, as 
transgression of gender norms has been centralised within ‘genderqueer’ identification. 
Further, the lack of cultural intelligibility of gender beyond or outside ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
renders historical examples at risk of erasure – as seen in anthropological contexts 
(Roscoe, 1993; Jacobs, 1968). 
More recently, recognition of gender beyond male and female has occurred in far-
reaching and widely discussed contexts. In 2014, the social networking website 
Facebook introduced dozens of additional options for individuals’ gender identities 
aside from ‘male’ and ‘female’ (Williams, 2014). The following year in an interview with 
TIME, the performer Miley Cyrus shared that she identifies as genderfluid (Steinmetz, 
2015). Such occurrences shape gendered discourses, as more people are exposed to 
broader models of the possibilities of gender. 
It is important to note how there has been significant overlap and conflation between 
experiences of sexuality, and of gender identity. Early sexological scholarship 
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attempted to explain male homosexuality as ‘the female soul trapped within the male 
body’ (Ulrichs, 1994). This essentialising turn of phrase has henceforth been used in 
relation to gender identity, particularly transgender women – though also people 
assigned male at birth identifying outside of the gender binary (Chettiar, 2015; 
Siomopoulos, 1974).  
The lack of research into non-binary identities meant that this research benefitted from 
considering factors of greatest relevance to the collective non-binary population. The 
questions central to this research project were as follows:  
 How are non-binary identified individuals involved with and integrated into queer 
communities? 
 How do non-binary identified individuals negotiate existing medical practices?  
 What does the emergence of non-binary gender identities imply for queer 
community organisation and activism?  
 What does the emergence of non-binary gender identities imply for trans/queer 
healthcare? 
 
I argue that whilst many additional contexts – such as the workplace – have also not 
been considered in relation to non-binary gender identities, these particular domains of 
focus are justified through the centrality of their importance to experiences of being 
transgender. Community interactions are sites of identity exploration, central sources of 
affirmation, and grant access to resources in negotiating experiences of stigma (Singh 
et al., 2011). In addition, medical transitions may be critically important to processes of 
transgender identity negotiation (Levitt and Ippolito, 2014), and transition discourses 
have affected experiences of transgender communities even for those individuals who 
do not wish to medically transition (Kuper et al., 2012; Factor and Rothblum, 2008). 
Access to medical services in order to transition have been central in the study of 
transgender people since the establishment of the term ‘transsexual’ by clinicians, 
which has influenced the experiences even of those who do not wish for medical 
interventions regarding their gendered embodiment (Snelgrove et al., 2012). The 
intelligibility of these questions, and the analysis which will serve to answer them, are 
dependent upon consistent and clear use of terminology which I will now elucidate.  
Definitions and Terms 
Language related to gender identity can be extremely problematic, and difficult to use 
in a politically sensitive way – especially for those lacking experience with transgender 
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communities (GLAAD, 2016). Transgender people themselves may still use language 
that other in-group members consider problematic or offensive. It is also important to 
recognise that many identity labels are used by different individuals to mean 
(sometimes subtly) different things, which can complicate communication. These 
differences can be a result of changes over time in meanings (such as reclamation of 
slurs, such as ‘queer’), different national or geographical contexts, or of differences in 
the political opinions, social backgrounds, and educational experiences word-users 
have in describing themselves or others. Reflection on naming the self is significant 
across oppressed groups because of the political implications and ramifications which 
language use may have, which is context dependent (Zola, 1993). 
It is necessary to recognise that the subsequent unpacking of language is within the 
context of contemporary (British) English. Many languages use highly similar terms to 
those that have been constructed in English (particularly ‘transsexual’, ‘transgender’, 
and ‘transvestite’). They may subtly differ however, or carry context-dependent 
undertones that are easy for non-native speakers who are not community members to 
miss, or over-simplify. Whilst this nomenclature-based reflection obviously does not 
have the scope for an exhaustive international discussion, examples include how 
‘transgénero’ may be used in Spanish differently from ‘transgender’ in English, and the 
use of ‘Travesti’ or ‘transformista’ in various South American contexts differs markedly 
from common English understandings of ‘Transvestite’, due to culturally situated, 
differentiated discourses around both sex work and medical transitions (Ochoa, 2008). 
The following discussion is thus descriptive rather than prescriptive, and inevitably 
cannot reflect the feelings of all individuals who identify with the discussed terminology. 
The adjective ‘transgender’ is understood by many to simply refer to any individuals 
who do not identify with their gender assignation at birth. However, ‘transgender’ has a 
multitude of potential interpretations. It can often be implicitly used to specifically refer 
to those individuals who have transitioned or wish to transition from ‘one side’ of the 
gender binary to the other – that is, ‘binary identifying’ transgender men and women 
(assigned female and male at birth, respectively). Such a transition may be exclusively 
social, such that typically gendered clothing choices, name, and formal documentation 
are changed to be congruent with the gender the individual identifies with. Transition 
may also involve medical intervention, whereby hormones may be prescribed (or 
otherwise accessed), and/or a range of gender affirming surgeries may be undertaken 
to bring the individuals’ embodiment into better alignment with their sense of selfhood.  
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Over most of the 20th century, transgender people were required to transition socially 
and medically, and also to conform to socially dictated standards of hegemonic 
femininity and masculinity in order to receive any kind of formal legitimisation (Stryker, 
2008a; Spade, 2006). This is illustrated in part by media responses to some of the first 
publically recognised transgender women - such as Christine Jorgensen, who in 1952 
made front-page U.S. news with the now-famous headline ‘Ex-GI becomes Blonde 
Beauty’. Whilst the term used to describe Christine at the time was transsexual, 
Virginia Prince was instrumental in introducing the term transgender, in an attempt to 
differentiate between those who accessed surgery – transsexuals – and those who did 
not, but still lived and identified with the ‘other’ (socially intelligible) gender, 
‘transgenderists’ (Prince, 2005). I will use the term ‘transsexual’ only when discussing 
historical contexts, in which this was the term used by professionals and trans people 
alike. 
Prince’s model did not stand the test of time. Whilst some (usually older) individuals 
may identify as transsexual regardless of surgical history, many transgender people 
find this term to be offensive due to its clinical and pathologising overtones. Likewise, 
‘transgenderist’ is even more rarely encountered. ‘Transgender’ is now often used as 
an umbrella term (Currah, 2006) including a wide range of identifications and 
presentations. The ‘boundaries’ of transgender may still be debated – for example, 
some may include those who engage with any cross-gender or transgressive gender 
presentation (such as cross-dressers, or drag queens and kings). Others, on the other 
hand, may resist acknowledging anyone as transgender except those who experience 
gender dysphoria – commonly characterised as a severe experience of distress or 
depression in relation to the disjunction between self-conceptualisation and the body, 
and/or social positionality (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
For the purposes of this work, I use ‘transgender’ as an umbrella term in reference to 
individuals who do not identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. This 
therefore includes individuals who identify within the gender binary or outside of it 
(binary and non-binary transgender identifications), but not drag performers or cross-
dressers. Whilst a drag artist or cross-dresser may also potentially identify as 
transgender, cultural acts of gender transgression do not in and of themselves position 
one under the transgender umbrella, as I use it. This is also reflective of the fact that 
whilst transgender discourses have often been positioned as inherently transgressive, 
homogenising transgender identities as such risks over-simplification and erasure.  
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Whilst ‘transgressing’ the commonly-held belief that physiological structures (penis and 
vagina) both universally and accurately predict gender identity, binary transgender 
people are quite capable of normative or even conservative views regarding gender 
presentation and roles. I maintain that ‘transgender’ can function as a sharper 
demarcating tool when employed in relation to identification, rather than presentation, 
or role transgression. There is also the vital advantage of such a usage of transgender 
being generally more respectful – drag queens and cross-dressers often do not identify 
as transgender, and many transgender people can resent the conflation that can be 
made between their genders, and others’ gendered performances. 
The term ‘trans’, whilst originating as an abbreviation of transgender, may often be 
used as a word in and of itself, with the same meaning as transgender. This also had 
roots in an attempt to bridge any sense of differentiation between those who identified 
as transgender or transsexual (as introduced by Prince). Due to the commonality of 
‘trans’ being used specifically in relation to binary transgender men and women, ‘trans*’ 
(with an asterisk) has be used by some to indicate an explicit recognition of gender 
pluralities (Killermann, 2012). Others argue that this is not necessary as ‘trans’ already 
adequately signifies gender plurality, and that the asterisk needlessly risks reproducing 
a hierarchy of transness (Ory, 2014). In this thesis I will often use trans as synonymous 
with transgender, whilst avoiding ‘trans*’, as I agree that an umbrella understanding of 
trans renders the asterisk redundant.  
When referring to individuals who do identify with the gender they were assigned at 
birth, I will frequently use the term ‘cisgender’, or ‘cis’. The construction of this word 
was made in reference to the Latin etymology of ‘trans’, meaning ‘across’ or ‘on the 
other side’ – with cis correspondingly meaning ‘on the same side’. The usefulness of 
cis is to decentralise ‘not-trans’ as being positioned as ‘default’. This relates to the 
concept of ‘cisnormativity’ – which describes social practices which assume all 
individuals identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. This positions 
cisgender individuals as ‘normal’ – and thus binary and non-binary transgender 
articulations as ‘abnormal’ (Bauer et al., 2009) in a manner analogous to the erasure of 
minority sexualities under heteronormativity (Schilt and Westbrook, 2009; Ekins, 2005; 
Kitzinger, 2005). This is particularly salient in medical contexts, where it may be 
assumed erroneously that one can always accurately infer physiology from gendered 
appearance (Baril and Trevenen, 2014).  
Recognising and challenging cisnormativity encourages a reflexive use of written 
language in relation to gender. Thus, if referring to an infant observed at birth to 
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possess a phallus, declaration that the infant was ‘born male’1 can be problematized 
due to naturalising and essentialising gender to the penis. This can be avoided by 
describing the infant as ‘assigned male at birth’ – or ‘AMAB’. Likewise in the case of an 
infant lacking a penis, they would almost always be assigned female at birth, or ‘AFAB’. 
Gender ascription at birth only indicates the apparent genitals, which is then conflated 
with gender identity. Disentangling this also assists in avoiding erasure of non-binary 
people, as it is not possible under a Western paradigm to be ‘assigned non-binary at 
birth’ (in any way other than recognition of intersex2 physiology). Some non-binary 
people may make the argument they were always non-binary because that is what they 
are, which language insisting that one is ‘born male/female’ erases. Whilst my use of 
the term non-binary does not include individuals on the basis of being intersex, there is 
the potentiality for intersex people to have non-binary gender identities. Membership of 
the category ‘non-binary’ rests with identification - rather than physiology or gender 
presentation. 
Prior to the cultural rise of ‘non-binary’ as an identity category, individuals who did not 
identify as male or female might identify as genderqueer. The foundation for this 
identity category was laid by transgressive trans activists of the early 1990s (Feinberg, 
2010; Bornstein, 1994), however the earliest usage of the word genderqueer itself was 
by Riki Wilchins in 1995: 
The fight against gender oppression…[is] about all of us who are 
genderqueer: diesel dykes and stone butches, leatherqueens and 
radical fairies, nelly fags, crossdressers, intersexed, transexuals [sic], 
transvestites, transgendered, transgressively gendered, and those of 
us whose gender expressions are so complex they haven't even been 
named yet. More than that, it's about the gender oppression which 
                                            
1
 This challenges the idea that physiological structures such as the penis are inherently 
or naturally gendered, and recognises the inscription of gender onto infants as a 
cultural act. This also respects trans individuals who might argue that as with cis 
people, their gender was always what it is, but that they needed to grow up in order to 
be able to articulate it.  
2  Intersex individuals possess any one of many possible variations in biological 
characteristics (chromosomes, genital or gonadal structures, or hormone levels or 
sensitivity) that do not fit with typical notions of male or female bodies. The most 
obvious examples, which are detected at birth, involve genital ambiguity, but cases 
such as new-borns assigned female at birth, later found to have XY chromosomes are 
also well recognised. For more information see: Harper, C. 2007. Intersex. Oxford, New 
York: Berg. 
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affects everyone […] But maybe we genderqueers feel it most keenly, 
because it hits us each time we walk out the front door openly and 
proudly.  
(Wilchins, 1995, p. 4, underlines original) 
Here, it is clear that genderqueer is being used as a broad term to highlight 
transgression of gender norms. Whilst some contemporary readings of genderqueer 
may intimate a more presentation-focused, transgression-oriented reading when 
compared to ‘non-binary’, these terms may be approximately used synonymously. The 
possibility of course exists for individuals to identify with one label and not the other, in 
which case such identification necessitates respect. Genderqueer identification 
however falls within this thesis’ understanding and usage of non-binary as an umbrella 
term. 
I use ‘non-binary’ to refer to individuals who do not identify as exclusively male or 
female. Non-binary identification necessitates dis-identification with assignation at birth, 
positioning non-binary identities as under the transgender umbrella. Non-binary, 
however, also functions as an umbrella term, encapsulating a wide range of both 
named identifications, and individualistic personal conceptualisations. Non-binary 
identification does not infer whether an individual experiences gender dysphoria or not, 
nor whether they wish to access hormones or surgeries. Non-binary individuals may 
identify as part of an explicit ‘third gender’ category that is static and stable, or they 
may identify as genderfluid, whereby gender identity can shift over time. Some may 
identify as bigender, where one identifies as male (or more male) some of the time and 
female (or more female) at other times. Yet others may identify as agender or neutrois, 
approximately synonymous terms which may be interpreted either as the absence of 
gender, or the presence of a neutral gender. Many more community-recognised identity 
labels exist in addition to these few. However, it is not possible to give an exhaustive 
account of the language coined in order to negotiate the multitude of personal 
experiences of gender, not least because of its continual growth and negotiation. Any 
attempt at formal codification would be dated as soon as produced. From this, one can 
see that non-binary gender identities are rich and complex, and can involve either a 
mixture or combination of maleness or femaleness, or stepping outside of this 
paradigm altogether (Yeadon-Lee, 2016).  
There remains the potential difficulty of those who may identify as non-binary, without 
identifying as transgender. This reiterates how bounded categories are inevitably 
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permeable and imperfect, and that no simple model of nomenclature will ever be able 
to encapsulate all possible nuances of identification. It is however very common for 
non-binary people to identify under the transgender umbrella, rather than outside it. 
This is in large part due to the centrality of transgender identification relating to dis-
identification with birth assignation, shared by binary and non-binary trans people alike. 
‘Queer’, like genderqueer, is a term that has been associated with resistance and 
controversy. Whilst historically meaning ‘strange’ or ‘unusual’, the meaning behind this 
word has changed greatly over time, and no longer occupies a clear single sentiment. 
As the word’s meaning came to be understood as a pejorative slur particularly in 
reference to passive male partners in anal sex throughout the 20th century (Robertson, 
2002), by 1990 there were explicit efforts to reclaim the term such as through the 
foundation of the activist organisation ‘Queer Nation’ in New York (Fraser, 1996). 
‘Queer’ is often used as yet another umbrella term for a wide range of highly 
differentiated sexualities and gender identities (Jagose, 1996). The rejection of 
heteronormative perspectives may be arguably a universal feature of queerness, 
however use of queer as an identity label does not indicate whether an individual 
identifies within the gender binary or not, or whether they are cis or trans. In addition to 
appreciating the language related to non-binary trans identities, the structure of UK 
medical services must also be introduced, to contextualise participant healthcare 
interactions. 
Non-Binary Medical Encounters 
In discussing medical contexts within this thesis, it is important to clarify some terms 
that relate to this. Firstly are the different systems of care available. The majority of 
medical ailments are addressed by an individual’s GP3 – such a first port-of-call is 
termed primary care. Secondary care refers to more specialised physicians (such as 
dermatologists or psychiatrists) to whom one may be referred by a GP in order to 
address specialised healthcare needs. Tertiary care is also specialised care, and is 
also associated with referral from primary (or secondary) care physicians. It is 
consultative, and possesses specialised facilities, such as for cancer, or surgical 
management. Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) fall under tertiary care – these are the 
medical centres where individuals are referred to receive a formal diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, and to be given recommendations that allow access to hormones and 
surgeries to adjust gendered embodiment.  
                                            
3 General Practitioner. 
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In relation to non-binary health needs, medical practice can be divided into two main 
areas – medical services related to gender transition (or gender affirming medical 
services), and all other health needs. For those who wish to access gender affirming 
medicine, a referral is needed from primary care to a GIC if utilising the NHS4. In 
contrast, private healthcare practitioners may be approached through self-referral. This 
has the advantage of avoiding extremely long waiting times (UK Trans Info, 2016), but 
is also expensive. Some individuals may access private care whilst remaining on an 
NHS waiting list. This is because, for example, private assessment and hormone 
prescriptions may be affordable, whilst private surgery may not be. 
Non-binary gender identification may impact access to, and experiences of medical 
services beyond those services directly related to gender transition. On the one hand, 
there are areas of medicine that are significantly cisnormatively gendered, such as 
sexual health, or obstetrics. On the other hand, there is also the potentiality for 
gendered assumptions to impact the doctor-patient interaction in any context, no matter 
how mundane or unrelated to gendered medicine itself (e.g. a broken arm).  
Due to the lack of intelligibility (Butler, 1993a) of non-binary gender identities, non-
binary people often experience erroneous gender attributions. Gendered interactions  
may be made confidently (yet wrongly) when an individual is read in binary terms, or be 
navigated awkwardly or insensitively if an individual has an androgynous presentation. 
Such experiences are examples of ‘misgendering’. In the context of primary care, a 
lack of non-binary cultural intelligibility  and cultural competence (Betancourt and Green, 
2007) among practitioners may produce problematic experiences even when 
attempting to access services that are not fundamentally gendered. Accessing 
gendered medical services can necessitate a process of ‘outing’ oneself, in order to 
navigate symbolically ascribed disjunctions made by the physician between a patient’s 
appearance and their medical needs.  
Primary and secondary healthcare may still deal with heavily gendered areas of 
medicine related to physiology that is socially positioned as ‘male’ or ‘female’ – such as 
sexual health screening, smear tests, or prostate examinations. In navigating the social 
world, attributions of gender are made constantly – with external appearance taken to 
be indicative of a person’s physiology; this has been termed ‘the cultural genitals’ 
(Kessler and McKenna, 1978). The ubiquity of gendered social interactions means that 
                                            
4 National Health Service.  
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possession of a non-binary gender identity changes how such interactions are 
experienced, which this thesis explores. 
It is important to note that experiences of primary, secondary, and tertiary care do not 
necessarily neatly demarcate. The maintenance of particular aspects of GIC-
associated, gender affirming medicine (such as blood tests and hormone prescriptions) 
are transferred back to primary care after assessment and diagnosis – a practice 
termed ‘shared care’. Medical records and administration, such as notes on medical 
files, and name or title changes, are theoretically shared between all sites of medical 
care (such as the GP and the GIC) via a Summary Care Record, or SCR (Greenhalgh 
et al., 2010). This holds a patient’s details in a central database, allowing their data to 
be accessed by any NHS site where consultation or treatment may be provided. 
Access to SCRs by doctors is not necessarily guaranteed, and concerns with patient 
confidentiality have been raised by medical practitioners (Devlin, 2010). 
 
Figure 2: Simplified GIC protocol chart. 
(NHS England, 2013, p. 4) 
The above figure is a simplified version of the chart given in current NHS England 
practice guidelines, illustrating the progression of clinical interaction following referral to 
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a GIC. The full chart differentiates in terms of the treatment of trans men and trans 
women, and gives more specific details on the protocol for accessing GRS5 as part of 
the ICP 6  if desired. Such a binarised construction of the GIC protocols can be 
problematized by non-binary individuals, who may seek to access GRS, without being 
positioned as men or women. 
Further, the views that non-binary people have of medical practice may not be clearly 
differentiated along the lines of primary, secondary, and tertiary care. This is 
particularly the case for any participant who does not have first-hand experience of 
accessing referral to a GIC, as lack of direct contact with specialists may mean their 
view of doctors is homogenous. However, the expectations held of primary, secondary, 
or tertiary care doctors (to be both knowledgeable of medical policy and to be 
respectful of an individual’s identity), and the services they offer, can be meaningfully 
demarcated. Thus, so can perceptions of primary, secondary, and tertiary care.  
Many non-binary people have no personal experience of seeking gender affirming 
medical interventions, either through feeling no need or desire for medical transition, or 
due to a wide range of possible barriers. As there has been a lack of focus on (binary 
or non-binary) transgender experiences of medicine outside of the context of transition 
more generally, I ensured a theoretical framework and selection of research methods 
that enabled analysis of all experiential aspects of non-binary people’s healthcare.  
Chapter Outlines 
Each of the forthcoming chapters will each contribute particular key theoretical, 
methodological, or analytical themes. Chapter one begins the contextualisation of 
transgender identities, with a particular focus on how transgender history of the past 
150 years has been intimately entwined with medical practitioners/researchers. This 
chapter also engages with literature from the sociology of health and illness. Whilst 
doing so, I reject the position that transgender identification is a pathological condition 
in and of itself, which is an increasingly mainstream position among practitioners 
specialising in transgender health (Richards et al., 2015). Health and illness literature is 
still relevant however, due to how gender dysphoria is addressed within clinical 
contexts, and the parallels that can be drawn between hormonal and surgical 
interventions, and the treatment of chronic health conditions. 
                                            
5 Genital Reassignment Surgery. 
6 Individual Care Plan.  
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Chapter two continues the examination of relevant literature, though now moving to the 
sociology of (trans)gender, specifically. This allows for conceptualisation of transgender 
identities beyond the gender binary to be explored in greater detail, and 
acknowledgement of the small amount of work that has recognised non-binary 
identities explicitly. Chapter three goes into detail on methodological considerations. I 
examine the epistemological position of my theoretical framework of symbolic 
interactionism (SI), and how this fits with the consideration of gender identities. I justify 
the choice of methods used (diaries followed by semi-structured interviews) to answer 
the research questions. I follow with reflexive analysis where my position as an insider 
researcher is explicitly acknowledged, and discuss the interplay this had with the 
project. Research involving a stigmatised minority group, such as trans people, 
particularly necessitates rigorous ethical considerations, which are also fully explicated 
within this chapter. 
Chapters four to seven are structured in relation to themes within the data, rather than 
in relation to the research questions themselves – such that analysis within a given 
theme may contribute to an understanding that cuts across the research questions. 
Chapter four considers the theme of instability and insecurity around a non-binary 
gender identity, with particular reference to notions of ‘not feeling trans enough to be 
trans’. Chapter five builds on this, focusing on aspects of non-binary experiences that 
impact over time. This includes consideration of specific community interactions and 
dynamics. 
Chapters six and seven function as a relatively tight pairing, with attention focused on 
participant accounts of medical practice. Chapter six scrutinises accounts of non-
transition oriented medical care, mostly primary care with some experiences of 
secondary care services. However the process of referral to a GIC, which is primary 
care based, and cross-care experiences of administration are also addressed here. 
Chapter seven looks into gender affirming medical interventions, the vast majority of 
which occurred in the context of the NHS GICs (although some private practice and 
non-UK examples are also present). The thesis concludes by considering what 
systemic improvements may be made to queer communities and medical provisions, to 
allow the heterogeneity of non-binary identifying people to feel legitimised in their 
identities, and have equal access and experience of services. In order to optimise such 
recommendations, the limitations of this study and future necessary directions of 
enquiry will be considered. Finally, the appendices contain some auxiliary information 
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that particularly relates to the methodology – such as consent forms, recruitment 
material, and an interview protocol.  
As transgender lives become increasingly visible, so too has academic interest 
increased. I believe it essential for researchers to be highly committed to their work 
having demonstrable value to the lives of their research populations. This also informed 
my theoretical framework choice – as this conviction is validated by a pragmatist 
philosophy, which underpins SI. The ability to efficaciously contribute to both 
scholarship and lived experiences requires appreciation of a ‘big picture’, thus my 
conclusion will also consider the limitations of this work. Recognition of the need to 
situate research within both the social, and academic contexts that have come before, 
leads directly to the review of literature relating medical practice, health, and 
transgender discourses.  
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Chapter 1 – Transgender and Medicine 
Medical practitioners and institutions have the social power to 
determine what is considered sick or healthy, normal or pathological, 
sane or insane – and thus, often, to transform potentially neutral forms 
of human difference into unjust and oppressive social hierarchies. 
(Stryker, 2008a, p. 36) 
Introduction 
The sociology of health and illness can be situated as important to this thesis for two 
central reasons. Firstly, hegemonic Western transgender narratives were originally 
constructed within the medical establishment, with a particular root in early 20th century 
sexology. Secondly, in considering how non-binary people negotiate existing medical 
practices, it is necessary to consider how such practices have been sociologically 
examined, and how medical practice has shifted over time. The sociology of medicine 
illustrates how the production of (supposedly objective, scientific) knowledge was, and 
is, socially produced and constrained. 
It has been argued by Timmermans and Haas (2008) that over time, the original field of 
‘medical sociology’ has fundamentally changed into the sociology of health and illness. 
The difference, they claim, is that the sociology of medicine “implied a discipline 
focused on the medical profession, hospitals, and the broader health service industry. 
Even more, it may have implied a discipline that uncritically worked within the value 
parameters and priorities set by clinicians. To rename medical sociology as the 
sociology of health and illness thus manifested a recognition that illness experiences 
spilt over into family, work, school, and other areas of life” (Timmermans and Haas, 
2008, p. 661). Recognition of the intersections between non-binary identities as 
negotiated in clinical contexts, and in other areas of life, thus benefit from this 
sociological shift.  
The first section of this chapter discusses how medical sociology nucleated into a 
discrete discipline, and important early contributions that came from this then-new area 
of interest. I follow this by outlining the shift of the doctor’s responsibility from 
‘preventing disease’ to ‘maintaining health’ (Donovan, 1977) and the implications this 
had for the social roles of medical practitioners. An important aspect of how the 
doctor’s role has been renegotiated has been the management of chronic conditions 
and disabilities in collaboration with healthcare systems, and increased recognition of 
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this. Due to the highly specific, detailed, and complex needs that individuals with 
chronic conditions can negotiate within their lives, the rise of ‘expert patients’ (Taylor 
and Bury, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; Donaldson, 2003; Prior, 2003) has had important 
ramifications for the power and agency of health service users, which will be discussed. 
It bears repeating that I do not conceptualise transgender or non-binary identities as 
‘chronic conditions’, as this implies an understanding rooted in pathologisation, which is 
deeply problematic. Parallels do exist however, due to chronic conditions and being 
trans both being long term/lifelong, and requiring specialised knowledge in some 
medical contexts.  
Despite originating as a topic of medical research, the relative obscurity of transgender 
discourses meant no work was produced by early medical sociologists on transgender 
identities or experiences. Further, early researchers were near-exclusively practitioners 
of medicine, rather than sociologists in their own right. The epistemological dominance 
of essentialism and positivism within the natural sciences during most of the 19th and 
20th centuries had an enormous impact on how gender variance was conceived when 
first receiving academic attention.  
The second section of this chapter will consider this early history, where labels of 
gender identity and sexuality (initially highly intertwined) were conceived to explain 
social deviance and ‘mental disorder’. Thus, gender variance moved into the domain of 
psychiatry. Further, the evolution of the medical consideration of transgender is also 
highlighted through the different (and ultimately highly critiqued and problematic) 
theories that were conceived to make a taxonomy of transgender in scientific terms – 
such as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ transsexualism, and ‘autogynephilia’.  
The vast majority of literature considering transgender people’s interaction with medical 
services focuses on gender transition, rather than more general experiences of clinical 
practice. Following from the clinical, transition-related literature, I examine research 
that considered other transgender healthcare experiences. Whilst general 
consideration of primary care is particularly under-researched, work on transgender 
experiences of alcoholism and addiction, sexual health, and mental health has been 
conducted, and is discussed. 
In the third section, I consider how medical practitioners and systems have intersected 
with transgender narratives and experiences, and how this has been sociologically 
examined. Rather than the medical sociological work performed by clinicians of the 
previous section, the work considered here emphasises research in the sociology of 
17 
 
 
 
health and illness, in relation to transgender. This includes topics such as doctor-
patient interactions, and transgender erasure within healthcare. 
This chapter closes by summarising the production of, and interactions with medical 
guidelines for the treatment of transgender people. Such documentation offers 
instruction to physicians on how to proceed with specific medical circumstances that 
may be outside of their day-to-day practice duties, such as hormone prescription, and 
surgical referral requirements. In relation to transgender transition needs, such 
guidelines and protocols may be praised for playing a part in assisting access to 
medical intervention, particularly if transition has been delayed by an excessively 
cautious or prejudiced general practitioner. However, such documents may also be 
critiqued for operating from a cisnormative position, and only in recent years have their 
contents shifted away from explicit pathologisation of transgender identification.  
From Medical Sociology to the Sociology of Health and Illness 
The importance of the social world within medicine was recognised concurrently with 
the ascent of biomedicine to the dominant practice within Euro-American contexts. 
Rudolph Virchow, credited as the father of modern pathology, is quoted as declaring 
medical practice to be a social science as early as the 1840s (Bloom, 2002). Whilst the 
‘social aspect’ of medicine was academically recognised as early as 1915, through the 
production of a journal titled ‘Sociologic Medicine’ (Freeman and Reeder, 1957), such 
work was performed exclusively by medical practitioners. 
Medical sociology underwent great development between the 1940s and 1960s 
(Annandale, 1998), with the first conference on medical sociology in Britain held in 
1964 (Thomas, 2007). Whilst the shift in knowledge production from physicians to 
sociologists was significant, Straus (1957) highlighted how it was important to 
recognise that by engaging in dialogues with practitioners, sociologists may experience 
pressures to construct their work in terms favoured by physicians. This can begin with 
technical language co-option, but end with limiting the scope with which sociological 
data is interpreted. Straus argued that ‘thinking like physicians’ risked limiting the 
possibilities of medical sociology, and could prevent critical engagement with (and thus 
improvement of) established medical practices (Straus, 1957). 
Indeed, sociological consideration of biomedicine has highlighted limitations with the 
biomedical model, which underpinned medical practice during the 20th century, and 
through to the present day (Annandale, 1998). These include reliance upon a 
reductivist and essentialist philosophy, whereby ‘disease’ invariably “is a problem of the 
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individual body, rather than a result of the interaction of the individual and the social 
world” (Annandale, 1998, p. 4). Further, in emphasising a preventative medicine, 
biomedical practice often attempted to recognise specific causes of a disease – its 
aetiology, which rarely provided a complete account beyond the most classical of 
pathogen-related conditions. Biomedical research has also positioned itself as 
fundamentally objective in nature. This has been heavily critiqued by feminist 
researchers (Haraway, 1988; 1989; Harding, 1986; Oakley and Roberts, 1981) who 
have argued that the dominance of the natural sciences by men within a patriarchal 
context resulted in the masculinisation of the discipline, and under-recognition of how 
misogyny (among other socialised biases) can impact scientific interpretation. 
Such critiques of a supposedly ‘objective’ epistemology have informed sociological 
work on experiences of health and illness, such that access to vulnerable and minority 
groups by researchers have become more effective and sensitive (Bolitho and 
Huntington, 2006; Sheriff and Chenoweth, 2003). In addition, recognition of subjectivity 
in medicine allowed for consideration of how social values may affect how medicine is 
practiced directly (Nurok and Henckes, 2009; Keating et al., 2007). A particularly 
revealing example by Hughes and Griffiths scrutinised arguments for the denial of 
surgery to patients with particular adverse risk factors. Whilst doctors claimed such 
decision making was ‘objectively’ informed, it was found that “age, lifestyle, and wider 
social structural factors figure centrally in discussions and appear to influence 
outcomes” (Hughes and Griffiths, 1996, p. 172). Thus sociological research can draw 
important attention to aspects of medical practice which may negatively impact patients 
through the limitations of the biomedical model. This is pertinent to the medical 
treatment of binary and non-binary people alike. 
The critiques of how biomedical practice can harm patients can be quite varied, 
including emphasising how social, psychological, or behavioural factors can be 
neglected, or using iatrogenesis7 as grounds for dismantling the current system (Lyman, 
1989; Engel, 1977; Illich, 1976). Lack of recognition of the importance of social factors 
in medicine allows for moralistic and biased practice to be erased, and remain 
unchallenged. This is particularly clear with health factors such as weight (Throsby, 
2009; Jutel, 2005; Saguy and Riley, 2005) and addiction (Hill, 2010; Berridge, 1979), 
yet also in relation to being transgender (Harbin et al., 2012; Spade, 2003).  
                                            
7 Iatrogenesis refers to inadvertent and undesirable health outcomes resulting from 
actions of healthcare and practitioners. This might include medication side effects, as 
well as misdiagnoses, refusal of treatment, and surgical and prescription errors.  
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Whilst there has been extensive development of a wide range of health subtopics since 
the 1960s, the impact of many theoretical (Rosenhan, 1973; Parsons, 1951) and 
methodological Glaser and Strauss (2009); (1966) ideas remain relevant today. One of 
the most important early theorists, Talcott Parsons, undertook influential work 
considering the interactions between patients and doctors. Parsons conceived the 
notion of the ‘sick role’, which ascribes both rights and obligations to individuals who 
occupy the social category of ‘sick’ (Parsons, 1951). Under this model, the sick 
individual is positioned as not responsible or blameable for their condition, and is 
correspondingly exempted from typical social obligations (such as work or self-
sufficiency) for as long as they remain sick. However, the individual must also be 
committed to exiting the sick role, and is expected to cooperate with recognised 
medical professionals in order to do so. Failure to perform these obligations may be 
used to justify no longer considering the individual as within the sick role, and thus 
unable to benefit from the associated exemptions. Such a framework provides 
historical context to see how a diagnosis of ‘transsexualism’ legitimised transgender 
realities, and attempted to mitigate stigma by redefining gender variance as pathology, 
rather than moral failure or perversion. 
Stryker illustrates how such early medicalising practices could protect the transgender 
population in the context of the 1960s. When a clinic was created at Stanford University 
Medical School which offered gender affirming surgical interventions, patients were 
provided with a laminated card which explained they were:  
Under treatment for transsexualism at the Center for Special Problems. 
Whilst the ID card did ‘out’ those carrying it as transsexual, it 
nevertheless allowed people to open bank accounts and do other 
things that required identification. Without that card, transsexuals living 
in a social gender other than the one assigned to them at birth were 
essentially ‘undocumented workers’ who had great difficulty finding 
legal employment.  
(Stryker, 2008a, p. 76) 
This historical case illustrates how the social interventions of the gender clinic could 
assist in rendering transsexuality recognisable (albeit as a pathology). The appreciation 
of barriers associated with transgender life, such as difficulty finding work, resonates 
with Timmermans and Haas’ (2008) earlier reminder of the importance of recognising 
social intersections with the provision of healthcare. These were the first steps in 
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allowing for cross-gender identification and articulation to be publicly expressed, with 
an official sanction so as to not be punished under the law. Such practices would now 
be deeply problematized due to the pathologisation of gender identity, and forced 
‘outing’ to any number of law enforcers or administrators – which may be embarrassing, 
distressing, or put an individual at serious risk of harm. 
Parsons’ model can also be read positively in that he recognised that understanding 
sickness as purely biological was problematic. However, the model has been criticised, 
and updated of its inability to address chronic health conditions whereby an individual’s 
condition is not something that can be ‘cured’, but managed (Turner, 1986; Bury, 1982; 
Levine and Kozloff, 1978). Parsons also made no provision for conditions which may 
have medical relevance but which are not constructed through a pathologising lens, 
such as pregnancy – as well as gender identity (Richards et al., 2015). 
Whilst it is now generally understood among specialists that transgender identification 
is not a mental illness (Robles et al., 2016; Richards et al., 2015; Meyer-Bahlburg, 
2010; Sennott, 2010), there remains debate around diagnosis being necessary in order 
to access services, and how this may be wielded as a form of social control of 
perceived deviance. In relation to this, Crossley (1998) has argued that assuming 
medical decisions are exclusively made in terms of humanitarian principles8 fails to 
take into account social and administrative constraints within which the NHS must 
operate. Whilst Crossley studied this in the context of how those with a long-term HIV 
positive status may be disempowered by being positioned as ‘sick’, despite being 
asymptomatic and active, particular parallels with the trans population can be made. 
Being positioned as ‘sick’ allowed for medical practitioners to attempt to exert power 
over how HIV positive individuals live, which could foster feelings of resentment or 
resistance (Crossley, 1998). Such responses to doctors can be found among the 
transgender community (Washington, 2016). The sick role fails to accommodate the 
possibility of patients having a more nuanced sense of their holistic and individualised 
needs than a healthcare provider, or that patients are not simple, passive recipients of 
medical instruction.  
                                            
8 Subsection F of principle 18 of the Yogyakarta principles, which apply international 
human rights law to sexual orientation and gender identity, states that “medical or 
psychological treatment or counselling [must] not, explicitly or implicitly, treat sexual 
orientation and gender identity as medical conditions to be treated, cured or 
suppressed”. See The Yogyakarta Principles. 2007. The Yogyakarta Principles. 
[Online]. [Accessed 30/09/2016]. Available from: 
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf. 
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The shift from what was initially termed ‘medical sociology’, to ‘sociology of medicine’, 
to ‘sociology of health’ or ‘sociology of health and illness’ highlights what Straus termed 
the difference between ‘sociology in medicine’ and ‘sociology of medicine’ (Straus, 
1957, italics added). Straus’s differentiation was based on whether the sociologist was 
concerned with “such factors as the organisational structure, role relationships, value 
systems, rituals, and functions of medicine as a system of behaviour” (Straus, 1957, p. 
203). This for Straus is the sociology of medicine – he argued that to analyse such 
factors one would need to be situated outside of the medical establishment, or risk 
untenable bias. Sociology in medicine by contrast was positioned as collaborative 
research with medics and/or integrated teaching efforts – making study of medical 
practitioners themselves difficult due to the potential of jeopardising one’s working 
relationships. 
Sociological research became decoupled from medical practice as the field developed 
and expanded within the academy. Increasing attention was given to how experiences 
of health and illness might intersect with lived experiences and identity. Bury (1982) 
considered how experiences of chronic illness could function as ‘disruptive events’ 
which could critically change an individual’s conception of themselves, and argued that 
onset of chronic illness (specifically using the example of rheumatoid arthritis) 
functioned to cause biographical disruption. Diagnosis may result in new constraints 
and responsibilities, which can dramatically affect routine life as well as prevent 
engagement in activities previously connected to an individual’s identity.  
Bury highlights how disruption “throws into relief the cognitive and material resources 
available to individuals” (1982, p. 178), illustrating how experiences of illness can lead 
to changes in the self. This is not only because of renegotiating interactions with the 
geographical, the material, or other social actors, but also due to changes in how an 
individual looks at their own life. Comparisons may be made to queer coming-out 
processes, whereby an individual renegotiates their relationship with themselves as 
well as other social actors in their lives. In the context of a social gender transition, 
difference in treatment, and/or fear and experiences of stigma and discrimination may 
likewise change routine life and activities.  
The relationship between biographical disruption and transgender identification is not a 
smooth parallel. This is chiefly because gender variant individuals inevitably experience 
gendered introspection and negotiations prior to any clinical interactions, if any. 
Medical professionals must then be approached in order to access any gender 
affirming treatments, rather than awareness of gender variance being identified by a 
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clinician9. This contrasts with a patient presenting symptoms and then being given a 
clinician’s diagnosis on the basis of interpreting those symptoms, as with the majority of 
actual chronic illnesses. Additionally, gender identity negotiation does not occur at a 
fixed point (as with the event of receiving a formal diagnosis) but over time, through 
processes of introspection and interaction10. Whilst experiencing chronic illness may 
involve a process of identity change (Carel et al., 2016), the critical event of the 
diagnosis does not have an analogue in the context of transgender/non-binary identity. 
However, experiences of minority stress (Meyer, 1995) may cause gender-variant 
individuals to be particularly aware of, and to value cognitive and material resources 
(community support, or finances to access healthcare, for example) in the same way as 
the chronically ill. 
Bury (1982) also highlights how patients may direct sharp criticism at the medical 
establishment, as they come to be more frequently and intimately involved with doctor-
patient interactions, and find that expectations are not necessarily met. This has been 
particularly considered in the context of the crisis of HIV in communities of gay men in 
the 1980s. Here, the traditional top-down power dynamic between doctors and patients 
was challenged through activists refusing to accept the initial apathy expressed by the 
political and medical establishments to the plight of socially undesirable demographics 
– namely gay men and injecting drug users (Epstein, 1996; Treichler, 1987). Individuals 
with chronic conditions frequently accrue lay and medical knowledge such that their 
expertise outstrips that of their doctors.  
The earliest occurrence of the term ‘lay expert’ (to refer to individuals who do not 
practice medicine but possess expert knowledge on a condition) has been claimed as 
1994 (Prior, 2003). Whilst any individual with a given chronic health condition is likely to 
                                            
9 It may be the case that an individual presents to a psychotherapist or psychiatrist with 
feelings they do not understand that are negotiated within a clinical context, however a 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria would not be made without the patient’s agreement. 
This fundamentally differs from any medical context where a patient relies on a doctor 
to ascertain what a patient has, even if the patient gave information necessary for that 
diagnosis to be made.  
10 That said, attaining a diagnosis may take a long time if chronically ill, as GPs may 
lack specialist knowledge to diagnose rarer conditions, or to identify chronic problems 
with common symptoms only (such as pain). Trans people and chronically ill people 
may therefore share the difficulty of accessing specialist care, though for significantly 
different reasons. While the chronically ill require diagnosis to access treatment and 
legitimise the sick role, trans people self-identify, and may seek ‘diagnosis’ as a tool to 
access resources, even if potentially problematizing the process of requiring diagnosis.  
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have some specialist knowledge of their condition for management purposes, the 
motivation for lay experts can be broadly positioned as in order to challenge medical 
hegemony (Prior, 2003). In fully understanding one’s condition, an individual can 
reclaim power by challenging professional decision-making, actions, or inaction that 
they have evidence to believe is not in their best interests. An important example of 
expert patienthood was seen in the responses of the gay community to the onset of the 
HIV epidemic in the 1980s. Little information was available, and it took significant 
resistance from individuals to access the most up-to-date treatments from 
unspecialised physicians. On a more macro scale, community activism (containing 
many expert patients) worked through activist organisations such as ACTUP (the AIDS 
Coalition to Unleash Power) in order to challenge lack of medical funding and silence 
from the Reagan administration (Epstein, 1996). Transgender activists have challenged 
the pathologisation of transgender identities, whilst stressing the necessity of 
maintaining access to transition-facilitating treatments – particularly in countries with 
insurance-based healthcare such as the United States. 
Whilst Prior (2003) argues that for the most part, lay experts are not ‘true’ experts due 
to a lack of knowledge about ‘medical fact gathering’ and diagnostic practices, even in 
accordance with such an understanding, being transgender may be an exception. This 
depends upon the paradigm shift in the conception of ‘transgender’ - to an identity-
based model, rather than a diseased-based model (Bockting, 2009). The difference is 
summarised as: 
The disease-based model assumes that normative gender identity 
development has been compromised and that the associated distress 
can be alleviated by establishing congruence between sex, gender 
identity and gender role, if necessary through hormonal and surgical 
sex reassignment. The identity based model assumes that gender 
variance is merely an example of human diversity and that the distress 
transgender individuals might experience results from social stigma 
attached to gender variance. 
(Bockting, 2009, p. 103) 
Bockting’s summary may still be critiqued as being over-simplistic, as this account of 
the identity based model does not provide space for distress in relation to embodiment 
rather than social stigma. As a biologically focused approach depends upon 
reproducibility to establish medical fact (Epstein, 1996), the identity based model does 
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not resonate with the medical establishment’s historical approach to gender transitions. 
This has however been informed by iterative feedback from transgender service users 
over the years, which partially explains the slow de-pathologisation of trans 
identification even in clinical contexts (Richards et al., 2015). Recent medically oriented 
fieldwork has shown increased recognition of social rejection and violence rather than 
situating distress solely with embodied dysphoria (Robles et al., 2016). This does not 
however undermine the importance of continued provision of transition-related medical 
services.  
The history of pathologising medical research also highlights tensions that have existed 
between clinical and sociological approaches to transgender realities. Richards et al. 
critique members of the academy who risk simplifying circumstances to that of “trans 
people vs. medical professionals” (Richards et al., 2014, p. 255), and condemn the 
academic criticism of practitioners who must operate within current systems - though 
as Taylor and Bury highlight: 
For most lay people such interdisciplinary disputes are merely 
‘academic’...Their main interests lie in having affordable access to 
timely and effective treatments and support services, based on the 
best possible appreciation of the options available to them as 
individuals in society. 
(Taylor and Bury, 2007, p. 42) 
Epstein argues that “the cultures of experts significantly encroach upon and transform 
those of the laypeople who would engage with them” (1996, p. 4). This raises the 
question of how cultures of ‘experts’ are transformative of service users, and how being 
situated as a ‘lay expert’ modifies this encroachment and transformation. These ideas 
relate to my own research questions, in particular “how do non-binary identified 
individuals negotiate existing medical practices”.  
Another key similarity between the AIDS activist narratives which Epstein details and 
the interplay between some transgender activists and the medical establishment is the 
championing of identity politics: 
Because identity politics stand in opposition to what Foucault calls 
“normalization,” these defenders of identity are highly sensitive to the 
imposition of norms, categories, and labels by outside authorities. 
(Epstein, 1996, p. 22) 
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By this, Epstein implies that the gay community (and correspondingly the transgender 
community) have resisted and rejected medical explanations of their lived experiences 
which are constraining, un-relatable, and positioning of the subject as deviant, or 
indeed sick because of being gay, or being trans. Such notions strongly underpin the 
history of how gender variance was constructed and viewed within medical research 
and practice, which will now be contextualised. 
The Construction of the Transsexual, through to Non-Disordered Gender 
Complexity 
During the late 19th and early 20th century, consideration of sex and sexuality increased 
as a subject of interest for doctors and scientists (Jordanova, 1993). This became 
possible as the monopoly held by Christianity over the legitimisation of knowledge 
lessened. A cultural shift occurred such that understandings of sex (both sexed 
anatomy and sexual intercourse) were to become the realm of medical researchers, 
rather than the church (Chauncey, 1982). Foucault (1978) articulated how there was a 
shift from the ‘moral’ authority of Christianity to the ‘rational’ authority of science, and 
challenged the notion that Victorian society was ‘repressed’ with regards to sex. 
Foucault illustrated an abundance of sexual discourses, and shifts in focus on what 
constituted ‘authoritative’ knowledge on and of sex.  
Historically, the articulation of sexuality was as essentialised to the ‘truth’ of an 
individual’s gender as their genitals (Trumbach, 1993; Kessler and McKenna, 1978). 
That is, attraction to men was seen as so essentialised to the category ‘woman’ that 
anyone attracted to men must therefore be a woman. Culturally constructed notions of 
masculinity and femininity also demanded that men performed their gender as active, 
thus acting as sexual penetrators, whilst women were passive and were penetrated. 
Sodomy in and of itself did not pose a challenge to a man’s status as male, so long as 
the man in question was not penetrated. Thus men (rather than boys) who were 
penetrated, and women who penetrated women “violated the patriarchal code… such 
persons were likely to be classified as hermaphrodites and, thus, as biologically deviant. 
In men, this classification was sometimes understood to be symbolic, but in the case of 
women, they were likely to be examined by doctors for signs of actual clitoral 
enlargement” (Trumbach, 1993, p. 113). This illustrates how early discourses of what 
we now understand as sexuality related to the nucleation of non-binary identification – 
individuals who conformed to some ideas of gender but transgressed others could be 
relegated to suspicious or stigmatised gender-ambiguity. 
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Such a backdrop was to influence how homosexuality was to be conceived by late 19th 
and early 20th century scientific research on sexuality and gender. Foucault articulates 
that “homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed 
from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the 
soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a 
species” (1978, p. 43). As this quotation implies, ideas about sexuality and gender 
identity were strongly intertwined. Sexuality and gender were to be both defined and 
disciplined through medical scientific authority. 
Homosexuality was understood within a strongly heteronormative social framework, 
whereby it was repositioned and naturalised in heterosexual terms through claims of 
the ‘internal female truth’ of the homosexual man. That is, due to the essentialised 
notion of ‘attraction to women’ as necessary in order to ‘really’ be male, homosexual 
men blurred understandings of gender as the essential qualities of ‘phallus’ and 
‘attraction to men’ directly contradicted. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs was the first to articulate 
this idea as ‘a female soul trapped in a male body’ (Ulrichs, 1994). This phrase still has 
cultural salience today, though is now often used in order to provide a simple (but 
limited) explanation of binary transgender women.  
Work by early sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing further developed the view 
of same-gender desire as a pathological problem. He drew from Ulrichs in articulating 
women attracted to women as having ‘a masculine soul, heaving within a female 
bosom’ (Krafft-Ebing, 1886). As terminology was still being negotiated, there was a lack 
of consistency over how phenomena of sexual orientation and gender variance were 
described (Ellis, 1927a; 1927b; Moll, 1919; Marcuse, 1916; Hirschfeld, 1910; Krafft-
Ebing, 1886).  
Magnus Hirschfeld (1910) coined the term ‘transvestite’ in reference to men wearing 
women’s clothing. However, a clear distinction between men who found pleasure in 
wearing women’s clothing but still identified as men, and individuals who dis-identified 
with the gender they were assigned at birth was only to come in the 1940s and 1950s 
(Ball, 1967). Further, little attention was paid to those individuals assigned female at 
birth who presented themselves as male, despite notable historical examples of women 
who cross-dressed and served in the military (Stryker, 2008a; Cromwell, 1999a). 
Whilst Hirschfeld was the first to use the term ‘psychic transsexuality’ (1923), Cauldwell 
was the first to use the term ‘transsexual’ to specifically describe desires for 
physiological/anatomical change, accompanying cross-gender presentation 
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(Meyerowitz, 2002; Bullough, 1987; Cauldwell, 1949). The medical construction of 
transsexuality allowed for the introduction and legitimisation of hormonal and surgical 
‘treatment’ for individuals diagnosed with transsexualism – due in great part to the work 
of Harry Benjamin, who advocated for such access (Benjamin and Ihlenfeld, 1973; 
1967; 1966; 1954). Whilst the earliest transsexual surgical procedures were carried out 
under the supervision of Hirschfeld in Germany – such as Dora Richter in 1930, and Lili 
Elbe in 1931 (Stryker, 2008a), these were experimental and not yet more broadly 
known or accessible. Predating this however was the surgical masculinisation of the 
genitalia of Herman Karl in 1882. This ‘change of sex’ was officially recognised by the 
Prussian state (Bullough and Bullough, 1993). 
Access to surgical intervention remained extremely limited for many years. This is well 
illustrated by the experiences of two early pioneers of gender affirmation surgeries – 
Roberta Cowell, and April Ashley. Roberta Cowell was the first transsexual woman to 
receive surgery in the UK in 1951; however this was only possible due to a 
manipulation of the contemporary medical system. Cowell had developed a friendship 
with Michael Dillon, who was the first trans man to undergo phalloplasty in the UK 
(Beemyn, 2013). Dillon was a medical student, and agreed to conduct an illegal, secret 
orchiectomy (removal of the testes) on Cowell – as detailed in a biography by Kennedy 
(2008). This allowed Cowell to convince a Harley Street doctor that she was intersex, 
allowing access to the first UK vaginoplasty and a change of birth certificate. This 
significantly illustrates how the medical establishment at this time, despite interest in 
‘transsexualism’ as a medical disorder, failed to provide recognition unless intersex 
arguments could be levied to make claims of the ‘truth’ of a person’s physiology. 
Transsexuality was positioned as a mental disorder, with the view of the genitals at 
birth still being positioned as the ultimate indicator as to the individual’s ‘real’ 
sex/gender. 
Hines has argued that class position was a significant factor in Cowell being able to 
access surgery in the UK. April Ashley – who was working class – needed to travel 
abroad to Morocco in 1960 to access surgery, due to lack of relevant social capital 
(Hines, 2007a). Whilst the availability of social connections and mobility undoubtedly 
had a crucial role11, it is important to recognise the extent of the resistance to provision 
of surgical procedures for transsexual people – as distinct from intersex people – at this 
time. Dillon’s access to medical education uniquely positioned him as the first 
                                            
11 Dillon was also part of a family with an inherited Baronetcy, indicative of his relative 
wealth, status, and social mobility. 
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transgender person able to write on the subject within the academy – as early as 1946, 
arguing against a model of mental disturbance (Dillon, 1946).  
Dillon’s medical contemporaries commonly approached transsexualism as a mental 
condition, produced through social factors and trauma, which they believed was best 
approached via psychiatry. These assumptions percolated throughout decades of 
research, typified in how Pauly stated “parents ought to be made more aware of the 
need to positively reinforce all infants for those gender characteristics which are 
consistent with their biological sex”  (Pauly, 1974, p. 509). The ways in which gendered 
behaviours are socially constructed were long from being recognised, with medical 
decision-making structured around the curing of sickness, production of ‘normality’, and 
the disciplining of deviance (Foucault, 1973). 
Medical narratives of transgender were not only stigmatising and constraining through 
the positioning of transgender identification as a mental illness, but were also highly 
normative - enforcing the gender binary and gender roles. This is illustrated by the 
infamous case of John/Joan (Money and Ehrhardt, 1972). In this case, a child 
unambiguously assigned male at birth had his penis destroyed in a circumcision 
accident. Under the advice and supervision of John Money, the infant – anonymised as 
John/Joan in Money’s writing and later literature (Sloop, 2000) was surgically 
reassigned as female through vaginoplasty. The parents were instructed to raise their 
child as a girl, whilst concealing his original assignation and physiology. It was believed 
by Money that gender identity was entirely dependent upon socialisation, provided a 
consistent role was set in early childhood. As Rosario points out, the case was “cited 
not just in the psychological literature but in feminist circles as well as the most 
dramatic proof of gender plasticity” (Rosario, 2006, p. 3). 
It was later revealed however that John/Joan (later coming forward publicly as David 
Reimer) had an unhappy childhood and adolescence, eventually rejecting his female 
re-assignation and upbringing (Diamond and Sigmundson, 1997). David received a 
phalloplasty procedure and was able to assert his attraction to women as 
heterosexuality, however the impact of David’s earlier experiences have been strongly 
intimated as relevant to his suicide in 2004 (Colapinto, 2004). Money reported Reimer’s 
case as ‘successful’, which resulted in “the basis of surgical standard of care for 
intersex infants for the next three decades” (Beh and Diamond, 2005, p. 7). This 
illustrates the potential consequences in under-recognising how medical research 
operates within a social context, and is unavoidably influenced by social norms and 
interactions. It also demonstrates how the positioning of biomedical research as the 
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authoritative source of academic knowledge can fail to incorporate vital dimensions 
(such as David’s lived experience and identity). This can purport harmful and 
erroneous information whilst maintaining a position as ‘unproblematically factual’, as a 
strategy of being beyond rational reproach. Benetar has highlighted that it is a “violation 
of autonomy” for parents to be allowed to decide how an infant’s genitals are to be 
constructed, in cases where there is no pathological risk or loss of function (Benatar, 
2006, p. 88).  
The medical category of transsexualism became more widely recognised, with first 
mainstream visibility occurring in 1952 through the media coverage of the transition of 
Christine Jorgensen (Meyerowitz, 1998). Consequently, awareness of the possibility of 
medical gender transition began to spread. However, the creation of diagnostic 
categories and criteria were applied such that only the most normative expressions of 
cross-gender identification were legitimised. For example, when medical research 
attempted to construct an aetiology of transsexuality, a hierarchical narrative was built 
such that transsexual people were subcategorised as ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ (Doorn et 
al., 1994; Person and Ovesey, 1974a; 1974b). This may be related to the use of 
‘primary and secondary’ conditions in medicine more generally, where a primary 
condition is defined as an underlying cause, whilst secondary conditions may constitute 
treatable symptoms, that are only cured through addressing a primary condition (Kinne 
et al., 2004).  
Primary transsexuality was characterised by very early onset (before puberty) and 
highly stereotyped behaviour, and identity patterns conforming to gender norms – as 
were then particularly acute, such as (in patients assigned male at birth) passivity, 
femininity (in physical build, mannerisms, and presentation), activity choices 
considered feminine, and sexual attraction towards men. Secondary transsexuals were 
positioned as “effeminate homosexuals and transvestites, who develop transsexualism 
as a regressive phenomenon under conditions of stress” (Person and Ovesey, 1974b, 
p. 174) and could thus be positioned as ‘inauthentic’. This reiterates the un-evidenced 
assumption within such early research that transsexuality could be a response to 
trauma – in this case, the stress of being homosexual. The model did not offer space 
for transgender women attracted to women.  
Under the ‘disease model’ then implicit in practice, stereotypical gendered behaviours 
associated with the ‘opposite’ gender to that assigned to the individual at birth 
functioned as a ‘symptoms’, or diagnostic criteria. The medical establishment thus 
disciplined gender variant individuals to be socially produced as normative and 
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heterosexual after having accessed medical services. This contributed to the 
circumstances whereby the transgender community would learn that presenting 
themselves to fit with the narrative of the primary transsexual would be far more 
effective in procuring medical legitimisation. Further, it was common practice for 
transsexual people who transitioned to be expected to reinvent their lives, tell no-one of 
their transition, and not to have contact with other transsexual people (Beemyn and 
Rankin, 2011).  
A further influential piece of theorisation which impacted interactions between medical 
practitioners and trans service users was Blanchard’s theory of autogynephilia 
(Blanchard, 1993; 1989a; 1989b). The term was created to refer to the idea of 
individuals assigned male at birth experiencing erotic arousal at thoughts or images of 
themselves as women. The theory sought to expand the limited parameters that 
defined the classical image of the medically legitimised transsexual, as medical 
gatekeepers were forced to recognise that many individuals assigned male at birth who 
sought to be recognised as women still experienced attraction to women.  
Trans AMAB patients also did not always exhibit femininity, and may also have 
previously identified with or practiced ‘transvestitism’ (Serano, 2010; Blanchard, 1989a). 
Blanchard proposed that transsexual people assigned male at birth (‘MtF’ or ‘male to 
female’ transsexuals) could be usefully categorised based on whether an individual 
was exclusively attracted to men or not, and that this factor could be used to determine 
separate aetiologies. This depended upon the presence or absence of a 
heteronormatively conceived ‘erotic target location error’ (Serano, 2010; Freund and 
Blanchard, 1993). Blanchard claimed that lesbian transgender women were in fact 
eroticising the self, whilst being in denial about this (Baril and Trevenen, 2014). 
Baril and Trevenen consider how the manner in which the claim to a transgender 
identity is articulated impacts on whether the individual’s identity is granted legitimacy 
by medical practitioners, and correspondingly whether that individual is then able to 
access gender affirming hormones and/or surgeries. They argue that a hierarchy is 
created between “identity troubles and paraphilias” (2014, p. 390), such that claims 
rooted in ‘decreased distress’ are given greater legitimacy than ‘increased 
happiness/pleasure’. It is also recognised how such gatekeeping is part of a larger 
narrative of attempts by medical researchers to create a diagnostic hierarchy of 
‘realness’, such as with the classification of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ transsexualism 
(Person and Ovesey, 1974b). More specifically, Baril and Trevenen argue that the 
legitimisation of transgender articulations is based on identity politics, whilst any 
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intersection between gendered self-conception and eroticism is positioned as an 
illegitimate pathology is inherently “ableist, sex-negative and cisnormative” (Baril and 
Trevenen, 2014, p. 408). 
Blanchard’s model has received significant criticism for being dramatically overstated 
and centred around a flawed methodology, including lack of replication of results, a 
non-representative sample, no control groups, and presumptive or leading recruitment 
criteria (Serano, 2010; Wyndzen, 2003). The model also makes no mention of 
aetiology for experiences of individuals assigned female at birth (cisgender women or 
transgender men). Work on autogynephilia fails to recognise the now widely accepted 
notion that sexual orientation and gender identity operate socially as separate traits, 
albeit with an entangled history. 
It has also been noted that the majority of transgender women who judge Blanchard’s 
theory believe that it is unrepresentative of their identities or experiences (Veale et al., 
2012). In further highlighting the cisnormative basis of the theory, Moser performed 
work that suggested up to 93% of cisgender women fulfilled the clinical criteria of 
autogynephilia (Moser, 2009) – yet the policing of sexuality so as to demarcate some 
individuals as ‘autogynephilic men’ served to specifically police and delegitimise trans 
claims of womanhood. Blanchard and other clinical researchers fail to appreciate how 
their work may be used to justify a medical system which erases and disenfranchises 
particular expressions of gender variance, through an authoritative positioning of 
heterosexuality and cisgender as ‘normal’ (Ansara and Hegarty, 2014; 2012; Baril and 
Trevenen, 2014).  
Much has changed in the protocols that govern the provision of treatment to gender 
variant individuals (Israel and Tarver II, 1997). Clinics now state that they no longer 
judge a trans person’s treatment eligibility on their appearance or sexual orientation 
(NHS, 2014), nor are arbitrary and unnecessary procedures such as microscopic 
inspection of chromosomes, or EEGs12 routinely performed (Bolin, 1987). This reflects 
changes in how medical power is supposed to be exerted in practice. However, it is 
important to also recognise that the existence of explicit guidelines and protocols does 
not guarantee their application. Guidelines may be rejected by individual practitioners 
as “cookbook medicine that threatens the art and autonomy of medical practice” 
(Berwick et al., 1992, p. 305). Further, factors such as gendered presentation and 
                                            
12  Electroencephalograms, a method of measuring brain neuron voltage used to 
identify a range of focal brain disorders. 
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‘passing’ as one’s identified gender 13  in clinical appointments may well potentially 
influence who a doctor considers a ‘straightforward case’ or not, beyond their 
conscious decision-making. Improvement of protocols does not automatically result in a 
paradigm shift in how socially constructed gender norms influence clinical practice (Bird 
and Rieker, 1999) 
Foucault outlines how the medical gaze was able to function as “no longer the gaze of 
any observer, but that of a doctor supported and justified by an institution, that of a 
doctor endowed with the power of decision and intervention” (Foucault, 1973, p. 109). 
What is seen and correspondingly judged by that medical gaze is difficult to challenge 
because of the weight of institutional authority behind it. As medicine has increasingly 
recognised the role of the patient in negotiating (and resisting) healthcare practices, 
Singer (2006) highlights particular factors in evidencing a healthcare paradigm shift: 
Pathology Model Trans-health Model 
Normative bodies and genders Nonstandard bodies and genders 
M/F – only two types Spectrum of body types and genders 
Institutional regulation Harm reduction and advocacy 
Gate-keeping (meeting standard criteria) Informed consent 
Experts and providers in control Peer expertise and community partnering 
Pathologization Self-determination 
Gender Identity Disorder Non-disordered gender complexity 
Table 1: A pathology model versus a trans-health model approach to gender identity. 
 (Singer, 2006, p. 615) 
Whilst the division of these healthcare models into diametrically opposing factors is 
inevitably a simplification of real-life complexities, these factors can act as signposts for 
the political positioning of practitioners relative to their trans patients under current 
criteria. Building on her work looking at trans patient behaviour supporting and 
challenging medical knowledge, Dewey has investigated the challenges of 
implementing collaborative models of decision making with trans patients (Dewey, 
                                            
13 Impossible for a non-binary patient, as there are no presentations that are culturally 
codified as specifically ‘neither male nor female’. At best, one can mix ‘male and female 
presentation’, which may be potentially interpreted as ‘incomplete’ or ‘confused’. 
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2013). Whilst this US-based study showed medical practitioners often desirous of 
collaboration with patients, lack of formal education on gender, together with absence 
of institutional support and inconsistency in applying diagnostic guidelines created 
barriers. Also, whilst the importance of trust in the client-practitioner relationship was 
emphasised, this was upset when transgender service users felt obliged to present in 
particular ways as a result of how diagnostic manuals were sometimes applied (Dewey, 
2013). 
There is a lack of academic discussion over whether a person’s transgender identity 
may impact access to healthcare unrelated to transition. It is important to recognise 
that amongst the literature considering LGBTQ14 interactions with healthcare, some will 
fail to adequately engage with the range of gender and sexuality minorities they claim 
to. For example, when considering Quinn et al.’s recent (2015) work looking at ‘LGBTQ 
perceptions and healthcare experiences’, the data shows that of 632 participants only 
13 listed themselves as transgender or ‘other’ ( than male or female). These categories 
were then “not included in subsequent analyses” (Quinn et al., 2015, p. 251), with 
discussion exclusively centred around LGB – rendering the title of the article 
misleading, and claims in the discussion under-substantiated for these unreached 
populations.  
When it is discussed explicitly within healthcare literature, ‘transgender health’ almost 
always centres on gender affirming transition related services. Little attention has been 
given to transgender experiences of medical services that relate to other healthcare 
needs. Despite this, it has been recognised that transgender identification does place 
an individual at higher risk of suicide, HIV contraction, and drug/alcohol addiction. This 
is usually in research contexts looking at LGBTQ collectively, to the neglect of trans 
specificity (Quinn et al., 2015; Hughes and Eliason, 2002) although some specific work 
on trans communities has been performed, which will now be considered.  
The 2014 National Transgender Discrimination Survey in the United States found that 
44% of those trans people assigned female at birth and 38% of those assigned male at 
birth made at least one suicide attempt across the life course (Haas et al., 2014). 
These figures rose to between 51-60% when adjusted for those who have had negative 
experiences of medical care. This indicates correlation, and due to the intense 
                                            
14 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer. 
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importance of medical care within many trans narrative, may be directly or partially 
responsible15.  
These figures are broadly supported by smaller scale investigations, with a study 
containing 515 transgender individuals16 finding an overall attempted suicide rate of 32% 
(Clements-Nolle et al., 2006). In relation to this, “28% had been in alcohol or drug 
treatment, 59% had been physically forced to have sex or raped, 62% experienced 
gender discrimination, 83% experienced verbal gender victimization, and 36% reported 
physical gender victimization” (Clements-Nolle et al., 2006, p. 59). The link between 
experiencing gender based victimisation as a transgender person and attempted 
suicide has been explored specifically, finding those who experienced such 
victimisation were more than four times more likely to attempt suicide (Goldblum et al., 
2012).  
The discussion of sexual health among transgender people has been polarised 
towards binary transgender women (Melendez et al., 2006). Herbst et al.’s (2008) 
literature review found 29 studies considering HIV in trans people, with 22 of these 
focused on trans women. Melendez et al. found that whilst there were not substantial 
differences in the health statuses of HIV positive trans women and HIV positive cis 
people, trans women were less likely to take highly active antiretroviral therapy. This 
would support a hypothesis that trans women are more likely to experience barriers to 
sexual healthcare. Trans people (particularly trans women) are among the highest at 
risk of HIV infection (Operario and Nemoto, 2010). Infection is linked to societal 
rejection, high rates of sexual abuse, and the utilisation of sex work in order to fund 
transition, or more broadly to survive (Kosenko, 2011; Bockting et al., 1998). 
The relationship between increased sexual risk (among trans women) and alcohol or 
drug use as a response to stress has been considered (Santos et al., 2014; Hotton et 
al., 2013). This found a significant relationship, emphasising how responses to stigma 
and social exclusion are interconnected. Linkage has also been made to transgender 
experiences of mental health conditions, with stigma concerns and anxieties around 
                                            
15 Whilst correlation does not imply causation in and of itself, the highest percentage of 
60% attempted suicide for those with negative experience(s) of medical practice were 
those who said “[a] doctor or other provider refused to treat me because I am 
transgender/ gender nonconforming” (Haas et al., 2014, p. 12). Thus it can be inferred 
that the more extreme the negative experience of healthcare, the higher the chance of 
a suicide attempt.  
16 392 participants were labelled MTF, whilst 123 were labelled FTM. This study made 
no mention of non-binary identities.  
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potential interplay with transgender status. This included concern that having a mental 
health condition would impact the ability of an individual to access transition related 
services – the fear of being deemed mentally unstable rather than transgender, as an 
explanation of the desire to transition. Others were concerned that transgender status 
may be inappropriately fixated upon in accessing treatment or therapy for anxiety or 
depression (Shipherd et al., 2010).  
None of this research made specific reference to how the nuances of identification 
outside of the gender binary may relate, though analysis of The National Transgender 
Discrimination Survey suggests that non-binary experiences of stigma and concordant 
risks to health are equal to or worse than the overall trans population (Harrison et al., 
2012) . Further, research on medical outcomes for trans people generally, that is, not 
oriented around transition, near-exclusively consider sexual health, drug and alcohol 
addiction, or mental health. Therefore this project begins to provide a long-overdue 
contribution to trans experiences of general healthcare, though specifically for non-
binary people.  
Investigation into how practitioners conceive of their roles, the role(s) of the medical 
institution, the responsibilities and rights of patients, and their conceptualisations of 
gender are highly relevant areas of consideration that relate to my research questions. 
The following section recognises that as the sociology of health came to be studied by 
academics outside of the medical profession, critical new perspectives came to be 
articulated. I now consider the research which has sociologically considered 
transgender healthcare but was not produced by medical doctors – sociology of 
medicine, in contrast to the earlier sociology in medicine (Straus, 1957).  
Sociological Consideration of Transgender and Medicine 
Whilst a slow dissemination of information on transsexualism occurred in the academic 
medical community from the 1950s onwards (Barlow et al., 1973; Randell, 1971; Ball, 
1967; Benjamin, 1966; Money et al., 1957), the ways in which practitioners’ views of 
gender were culturally ingrained resulted in large restrictions in how individuals could 
express themselves and be found eligible for treatment. This has been considered by 
Spade (2006; 2003), who emphasises that problematic rigidity in accessing gender 
affirmation services is not yet a historical relic. Spade argues that there is a continued 
over-reliance on medical evaluation and ‘expertise’ (considering the limited and 
problematic results this has historically generated), which creates legal difficulties in 
lobbying work for transgender equality. In many parts of the world, access to medical 
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care is dependent upon one’s financial resources, and within a North American context 
for example, ensuring gender affirmation procedures are covered under insurance 
policies is often difficult. This means that accessing medical procedures (which are 
frequently viewed as evidence for legal recognition) are highly constrained by class, 
which at the level of populations, intersects sharply with race. Health inequality 
intersections with class and race are apparent transnationally, with differential complex 
manifestations dependent on national context, healthcare system, and many other 
nuances.  
Transgender activism has undertaken the difficult position of challenging medical 
authority, whilst still negotiating the use of medical services. Spade considers the 
relationship between gender variant individuals seeking gender affirming services and 
“the medical establishments with which they must contend” (Spade, 2006, p. 316). He 
makes the argument that whilst “the creation of the subject position “transsexual” by 
the medical establishment restricts individuals seeking body alteration and promotes 
the creation of norm-abiding gendered subjects” (p. 316), trans consumers are also 
themselves shaped by navigating a system which is rooted in gender norms. Spade 
argues (and demonstrates through personal narratives) that the medical approach to 
gender variance places restrictions upon attempts to transition into a non-normative 
gender role. He also however recognises that “courts examining the question of what 
qualifies a transsexual to have legal membership in the new gender category have 
relied heavily on the medical model of transsexuality when they have decided 
favourably for transsexuals” (p. 328).  
Spade’s nod towards such historical progress can be related to Spivak’s concept of 
strategic essentialism (1985). Whilst conceived in the context of postcolonial theory, 
this posits that a group may benefit from the (temporary) simplification of group identity 
in order to achieve particular political goals. Biomedical research has been used by 
transgender activists to demonstrate that transgender identities are ‘real’ and embodied 
– such as similarities between the structures of the hypothalamus in cis and trans 
people of the same gender (Kruijver, 2004). This simultaneously occurs with critiques 
that problematize reliance on an essentialist and reductionist biomedical system of 
knowledge production (Heyes, 2007).  
In addition to such macrosociological medico-legal discussions, sociologists of health 
have considered the negotiation of transgender healthcare in practice. Dewey has 
performed sociological health research looking at the interactions between transgender 
patients and their doctors (Dewey, 2008). A complex interplay is described, where 
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transgender patients may simultaneously accept (or tolerate) and resist existing 
medical knowledge and practice from their physicians. Dewey utilises Hirschkorn’s 
model of ‘knowledge legitimacy’ (Hirschkorn, 2006) which considers how doctors 
employ different forms of knowledge. The model conceives of ‘technical knowledge’, 
which is legitimised through an appeal to the authority of biomedical research, and 
‘indeterminate knowledge’, which is produced through the practitioner’s experiences 
within the clinic and is socially legitimised by their position of power and expert status 
(Jamous and Peloille, 1970). Such knowledges may be transformed into common or 
everyday knowledge, or conversely positioned as exclusively available to professionals 
(Dewey, 2008; Hirschkorn, 2006). However, with the increasing ubiquity of digital 
networking and the ease of knowledge access through the internet (Lupton, 2013; 
Morris et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2010; Sethuram and Weerakkody, 2010), less and 
less information is positioned as inaccessible, particularly when considering the earlier 
discussion of expert patients (Taylor and Bury, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; Donaldson, 2003; 
Prior, 2003).  
Acceptance by transgender service users of medically articulated knowledge was 
notably apparent in contexts where stigma could be avoided through such acceptance, 
to further their access to desired treatments and care. Yet resistance could be 
articulated, through such means as the termination and replacement of medical 
relationships (which is possible even in the relatively restricted UK context of a GIC). In 
the context of primary care, it was evidenced that ‘coming out’ as transgender to a 
medical practitioner could result in unequal treatment and potentially constrained 
access to services. An example illustrating this involved a patient sharing: 
That by concealing her trans-identity she had more flexibility to make 
an appointment whenever she desired instead of the designated day 
reserved for trans-patients. She revealed that her medical practitioner 
scheduled all trans-patients on the same day so that regular patients 
were not offended. 
(Dewey, 2008, p. 1351) 
This particular example relates back to potential specific concerns that transgender 
people may encounter at the primary or secondary care level, rather than in specialised 
gender clinics.  
Whilst medical access for binary transgender people has undoubtedly improved, no 
longer needing to utilise intersex narratives to gain access to the services which now 
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specifically exist to facilitate medical transitions (Bockting et al., 2004), it remains 
unknown how non-binary people negotiate medical services. The question of whether 
non-binary people feel their identities and needs are treated with as much validity as 
established binary narratives also remains under-researched. Dewey raises the 
important question of whether “new forms of medical knowledge can be introduced, 
legitimated, and sustained” as a result of trans patients introducing fresh perspectives 
on trans people to doctors (Dewey, 2008, p. 9). 
The medical establishment have long recognised the fallibility of a rigid gatekeeping 
system, with Stoller saying in 1975: 
Those of us faced with the task of diagnosing transsexualism have an 
additional burden these days, for most patients requesting ‘sex change’ 
are in complete command of the literature and know the answers 
before the questions are asked. 
(Stoller, in Cromwell, 2006, p. 248) 
One can note a possible tone of resentment here, in that the medical professional’s 
position of power is partially undermined by transgender service users ‘gaming the 
system’ (Spade, 2003). This illustrates a problematic perspective that has been 
highlighted amongst some medical practitioners, as viewing transgender people as 
manipulative or deceptive, with doctors needing to be a ‘step ahead’ - rather than 
engaging in a collaborative medical enterprise. Hagen and Galupo recognise this when 
they discuss an article written by the psychologist Michael Bailey, titled ‘What many 
Transgender Activists Don’t Want You to Know: and why you should know it anyway’ 
(Hagen and Galupo, 2014; Bailey and Triea, 2007). Hagen and Galupo discuss how 
Bailey’s writing “showcases the distrust of the medical community of trans* patients” 
(2014, p. 18), and positions doctors and patients as operating oppositionally. Claudine 
Griggs illustrates her personal frustration with such a system in saying:  
[Psychiatrists and therapists]… use you, suck you dry, and tell you 
their pitiful opinions, and my response is: What right do you have to 
determine whether I live or die? Ultimately the person you have to 
answer to is yourself and I think I’m too important to leave my fate up 
to anyone else. I’ll lie my ass off to get what I have to. 
(Griggs, 1998, p. 32) 
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The implicit claim made by Griggs is that medical practitioners are ultimately a 
hindrance for trans people attempting to access medical transition, but that this is 
currently unavoidable (although can be ameliorated if one can afford to pay for private 
healthcare). The purported purpose of medical gatekeeping regarding access to 
hormones and surgeries is to support those who are uncertain of their gender identities, 
and also to prevent individuals with delusional cross-gender identification (such as 
particular manifestations of schizophrenia) from inappropriate service access. However, 
this illustrates the cisnormative lens through which the medical establishment has 
approached gender variance. Gatekeeping is disproportionately concerned with a very 
small number of, or hypothetical cases of inappropriate attempted access, rather than 
with the majority who are constrained and impacted by far greater waiting times, and 
the associated difficulties and risks, including suicide as already highlighted (Jeavons, 
2015). 
Califia supports the point that transgender people resist medical gatekeeping, in saying 
“the gender community has at this point accumulated a lot of folk wisdom about what 
you need to tell the doctors to get admitted to a gender-reassignment program” (Califia, 
2012, p. 224). How such negotiations ‘play out’ will change and shift over time, not only 
due to changes in medical policy and the landscape of transgender identities, but also 
how society changes over time in response to newly-possible articulations of gender 
variance. It also remains unknown how frequently and to what extent non-binary people 
wish to access medical services in relation to their gender identities. Hines has 
discussed how the oft-repeated narrative of ‘a man trapped in a woman’s body’ or vice 
versa has been “repeated to gain surgical reconstruction” (Hines, 2007a, p. 65), but 
recognises that as the rigidity of the gender binary lessens, a wider range of medical 
narratives becomes possible (such as hormones without surgeries, surgeries without 
hormones, etc.).  
Contemporary concerns that transgender people have regarding medical care are 
complex and variable. There remain concerns with a lack of inclusion of LGBTQ 
specific training within medical degrees (Obedin-Maliver et al., 2011), as well as fears 
of healthcare inequalities (Bradshaw and Ryan, 2012). Erasure of transgender people 
within healthcare is an area that has been examined sociologically (particularly from an 
activist position). This is discussed in Namaste’s work ‘Invisible Lives’ (2000), where 
erasure is defined as “how transsexuality is managed in culture and institutions, a 
condition that ultimately inscribes transsexuality as impossible” (Namaste, 2000, pp. 4-
5). This extremity, whilst impossible in the tertiary care context of a Gender Identity 
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Clinic, may be identifiable at the level of primary care, especially in relation to non-
binary gender identities which lack cultural intelligibility (Butler, 1993a).  
Bauer et al. (2009) identified two key sites of erasure in relation to transgender 
healthcare – informational, and institutional. Informational erasure is defined as “both 
the lack of knowledge regarding trans people and trans issues and the assumption that 
such knowledge does not exist even when it may. It is manifest in research studies, 
curricula, and textbooks and in the information learned by or readily accessible to 
health care providers and policy makers” (Bauer et al., 2009, p. 352). Institutional 
erasure in contrast is “a lack of policies that accommodate trans identities or trans 
bodies” (2009, p. 354). The literature examining the (relatively short) history of state 
approved and regulated transition has almost exclusively examined transgender 
narratives that have been articulated as ‘crossing’ from one side of the gender binary to 
the other, with little to no challenge posed to how gender can be conceived of more 
broadly (Garfinkel, 1967).  
Hines (2006) also argues that “a lack of emphasis on particularity 17  within 
poststructuralist and postmodern theory has led to a homogenous theorisation of 
transgender” (2006, p. 49). Transgender interview subjects in Hines’ study rejected an 
“essential categorisation” of transsexuality, which supports the movement from an 
essentialist disease-based model to the sociologically supported identity-based model 
in clinical practice. However, the positions of medical professionals in the UK on their 
conceptualisations of transgender have yet to be sociologically examined, particularly 
with regards to gender articulations beyond the binary. In demonstrating the 
importance of particularity, Hines puts forward that a queer sociological framework is 
key to overcoming limitations within queer approaches to transgender, as this would 
situate analysis within “the material and embodied contours of transgender lives” (2006, 
p. 64). 
When practitioners and transgender service users enter into a dialogue within the 
clinical space in the context of a medical appointment, a relationship is generated that 
can be considered through a Foucauldian lens of power dynamics impacting upon each 
other. Work in sociolinguistics (with a medical focus) has examined power dynamics 
that exist between patients and doctors through ethnographic studies. This has 
included investigation into how gender affects questioning and topic control in medical 
                                            
17 ‘Particularity’ is defined as the quality of being individual, and thus a clinician’s ability 
to respond to particularity will inform how transgender identities are articulated within 
clinical dialogues. 
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encounters, and how diagnoses can be co-constructed through storytelling (Ainsworth-
Vaughn, 1998).  
The emergence of non-binary identities troubles pathology model-oriented practice, as 
normative and traditional understandings of gender are challenged. Non-binary 
identities are less likely to be well understood by doctors, or represented in diagnostic 
manuals. The final section of this chapter considers the construction of manuals and 
guidelines, and how they pertain to non-binary healthcare.  
The Roles of Manuals and Guidelines in Medical Practice 
 Provision of treatment has historically rested upon the characterisation of gender 
dysphoria as a mental disorder (Cohen-Kettenis and Gooren, 1999). The DSM 18 , 
currently in its fifth edition, is a catalogue of diagnosable conditions, and may be used 
by clinicians for reference when making their diagnoses. The DSM is published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) but sees application worldwide. The first 
edition of the DSM was released in 1952, and characterised homosexuality as a 
disorder until the seventh printing of the second edition (DSM-II) in 1974. In 1980, 
gender identity entered the DSM-III in two forms – ‘transsexualism’, and ‘gender 
identity disorder of childhood’. This illustrates how prior to this, for more than thirty 
years, there existed an uncomfortable tension between transgender service users 
being treated by the medical establishment, yet lacking any formal recognition within 
healthcare manuals.  
When the DSM was revised in 1987, a third category – ‘gender identity disorder of 
adolescence and adulthood, non-transsexual type’ – was added, but then removed in 
1994 with the advent of the DSM-IV and the synthesis into the single condition of 
‘gender identity disorder’. It has been claimed that the addition of gender identity to the 
DSM may have had political motivations connected to the de-pathologisation of 
homosexuality (Zucker and Spitzer, 2005). Such thought is potentially significant due to 
how community discussion of this idea may have influenced transgender service users, 
who may remain distrustful of the levels of sensitivity and competence of the medical 
establishment in facilitating transitions in a manner that does not cause distress.  
In the most recent edition published in 2013, Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was 
renamed ‘Gender Dysphoria’ to reflect “a change in conceptualization of the disorder’s 
defining features by emphasizing the phenomenon of ‘gender incongruence’ rather 
                                            
18 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
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than cross gender identification per se” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
propositions of gender dysphoria and the creation of separate criteria for children, and 
adolescents or adults were both accepted. ‘Subtyping’ on the basis of sexual 
orientation was also removed in this edition. The decision of whether to keep GID 
within the DSM was a subject that received much attention and debate, with the work 
group of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) charged 
with establishing whether distress is an inherent factor in being transgender, socially 
produced through stigma, or a combination of both. The specific forms of harassment, 
risk of violence, potential difficulty with mainstream social integration, employment, and 
family life that transgender people can face has been developed from the concept of 
minority stress with regards to sexuality in particular (Meyer, 2003; 1995) to that of 
marginalisation stress (Bouman et al., 2010).  
Medical specialists in the area of transgender transitions have demonstrated 
recognition of the tension that exists between the need for service access by 
transgender people, but the problematic stigmatisation with identity itself still being 
pathologised (Richards et al., 2015; Bouman et al., 2010). The renaming of GID was 
articulated as an attempted compromise, due to the fact that “the healthcare funding 
systems in many countries are set up in such a way as to make it effectively impossible 
to assist trans people with hormones and surgeries if they do not  have a diagnosis 
which relates to those interventions” (Richards et al., 2015, p. 310). There are therefore 
strong pragmatic reasons for trans to be medically positioned so as to allow individuals 
to make insurance claims to fund transition. 
A similar redefinition is viewed as likely for the next edition of the ICD19, which is 
maintained by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Currently in its 10th edition, ICD 
11 is projected to be released by 2018 (World Health Organisation, 2015). Drescher et 
al. (2012) neatly illustrate and summarise the evolution and re-evaluation of the 
medical construction of gender variance over time, within both the DSM and ICD: 
 
 
 
 
                                            
19 International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems. 
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Edition Parent category Diagnosis name Code 
ICD-6 (1948) N/A N/A N/A 
ICD-7 (1955) N/A N/A N/A 
ICD-8 (1965) Sexual deviations Transvestitism 302.3 
ICD-9 (1975) Sexual deviations Transvestism 
Transsexualism 
302.3 
302.5 
ICD-10 (1990) Gender identity 
disorders 
Transsexualism 
Dual-role transvestism 
Gender identity disorder of 
childhood 
Other gender identity 
disorders 
Gender identity disorder, 
unspecified 
F64.0 
F64.1 
F64.2 
F64.3 
F64.4 
ICD-11 (2015)20 ? Gender incongruence of 
adolescents and adults 
Gender incongruence of 
children (proposed) 
? 
 
? 
Table 2: Gender identity-related conditions in different editions of the ICD.  
(Drescher et al., 2012, p. 570) 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 Since publication of this table, the ICD-11 release date has been pushed back to 
2018. 
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Edition Parent Category Diagnosis Name 
DSM-I (1952) N/A N/A 
DSM-II (1968) Sexual deviations Transvestitism 
DSM-III (1980) Psychosexual 
Disorders 
Transsexualism 
Gender identity disorder of 
childhood 
DSM-IV (1994) Sexual and gender 
identity disorders 
Gender identity disorder in 
adolescents or adults 
Gender identity disorder in 
children 
DSM-IV-R (2000) Sexual and gender 
identity disorders 
Gender identity disorder in 
adolescents or adults 
Gender identity disorder in 
children 
DSM-5 (2013) Gender dysphoria 
(proposed) 
Gender dysphoria in adolescents 
or adults 
Gender dysphoria in children 
(proposed) 
Table 3: Gender identity-related conditions in different editions of the DSM. 
(Drescher et al., 2012, p. 572) 
In addition to the manuals that describe diagnostic criteria, WPATH has also produced 
standards of care to be followed by doctors providing for transgender patients 
(Coleman et al., 2012). These 2012 guidelines specifically highlight ‘gender-
nonconforming’ individuals separately from transsexual and transgender people. There 
is also recognition of individuals who wish to socially transition and/or be recognised as 
a gender they were not assigned at birth, but do not wish for any medical intervention. 
However in practice “the history of pathologising trans* bodies and identities remains 
prominent” (Hagen and Galupo, 2014, p. 19). Normative and normalising gatekeeping 
practices can still be found within NHS governed transgender care, such as 
requirements for psychotherapy before accessing surgical services, and the ‘Real Life 
Experience’ (RLE), whereby an individual must live ‘full time’, articulating their identified 
45 
 
 
 
gender before particular gender affirming procedures can be accessed (Bockting, 
2008). The RLE has been critiqued (Levine, 2009) due to the essentialist approach to 
gender that underpins any idea of what it means to ‘live as a gender’. Further, it is 
standard practice for surgeons to request evidence of the RLE in an uncodified manner, 
with the potential to refuse to operate if they are not satisfied. This is a cisnormative 
and moralistic process, functioning to discipline candidates for surgery in terms of their 
surgeon’s gendered expectations.  
This poses particular problems for non-binary individuals due to the lack of a culturally 
intelligible (Butler, 1993a) non-binary ‘role’. Further, this may force individuals into 
administrative or social changes they otherwise might not want – such as name or title 
change (potentially also true in a binary transgender context with unisex names – a 
name change is still often expected) in order to be found ‘valid’ for surgery. Expressing 
one’s gender identity through gendered presentation and name change may provide 
significant risks of ridicule, violence, or stigmatisation should an individual struggle to 
‘pass’ (Speer and Green, 2007; Kando, 1972). This evidences how the RLE was 
conceived exclusively with normative, binary identified transgender articulations in mind, 
from a cisnormative perspective that also assumes all individuals want to pass as cis. 
It is also important to recognise that information presented in diagnostic and best 
practice guidelines are nearly exclusively considered by (particular secondary and 
tertiary) practitioners specialising in transition services, as assessments for transition-
related care access are not made in primary healthcare21. The vast majority of the 
literature considering transgender healthcare discusses gender affirming medical 
services, rather than the healthcare experiences of the transgender population more 
generally. Correspondingly, the needs and experiences of transgender people wishing 
to access primary care for health concerns unrelated to their gender is under-
researched, despite an individual’s gender being an important recognised element 
within social interaction (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1959). It has been observed that due 
to the relative ignorance of primary care medical professionals on gender variance, that 
many transgender people find themselves required to undertake the unofficial and 
unrecognised (and potentially uncomfortable and contentious) task of educating their 
practitioners (Hagen and Galupo, 2014; Grant et al., 2011). 
                                            
21 Primary care practitioners are responsible for referrals and often have care duties 
transferred to them from GICs. Despite this, as well as the recommendation to provide 
bridging prescriptions due to lengthy waiting times, very few primary care practitioners 
have detailed familiarity with transgender healthcare.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed literature from both ‘sociology in medicine’ and ‘sociology of 
medicine’ (Straus, 1957). I have considered how this has shaped the sociology of 
health and illness, medical approaches to transgender people and theorisations, and 
the oftentimes blurred intersection between these interests. There has been a clear 
shift in the sociological paradigm from research occurring within the medical 
establishment, to within the social scientific academy. This has allowed the relationship 
between transgender and medicine to be considered in ways which were not possible 
when medical researchers were first constructing the language and practices which 
have informed how transgender discourses have been understood. As the 
conversations around transgender medical access and equality have broadened, it 
would be an artificial and limited enterprise to purport that only self-identified 
sociologists of health and illness have considered the interplay between transgender 
and healthcare. Indeed, a great deal of debate and scrutiny has come from 
transgender writers themselves, which reiterates the importance of expert patient/lay 
expert concepts in relation to this thesis. There has however been no prior work 
specifically considering how a lack of non-binary medical precedence may impact non-
binary transgender people’s access to gender affirming medical services. 
The review I have presented also suggests a gap between the level of recognition of 
non-binary presentation and identification, or otherwise deviation from classical 
transgender narratives within guidelines, and the awareness and sensitivity of medical 
practitioners overall. One might argue that earlier practice guides have had limited 
impact due to the rigidity of gender discourses that most doctors are socialised with, 
and how being positioned as ‘clinical expert’ allows for the enforcing of their views in 
relation to patient care. Community voices emphasise this as the case far more than 
examples of a nuanced and holistic service provision, though this may well be 
changing (Webberley, 2016). In the next chapter I turn attention to formulations of 
gender-variant communities and history outside of the context of medicine, which have 
had important historical and contemporary interplay with biomedical institutions and 
other social structures, such as the government, workplaces, and the academy.   
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Chapter 2 – Moving Beyond the Binary in Transgender Studies 
Perhaps the task of twenty-first-century scholars will be to deconstruct 
the social history of a trigender paradigm whose awakenings began in 
the 1990s. 
(Bolin, in Herdt, 1993, p. 485) 
Introduction 
This chapter situates non-binary gender identities within existing research on 
transgender. Transgender Studies is interdisciplinary by nature, with important 
contributions from scholars within anthropology, medicine, the humanities, law, and 
sociology, amongst others. Attempting to demarcate transgender scholarship by 
different disciplines is no simple task however, with feminist discourses, gender theory, 
and activist scholarship coming from a wide cross-section of overlapping backgrounds. 
Despite this, I aim to discuss how the academic consideration of gender diversity has 
produced a varied and ever-expanding range of literature that vitally informs the 
specific consideration of non-binary identities.  
As addressed in the previous chapter, academic enquiries into sex and gender were, 
historically, closely related to the study of sexual orientation (Bullough et al., 1983; 
Garfinkel, 1967; Krafft-Ebing, 1886), and the earliest history of transgender scholarship 
was exclusively the domain of medical research (Benjamin, 1966; 1954; Stoller, 1964; 
Money et al., 1957). However, this chapter’s discussion will begin with some of the 
earliest non-medical discussions, which started to recognise the importance of social 
factors in relation to gender. Such contributions were to initially come from 
ethnomethodology (Kessler and McKenna, 1978; Garfinkel, 1967), which also 
highlighted limitations within the epistemological basis of earlier natural scientific 
enquiry (Martin, 1991; Harding, 1989).  
The discussion will then move to feminism and transgender. Feminist scholarship 
initially exhibited particular hostility to transgender women (Raymond, 1979), however 
underwent shifts such that feminist work helped develop queer theory (Stone, 2006; 
Wilchins, 2004; Butler, 1993a; 1990; Sedgwick, 1991), and transfeminism (Salamon, 
2008; Koyama, 2003). Subsequently I will illustrate the range of sociological 
transgender scholarship that was to follow (Davy, 2011; Hines, 2007a; Monro, 2007; 
2003; Cromwell, 1999b; Gagné et al., 1997; Devor, 1989; 1987). Further, struggles for 
equal rights and recognition have resulted in important discourses on transgender 
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experiences in relation to the law (Spade, 2006; Whittle, 2002), and also from 
transgender activists who work within the academy (Califia, 2012; Serano, 2010; 2007).  
The majority of this scholarship has, whilst recognising the mutability of gender identity, 
not specifically or extensively engaged with identification outside of the binary of male 
and female. The small amount of scholarship to date which has considered non-binary 
individuals is addressed at the end of this chapter. Only the most recent examples of 
this scholarship recognises non-binary identification as an (umbrella) category in its 
own right, with older work implicitly illustrating non-binary variation before the term 
‘non-binary’ entered academic or queer community contexts. Whilst some of this broad 
cross-section of transgender literature recognises the possibilities of identification 
outside of the gender binary, there is a dearth of sociological consideration of non-
binary experiences as a specific focus. I will conclude this chapter by highlighting how 
the scholarship reviewed may inform future directions, and discuss how drawing from a 
theoretically diverse body of work benefits the consideration of non-binary gender 
identities.  
The Ethnomethodological Approach to Gender 
First developed by Harold Garfinkel, ethnomethodology can be defined as “the body of 
common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by means 
of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and 
act on the circumstances in which they find themselves” (Heritage, 1984, p. 4). 
Ethnomethodology challenged contemporary sociological approaches, which were 
primarily concerned with macro-sociological structures. Instead, ethnomethodology 
addressed how individuals navigate (and in part, construct) social orders. The 
positioning of sociological facts as objective was problematized, with a greater 
emphasis instead placed on the processes by which individuals construct and 
experience their realities – the organisation of their everyday lives. The 
ethnomethodological consideration of gender was to propose and illustrate how rather 
than simply a biological manifestation, gender is ‘achieved’ through action, interaction, 
and presentation. This paved the way for later academic theorisation of ‘doing’ gender 
(Butler, 1990; West and Zimmerman, 1987).  
Garfinkel considered how gender was achieved and negotiated through the case study 
of an individual originally believed to be intersex (Garfinkel, 1967). Contemporary 
medical discourses of the 1960s positioned intersex people as rare ‘abnormalities’ 
(Stoller and Rosen, 1959), and thus Garfinkel considered the medical and social 
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process which a young woman named Agnes, presenting as intersex, needed to 
navigate in order to be recognised as a woman. Agnes was referred to the medical 
practice of Robert Stoller (with whom Garfinkel collaborated), in 1958. Assigned male 
at birth due to the presence of a penis and testes, Agnes reported that she 
spontaneously feminised during puberty, developing breasts and a highly feminised 
appearance. Agnes articulated that her feelings concerning her penis were of no 
greater consequence than “having had a painful wart that had been removed” 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 66), and that she identified and lived fully as a heterosexual woman.  
In order to access vaginoplasty, it was necessary for Agnes to undergo exceptional 
scrutiny, including factors such as her sexuality (diagnostic criteria specified that 
heterosexuality was necessary for medical verification of her womanhood), interests, 
gendered appearance, and mannerisms. This illustrates a form of what Foucault 
described as discipline – whereby the medical establishment (in this case) has the 
power to legitimise what bodies and identities are desirable and permissible (Foucault, 
1978). Garfinkel’s paper was originally to demonstrate how an intersex person such as 
Agnes could successfully integrate into the social role of ‘female’, in spite of her 
‘condition’. However, of critical importance was the fact that long after accessing the 
surgery she sought, Agnes revealed that she had been surreptitiously taking her 
mother’s hormone replacement pills from the age of 12, and it was the luck of this 
timing in relation to puberty that led to physiological developments which allowed her to 
‘pass’ as a woman in all respects except for her genitals, when medically scrutinised 
years later (Stoller, 1968).  
This significantly altered how Garfinkel’s original paper could be read – Agnes’ status 
as a “natural, normal female” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 61) was due to how remarkably 
feminine (yet ‘appropriate’) she appeared to Garfinkel and her physicians. Had her 
accurate history been known, she would have been dismissed as a ‘male with a mental 
disorder’ and been denied access to the surgery she sought. Agnes’ transgender 
status illustrates how particular biological traits were essentialised as gender.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, the gendered assumptions Garfinkel himself made regarding 
Agnes’ ‘authenticity’ become highly obvious. This evidences how gender is 
essentialised, and reveals the culturally constructed biases and values which Stoller 
and Garfinkel displayed when scrutinising Agnes.  
Viewing this work with the benefit of the feminist and gender scholarship that followed 
over the next 40 years, it is clear how Garfinkel’s considerations were limited by 
restricted notions of masculinity and femininity, as well as ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’, 
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together with an uncritical biological essentialism (Bologh, 1992; Rogers, 1992). Davy 
asks the questions “What if Agnes’ presentation had been of a non-normative 
femininity? Would Garfinkel’s analysis have been the same? Would her ‘true’ 
(inter)sexuality have changed?” (Davy, 2011, p. 63). These questions illustrate how 
critical evaluation has developed since the context of Garfinkel’s work. Whilst a 
valuable contribution that considered how Agnes negotiated the necessary social 
factors to be found to be an ‘authentic woman’, the limitations through lack of critical 
reflexivity from the research are very apparent.  
It is reasonable to conclude that Stoller’s and Garfinkel’s essentialist positions and 
policing of gender expression contributed greatly to Agnes’ treatment. Should she have 
been found lacking – such as through presenting a non-normative femininity, it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that she likely would have been positioned as male – a 
‘transsexual male’ rather than ‘intersex female’. Such language that erases trans and 
intersex realities illustrates how gender is essentialised primarily to binarised genitals, 
with this ‘fact’ only then being revised with swathes of normative and disciplined 
evidence that Agnes provided. This example serves to contextualise how transgender 
people have exhibited resistance in their interactions with and navigations of medical 
services to procure their desired outcomes. The gate was now opened for the 
academic consideration of social interactions in the study of gender. 
The work of the ethnomethodologists Kessler and McKenna (1978) took Garfinkel’s 
concepts further, by exploring how the significance of biological structures in defining 
sex/gender is as culturally constructed as notions of masculinity and femininity. Their 
discussion recognised ‘cultural genitals’ – the penis or vagina an observer assumes to 
be present, when attributing a gender to another individual based on social interaction 
or observation. This concept was used to underpin an analysis that recognised how 
choices and behaviours contribute to gender, with the ability of transsexuals to ‘pass’ 
as their identified gender used as evidence. 
Kessler and McKenna’s critique of earlier medical research impacted on the 
consideration of gender within the natural sciences. Their discussion of biological 
factors including chromosomes, hormone levels, internal reproductive organs, genitalia, 
and secondary sexual characteristics (such as body hair patterns and fat distribution) 
has been developed considerably by Anne Fausto-Sterling (2008; 2005; 2000b). Her 
work has bridged natural and social scientific analyses which have considered 
biological differentiation, whilst recognising the considerable interplay and restrictions 
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of cultural factors – including consideration of a ‘five sex system’ (Fausto-Sterling, 
2000a; 1993).  
Such research has been important in highlighting how there is still a lack of clear 
evidence for a dimorphic neuroanatomy, as “there are no stable criteria that distinguish 
sexes reliably or concretely” (Gauthier, 2014, p. 42). Fausto-Sterling’s analyses also 
serve to critique a binary model of gendered/sexed physiology, and also challenge an 
over-simplistic reduction of ‘sex’ to ‘genitalia’. Such logic can be equally proposed as 
regards identity, in that a bimodal model (of male and female identification) fails to 
represent the complete population. Despite this, no work has ethnomethodologically 
considered the everyday practices of people with non-binary gender identities.  
In illustrating gender categories as contextually situated, Kessler and McKenna drew 
upon non-Western articulations of gender (Herdt, 1993), which had historically been 
considered by anthropologists, albeit in a problematic manner (Mead and Boas, 1928; 
Malinowski, 1927). However, whilst Kessler and McKenna recognised the interpretation 
of gender as socially constructed, they did not suggest or recognise the possibility of 
intelligible genders other than male or female. Individuals who did not identify with the 
gender they were assigned at birth were used to illustrate how gender is ‘done’, though 
their doing of gender was still highly binarised.  
Kessler and McKenna would later write “It did not even occur to us that within 20 years 
there would be some people who would want to confront others with the contradiction 
between their gender presentation and other "facts" such as their genitals or gender 
history” (2000, no pagination). Transsexual people were expected to construct their 
bodies, presentations, and identities to align with normative ideas of gender, 
unavoidably therefore, within the gender binary. Kessler and McKenna showed how 
even binary-identified individuals who challenged expectations of a normative 
medicalised ‘transsexual narrative’ (by not seeking or desiring genital surgery for 
example) were not considered, nor was the idea of non-binary gender identification 
within a Western context. 
The legacy of ethnomethodology on the study of gender has been through its shift 
away from the ‘hegemony of sex’, dictated by the epistemology and methodology of the 
natural sciences. It has directly influenced feminist work that has looked at how gender 
is done within the context of relationships (Sanger, 2010), relating gender to sexuality 
(Schilt and Westbrook, 2009), and influenced the use of methods such as conversation 
analysis (Kitzinger, 2009). My own research questions benefit from recognising 
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ethnomethodology. Thus, the lack of work on non-binary means that giving space for 
participants to make sense of their own circumstances (in relation to queer 
communities and medical practice), as this approach encouraged, makes possible 
broad, rich data. However, these early ethnomethodological discussions lacked 
particularity (Hines, 2006) or recognition of the possibility of gender plurality. Indeed, it 
would take time for transgender discourses to be further developed, chiefly through 
interaction with feminist scholarship.  
Feminism and Transgender – from Radical Exclusion to Queer Embrace 
As awareness of cross-gender identification grew, tensions arose with then-burgeoning 
second-wave feminism. Stryker illustrates this with a case history of the trans woman 
Beth Elliot, showing how transgender women were viewed as men undertaking an 
“unwanted penetration into women’s space” (Stryker, 2008a, p. 102), particularly by 
cisgender lesbian separatists. Stryker’s choice of words is no coincidence, with anti-
trans critics commonly positioning trans women as rapists due to their entrance to 
woman-only environments (Raymond, 1979). Whilst transgender women bore the brunt 
of feminist criticism, transgender men were typified as ‘women’ attempting to access 
patriarchal “male power and privilege” (Hines, 2007a, p. 18).  
Such anti-trans sentiments were present in feminist scholarship as well as activist and 
social networks. The most infamous example of such work is Janice Raymond’s book 
The Transsexual Empire (1979), where she argued that transgender women are 
‘actually’ men articulating hyper-feminine, servile parodies of womanhood. Raymond’s 
arguments relied upon an essentialist, biologically based definition of womanhood, and 
claimed transgender women rape ‘real’ women through cultural invasion. Similarly, 
Sheila Jeffreys (2014; 1997) has argued that transgender rights transgress upon 
women’s rights, and claims that gender affirming medical interventions (such as 
vaginoplasty) are mutilations. Davy summarises such arguments by saying “doctors 
stand accused of conspiring with transwomen to prop up patriarchy, by surgically and 
hormonally transforming them into “pseudo-women”, who may, therefore, duplicitously 
infiltrate “womyns” (especially radical lesbian feminist) spaces by “pretending” to be 
lesbian women and consequently subverting feminism” (Davy, 2011, p. 47, emphasis 
original).  
Further, trans-exclusionary radical feminists have made claims that transgender 
women fetishise womanhood, wishing to ‘become’ women in fulfilment of erotic fantasy. 
This relies on Blanchard’s theory of autogynephilia (1989b), as discussed in detail in 
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the previous chapter. Essentialised notions of womanhood, and the socially 
constructed patriarchal biases that entered scientific research on gender were critiqued 
by second wave feminist thought, and yet were relied upon in trans-exclusionary 
radical feminist arguments.  
Trans-critical ‘feminism’ has been regarded as problematic by many (Califia, 2012; 
Stryker, 2008a; Hubbard, 1996). One of the earliest and most important critiques of 
trans exclusion came from Sandy Stone, who was a target of personal attack by 
Raymond in her work. Informed by the feminist work of Donna Haraway (1991), 
Stone’s Posttranssexual Manifesto (2006) utilises a postmodern analysis to 
deconstruct “the foundationalist assumptions that support Raymond's narrower concept 
of womanhood, and by claiming a speaking position for transsexuals that cannot be 
automatically dismissed as damaged, deluded, second-rate, or somehow inherently 
compromised” (Stryker and Whittle, 2006, p. 221).  
Stone also encouraged an opening of transgender narratives, stating how the medically 
informed narrative of being ‘trapped in the wrong body’ had dominated, creating a 
hierarchy between normative, ‘good’ transsexuals, and other more stigmatised 
articulations of gendered difference (such as transgender people who did not seek 
surgery). Stone challenged the ubiquity of ‘transsexual’ as the approved label by the 
“body police” (that is, the medical establishment) in their erasure of “a vast 
heteroglossic account of difference” (2006, p. 229) due to its origin within pathologising 
and disciplining medical discourses. Such an appeal to legitimise gender plurality was 
an important step in genderqueer and non-binary identities becoming articulable within 
queer and trans communities.   
In the wake of challenging radical feminist discourses, Stone’s deconstruction would go 
some way in laying a foundation for postmodern feminist discourses of the 1990s, and 
marked the development of queer theory. Judith Butler opened up radical new 
considerations of sex and gender through her seminal works Gender Trouble and 
Bodies that Matter (1993a; 1990). Butler developed the concept of performativity, 
through consideration of the construction of identity in social interactions. In articulating 
performativity in relation to gender, Butler argues that identity categories and politics 
limit possibilities which feminism aims to make available (Butler, 1990).  
In challenging the notion that genders are inescapably restricted by a ‘mimetic relation’ 
to a binary of sex, and by also illustrating the capacity for sex to be constructed within 
culture, Butler draws upon the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty in claiming the body as “a 
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set of possibilities to be continually realised” (Butler, 1988, p. 521), though with 
contextual constraints.  The advent of non-binary identities into increasingly public 
awareness suggests such contextual constraints are shifting to allow greater gender 
plurality, highlighting the necessity of study. Butler sought to avoid early 
misinterpretations of her work that conflated performance with performativity, which 
sometimes occur due to her deconstruction of drag performances. Performativity is not 
a conscious iteration of the self in response to an environment, as this, by Butler’s 
analysis, “presumes a [gendered] subject” (1993b, p. 21). Rather, performativity 
indicates a relationship between gender and selfhood which simultaneously creates 
and challenges the idea of a given subject, which Butler positions as only recognisable 
though interactions with the culturally idiosyncratic system or ‘matrix’ of gender (Butler, 
1993b).  
Butler’s work has been critiqued, with Raewyn Connell arguing that transgender 
realities are appropriated and erased in order to discuss abstract theorisation on 
identity, without recognising transgender experiences of oppression and violence 
(Connell, 2012; Namaste, 2009; 2000). Prosser has raised concerns with how Butler’s 
deconstruction may be used to undermine claims of stability in transgender identities 
(Carrera et al., 2012; Prosser, 2006). Prosser further explains how it can be assumed 
from reading Butler that “transgender is queer is subversive” (Prosser, 2006, p. 262), 
and critiques notions that imply a hierarchy of authenticity – with drag potentially 
celebrated as (transgressively but permissibly) performative, yet transgender 
marginalised as ‘merely performance’. This can be related to discussion of medical 
power and authority in the previous chapter, as the clinical gaze functions to suppress 
subversive behaviour, ‘disciplining’ the genders of those seeking medical transition. 
The relationship here is that in order to be legitimised within the clinical context, trans 
people must allow a display of their genders to be scrutinised by practitioners. 
Transgender people are more likely to succeed in accessing treatment if ‘doing’ gender 
normatively. This is due to better fulfilling practitioner’s expectations of what it means to 
‘be’ a man or woman. Being trans in and of itself may already be taken as subversive 
through the association Prosser highlights; posing any additional challenge to 
hegemonic gender roles (such as by being non-binary) may be punished, though being 
positioned as a ‘complex case’, and delayed or denied treatment (Roller et al., 2015; 
Cruz, 2014). 
Snyder (2008) explains how third wave feminism responded to the ontological collapse 
of the category ‘woman’ in essentialised terms, such that a wider range of 
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heterogeneous feminist voices could be empowered. Inclusivity and reflexive self-
critique were to be increasingly emphasised, rather than attempts to create a single all-
encompassing narrative of womanhood. This not only increased the recognition of 
specific queer and black feminist issues but allowed for a wider range of feminist 
positionalities (Boux, 2016; Harris, 2010; Duggan and Hunter, 2006; Glick, 2000), 
particularly important given the ‘sex wars’ of the 1980s (Martindale, 1997; Willis, 1981). 
Nagoshi argues that transgender theory has benefitted feminist and queer analyses by 
helping to connect such scholarship to social work and advocacy, so as to more 
directly challenge different forms of social oppression (Nagoshi, 2010). Examples given 
include how transgender scholarship has not only considered gendered language use 
and transphobia, but emphasised how lived experiences have transgressed particular 
normalised narratives, revealing gendered oppression. Such oppression can then be 
resisted through the negotiation of transgender identities which serve to empower, 
which social workers benefit from understanding in order to work effectively with 
transgender clients.  
Halberstam’s queer analyses of gender (2005; 1998) made the point that the flexibility 
and fluidity of gender has allowed ‘dimorphic gender’ (the gender binary) to socially 
dominate. This is due to how “so few people actually match any given community 
standards for male or female, in other words, gender can be imprecise and therefore 
multiply relayed through a solidly binary system” (1998, p. 20). Whilst the binary does 
not inherently reduce social capital for non-stereotypical articulations of gender, 
individuals who actively mix, subvert, or exist outside of such gendered practice (such 
as non-binary individuals) are rendered socially impossible. This has been recognised 
by Butler through the idea of cultural intelligibility (Butler, 1993a), which may be 
understood as being how the construction of a given social phenomenon (such as 
gender) renders particular individuals or identities invisible, through a lack of factors 
that act as symbolic social cues for a particular embodiment (Lloyd, 2007). For 
example, individuals scrutinise others whenever making a gender ascription, which 
within a contemporary Western context, is invariably either male or female. Ambiguous 
presentation or mixing of gendered traits is not enough for ascription as non-binary, but 
leads to greater levels of scrutiny to ascertain ‘the truth’ (looking for an Adam’s apple, 
or signs of facial hair growth in androgynous individuals, for example). The 
pervasiveness of cisnormativity (Worthen, 2016; Bauer et al., 2009) results in non-
binary identified people going unrecognised as ‘legitimate’ subjects by other social 
actors, and therefore being rendered unintelligible. 
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The continual development of empirical, feminist, transgender studies have articulated 
a politics far removed from second wave criticisms of transgender. Similarly to Stone, 
Hines illustrates how arguments such as Raymond’s and Jeffreys’ “exemplify how a 
gender binary understanding is unable to incorporate transgender into feminist theory 
and politics” (Hines, 2007a, p. 20). However, critical philosophical engagement with 
questions of gender via third wave and postmodern feminisms lead to more 
emancipatory and intersectional feminist scholarship (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Such 
scholarship valuably informs this thesis, in situating analyses of non-binary within a 
broadening emancipatory feminist framework. Such a dimension is also necessary to 
appreciate how misogynistic practices may impact non-binary people (Desmond, 2015), 
as has been done in relation to trans women (Connell, 2012; Serano, 2007). 
Questions have been raised about how Women’s Studies can respond to the 
emergence of new gender categories, and the reinterpretations of how gender is 
embodied and lived. Gayle Salamon has argued that gendered judgements on the 
basis of bodily signifiers (such as bilateral scars on a man’s chest) can lead to 
assumptions being made about what knowledge such signifiers deliver – in this case, a 
transgender history/identification – as such scarring would symbolise mastectomy, 
whilst accompanying masculine presentation. Salamon positions transfeminism as an 
evolution that would allow feminists to “ethically engage otherness without the fear of 
mutual annihilation” (Salamon, 2008, p. 136). This phrasing clearly references the 
historical tensions seen between feminist and transgender communities and voices.  
Whilst the underlying principles of a transgender inclusive feminism have been present 
at least as early as Stone’s The Empire Strikes Back (originally published in 1991), 
Koyama produced The Transfeminist Manifesto (2003) in order to guide a trans 
movement that centred around discussions which connect feminist and transgender 
discourses. Issues of concern within the manifesto include experiences of male 
privilege, transmisogynistic violence, and healthcare. The recognition of how gendered 
oppressions fundamentally connect feminist and transgender scholarship has resulted 
in increased discussion of their synergy (Gomes de Jesus, 2014; Van der Merwe and 
Padi, 2012; Halberstam, 2006; Scott-Dixon, 2006). 
There has now been a range of academic considerations of how feminism, queer 
theory, and transgender are situated in relation to each other, and the ways in which 
they overlap (Marinucci, 2011; Richardson et al., 2006; Hines, 2004; Heyes, 2003). By 
deconstructing essentialised notions of womanhood and increasing the visibility of 
gender variance through queer analyses, transgender feminist scholarship has 
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expanded. Julia Serano has argued how a great deal of transphobic and cisnormative 
manifestation is strongly linked to traditions and expressions of misogyny (Serano, 
2007). Dan Irving has considered how capital can relate to transgender legitimisation, 
incorporating intersectional consideration of race, class, and non-binary identification 
into transgender experiences of stigma (Irving, 2014). Interdisciplinary attention has 
allowed nuanced empirical methods and broader theoretical considerations to develop 
outside of the abstract theorisation and textual analyses that earlier feminist and queer 
scholarship primarily relied upon and produced.  
Richardson has emphasised that a common criticism of postmodern analyses is a lack 
of translation from texts to the real world. She criticises the academy for being overly 
abstract in its considerations, and failing to situate knowledge within the lived 
experiences and political needs of queer subjects (Richardson, 2005). This bears a 
similarity to the criticism levelled by Connell (2012) – that there is a moral as well as 
intellectual imperative for scholarship to be connected directly to lived experiences. 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a response to this concern through a now 
well-emerged empirical sociology of transgender, which has built on postmodern 
scholarship (Valocchi, 2005) whilst pragmatically engaging with lived experiences of 
transgender.  
The Sociology of Transgender 
The sociological study of transgender followed on from theoretical postmodern debates 
around gender, and also early work and biographical accounts originating from the 
transgender community (Cromwell, 1999b; Hewitt and Warren, 1995; Bornstein, 1994; 
Castle, 1992; Feinberg, 1980). Some of the earliest sociological work specifically 
considering gender variance was by Devor, who considered the expression of 
masculinity in women as a direct challenge to the gender binary (Devor, 1989; 1987). 
The focus of this work was not to consider the gender identities of the women involved 
in the research as potentially neither male nor female. However, Devor’s work may be 
reinterpreted with the benefit of 25 years of further development of transgender studies. 
Due to how the contemporary emphasis on understanding gendered articulations was 
primarily psychological rather than sociological (Hird, 2002), Devor assumed that 
participants: 
Learned from their parents, grandparents, and siblings that the 
behaviors and attitudes associated with maleness (masculinity) earned 
one power, respect, and authority while the behaviors and attitudes 
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associated with femaleness (femininity) epitomized weakness, 
incompetence, and servility. 
(Devor, 1987, pp. 14 - 15) 
Such a conclusion centres the explanation of gendered behaviour and identification on 
macro structures whilst under-recognising the potential importance of individual agency. 
Devor concludes that individuals who are assigned female at birth may adopt 
masculine coded behaviours and appearances, due to the preferential regard for 
masculinity under patriarchy. Further, despite some participants expressing significant 
interest in medical gender transition, they were still positioned exclusively as women 
within the research. That some participants spoke of ‘being a boy/girl’ rather than in 
terms of masculinity/femininity opens the possibility of genderqueer identity negotiation: 
I sort of was a dual personality. I still wanted to be a boy and I still 
wanted to wear jeans and climb trees... One day… I decided that I 
wanted to be a girl that day. 
(Devor, 1987, p. 21 - 22) 
Due to how the individual had negotiated masculine behaviours and presentation, this 
prevented social acceptance when deciding to articulate a feminine presentation, 
despite being assigned female at birth and thus being ‘less transgressive’ in doing so.  
This introduced the important dimensions of individual agency, and how microsocial 
interactions may allow or constrain particular articulations of resistance to gendered 
hegemony. Being a masculine girl was possible, but going ‘back and forth’ was not. 
Whilst clearly related, this early work by Devor did not specifically claim to be studying 
trans people, per se.  
Two of the first sociologists to collaborate on an empirical consideration of transgender 
were Patricia Gagné and Richard Tewksbury. Following from Kessler and McKenna, 
their research considers how “the institution of gender is taken for granted” (1998, p. 
81), and that transgender people22 simultaneously experience pressure to conform to 
heteronormative expressions of masculinity and femininity, whilst resisting factors that 
position assignation at birth as the ‘correct’ indicator of how their gender should be 
                                            
22  Gagné and Tewksbury’s definition of transgender somewhat differs to common 
contemporary usages, in that it specifically differentiates between transsexual and 
transgender. Transgender in their context includes a wide range of gender variance 
including cross dressers and drag queens, but not individuals who sought medical 
transition. 
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enacted. Gagné and Tewksbury’s work made the claim that most of their trans women 
participants believed in the ‘correctness’ of normative gender roles – that men and 
women ‘should’ express masculinity and femininity, respectively (Gagné and 
Tewksbury, 1998), and that transgender people should aim to be indistinguishable from 
the rest of society (Gagné et al., 1997). Whilst the term transgender was yet to be used 
in reference to individuals identifying as neither male nor female, the sample appears 
to contain individuals who exhibited non-binary articulations of transgender, which was 
explicitly recognised: 
A small number of persons (n = 5) who cross-dressed and had no 
desire for SRS23  referred to themselves in more politically oriented 
terms… Their intent is not to “pass” as women but to challenge the 
idea that gender is a “natural” expression of sex and sexuality. This 
group of five includes one “radical transgenderist”… who uses cross-
dressing as a means to express feminine aspects of self and to 
challenge traditional binary conceptualizations of sex, gender, and 
sexuality… one “ambigenderist”, an individual who lives alternatively 
as a man and a woman. Depending on how he or she feels, he or she 
frequently went out “in between” – as neither a man nor a woman (with 
long hair, makeup, high heels, tight pants, and a two-day growth of 
beard). In addition, this group includes three people who self-identified 
as a “third gender”. 
(Gagné et al., 1997, p. 484) 
These individuals’ experiences of gender were not the subject of further discussion. 
Gagné and Tewksbury viewed transgender women as outside of the gender binary by 
virtue of crossing it. Such a conceptualisation problematically renders all binary 
transgender people as failing in authenticity of their identified gender on the basis of 
essentialised physiological factors. Their conclusions that transgender women 
homogeneously believed in the importance of being normative as regards gender 
expression has also been called into question. Hines  shows that transgender 
assimilation was often “a contentious political issue”, and that “concerns around 
assimilating amongst transgender women often diminished through the stages of 
transition” (Hines, 2006, p. 60). 
                                            
23 Sex Reassignment Surgery. 
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The lack of recognition of (potential) non-binary identification by participants and by 
researchers may be explained through consideration of Plummer’s analysis of sexual 
stories (Plummer, 1995). Plummer illustrates how the social context in which a 
narrative is expressed can limit the ways that narrative may be interpreted. As a result, 
the increase in transgender visibility over the past 25 years has produced a greater 
potential for individuals to recognise, and feel able to explore gender variance. This 
functions in a manner analogous to how gay ‘coming out’ narratives became possible, 
gained visibility, and shifted over time (Saxey, 2008). Such possibilities have also 
depended upon the accessibility of queer communities, as “for narratives to flourish 
there must be a community to hear; that for communities to hear, there must be stories 
that weave together their history, their identity, their politics” (Plummer, 1995, p. 87).  
Plummer explains how stories may encourage political changes, as they can inspire 
shifts in attitude amongst members of the public through education and normalisation – 
which has been aided by ‘slice of life’ television shows such as the highly successful 
My Transsexual Summer (Mangan, 2011). It is also argued by Plummer that cultural 
dominance of particular stories can prevent other stories from being heard (such as the 
medically sanctioned narrative of being ‘trapped in the wrong body’). Plummer 
illustrates this using the example of how narratives of pornography consumption tended 
to be overwhelmingly negative, and were used to position pornography as addictive 
and associated with extreme deviance, rather than positive, mixed, or neutral. A 
parallel can be drawn with the dominance of particular transgender narratives within 
both the popular imagination and the academy, as the early hegemony of medicalised 
narratives and the gender binary means that heterogeneity and particularity of 
transgender continues to emerge (Hines, 2006; Namaste, 2000).  
Hird (2002) made one of the earliest attempts to formulate a ‘sociology of 
transsexualism’ through the discussion of authenticity, performativity, and 
transgression. Hird specifies how shifts from concerns with ‘authenticity’ to 
‘performativity’ have been brought about by a rise in sociological analyses, and a 
decline in an emphasis on psychological approaches to transgender. Hird argues that 
the discipline of psychology, as a natural science, still makes essentialist and positivist 
assumptions concerning gender, which struggle to ‘keep up’ with the diverse and 
expanding articulation of identities (Hird, 2002; 2000). This critique evidences an 
epistemological shift, with postmodern analysis not making claims of the ‘realness’ of 
identities, but the importance of recognising different ‘enactments’ of the self. This 
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sociological development was clearly influenced by the theoretical deconstructions of 
queer theory, as highlighted in the previous section.  
In addition to discussing the typologies of authenticity and performativity within 
transgender studies, Hird also positions ‘transgression’ as a critical theme, as 
transgender narratives have called into question the traditional relationship between 
sex and gender. This analysis made the assumption that sex and gender can be 
differentially defined and demarcated unproblematically, which has been challenged 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2008; Kitzinger, 1999). Parallels are drawn between gender and 
sexuality, usefully illustrating how homosexuality, lesbianism, and heterosexuality have 
all been acknowledged as socially constructed, as transsexuality/transgender was 
coming to be understood outside of medical contexts (Jackson, 1999; Esterberg, 1996; 
Weeks, 1996; Ingraham, 1994; Ringer, 1994; Greenberg, 1990; McIntosh, 1968). Hird 
recognises that within Gagné and Tewksbury’s work as well as that of Hausman (2001; 
1995), transgender identity negotiation was interactive. This was consistent with 
sociological consideration of the self, and with personal narratives (Plummer, 1995; 
Gecas, 1982; Goffman, 1959).  
Hines has specifically acknowledged the significance of transgender communities in 
the production of transgender sociology. This work illustrated the importance of 
community movements for trans people, in contrast to earlier decades when stigma, 
together with guidance from doctors, encouraged transsexuals to go ‘deep stealth’ – 
sharing their trans history with no-one. In focussing on how care is articulated, she 
argues that transgender social movements not only ‘fill in gaps’ left by professional 
services due to lack of provision and effective training, but serve to challenge the 
efficacy of a system that requires grassroots resistance and support (Hines, 2007b). 
Similarities and differences with how non-binary people use community interactions 
has yet to be investigated, which supports the inclusion of research questions 
examining this within this thesis. Care within medical systems was also discussed by 
participants, highlighting feelings that there was a need for greater awareness and 
training. This raises questions not only over practices of care used by members of non-
binary communities, but whether there are concerns (and if so, what) with how medical 
care is given. In further work, Hines has flagged a lack of theoretical recognition of the 
heterogeneity of transgender identities (Hines, 2006). Increased recognition of non-
binary narratives would serve to assist in the production of a  ‘politics of difference’ 
(Hines, 2013), a system which encourages interaction between organisations which 
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create policies and minority groups so as to allow for flexible and optimisable treatment 
of members of those groups. 
In understanding how gendered difference is accommodated into legal systems and 
social policy, Surya Monro has produced scholarship looking at UK transgender politics 
and citizenship (Monro, 2005b; Monro and Warren, 2004). Further, Monro is among the 
first to explicitly recognise gender beyond male or female within the sociology of 
transgender, once again building from, but also critiquing, earlier postmodern theory 
(Monro, 2005a). Systems of categorisation struggle to be consistent, and  in granting 
equal ease of participation, as they “fail to address the fluid and developmental nature 
of identity” (Monro, 2003, p. 442). Monro highlights this using the example of Hijra in 
India, a non-Western, non-binary gender identity (Nanda, 1993; 1990). Further, the 
significant and specific manner in which intersex citizenship is troubled by the 
embedding of the gender binary in law and policy is positioned as twofold, due to how 
the binaries of physical attribution (‘male or female genitalia’) and identity can both be 
challenged by intersex. Such work also bridges demarcations between different non-
binary experiences (intersex and non-binary trans) through common problems in 
relation to equal citizenship.  
Under the hegemony whereby the interpretation of bodies is binarised, transgender 
bodies (that are assigned a gender unambiguously at birth) do not challenge systemic 
interpretation in the same way as intersex. The increasing visibility of non-binary 
people however does call into question how ‘non-binary bodies’ are interpreted 
ontologically, as whilst this could mean intersex, it may also signify those bodies 
belonging to those who possess a non-binary gender identity. This remains an 
important point of consideration in the continuing discussions of gendered citizenship, 
similarly to how bisexuality and queer identification challenge binarised analysis with 
regards to sexual citizenship (Monro, 2015b; Monro and Richardson, 2014). 
Diane Richardson has discussed how through the rise of a neoliberal politics of 
normalisation, questions are raised about “what communities and which individuals are 
becoming acceptably visible, as others are being marginalised” (Richardson, 2005, p. 
524, italics original). Analysing neoliberalism recognises how identity politics have 
interplay with consumption under capitalism – with media discourses subsequently 
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proclaiming the ‘transgender tipping point’ (Steinmetz, 2014)24. Earlier work considering 
sexual citizenship raised the importance of recognising the institutionalisation of 
heterosexual and male privileges (Richardson, 1998), yet the relationship between 
sexuality and gender identity meant that a logical extension from such work was how 
gender identity may limit equal experience of citizenship (Monro and Richardson, 2014; 
Hines, 2013; Richardson, 2007; Monro, 2005b; Monro and Warren, 2004). Such 
analysis implies a potential hierarchy of gender variance, with citizens normatively 
integrating, producing, and consuming possessing greater social capital (Portes, 2000). 
This disadvantages non-binary identification under a politics of normalisation, as the 
unintelligibility (Butler, 1993a) of ‘non-binary’ is inherently transgressive of gender 
norms. 
In highlighting further problems caused by the gender binary’s dominance, Monro has 
considered challenges to the gender binary through a cross-cultural comparison 
between India and the UK, in order to support diversity and challenge systemic 
inequalities (Monro, 2007). Vidal-Ortiz importantly recognises how transgender 
narratives have also become considerably more fractured in terms of intersectional 
considerations such as race and class (Vidal‐Ortiz, 2008), though this remains under-
researched. These intersectional considerations are an important development since 
the sociological development of transgender studies, as the methodologies of 
postmodern approaches, and less culturally nuanced natural scientific/medical 
research failed to recognise heterogeneity amongst trans experiences. The increased 
recognition of transgender people of colour was an important development within 
Transgender Studies (de Vries, 2015), such that analysis of transgender embodiment 
and experience is not reduced to consideration of gender ‘in a social vacuum’, with no 
further recognition of additional factors entwined with how gender may be experienced. 
In addition to the structural implications that considering citizenship has for policy 
formation, the sociology of transgender has allowed scholarship of bodies outside of 
the context of medical, aetiological theories. Davy (2011) discusses transgender in 
relation to bodily aesthetics, and the politics of embodiment. In relation to medical 
transition, a performance of femininity from transgender women and masculinity from 
transgender men was necessary to access a diagnosis, hormones and surgeries (as 
discussion of Agnes particularly emphasised). Davy points out that “transsexuals were 
                                            
24  Within the 2015 Louis Theroux documentary Transgender Kids, a non-binary 
narrative was explored to illustrate gender variance amongst children, showing how 
media representation is bringing discussion of non-binary to a wider audience. 
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concerned with the rights to medical intervention for their ‘Gender Dysphoria’ rather 
than critiquing psycho-medical constructions of Transsexuality” (Davy, 2011, p. 146). 
This is an important example of how trans populations acted pragmatically to ensure 
their needs were met, rather than attempting a bottom-up re-conceptualisation of 
gender.  
Further, Davy articulates how “being recognised within a binary system is seen to allow 
transmen and transwomen to accomplish gender normativity, which is also seen as 
having grave consequences for all women and gender minorities who do not abide by 
the gender order’s notions of masculinity and femininity” (2011, p. 147). This can 
clearly be connected to the previous discussion of citizenship, as embodiment in 
relation to the demands of ‘the gender order’ impacts whether and how an individual is 
legitimised. Thus, the way in which some members of the transgender population 
access and negotiate medical services may impact upon how others then experience 
those services, because of potential generalisations and homogenisation of 
transgender amongst medical practitioners. However, a sociological analysis of the 
views of non-binary transgender people in the UK on their experiences of medical care 
has yet to be undertaken. How the body is considered (both medically and socially) 
remains fertile ground for scholastic investigation with regards to non-binary 
transgender people.  
In addition to providing important analyses of transgender embodiment and body image, 
scholastic consideration has been extended to body image amongst the partners of 
transgender people (Pfeffer, 2008), the concept of agency within transgender families 
(Pfeffer, 2012), and partnerships (Sanger, 2010). Pfeffer makes a valuable point in her 
discussion on lesbian partners of transgender men being difficult for researchers to 
reach, “due to their failure to “fit” neatly into researchers’ operationalisation of what 
constitutes lesbian sexual orientation” (Pfeffer, 2008, p. 327). This raises a cross-
discipline methodological consideration of how research is designed to examine 
transgender realities, but may risk the failure to reach potential non-binary participants 
if language is uncritically binary. Further, the manner in which intimate transgender 
connections problematize labels of sexual orientation illustrates tensions of identity that 
may manifest in the personal lives of transgender partnerships. For example, a gay 
cisgender man in a relationship with a gay transgender man may need to (re)negotiate 
gay identity in relation to the association between genitals and sexual orientation.  
It is also argued (Beauchamp, 2014) that transgender body narratives are constructed 
within a context of great pressure to conform to medical expectations. It is important to 
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recognise how interplay between dysphoria and the strategic performance of particular 
body narratives (in order to access medical services) may affect others who encounter 
these narratives, be they transgender, or a transgender person’s partner (Gamarel et 
al., 2014). The relationship non-binary people may have with dysphoria as the 
dominant model for understanding the desire to make changes to embodiment, or how 
trans community discourses impact non-binary people, are currently unexplored. It is 
reasonable to infer that non-binary individuals will be as heterogeneous as in the binary 
trans population (long-recognised by the demarcation on the basis of surgical desire 
into ‘transsexuals’ and ’transgenderists’). Whether specific non-binary identities relate 
to particular embodied desires – such as being partially masculinised or feminised, or 
androgynous – also merits exploration. Such non-binary desires may be modulated by 
interactions with both queer community and medical practice.  
Whitley has considered the negotiation of relational identities amongst who he terms 
‘SOFFAs’ – Significant Others, Family Members, Friends, and Allies of transgender 
people (Whitley, 2013). Participants were conceived as ‘undoing’ and ‘redoing’ their 
understandings of gender based upon the new embodiments and identities SOFFAs 
were exposed to. Tensions between factors such as concern for the transgender 
person they know, anxiety to not offend, and how to be effective in their support were 
considered in contrast to stigmatisation that SOFFAs registered from external sources 
or recognised in themselves. Such work raises the question as to how transgender 
people conceive and perceive the interactions they have with their friends and loved 
ones – with regards not only to coming out and any potential transitions, but in the 
navigation of routine life.  
Similarly utilising an image of undoing and redoing, Catharine Connell has discussed 
gendered interactions within the workplaces of transgender people, and uses such 
situational negotiation to critique West and Zimmerman’s ideas (Connell, 2010; Connell, 
2009; West and Zimmerman, 1987). Rather than ‘doing gender’, Connell argues for 
‘doing transgender’ as a framework to consider workplace inequalities with specificity.   
This is due to her findings that “regardless of whether they are stealth or out, 
transgender positionality sensitizes transpeople to gender discrimination, thereby 
opening up possibilities for the collective contestation of gendered inequality by 
transpeople and feminists” (Connell, 2010, p. 51).  
Schilt has looked specifically at transgender men’s experiences of inequality in the 
workplace. Whilst explaining how there has been a “weakening of the hegemony of the 
deep stealth model” (Schilt, 2010, p. 33). Lack of representation and recognition is also 
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highlighted – with particular note given to the fact that the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) only gained its first transgender board 
member over 20 years after the organisation’s formation (Minter, 2006). This particular 
example emphasises how trans voices being actively involved in trans healthcare 
practice is a relatively recent initiative. Experiences with workplace discrimination and 
rights were also discussed in relation to legal protection, stressing the tension that 
exists given that individuals who hide their transgender status to mitigate discrimination 
risk or out of a simple sense of privacy may by doing so sacrifice legal protections.  
Whilst transgender scholarship has emphasised negative experiences such as 
dysphoria, stigma, and discrimination, positive aspects of transgender identity have 
also been specifically recognised within the literature (Riggle et al., 2011). In their work 
which considered positive aspects of transgender self-identification via an online 
survey, Riggle et al. recognised eight central themes – “congruency of self; enhanced 
interpersonal relationships; personal growth and resiliency; increased empathy; a 
unique perspective on both sexes; living beyond the sex binary; increased activism; 
and connection to the GLBTQ communities” (2011, p. 147).  
Many of these factors illustrate how experiences of positivity in relation to transgender 
identification were negotiated over time in relation to processes – such as disclosure to 
friends and family, and coming to terms with internal feelings. That one third of 
participants expressed that recognising and living beyond the gender binary was 
positive for them in and of itself invites more detailed consideration of the interplay with 
lived experiences. It is important to note how even binary transgender identification 
provided insight and empathy into gender expression that more radically challenged 
the gender binary (a further example to challenge the earlier claims of Gagné and 
Tewksbury that transgender people exhibited strictly normative views on gender).  
The sociology of transgender has considered a diverse range of factors affecting the 
interactions which transgender people experience. In shifting from consideration of 
transgender as an inherently radical disruption of gender, increasingly nuanced 
consideration has been given to questions of identity. Abstract theorisation has been 
enmeshed with empirical examination of transgender experiences. Working to achieve 
legal protection and equal rights has been of central concern to transgender activism, 
and so interdisciplinary scholastic consideration of the law and transgender is of 
importance in contextualising the study of gender variance. 
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Transgender Rights – The Law, and Activism 
Legal discourses and shifts have had a significant impact upon transgender narratives, 
experiences, and academic discourses. One of the most significant events in relation to 
this was the passing of the Gender Recognition Act in 2004 in the UK, coming into 
effect in 2005.  This allowed for the potential acquisition of a new birth certificate and 
access to the (then exclusively heterosexual) institution of marriage. Prior to this, there 
was a significant intersection between activist writing and appeals for changes to laws 
and social policies (Lloyd, 2005; Spade, 2003; Sharpe, 2002; Whittle, 2002). Spade 
criticises how legal decision-making prioritises medical narratives as evidence, due to 
systemic assumptions that medical research carries an authority that sociological 
consideration or activist experience does not (Innvær et al., 2002; Elliott and Popay, 
2000). In order to access medical services, Spade discusses how transgender people 
“suggest different ways to get around the requirements” and “know all about what it 
means to lie and cheat their way through the medical road-blocks to get the opportunity 
to occupy their bodies in the way they want” (Spade, 2003, p. 23). This further 
contextualises how from a medical practitioner’s perspective, there may appear to be 
greater homogeneity amongst transgender service users than may be accurate.  
Greenberg has considered the legal precedents which constructed contemporary law in 
relation to race, so as to make a direct comparison with the legal construction of 
gender as it relates to transgender (Greenberg, 2002). Greenberg begins by describing 
how both race and gender have a history of being enforced as a binary, before being 
increasingly recognised as a cultural construction. She highlights how natural scientific 
data has been relied upon, and epistemologically privileged so as to set legal 
precedents, illustrating institutional power wielded by medical practitioners performing 
gender research. This work also provides an early incidence of suggesting gender 
nonconformity as a possible criterion under anti-discrimination law, which may directly 
improve the ability for non-binary transgender people to access equal citizenship.  
Legal scholars have addressed the conception of transgender rights as human rights, 
and have recognised how historical, stigmatising policies have functioned to allow 
structural discrimination (Balzer et al., 2012). Balzer and Lagata illustrate the 
beginnings of a paradigm shift, such that laws based upon medical discourses are 
replaced with those based on human rights discourses (Balzer and Lagata, 2014) as a 
partial result of the Yogyakarta principles. These principles addressed “the application 
of international human rights law in relation to sexuality and gender identity” (The 
68 
 
 
 
Yogyakarta Principles, 2007). Wilkinson discusses the notion of ‘cultural competency’ 
as a way to understand how a minority population may have its needs and diversity 
understood and addressed effectively (Wilkinson, 2014). Education is emphasised as 
essential in establishing permeation of gendered knowledge throughout all aspects of 
society, particularly for key service providers – and that this is a continual process, 
rather than a topic that can begin and end with a single diversity workshop.  
Spade highlights the complexities between consideration of the law, transgender 
citizenship, and intersectional politics (Spade, 2006), relating the law to the earlier 
discussion of sexual and gendered citizenships. He makes a distinction between 
struggles for non-discrimination rather than equality, and how (within a US context) 
low-income gender variant individuals are particularly disadvantaged by “sex 
segregation and the gendering of legal identity” (2006, p. 231). This can be related to 
Tam Sanger’s work on gendered governmentality (Sanger, 2008). Originally conceived 
by Foucault (Lemke, 2001; Foucault, 2010), governmentality concerns systems of 
power flowing between governments and subjects, in order to shape citizens such that 
governmental policies can be more easily fulfilled. Sanger explores how across 
disciplines, the privileging of particular transgender voices has resulted in a relatively 
“homogenous conceptualisation of trans” (Sanger, 2008, p. 44). This agrees with Hines’ 
critique of a lack of recognition of trans particularity (Hines, 2006). The point can be 
made that even with explicit identification outside of the gender binary, individuals will 
be read and positioned within the binary by others, due to the extent of a binary-
assuming hegemony and the lack of cultural intelligibility non-binary currently struggles 
with (Butler, 1993a).  
Within a specifically UK context, Alex Harris has considered how queer theory can be 
linked to, and used, in the analysis of the treatment of transgender people under legal 
systems (Harris, 2013). A critical deconstruction of the Gender Recognition Act (as 
problematically essentialist) is made, due to the Act’s requirement to ‘live in the 
acquired gender’ for a two year period prior to legal recognition and to agree to make 
no subsequent gender change following legal transition. The Act continues to reify a 
system which “treats transsexuals as individuals subject to assimilation within a 
heteronormative framework” due to the imposition of particular notions of gender 
positioned as objective and absolute (Harris, 2013, p. 68). Harris highlights systemic 
epistemological problems within legal decision making, utilising Butler’s work. Such a 
usage poses a direct challenge to the common criticism of postmodern scholarship – 
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that it is too abstracted from the material world to be applied to problem solving. 
Therefore whilst the sociology of transgender in the previous section demonstrated the 
influence of postmodern work in relation to empirical studies, hermeneutics of policy 
documents shows direct application. The argument also illustrates in particular how the 
generation of empirical considerations of gender beyond the binary are necessary in 
order to continue to effect emancipatory social changes. The range of academic 
studies considered so far often contained participants who articulated themselves as 
neither male nor female. However, these works did not expressly focus on 
understanding non-binary identities.  
Activist work has provided recent evidence to further highlight increases in both non-
binary visibility, and needs. The UK transgender charity Action for Trans Health 
produced data illustrating that 62.5% of their funding support was granted to non-binary 
people – illustrating not only the increased visibility of the non-binary population, but 
simultaneously how they may be at greater risk of forms of vulnerability that render 
them eligible for charity support (Action for Trans Health, 2015; Harrison et al., 2012). 
Finally, the recent extension by the charity Stonewall to include transgender equality 
under its remit involved the production of a report, after hearing from hundreds of 
transgender people (Hunt and Manji, 2015). Non-binary people were the second 
largest contributing demographic to this report, illustrating how the transgender 
population contains a sizeable number of non-binary people who wish to be recognised. 
The final section of literature to be considered is the comparably small number of works 
which expressly look at those identifying as neither male nor female. 
Non-Binary Articulations of Transgender 
The earliest considerations of gender outside of the Western binary paradigm of male 
and female were to be found in the field of anthropology (Herdt, 1993; Jacobs, 1968; 
Lurie, 1953; Malinowski, 1927). However, whilst gendered expression and identity were 
recognised as differing to Western organisations and expectations, explanations and 
analysis were framed in Western terminology, which resulted in the simplification of 
non-binary gender identities and the loss of nuance in cultural differences. Jacobs, in 
his analysis of North American Berdache25 gave the definition as “one who behaves 
                                            
25 This term was used within anthropological literature to refer to a wide range of North 
American First Nation gender identities across different tribes. The term is often 
considered offensive due to its origin from a French word for prostitute, and the term 
‘two-spirit’ is now preferred as an umbrella term, originating from First Nation 
communities – however tribally specific terms may be argued as offering greatest 
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and dresses like a member of the opposite sex” (1968, p. 25), implying analogousness 
with cross-dressers, which is not the case. Kessler and McKenna explain how:  
The Winnebago people were reluctant to discuss their Berdache 
honestly with white men because the Winnebago could tell that the 
white men regarded the institution negatively. Reluctance could stem 
not only from embarrassment at revealing behavior that was being 
judged by outsiders as immoral, but also from beliefs in the 
sacredness of the institution and an unwillingness to share this aspect 
of their culture.  
(Kessler and McKenna, 1978, p. 31) 
This illustrates how lack of reflexivity amongst researchers meant their own relationship 
to the research went under-interrogated, resulting in flaws in reliability. This 
methodologically valuable lesson retains its salience in establishing rapport and 
considering relative social positions when engaging with transgender research 
participants, as already recognised in Vidal-Ortiz’s work (2008). 
As Hines has summarised, early works that came to be collectively viewed as 
‘transgender theory’ opened alternatives to how transgender had been medically 
constructed, which could be used to challenge the stigma associated with being 
pathologised (Hines and Sanger, 2010). In performing this critical deconstruction, the 
stage was set for more nuanced investigations of how transgender can be understood. 
One of the earlier pieces of literature which opened discussion on Western non-binary 
genders (beyond problematic claims of binary transgender people being ‘other than 
male and female’, or discussions centred on sexuality) was Kate Bornstein’s Gender 
Outlaw (1994). In addition to discussing non-binary transgender people and providing 
an academic nucleus for further study (Bornstein and Bergman, 2010; Stryker and 
Whittle, 2006; Hausman, 2001), Bornstein’s work also acted as one of the seminal 
texts in the development of Transgender Studies. This differed from contemporary 
literature of the time by not being driven by postmodern theory explicitly, but was 
rooted in grassroots community voices. Such voices were however potentially informed 
by the postmodernism in queer theory (Rollins and Hirsch, 2003; Nicholson and 
                                                                                                                                
respect and specificity. See Epple, C. 1998. Coming to Terms with Navajo Nádleehí: A 
Critique of Berdache," Gay,"" Alternate Gender," and" Two‐spirit". American Ethnologist. 
25(2), pp.267-290. 
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Seidman, 1995). In addition, Bornstein’s work has been discussed and positioned as 
postmodern, through their radical queerness (Bell, 1994). 
In Gender Outlaw, Bornstein outlines a clear list of ‘social rules of gender’ and how 
non-binary identities challenge or break such statements. By deconstructing the criteria 
that are commonly used to define individuals as being male or female, permission is 
created for non-binary transgender narratives which defied much then-contemporary 
medical intervention, such as active erasure of an individual’s transgender history26.  
Bornstein discusses ‘passing’ (as male or female) both sympathetically and critically. 
On the one hand, “most passing is undertaken in response to the cultural imperative to 
be one gender or the other. In this case passing becomes the outward manifestation of 
shame and capitulation. Passing becomes invisibility. Passing becomes lies. Passing 
becomes self-denial” (Bornstein, 1994, p. 125). Whilst damning the reification of a 
compulsory gender binary (or movement between oppressively gendered categories), 
Bornstein states that to pass is to ‘have’ one’s gender, to be viewed and accepted as 
one wishes to be. Thus, passing by choice in order to validate one’s sense of self is 
firmly differentiated from ‘enforced passing’27. However as one can only pass as man 
or woman due to the entrenched nature of the gender binary, it is currently impossible 
for non-binary people to pass as their identified gender, again as a result of the 
unintelligibility of non-binary as a subject. The potential for such unavoidable erasure to 
cause a minority stress experience (Herman, 2013; Hendricks and Testa, 2012) in non-
binary people places additional emphasis on exploring potentially important modalities 
of stress management, such as queer communities.  
Whilst the vast majority of sociological consideration of gender variance has focused 
exclusively on transgender men and women, there are examples whereby a diversity of 
transgender narratives beyond the gender binary are acknowledged. Ekins and King 
                                            
26 Historically it was deemed necessary by medical practitioners that, in order to be 
socially accepted, transgender people needed to hide their trans status, even 
relocating and establishing an entirely new social network when post-transition. This 
practice has been criticised as preventing the normalisation of transgender narratives, 
as well as limiting transgender communities and political mobilisation by creating 
pressure for self-erasure even from each other. See Namaste, V. 2000. Invisible lives: 
The erasure of transsexual and transgendered people. Chicago, London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
27 The passing of a trans person as the gender they were assigned at birth (that is, 
passing as cisgender) for work, comfort, or safety reasons. An example would be a 
transgender woman ‘passing’ as a man, due to being socially read as male.  
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provide a model that accommodates and explores this in writing of a sociology of 
transgendered bodies (1999). Transition narratives are opened beyond ‘male-to-female’ 
or ‘female-to-male’, but as potentially ‘migratory’, ‘oscillatory’, ‘erasing’, or 
‘transcending’. Gender beyond male and female is directly referenced via the category 
of transcending, allowing space for a sociology of non-binary transgender bodies28. In 
setting up such a framework, Ekins and King proposed the next step to be to “set such 
a psychobiological focus firmly within the study of social interaction, social situation, 
social structure and social system” (Ekins and King, 1999, p. 600) of which medical and 
queer social experiences play a significant part, supporting this project’s lines of 
enquiry. However, Ekins and King do still draw conclusions which make certain 
‘binarising’ assumptions. For example, they make the argument that: 
The critique of the binary gender divide and the ideas of gender fluidity 
and impermanence would seem to rule out surgical and hormonal 
substituting because of their permanent and binary nature. 
(Ekins and King, 1999, p. 597) 
This fails to recognise how only particular combinations of biological traits are 
legitimised as normative (such as breasts, vagina, feminised fat distribution, female 
hair growth patterns). Accessing medical services may result in some biological 
structures/patterns associated with maleness, and others with femaleness (for example, 
taking estrogen and receiving breast implants but retention of the penis and testicles). 
The motivations for accessing or not accessing surgical and hormonal interventions are 
heterogeneous and potentially complex. Finally, in ascribing all hormonal and surgical 
interventions as ‘binary in nature’, Ekins and King are not recognising how it is only 
hegemonic gender discourse that is inscribed onto physiology, and that this may be 
resisted. For example, the queer possibility of ‘breasts’ to be understood as male or 
non-binary, rather than inherently female – granting space for the personal inscription 
of meaning onto bodies, and onto medical interventions. 
An important contribution came from Bilodeau (2005), where explicitly non-binary 
transgender identities were analysed by repurposing the D’Augelli (1994) lifespan 
model of sexual orientation identity development. This analysis came before much of 
the larger empirical studies of binary trans individuals within sociology, contextualising 
why a model for understanding sexual orientation was deployed.  In focusing on 
analysis of two participants, detailed analysis was possible, finding connections with 
                                            
28 That is, the bodies of non-binary trans people, rather than intersex bodies.  
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themes already explored within this chapter, such as negotiation of feminist and trans 
identities, and postmodern gender identification (such as simultaneous identification as 
non-binary and as woman). Valuable support is illustrated for the importance of 
transgender communities in the exploration of non-binary identification, and also 
recognising potential in-group tensions, as one participant suggested how trans women 
may “take much of their [male] privilege with them” (Bilodeau, 2005, p. 42). This 
echoes challenges made to trans women by some cisgender radical feminists (Stone, 
2006), however the positionality as an intracommunity tension deserves greater 
attention. 
Differences in individual’s views regarding the gender binary as constructed or 
essentialised, and the validity of difference between transgender narratives has led to 
problematic hierarchies of ‘transness’ within some transgender communities (Schilt and 
Waszkiewicz, 2006; Roen, 2002). A key example of this is the  phenomenon of 
‘Truscum’ – an online community of binary identified trans men who support the 
medical model of ‘transsexualism’, or consideration of gender dysphoria as a medical 
condition, whilst articulating harsh criticisms of non-binary identities (referred to as 
‘trans-trenders’ and considered inauthentic). The ‘Truscum identity’ operates a politics 
of exclusion that judges the experience of dysphoria and binary identification necessary 
to ‘allow’ an individual to identify as trans (Schmitt, 2013)29 . Such tensions within 
transgender communities are not new, with accounts of post-operative transgender 
women experiencing social exclusion from transgender women who had not had 
surgery (Keatley, 2015). Such developments recognise how the internet is an 
increasingly important site of trans community interactions (Drager, 2012; Pearce, 
2012). 
Investigation into differences between the experiences and identities of binary and non-
binary transgender people has received limited specific attention. One important 
exception is an analysis of the 2008 National Transgender Discrimination Survey by 
Harrison et al. (2012). The data from the 860 respondents who did not identify as ‘man’ 
or ‘woman’ 30  were compared with the 5590 binary trans respondents who did so 
                                            
29 No peer reviewed material yet exists which references the social phenomenon of 
Truscum. Thus further highlights the space for research into the nuances of binary/non-
binary transgender community interactions. 
30 These 860 respondents did not include individuals who were living part time as one 
gender and part time as another, as might be the case with a binary transgender 
person who is not out in some environments such as work, but out in others. 
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identify. A significant observation of the study included these 860 ‘Q3GNLs’31 being 
refused medical service at lower rates, but being more likely to avoid seeking 
professional medical care when sick or injured. It is possible this reflects a greater 
anxiety in non-binary people of ignorance in medical practitioners concerning their 
gender identities, but it is also important to recognise the American cultural context 
within which this research is situated 32 . Q3GNLs were also more likely to have 
attempted suicide when compared to the binary trans population, have higher levels of 
educational attainment, be more likely to have participated in “underground or informal 
economies for income” (Harrison et al., 2012, p. 22) such as sex-work or drug dealing, 
and were significantly less likely to be white, assigned male at birth, or over the age of 
45. Such information may be helpful in contextualising the experiences of non-binary 
communities, as the interactions that people experience (and produce meaning through) 
will be influenced by demographic membership. 
Some important, recent work specifically looking at narratives of non-binary gender 
identities has been conducted by Tracey Yeadon-Lee (2016). Qualitative analysis was 
performed of online forums and blog posts that discussed non-binary identification. 
Analysis of personal negotiations of gender were delineated into two categories, 
younger (twenty-nine and below) and older (thirty and above) generations. Within the 
blogs examined, Yeadon-Lee found evidence that suggested how the wide array of 
identity labels that now exist can be a positive resource fostering self-determination in 
some cases, in others there could be a pressure to ‘find the place you fit’, and feel 
insecurity and uncertainty. Discourses also related back to older binary trans narratives, 
with the suggestion that engaging with these narratives aided in interrogation of the 
internal sense of self, rather than acting to constrain. Yeadon-Lee also discussed how 
labels could create “a sense of outsiderness”, citing a particular blog writer who said “I 
feel like sort of an imposter among non-binaries” (Yeadon-Lee, 2016, p. 29). Instability 
                                            
31 An acronym created and used by the authors standing for ‘Question 3 Gender Not 
Listed’, a reference to respondents’ answers to question three of the survey, where 
non-binary participants indicated their gender identity as neither man nor woman, and 
therefore ‘unlisted’.  
32 Important examples of this include the pervasive culture of religious conservatism 
that exists in certain parts of the United States, which may result in serious fears of 
discrimination, rejection, and ridicule. Also the private healthcare system of the US 
changes the dynamic and implications of receiving healthcare, with poorer individuals 
likely to avoid visiting a doctor if at all possible due to costs (if uninsured or 
underinsured), or due to the risk of losing a job if taking time to attend medical 
appointments, far less possible under the legal framework of the UK. 
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and insecurity of identity, and the (re)production of an artificial hierarchy of transness 
are themes I explore in relation to data this project produced.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the ways in which transgender has been considered 
through academic writing over the past 50 years. This has ranged from the first 
recognition that gender is more than demarcation on the basis of reproductive 
physiology, to postmodern expansions of gender categories, through to the extensive 
empirical attention given to transgender identities, citizenship, and embodiment in 
particular. Whilst valuable in nucleating the shift away from essentialist medical 
discourse, the position of ethnomethodology is rarely seen in contemporary analysis. 
The ethnomethodological enterprise of considering how individuals navigate, and relate 
themselves to social structures/orders was vulnerable to deconstruction popularised by 
queer theory. Thus, there was a shift to the consideration of gender in terms of power 
dynamics between individuals, or through the analysis of subjective experiences of 
interpersonal interactions. This was more compatible with postmodern analysis in that 
focus moved was away from the roles of social structures.  
The value that feminist scholarship has played in situating analyses of transgender in a 
context of wider gender inequalities and emancipatory politics continues to be 
significant, particularly as a system for relating transgender to ideas of race, class, 
disability, sexuality, and other factors through the concept of intersectionality – which 
originated through the work of black feminist thought (McCall, 2005). However there 
remains a thorough lack of literature considering these factors in transgender contexts, 
particularly race. It is no coincidence that early appearances of genderqueer narratives 
closely followed from some of the most significant postmodern contributions. Queer 
communities were collectively influenced by work from individuals such as Butler and 
Bornstein. Therefore these literatures are part of a history of interventions vital for the 
contextualisation of non-binary.  
The development of an empirical sociology of transgender has had specific benefits. 
For example, Love  points out that “accounting for material experience” (Love, 2014, p. 
174, my emphasis) positioned transgender studies as able to more effectively account 
for transgender embodiment. Recognition of the explicit presence of participants not 
identifying as male or female in older research on transgender has demonstrated the 
value that revisiting such work with the benefit of a contemporary lens can provide. 
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Secondly, this grounds this non-binary research within an existing research narrative, 
which is not initially obvious.  
The growth of the sociology of transgender has occurred rapidly over the last 20 years, 
with continued engagement over issues including body image, embodiment, practices 
of care, identity formation and narrative, experiences of discrimination, and how these 
debates have impacted upon communities and policies. However, as I have highlighted, 
there has also remained a lack of empirical attention to the experiences and voices of 
non-binary transgender people in particular, despite their increasing acknowledgement 
within theoretical discussions, and cultural visibility. In the following chapter, I articulate 
the methods and analytical framework used in this project.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
Interactionism insists on being a humble theory, not claiming too much 
and not dealing with major abstractions and false dualisms. Indeed the 
real task of an interactionist is to simply look at social life as people “do 
things together”: its core interests lie in the doing of ethnographies and 
in an intimate familiarity with ongoing social (sexual) worlds. 
(Plummer, 2003, p. 524) 
Introduction 
This chapter will reflect on the project’s research design and execution. Theoretical 
considerations were also central to the process of assessing the ‘fit’ between research 
questions and methods. I begin with an explication of the lens through which this 
research was undertaken, discussing the epistemological position of symbolic 
interactionism. The connection between this approach and the choice of methods – 
diary-keeping and follow-up semi-structured interviews – are then explained.  
The research is then contextualised through discussion of the study’s objectives, and 
their relationships with my research questions. Decisions made in the design and 
practice of this research was informed by minority group insider politics (Kanuha, 2000; 
Zinn, 1979), emphasising the importance of emancipatory political potential in its 
applications, together with ethical rigor. This project used a multi-method approach. I 
then illustrate how this allowed for a synergy which ameliorates some of the limitations 
that can be found when diaries or interviews are used alone. My construction of ‘mixed 
media diaries’, which allowed diary-keepers to record entries via any number of 
creative forms, is explained and justified, together with discussion of semi-structured 
interviews, and how the research was executed. I follow with an explanation of the 
research design. Further, I discuss some important reflexive points that informed my 
decision making, enhancing rapport and access.  
Recruitment of participants is subsequently discussed. Access to non-binary individuals 
was gained through a wide range of leads, which are outlined. Attention is then turned 
to the sample, where I present demographic data on the research participants. I then 
discuss my approach to data analysis, so as to empirically demonstrate trends and 
tensions within the participants’ accounts in relation to queer communities and medical 
practice. Further, the results of ethical decisions such as choice by participants 
regarding their anonymity are reflected upon. This leads into a final, broader discussion 
of ethical considerations. 
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Epistemology of Symbolic Interactionism 
Symbolic interactionism (SI) considers the meanings ascribed to objects and actions by 
social actors. Williams (2008) points out how SI differed from most mid-20th century 
sociological practice, in that it did not make “the epistemological assumption that the 
social sciences could be modelled after the biological and physical sciences to produce 
verifiable “facts” that explain social behaviour and predict future behaviour” (p. 849). SI 
has a history of being anti-positivist33 and interpretive. Further, by using a symbolic 
interactionist framework, I reject the premise that microsociological knowledge can be 
acquired or generated independently from the subject.  
Symbolic interactionism is rooted in the philosophical tradition of Pragmatism. This 
system of thought holds that reality is best understood in terms of the different 
perspectives that individuals may hold, rather than modelling a singular (objectively 
knowable) world. Whilst an objective material world may exist, Pragmatism recognises 
that all understanding of the world must pass through the lens of human experience, 
which is unavoidably constructed and constrained by social context (Hamati-Ataya, 
2014).  
Pragmatists focus on the uses that modes of understanding have, as opposed to 
objectivist attempts to mirror, uncover, or explain some ‘truth’ of reality. No singular 
truth is believed to exist, with personal realities being “actively created as we act in and 
toward the world” (Hewitt, 1984, p. 8). However, the absence of an objective truth 
about the world does not preclude the existence of the world, separate and apart from 
individuals. Rather, individuals act on the basis of the meaning that things have for 
them, and it is this interaction between individual and object that produces meaning 
(Benzies and Allen, 2001). 
Individuals form their views and construct their own truths of the world, on the basis of 
the interactions they experience – with other people, objects, and ideas. The role of 
(social) scientific enquiry thus becomes “a moral endeavour”, concerned not with an 
abstract knowledge production for its own sake, but with the purpose of application to 
the improvement of human lives (Williams, 2008, p. 850). Thus, my theoretical position 
                                            
33 Positivism is an epistemological position which argues that scientific analysis of data 
is the exclusive source of knowledge. Thus the existence of absolute truth is presumed, 
with little to no scope for relativistic positionality. Positivism infers that natural laws may 
be formulated to predict and explain social interactions. This has been widely 
challenged within the social sciences, ranging from Weber’s Verstehen, to the 
formation of critical theory. 
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may be understood as ontologically relativistic – the purported understandings of reality 
are not attempting to access any objective truth, but all have value in and of 
themselves, derived through application.  
During the development of symbolic interactionism, two separate branches of 
pragmatism were used – by Mead (1934) on the one hand, and Dewey (1905) on the 
other. Lewis and Smith argue that Mead’s pragmatism has been conceived as 
philosophical realism 34  which has macro-sociological overtones (Lewis and Smith, 
1980). In contrast, Dewey produced a ‘nominalist’ pragmatism – which recognises 
macro-social structures, but attributes greater importance to individual interactions in 
shaping identities and behaviours (Lewis and Smith, 1980). The use and understanding 
of symbolic interactionism in this work leans towards Dewey’s position, with a focus on 
how the meanings that objects have for individuals are personal and subjective, and 
symbolically associated with objects however the actor interprets (Ritzer, 2008). 
Qualitative methods are most often chosen when using a symbolic interactionist 
framework, due to their usefulness in elucidating nuanced analysis from 
microsociological interactions. Utilising diaries as a method creates a shift from 
“participant observation towards the observation of participation” (Tedlock, 1991, p. 69). 
Tedlock describes how this change also alters the research dynamic away from a 
researcher-self versus researched-other to a “single narrative ethnography” (p. 69). 
This allows for co-production of knowledge between participants and investigator, fitting 
with the epistemological premise within SI that “rejects the idea of a disembodied 
researcher” (Williams, 2008, p. 849). Further, this assists in avoiding a problematic 
power dynamic that can be seen particularly in historical medical research on (rather 
than with) trans people, and has led to alienation and suspicion of researchers among 
some in the trans community (Tagonist, 2009). 
Symbolic interactionism is epistemologically well suited to the study of gender, and has 
previously been rehabilitated in order to act as a framework for a feminist sociology of 
sexuality (Jackson and Scott, 2010). In arguing that interactionism accounts for the 
processes by which sexuality is constituted through cultural, interpersonal, and 
intrapsychic interactions35, the same approach can be followed in an analysis of (non-
                                            
34 Realism places an emphasis on societal structures and the ways in which control 
and influence occurs over individuals.  
35 Jackson and Scott draw on Gagnon and Simon’s 1974 work Sexual Conduct in 
considering these three categories as the key divisions of ‘scripting’, that is “the 
application of sociocultural scripts that imbue [objects] with meaning” (2010, p. 814). 
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binary) gender identities. Jackson and Scott also draw some comparisons between 
Postmodern and Interactionist social construction (Gagnon and Simon, 1973), though 
specifically with reference to Foucault. The most critical comparison by Jackson and 
Scott explains that “Foucault’s terminology does not permit a distinction between sex 
as erotic acts and sensations, and sex as sex difference – what we would call gender” 
(2010, p. 819). Whilst this can be resolved, it is argued that it is at the expense of 
broader conceptualisation and investigation of the nuances of gender in social 
interactions. The argument that interactionism accounts for the processes through 
which sexuality is constituted can be followed in an analysis of gender identity.  
As non-binary narratives have little specific precedent as a named category, the stories 
participants tell in relation to identity illustrate new possibilities of being. Plummer 
asserts that “for narratives to flourish there must be a community to hear” (1995, p. 87), 
which highlights how structuring the research to consider queer communities in 
particular has epistemological justification. The growing significance of non-binary 
identity labels (Williams, 2014) also reflects the ontological importance which the 
epistemological position of SI grants. This articulation of real life experiences 
necessitated Plummer to ask “how might stories work to perform conservative functions 
maintaining dominant orders, and how might they be used to resist or transform lives 
and cultures?” (1995, p. 25).   
Plummer explains how the telling of some stories can empower, whilst others can 
reduce possibilities or exert control (1995, p. 123). In drawing from Jackson and Scott’s 
analysis of SI for sociological consideration of sexuality (2010), I likewise use 
interactionism to consider the ‘cultural, interpersonal, and intrapsychic processes’ 
which influence non-binary identities. Indeed, Harrison et al. specifically state that this 
awaits further study when asking “how does nuance or multiplicity in gender identity 
and expression play out when interacting with gender policing structures and forces?” 
(2012, p. 20). Thus the epistemological relationship between this project’s methods and 
questions strengthens claims of effective knowledge production, via theory-driven 
method selection, and question articulation.  
                                                                                                                                
Cultural interactions are had between the individual and social structures, such as a 
government. The interpersonal indicates those interactions that occur between an actor 
and other individuals, whilst the intrapsychic is when an individual introspects, viewing 
the self from a third person perspective. 
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Research Objectives 
The overarching objective of this research was to explore factors important for people 
negotiating non-binary gender identities. The discussions of previous scholarship on 
transgender supports the argument that access to gender affirming medical services is 
essential for those who experience gender dysphoria (Richards et al., 2015; Bouman et 
al., 2010). Additionally, due to the multifaceted stigma, discrimination, and inequalities 
trans people can experience in everyday life, community interaction is of critical 
importance for many in resisting the impact of minority stress, and being validated or 
reassured (Hackimer and Proctor, 2015; Pilecki, 2015; Hines, 2010). Focussing on 
these two critically important milieus of queer communities and medical practice 
allowed for enough specificity to comparatively analyse participant data. In keeping 
with the pragmatic goals of symbolic interactionism, this research aims to illustrate non-
binary views and experiences36 of social interactions and processes, in order to offer 
recommendations for their improvement. 
Taylor and Whittier state that “to understand any politicized identity community, it is 
necessary to analyse the social and political struggle that created the identity” (1992, p. 
352). Queer communities and medical practice were selected as potentially important 
sites impacting non-binary identity negotiation, due to precedent from binary 
transgender narratives of the importance of such contexts (Schmitt, 2013; Hines, 2010; 
2007a; 2007b; Bauer et al., 2009; Gagné et al., 1997). This is not to say that other 
potential avenues of focus – such as experiences in the workplace, of family, youth or 
old-age, or of education – lack importance. However, discourses around transition and 
community are by far the most overarching contexts of transgender research, due to 
their extensive and heterogeneous relevance in the attainment of needed or preferred 
embodiment, social inclusion and legitimacy. Such an objective informed the 
construction of the research questions: 
 How are non-binary identified individuals involved with and integrated into queer 
communities? 
 How do non-binary identified individuals negotiate existing medical practices?  
 What does the emergence of non-binary gender identities imply for queer 
community organisation and activism?  
                                            
36  This includes infrequent interactions, such as a potential GIC appointment or 
significant GP appointment, and everyday or frequent interactions, such as talking with 
friends.  
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 What does the emergence of non-binary gender identities imply for trans/queer 
healthcare? 
These questions can be grouped as two pairs. The first pair was conceived to consider 
non-binary participant’s interactions with queer communities, and medical practice, 
respectively. The questions necessitate attention to how non-binary people respond to 
and feel about the interactions they have within these contexts, and how their 
conceptions of such communities and medical practice (and of themselves) are 
accordingly shaped. Whilst this first pair of questions looks at how communities and 
medicine impact non-binary people, the second pair looks at how non-binary as a 
phenomenon is impacting communities and medicine. In answering the second pair of 
questions, analytical attention is turned to how these interactions, meanings, and 
realities can be interpreted and acted upon in wider social contexts. The data 
generated were not only reliant upon the participants and researcher, time and place of 
the research, but also the methods selected and methodological decisions made during 
the research process. Recognition of the subjectively situated nature of the knowledge 
produced however, does not serve to limit its applicability, but indeed strengthens its 
sociological nuance within an interactionist tradition. 
Mixed Media Diaries – Adding New Dimensions to Participant Voices 
Participants were invited to express themselves freely during the period of diary-
keeping, and could articulate their thoughts and feelings utilising any media they 
preferred. Resultant data included hand-written prose, typed prose, audio recording, 
poetry, doodles, collages, photography, and drawings37. The goal of this was to allow 
participants to express themselves in the manner with which they felt most comfortable 
and able, so as not to inherently privilege any one mode of communication above 
another. 
Using diary-keeping as a research method provided a range of advantages for this 
research. Alaszewski points out how diaries “provide a rich source of data for 
researchers who wish to explore the development of an individual life, and the activities 
and relationships of particular groups in society” (2006, p. 33). As the research 
questions specify that the key points of interest are how participants’ gender identities 
are negotiated in relation to particular settings, a method allowing participants to record 
                                            
37 Examples of audio recording – which were vocal, rather than musical – were not 
ultimately used within the final analysis. However this data did still serve to influence 
my thinking, and enrich my reflection on non-binary perceptions.  
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interactions they deemed relevant resulted in both detailed and highly varied data. 
Further, Bolger et al. point out how diaries allow “the examination of reported events 
and experiences in their natural, spontaneous context” (2003, p. 580), reducing the 
time between an experience occurring and it being recorded. Research methods such 
as interviews or focus groups in isolation are comparably disadvantaged, as greater 
retrospection is relied upon in participant recall. By these methods’ natures, gaps and 
inaccuracies in recall of a longitudinal account are considerably more likely. 
Hyers et al. (2006) note in their discussion of using daily diaries to examine every-day 
prejudice-related experiences that retrospective methods, such as interviews, tended to 
result in the discussion of more extreme and unusual happenings due to their 
memorable nature. This potentially obscures more routine happenings and interactions, 
which are important sites of identity negotiation. Hyers et al. also mention how the 
discussions of some particularly sensitive topics may mean “that coping mechanisms, 
including efforts at sense making, may create distortions in recall.” (2006, p. 317). The 
diary method encourages participants to create a record of their thoughts and feelings 
in relation to their gender identities soon after an interaction. Thus, one can gain 
access to a more intimate and detailed sense of the social phenomena under study. 
This is the case whether that interaction is with an institution or social structure, 
another person, or within oneself – the cultural, interpersonal, and intrapsychic, 
respectively (Jackson and Scott, 2010). 
Precedent for the use of diaries which go beyond text can be seen in the work of Bragg 
and Buckingham (2008), who used scrapbook-style diaries to conduct media research 
with young people. Bragg and Buckingham followed this with interviews, focus groups, 
and surveys, highlighting how diaries in research can synergise with a multi-method 
research design. When commenting on the outcomes of their research, Bragg and 
Buckingham noted that the ‘voices’ that emerged from the scrapbooks could be very 
different when placed in the interview environment – “some wrote extensively in their 
scrapbooks but were shy in interviews, and vice versa” (2008, p. 121). This evidences 
that combining methods which offer different modalities of expression increases the 
ability of participants to express themselves clearly – helping to access a wider range 
of voices, and thus richer data. The method thus allows for patterns to be examined in 
the experiences and feelings of non-binary people, whilst recognising the power of 
individual voices (Karnieli-Miller et al., 2009). Flexibility as to how diaries could be 
recorded also served to be emancipatory through the lens of disability, as multiple 
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participants expressed that producing data with a computer helped mitigate both 
dyslexia, and CFS38  
Additionally, I would suggest that the method is particularly appropriate for transgender 
research. Ken Plummer points out that “sociology could learn some lessons… from 
queer theory” (2003, p. 522). He is particularly referencing how innovative methods 
such as “drama, personal narrative with multiple voices, and poetry” (2003, p. 522) 
have been used to improve access to marginalised voices. This destabilises 
hegemonic notions of ‘correct form’ within the research paradigm, opening up new 
possibilities. This can also be applied to interviewing practices (Kong et al., 2001).  
The use of diaries to produce reflections upon social interactions is another factor that 
places my methods in constructive synergy with SI. Plummer (1990) has written on 
how Blumer used life histories, and one can regard diary entries as a partial telling of a 
period of one’s life (Bolger et al., 2003). Plummer himself has set a precedent as a 
symbolic interactionist ethnographer using narratives (specifically, the telling of stories) 
to investigate questions of sex and sexuality (Plummer, 1995). Indeed, Plummer states 
that he takes as his topic “the personal experience narratives of the intimate” (Plummer, 
1995, p. 19) – which also accurately describes the non-binary gender identity 
narratives accessed in this research. The link between interviews and SI has been 
similarly made, with Miller and Glassner stating how “interview subjects construct not 
just narratives, but social worlds” (1997). By this, Miller and Glassner indicate that 
interviews can access a view of meanings ascribed to social worlds, experiences or 
events, people, and indeed symbols generally. 
Semi-Structured Interviews – Collaborative Construction of Data 
The importance and extent of interview use within sociology is captured by Benney and 
Hughes’ (1956) claim that “sociology has become the science of the interview” (p. 137). 
Many forms of interviewing have been deployed within sociology (Kajornboon, 2005) in 
a manner dependent on the research questions. Semi-structured interviews involve the 
researcher having prepared topics and questions for discussion, but with topic 
deviation and substantial difference between participant interviews being permissible 
(Fylan, 2005). The focus on participant identities positions semi-structured interviews 
as an apt choice, due to the flexibility this method may accommodate. 
                                            
38 Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, also called ME – Myalgic Encephalomyelitis. 
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The use of follow-up semi-structured interviews is highly compatible with diaries, as 
limitations encountered when using each method alone may be avoided, by filling each 
other’s gaps. Bolger et al. (2003) note how personality factors of participants (such as 
conscientiousness or forgetfulness when engaging with diary-keeping) or health factors 
(such as cognitive impairments, or addictions) may create selective biases in diary data. 
In contrast, the environment of the interview means that data production is more 
structured, able to be observed directly, and ‘guided’ by the researcher to some extent. 
Further, whilst diaries allowed for detailed recall and reflection upon events and 
experiences whilst relatively fresh in participants’ minds, the opportunity to reflect upon 
and discuss interactions at a later time in the interview setting allowed access to a 
different set of related data (Elliott, 1997).  
In order to minimise disruption when interviewing participants, I travelled to locations 
convenient and local to them wherever possible. However, lack of mutually possible 
meeting times and restrictive travel costs meant that video interviews via Skype were 
used as a cost and time-effective solution. Concerns over potentially significant 
differences between remote and in-person interviews have been raised (Irvine et al., 
2013). It has been argued that synchronous (real-time) environments using video are, 
whilst not identical to face-to-face interviewing, are significantly similar – particularly 
when the interview is unstructured or semi-structured (Sullivan, 2012; Berg, 2007). By 
ensuring a two-way video link, body language and facial expression could be seen by 
both researcher and participant, allowing a closer approximation to interaction in 
person. Whilst drawbacks have also been identified in using Skype interviews such as 
increased risk of withdrawal, or technological difficulties acting as a barrier to rapport 
(Deakin and Wakefield, 2014), many of these were ameliorated by earlier interactions 
with participants in relation to making interview arrangements, and during the diary 
phase of research.  
The interview gave the opportunity for diary contents to be discussed, allowing for 
reflection from participants, and questions related to their diary specifically, as well as 
for questions to be structured around themes that emerged from all participant 
responses overall. By this logic, considerations of non-binary identity inspired from 
diary entries could then be tested and refined in the interview settings, so as to 
cogently articulate themes for analysis.  
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Research Design – Data Collection Strategy and Practicalities 
The diaries were kept by participants for four months. This time-frame was chosen so 
as to strike a balance between enough time for the potentiality of community and/or 
medical ‘events’ to occur, but without being so long as to unreasonably burden 
participants. The use of diary-keeping over a four month period is an example of an 
intensive, short-term, longitudinal method (Fraley and Hudson, 2014). This allows not 
only for frequent and ongoing reflection on lived experiences, but for participants to 
potentially revisit their diaries prior to their return in order to make amendments, or 
produce entries inspired by their own earlier contributions. The function of the semi-
structured interviews to discuss diary contents and collaboratively produce meanings 
with participants that occurred during the diary keeping (and more generally) allowed 
for multiple levels of insight into participant experiences and perceptions. Whilst the 
diaries in and of themselves emphasised freedom of direction and depth, the interviews 
complemented this through more targeted questioning, and the clarifying benefit of 
dialogue. The fixed length of time for the diary-keeping period positioned the research 
design as time-based (rather than event-based, whereby a certain minimum number of 
predefined occurrences are needed to trigger the end of data production), in order to 
allow participants definitive knowledge of the length of their participation (Iida et al., 
2012). The emphasis on the depth of data rather than quantity of infrequent events 
(such as potentially GIC appointments, or other necessary medical care) so as to 
reduce the timeframe of fieldwork also has the benefit of greater accessibility for those 
who experienced barriers to the ease of recording their diaries.  
Each participant was posted an A5, 192 page, lined, hardback notebook to use during 
the project. It was made clear that use of the provided book was not compulsory. 
Articulating to participants that entries could be instead be produced using other media, 
particularly on computers, was important to maximise the potential range of expression 
seen in the diaries. Each diary included three pages of guidance, for referral during the 
project (appendix 5). This contained open-ended advice on the topics of consideration, 
as well as protocol for practicalities including naming any computer files and saving 
digital diary entries, and how to return the diaries at the end of the recording period.  
Diaries were posted to participant’s addresses of choice, using a name specified for 
this purpose by each participant. This was an important factor to consider, as name-
use may be situational and conditional for transgender people, particularly if not ‘out’. 
Some participants used names for postage that differed from the name they wished to 
be referred by in all other contexts, such as during email correspondence.  
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Participants were encouraged to write (or otherwise produce entries) in their diaries as 
frequently as possible, without being made to feel pressured to produce data. During 
recruitment, many of the participants asked how often they should use their diaries. 
This was indicative of a range of concerns, including whether they would have enough 
time to commit to the project, and anxiety over having ‘enough’ to say. Whilst I 
emphasised that there was no ‘correct’ way to use the diary, I suggested that being 
able to produce something every week would be desired, but that I also recognised 
some people might prefer fewer, longer entries whilst others may favour producing a 
larger number of smaller pieces. I thus needed to negotiate the tension between 
participants being given space to tell their stories in their own ways, whilst not being 
unclear such that participants lacked direction or experienced uncertainty about what to 
do. 
Engagement with diaries was encouraged by sending weekly ‘reminder’ emails to 
participants. The decision to do this is supported by work done by Horvath et al. (2007), 
who received all diaries back on time except one, which was only a day late (out of a 
total of 26) when sending daily email reminders.  In comparison to a previous study 
(Usdan et al., 2004) which did not send email reminders, an 82% non-completion rate 
was seen.  
Weekly emails also acted as a useful way to develop rapport with participants, many of 
whom would reply to these messages. I ensured that the content of the messages 
differed every week, in order to avoid immediate deletion without being opened, or 
seen as irrelevant or annoying. In these messages I would offer potential suggestions 
of how the project might be approached, and also provided links to online material 
concerning diaries, or queer content that I thought might be found interesting. Finn for 
example said of the emails “they're really helping me structure some entries and know 
what's relevant to put in”. Alex responded to one weekly reminder that they felt “a bit 
adrift” and that they “just worry about putting stuff that isn’t going to be of any use”. 
Whilst this demonstrated Alex’s commitment through their concern, it was also a useful 
chance to attempt to reassure, and offer guidance and advice which may have helped 
Alex in engaging with the diary-keeping. Many of the participants used the weekly 
emails as a way to ‘check in’, offering their assurances that the diary had been 
received at the outset, and they were engaging with the project. In order to allow time 
for organisation, I used the final month of the reminder emails to prompt arrangements 
for conducting an interview with each participant. 
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Upon completion of the diary-keeping period, participants returned their diaries using a 
pre-paid stamped addressed envelope (included when diaries were sent out). Those 
participants who made diary entries digitally returned their entries by email. In advance 
of the interviews taking place, all participant diaries were read, in order to produce a 
general interview guide (appendix 6). Before each interview, additional questions were 
added which related to the specific content of the individual participant’s diary – such 
as clarification or discussion of diary entries. Thus, guides were idiosyncratic, yet 
maintained comparable themes through the relationships observed between diary 
entries and the original research questions. Interviews were conducted in different 
locations at the convenience and comfort of participants. This included private meeting 
rooms booked at the University of Leeds, or public spaces such as cafes. Participants 
assured their comfort with interview locations prior to conduct. In cases where it was 
not possible for a face-to-face meeting for the interview, video calls via Skype were 
used. Six out of the eighteen interviews were remotely performed by this method. 
The number of questions prepared for each interview also allowed for an approximation 
of how long interviews would take, which was useful for both researcher and participant 
(Turner, 2010). Interviews were estimated to take one hour, although most participants 
were both able and willing to continue beyond this (in cases where a participant 
needed to finish by a certain time, these times constraints were observed). Interview 
length ranged from 47 to 140 minutes, with an average length of 90 minutes. The 
extensive nature of these interviews was a result of the depth and breadth of the 
majority of the participants’ answers, and the passion with which interviews were 
approached. 
Recruitment of Participants 
Emmel has highlighted how consideration of the practicalities of sample size is given 
relatively little attention, and that “to ask how big the sample size is or how many 
interviews are enough is to pose the wrong question. It is far more useful to show the 
ways in which the working and reworking of relationships between ideas and evidence 
in the research are a foundation for the claims made from that research” (Emmel, 2013, 
p. 137). This relates strongly to the notion of theoretical saturation, the assertion that 
an increase in the sample size will not generate significantly new codes/points of 
theoretical import (Guest et al., 2006). This concept is rooted in the context of work 
utilising grounded theory, and thus does not consider the additional dimension of a 
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multi-method approach. However the concept can still inform sample size decision-
making, by giving a sense of the ratio of labour to yielded themes.  
Guest et al. conducted sixty interviews, coding and analysing in batches of six, so that 
originality of contribution and redundancy could be looked at in terms of both individual 
codes, and their relative importance. Whilst there is an (arguably arbitrary and under-
evidenced) precedent for sample sizes of thirty within postdoctoral qualitative projects 
(Mason, 2010), Guest et al. found the yield of theoretically significant codes dropping 
off as early as following twelve interviews. With this evidence born in mind, a sample 
size of twenty-five participants was originally selected. Given the large time investment 
required by participants, this number was chosen to allow for enough data to still be 
produced should several participants choose to withdraw, fail to submit diary entries, or 
if multiple participants only produce a very limited number of entries.  
With hindsight this was a prudent decision, as seven participants withdrew from the 
project at various stages, leaving a final sample of eighteen participants. This was for a 
range of reasons, including feeling unable to dedicate enough time to the project, 
personal reasons, and in one case, loss of the diary and unwillingness to perform a 
stand-alone interview. One participant, Jess, also lost her diary, but was willing to be 
interviewed for the project. Thus, seventeen diaries and eighteen interviews comprised 
the final data set.  
In order to recruit participants, I produced a poster for use in both physical and digital 
spaces (appendix 1). In order to simplify the poster, the only criterion for participation 
mentioned was ‘identifying outside of the gender binary’, with the intention to explain 
further details and requirements upon expression of interest. The poster also explained 
briefly what participants would be asked to do, and provided contact details, and a 
reference number to prove the ethical approval of the work by The University of Leeds. 
I also produced an information sheet, which was provided to any potential participants 
who made enquiries about the project (appendix 4). The information sheet spanned 
two A4 pages (in the original format), so as to avoid inundating potential participants 
with too much information. I included an explanation of what the project was 
investigating and why, along with full eligibility criteria, what was required of 
participants, and a description of participant rights including withdrawal, and anonymity. 
In order to recruit from communities, I produced a template email to be sent to online 
groups to request circulation of my poster within their membership (appendix 2). These 
documents were all ethically reviewed and found satisfactory by the University of Leeds 
(AREA) Research Ethics Committee.  
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Recruitment of participants was pursued through multiple avenues. These include 
networking at queer oriented activist and academic events. I used pre-existing 
networks with The University of Cambridge and the University of Leeds LGBTQ 
societies. In addition, I made contact with non-binary groups and spaces, both 
physically and digitally. Building on this, snowball sampling from individuals accessed 
in these ways allowed further access to non-binary members of LGBTQ communities 
and friendship networks (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Calls for participation were also 
spread through digital networks such as Facebook, Tumblr, and Twitter, with requests 
for people to share the information widely. 
A potential limitation of snowball sampling is that data may lack variation, and 
insufficiently reflect the demographic under consideration (Biernacki and Waldorf, 
1981). This is due to recruitment occurring within networks of individuals likely to be 
demographically similar. It must be remembered that no piece of research can claim to 
be ‘truly’ or ‘completely’ representative. Here I am drawing on Haraway’s feminist 
concept of situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988), in that knowledge generated is not 
positioned as generalisable ‘fact’, but can be used to inform theorisation – in this case, 
processes of identity negotiation. The synergy of recruitment methods I used provided 
a sample with reasonable cross-demographic variation, considering the non-binary 
population is relatively small in comparison to research involving cisgender men and 
women. Estimating the size of the non-binary population is extremely difficult due to 
lack of reliable data and lack of cultural intelligibility, as well as shifting definitions of 
categorisation. However, detailed community-oriented work estimates the non-binary 
population as up to 0.4% (Titman, 2014). The reachable population for research will be 
significantly smaller. 
Three specific non-binary oriented groups were approached, with requests to distribute 
information on the project to their membership. These were Non-Binary South West, 
the Non-Binary Inclusion Project, and the UK Non-Binary/GQ meet-up network (which 
exists specifically as a closed Facebook group, but which I was able to access with the 
assistance of existing connections). The project was also posted on the ‘Beyond the 
Binary’ working group Facebook page. My recruitment poster was also displayed in the 
CliniQ waiting room in London, the only UK sexual health service aimed specifically for 
queer and transgender people.  
Posting on social media was an effective method of recruitment, with friends and 
community members reposting information to give a wider pool of potential interest. 
Digital recruitment methods did however highlight the importance of appreciating the 
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loss of control the researcher experiences over where a call for participants may be 
shared. This was brought to my attention when I received multiple enquiries by e-mail 
from interested persons in the United States, despite my project recruiting from people 
living in the UK only. The inclusion of this criterion was in order to make the broad 
cultural context of the research more consistent and comparable across the sample.  
Reflexive Positioning 
Having been defined as the “thoughtful, self-aware analysis of the intersubjective 
dynamics between researcher and the researched” (Finlay and Gough, 2003, p. ix), 
reflexivity offers important ways to perform social scientific research with heightened 
ethical considerations (Wasserfall, 1993). The demand for greater and sometimes 
difficult reflection from the researcher is an attempt to sensitively address power 
relations between researchers and their subjects/collaborators (England, 1994) – 
particularly where participants are already members of a disenfranchised population, 
as is the case for the non-binary transgender people in this research. 
It has been argued that whilst ‘being reflexive’ is often recognised as important in social 
scientific research, the practicalities of ‘doing reflexivity’ have not been emphasised 
(Mauthner and Doucet, 2003). Scholars can still problematically infer that “the 
researcher, the method and the data are separate entities rather than reflexively 
interdependent and interconnected” (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003, p. 414). With this in 
mind, my personal relationship with this project is significant and necessitates 
contextualisation. Whilst this thesis is not an auto-ethnographic piece of work, my 
history and identity have influenced important dimensions such as participant access 
and interactions.  
My experiences of transgender narratives have been highly personal and poignant. I 
shared a long term relationship with a binary trans man, during which time I indirectly 
experienced some of the emotional and bureaucratic difficulties of gender transition 
through the NHS. This was illustrative of the potential for systemic road blocks to 
progression, or unequal treatment between cis and trans patients under current policy 
and practice. In addition to this, I mourned the suicide of a close transgender friend, 
who had not only grappled with accessing medical services but also struggled with 
unrelated mental health conditions, compounded by transphobic stigma. Such personal 
exposure to the tremendous difficulties that trans people can experience, and the 
deficiencies in systems designed to provide support, means that I situate my research 
also within an activist tradition – in that the production of social change is as vital as the 
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production of knowledge (Warner, 2013; Ackerly and True, 2010). Further, my 
positionality in having a non-binary gender identity has synergised with these personal 
motivations in producing robust and rigorous scholarship in recognition and support of 
people’s lives.  
Audrey Kobayashi has discussed the negotiation of the personal and the political in 
critical qualitative research, in the context of her as a researcher introspecting on the 
wellbeing of her participants (Kobayashi, 2001). Valuably, Kobayashi underscores the 
importance of both understanding and taking responsibility for how one may set in 
motion complex emotions, that ‘flow back and forth’ in the course of a research 
encounter. Whilst this may be more obvious in the context of an interview and how 
respondents may feel about personal questions concerning identity, diary-keeping also 
entailed a potential impact. Such considerations shaped the ethical dimensions of my 
methodology. 
Ethical Considerations  
Before this research was conducted, the project was reviewed by the University of 
Leeds (AREA) Research Ethics Committee. The reference code given to this research 
was AREA 14-044. I structured the research to grant as much autonomy as possible to 
participants, without incorporating unacceptable levels of risk.  
A range of safeguards were used to protect participants from potential harm. All 
participants were required to sign a consent form before official recognition of their 
participation (appendix 3). This explicitly stated that participants were not required to 
share anything (in written/artistic form in the diaries or verbal form in the interviews) 
which they did not feel comfortable with. I outlined the right to withdraw from the project, 
with a specific deadline of one month following the date of the interview. Justification of 
this deadline was that proximity to the final submission of the PhD thesis would 
threaten the project, if too little data remained without time for replacements to be 
found. However, no participants withdrew consent following their interview. Participants 
could also change their anonymity status (becoming anonymous when formerly 
identifiable or vice versa) during the three months following their interview. The 
difference in dates reflected the comparative ease in anonymising/de-anonymising a 
participant relative to complete removal and replacement of an individual in the 
research. 
Within my paradigm of working with participants rather than ‘studying subjects’, I 
considered it a reasonable ethical decision to give participants the choice of whether to 
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be identifiable or not. The ethical consideration of that decision has been academically 
explored (Giordano et al., 2007). By assuming the state of anonymity to be essential, 
researchers risk “acting paternalistically and might be denying participants’ autonomy... 
and/or depriving participants of a “voice” that confers personal meaning to their 
enjoinment to the research and its effect(s), outcomes, and goals” (Giordano et al., 
2007, p. 265).  
Whilst I do not claim that allowing participants to share their names is always ethically 
justifiable, this is a context-dependent decision that must be critically considered in 
relation to risk. Given that only first names were used in this work, there exists no risk 
of identity theft, and I have no reason to doubt or question the ability of participants to 
accurately assess the meanings or impacts that real name use could have. Participants 
also were given the option to choose their pseudonym, if one was used. This further 
emphasised their collaborative involvement and autonomy. I chose pseudonyms for 
participants who did not wish to be identified and did not express any pseudonym 
preference. Of the eighteen participants, eight elected to be anonymised with ten 
choosing to be identifiable, demonstrating a slim majority of participants felt safe in 
being identifiable, and appreciated the option. Several participants were glad to choose 
their own pseudonyms as it allowed them expression though the choice of a name they 
liked, or which held some personal significance.  
Each method used had specific ethical considerations. As the diaries contained 
information on participants’ gender identities (a personal and potentially sensitive topic), 
I advised participants to be mindful of when and where they wrote, and how they stored 
their diaries. In the case of handwritten diaries, participants were advised to keep them 
in a safe and secure location. For entries written or produced on a computer, I advised 
that files were stored in a well-hidden folder, or password protected to ensure privacy. 
These precautions were particularly salient for participants who were not fully ‘out’. 
Upon receiving diaries (digital or handwritten) I stored all data in password protected 
files and in a locked filing cabinet respectively. Similarly, consent forms from 
participants were kept in a locked filing cabinet.  
Interviews also followed practices of sensitivity to ensure participant comfort during 
discussions. The negotiation of a non-binary transgender identity may be considered a 
sensitive topic, due to participants potentially having experiencing stigma, 
discrimination, or other upsetting associations in relation to trans status (Lee, 1993). 
Before each interview began it was clearly communicated to each participant that they 
did not have to answer anything they were not comfortable answering, and they did not 
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have to give any reason for doing so. Further, they could end the interview at any time, 
without communicating a reason. Participants had the right to refuse consent for 
particular topics of conversation to be written about, without necessarily fully 
withdrawing from the project. These explicitly communicated concerns for participant 
well-being served to reassure participants and add to rapport-building.  
Building Rapport Throughout the Project 
Schuman draws attention to the importance of language in the research encounter, in 
saying “all answers depend upon the way a question is formulated. Language is not a 
clean logical tool like mathematics that we can use with precision... as if this complexity 
were not enough, our answers are also influenced by who asked the question” 
(Schuman, 1982, pp. 22-23). Therefore, given the comparably extensive contact 
between researcher and participants prior to interview (via email), the development of 
rapport over this time was important for the interviews’ success. Rapport was 
developed during the recruitment and diary-keeping phases by engaging with 
participants with respect and reciprocity, which synergises with feminist ethical 
practices (Oakley and Roberts, 1981). Where asked, I shared of my personal 
experiences and motivations with participants. Due to the interviews being undertaken 
after the diary-keeping period, some important interaction with participants had already 
occurred when participants enquired about participation, and via email in the form of 
the weekly email prompts. During recruitment for example, Leon wished to ask me a 
range of questions, to inform their decision about participating: 
Before I go any further, though, I wonder if you could let me know a bit 
more about yourself.  What brought you to this research?  What do you 
hope to achieve and what impact do you hope your research will 
have?  How did you come to your research methods and what 
challenges do you envisage this particular methodology posing?  What 
ideas/theories/scholars/writers (academic and non-academic) have 
inspired you? 
Answering Leon’s questions in detail served to reassure them that my work was 
sympathetic towards non-binary emancipatory politics, rather than critical or 
transphobic, as with some scholarship that has come before (Jeffreys, 2014; Raymond, 
1979). My willingness to answer questions and discuss what brought me to a study of 
transgender lives, and the political convictions which guide my approach, served to 
improve both my access to, and interactions with participants. 
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It was important to continue to build a sense of trust and rapport with participants 
during the interviews. This was partly fostered through beginning the interaction by 
thanking the participant for their time and effort with the diary, and to affirm the pronoun 
they wished to be used. Whilst in the context of an interview referring to the participant 
in the third person generally did not come up, it was important for accurate writing 
about participant’s interviews and diaries. Further, this demonstrated to participants the 
centrality of their validity and respect in this research. 
Participant Demographic Information 
The below table summarises the participants who contributed to this research, and 
central demographic information that was collected following receipt of signed consent 
forms. When anonymity is listed as ‘yes’, the name shown is a pseudonym. 
Pseudonyms followed by an asterisk were chosen by the participant, un-asterisked 
pseudonyms were chosen by the researcher. Thus of the eight participants desiring 
anonymity, four elected to choose their pseudonyms. 
Name Anonymous? Age Town/City/County Pronoun(s) 
Alex No 20 South Yorkshire/Leeds They, he 
Ash No 33 Northamptonshire They 
Bobby Yes 23 Surrey They 
Charlie No 21 Nottingham They 
David Yes 31 London They 
Finn No 22 Sheffield/Leeds They 
Frankie No 25 London They 
Hal Yes 42 London They 
Jamie Yes 24 York They 
Jen No 29 Leeds She 
Jess No 26 Manchester She, they 
Leon* Yes 34 Nottingham They 
Mark No 43 Norwich He 
Pig No 30 Manchester They, it 
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Rachel* Yes 28 Manchester They 
Ricky* Yes 43 Nottingham They 
V* Yes 28 Nottinghamshire He 
Zesty No 22 Cairo/Leeds They, any 
Table 4: Participant names, anonymity, ages, locations, and pronouns. 
An interesting detail was that multiple participants felt able to use their name as their 
pseudonym, due to the name they identified with being chosen, and different from that 
given to them at birth. In some cases (such as Pig, for example), this chosen name 
would not be recognisable to anyone from whom anonymity would be desirable, but 
would be recognisable to those who knew them in queer communities (who they did 
not feel a need to be anonymised from). Names could thus disrupt the 
‘anonymised/identifiable’ binary, through their intelligibility in some contexts, but not in 
others.  
Participants lived in a total of twelve different cities or regions. Counties were used in 
cases where individuals lived in a location smaller than a city, in order to protect 
location privacy where necessary. The age range represented was 20-43, with a mean 
age of 29.1, and a median age of 28. Ages were recorded at the point of recruitment to 
the project. Whilst it could be argued that this data set does not provide adequate 
representation of older non-binary people, research by Harrison et al. demonstrated 
that (in a North American cultural context) non-binary people were significantly less 
likely to be over the age of 45 (Harrison et al., 2012). An explanation of this may be due 
to the way language use has changed with relation to transgender and gender variant 
people over the past several decades. This is similar to how ‘transgender’ has 
increasingly replaced the older term ‘transsexual’ both within academic literature, and 
as an identity label (Stryker, 2008a). The specific ‘naming’ of non-binary/genderqueer 
people is recent in Western contexts. As Plummer would put it, shifts in language have 
only recently allowed such stories to be told (1995). Older people are considerably less 
likely to associate with labels which were not known or not used for much of their lives, 
with ‘queer’ in particular being understood as a slur, more exclusively. Indeed, 
Plummer says “I feel that the use of the word “queer” is a younger person’s game. 
Knowing the history of the word, and how it was used on my childhood playgrounds, I 
found it very hard to use for a long while. Even now, I use it reluctantly” (Plummer, 
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2003, p. 521). Therefore this sample arguably offers a reasonable age range over 
those who identify with the term non-binary. 
The following demographic data shows participant ethnicities, educational attainment, 
sexuality, and whether they had any experience with keeping a diary prior to this 
project: 
Name Race/Ethnicity Education Sexuality Kept a diary? 
Alex White Welsh Undergrad in 
progress 
Queer In the past 
Ash White A-levels Fluid In the past 
Bobby White British Undergrad in 
progress 
Pansexual In the past 
Charlie White British Undergrad in 
progress 
Queer In the past 
David White other Masters Gay Blog project 
Finn White British Undergrad in 
progress 
Queer Yes 
Frankie White British Undergrad Dyke/queer Tried but 
failed 
Hal White Masters Primarily 
attracted to men 
As a 
teenager 
Jamie White PhD in progress Gay In the past 
Jen White Scottish Masters Queer No 
Jess White other PhD in progress Pansexual/tend 
not to define 
In early 
adolescence 
Leon White other PhD Queer No 
Mark White British Undergrad Mostly gay Kept a blog 
Pig White Undergrad Queer In the past 
Rachel White German 
Jewish 
Undergrad in 
progress 
Lesbian No 
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Ricky White British Masters Bisexual In the past 
V White British Masters Unfussed No 
Zesty Mixed Undergrad in 
progress 
polysexual In the past 
Table 5: Participant names, ethnicities, educations, sexualities, and writing experience. 
The above demographic data was collected in order to further contextualise the 
reached community members in this research. All except for one participant identified 
their ethnicity as white. This runs contrary to Harrison et al’s. (2012) non-binary 
population data, where 30% were non-white, but in a North American context. Whilst 
the 2011 UK census data estimates the proportion of the UK population who identify 
themselves as white at 81.9%, lack of racial/ethnic diversity may be symptomatic of 
snowball sampling. Alternatively, compounding minority statuses (non-binary, non-
white) may result in more vulnerable/marginalised individuals who are more difficult to 
access (Mutch et al., 2013).  
Educational attainment was significantly higher than the general population, with all 
participants except one currently attaining, or having already attained, at least one 
degree. This may be indicative of the class positions of participants, however more 
detailed consideration of class intersection was not examined. A wide range of different 
descriptors of sexuality were given. This is perhaps to be expected, as non-binary 
gender identities disrupt the binary foundation on which many sexualities are based. 
Despite this, some participants did identify as gay or lesbian – though no participants 
identified as straight/heterosexual. It is also noteworthy that the majority of participants 
had prior experience of diary-keeping. It is possible that advertisement of the method in 
recruitment material impacted interest in participation, such that individuals with a lack 
of writing experience may have been put off prior to initial enquiry. This may be 
positioned as a limitation of the research, however the method may have also served to 
make the research more attractive to some respondents.  
A Multi-Method Analytical Strategy 
Multi-method research poses particular challenges to analysis, given the different forms 
the data takes. I thus took inspiration from multiple frameworks in order to synthesise a 
frame that could be applied with an appropriate degree of flexibility. Thematic analysis 
had the advantage of allowing disparate data types within diaries to be concurrently 
assessed. Tuckett (2005) has considered how thematic analysis of qualitative data 
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works in practice, in relation to a symbolic interactionist framework. As symbolic 
interactionism recognises that the symbolic meaning ascribed to an object or idea can 
vary, comparison between different participants was vital in order to suggest 
explanations and recognise social patterns.  
An iterative analysis process was used, in that the multi-method nature of the research 
meant coding and analysis began before all data was collected. In the first instance, 
this began with initially reading participant diaries as they were returned. The nature of 
researching non-binary gender identities justified a combination of inductive and 
deductive coding, which has sociological precedent (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 
2006). Inductive coding, where codes are generated without predeterminations, was 
necessary because of the lack of attention that non-binary identities have received as 
of yet. However, the small amount of specific research that exists (Yeadon-Lee, 2016; 
Harrison et al., 2012), as well as an anecdotal sense from community interaction and 
involvement, meant that some deduction (and thus, deductive coding, informed by prior 
contexts) could be applied – particularly in relation to medical practice where some 
experiences are comparable to binary transgender narratives. 
No notes were made during the first read-through of each diary. This was in order to 
allow me to focus on the narrative sense of the data as a whole, and become closer to 
the raw data (Sandelowski, 1995). On a second read-through, initial themes were 
identified and colour coded, and cross-referenced with the other diaries. Themes were 
identified between diaries through cross-sectional comparison, and within diaries, 
between different entries over time (Thomson and Holland, 2003). Thematic 
interpretation of images, poetry, etc. was frequently discussed during interviews which 
allowed both an additional perspective and assessment of participant intentions. 
Regular academic supervision meetings also allowed for refinement of data analysis 
(Manzano et al., 2014). 
These read-throughs informed the construction of personalised topic guides. Each 
participant’s topic guide contained ‘core questions’ (appendix 6), but also notes of 
topics to discuss that were particular to individuals. For example, Finn included a poem 
in their diary but highlighted that much of the meaning was dependent upon 
performance, therefore in the interview setting I asked Finn to read/perform the poem 
which lead to a discussion around it39. Recurring themes that were identified between 
                                            
39 Whilst this was a beneficial decision due to the insights that were generated, this 
particular poem was not used in later analysis due to space constraints and overall fit 
with discussed themes.  
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diaries, for example, ‘feeling insecure as trans’, inspired the wording of questions. 
There is a certain parallel with a grounded theory approach here (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009) in that no assumptions were made about what would be found in the diaries, and 
by allowing diary content to inform interview guides, participant voices do not test 
existing theory, but rather produce it.  
Following the participant interviews, the audio recordings were transcribed. This was 
done near-verbatim, with the only omissions being occasional conversation asides that 
did not pertain to the research (but within the interview setting, contributed to rapport). 
The same approach was then taken to the transcripts as to the diaries – an initial read-
through without notes, followed by note-making and coding that was then cross-
referenced. Interviews were also compared back to the participant’s diary, and more 
broadly across the entire data set of others’ diaries and interviews.  
Limitations of Methods and Recruitment 
It is important to recognise potential limitations of using diaries and interviews as 
research methods. The length of time and level of commitment required from 
participants in keeping a diary was significant. This placed a relatively heavy burden on 
individuals, which contributed to the high dropout rate. This is however common in 
diary-based research (Bolger et al., 2003; Schroder et al., 2003) I attempted to reduce 
this by clearly highlighting the nature of the commitment before participation was 
confirmed, together with the use of weekly reminder emails as previously discussed. It 
can however be argued that participant autonomy is privileged within the diary-keeping 
method because, as Ruth Holliday highlights with the use of video diaries, participants 
may go back to consider earlier entries and edit as they see fit before passing their 
entries to the researcher. Holliday posits that this sort of research method therefore 
offers participants the “potential for a greater degree of reflexivity” (Holliday, 2000, p. 
510), which may increase participant confidence in the accuracy of their data in 
reflecting their views and experiences. 
As with other research methods (such as interviews), participants may attempt to adapt 
both tone and answers to fulfil what the perceived expectations of the researcher. I 
attempted to minimise this by clearly signposting the freedom of expression 
participants had in producing entries relating to their sense of negotiating their gender 
identities. Interviews may potentially be accused of focusing on exceptional events; 
however this was ameliorated by the multi-method approach.  
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As previously mentioned, the sample itself can also be critiqued, in that more 
intersections of diversity may have been possible through a more nuanced recruitment 
strategy. Although the question was not asked specifically when collecting 
demographic information, many participants in their diaries and interviews made 
specific reference to experiences of disability. Thus, intersections between non-binary 
gender identity and disability were able to be explored, whilst race (for example) was 
not. The theory of situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988) challenges any claim that 
individual representation of a particular marginalisation (disability, race, class status, 
age, sexuality, etc.) grants group representation in and of itself.  
Research is often limited in some manner on the basis of a researcher being an insider 
or an outsider in relation to the researched population. Whether or not the researcher 
has lived experience that provides familiarity with participants, this will impact (and 
shape) the knowledge produced (Griffith, 1998). Despite identifying as queer prior to 
conducting this research, I positioned myself as an outsider researcher due to my not 
(then) identifying explicitly as non-binary.  
However, the process of conducting the research significantly shaped my relationship 
with my own gender, and this was certainly informed by the manner in which 
participants responded to me. For example, within interview settings, informal aspects 
of conversation (not recorded) could involve participants articulating thoughts expressly 
about ‘our’ community, rather than ‘their’ community. Despite my ambiguities around 
identity labels, my closeness with the trans and LGBTQ communities prior to the 
research means it is more accurate for me to be considered an insider researcher, 
particularly as it was during the research that I explicitly articulated my own non-binary 
gender identity. Indeed, these experiences challenge an overly-simplistic modelling of 
an insider/outsider binary in relation to groups. Researcher involvement can indeed 
necessitate becoming an insider with particular forms of ethnographic study, such that 
study of community also allows autoethnography (Throsby, 2016; Crossley, 2006). 
Whilst I would not position this research as ‘creating’ my identity, it arguably produced 
an effective environmental circumstance for transformative reflection upon identity 
(Breen, 2007; Ganga and Scott, 2006). By being reflexively conscientious of my own 
positionality in relation to the subject matter, I aim to sharpen my appreciation of factors 
that shaped the production of the analysis (Kanuha, 2000). Further, working from a 
position as an insider has multiple recognised advantages, as was demonstrated by my 
relative ease regarding recruitment and rapport (LaSala, 2003). 
102 
 
 
 
Participant Pen Portraits 
Alex is a white Welsh 20 year old student, who lives in South Yorkshire/Leeds. They 
identify as queer. They are polyamorous, and in an open relationship.  
Ash is a white 33 year old sex worker who lives in Northamptonshire. They identify as 
having a fluid sexuality, and are in a relationship. 
Bobby is a white British 23 year old student who lives in Surrey. They identify as 
pansexual, and are currently single.  
Charlie is a white British 21 year old student who lives in Nottingham. They identify as 
queer, and are in a relationship. 
David is a white 31 year old policy researcher who lives in London. They identify as 
gay, and are married. 
Finn is a white British 22 year old student who lives in Sheffield/Leeds. They identify as 
queer, and are in polyamorous relationships.  
Frankie is a white British 25 year old sexual health and wellbeing worker who lives in 
London. They identify as a queer dyke, and are in polyamorous relationships. 
Hal is a white 42 year old market researcher who lives in London. They are primarily 
attracted to men, and they are currently single. 
Jamie is a white 24 year old PhD student who lives in York. They identify as gay, and 
they are married. 
Jen is a white Scottish 29 year old PhD student who lives in Leeds. She identifies as 
queer, and is in an open relationship. 
Jess is a white 26 year old PhD student, teaching assistant, and proof-reader, who 
lives in Manchester. She identifies as pansexual (though tends not to define). Their 
relationship status “is complicated”. 
Leon is a white 34 year old lecturer, who lives in Nottingham. They identify as queer, 
and are in a civil partnership. 
Mark is a white British 43 year old personal carer who lives in Norwich. He identifies as 
“mostly gay”, and is currently “single-ish”.  
Pig is a white 30 year old youth worker who lives in Manchester. They identify as queer, 
and have a long term partner. 
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Rachel is a white German Jewish 28 year old student who lives in Manchester. They 
identify as a lesbian and are in a relationship. 
Ricky is a white British 43 year old counsellor and trainer, who lives in Nottingham. 
They identify as bisexual, and they are married. 
V is a white British 28 year old artist, writer, and performer who lives in 
Nottinghamshire. They describe their sexuality as unfussed, and they are currently 
single. 
Zesty is a mixed-race 22 year old student chef who lives in Cairo/Leeds. They identify 
as polysexual, and they are currently single.    
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have given a thorough grounding of the symbolic interactionist 
framework used to demarcate and consider interactions that participants experienced. 
The methodological basis of this work has emphasised the privileging of non-binary 
voices in being able to tell new stories (Plummer, 1995). I follow this by descriptively 
grounding and clarifying how fieldwork was done, and laid the theoretical foundations 
that situated mixed media diaries and semi-structured interviews both in relation to 
each other, and this project overall. I have fully elucidated the decisions made in this 
research so as to successfully recruit participants, develop and sustain rapport, and 
most importantly ensure rigorous ethical safeguarding. The methodological decision to 
construct a multi-method project was made use of in my analytical practices, as the 
ability to begin the coding of diaries gave greater security in the ability of interviews to 
cover material deemed salient by participants.  
Recognising additional demographic dimensions of participants was important in 
avoiding positioning consideration of gender identity in a social vacuum. Demographic 
similarities (such as age) and differences (such as race) to prior non-binary-specific 
research samples (Harrison et al., 2012) may be understood in relation to method 
limitations, the demographic make-up of the UK overall, and who may be more or less 
likely to be able to articulate a non-binary identity and be accessible to research.  
Whilst no work is without its limitations, I have presented an argument for how my 
choice of methods served to produce data in an effective way, whilst also being 
compatible with an emancipatory transgender politics, and the theoretical framework of 
symbolic interactionism. Rejecting a positivist approach, this combination of framework, 
methods, and analysis has allowed for a process of collaborative knowledge production, 
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with resultant analysis illustrative of both researcher and participant synergy. The 
contents of diaries and interviews provided some of the first data to consider non-
binary identities as a discrete yet amorphous set of realities, negotiating social and 
medical differences or needs relative to binary transgender people. The following 
chapters will detail and analyse central themes identified within the data.  
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Chapter 4 – ‘Not Trans Enough’: The Relationship between Non-Binary Gender 
Identities, Uncertainty, and Legitimacy 
Using queerness itself as a category of analysis seems to invite a new 
round of debate devoted to who is “really queer”. A voice that 
originated from one set of margins begins to create its own 
marginalized voices. These twin problems of identities – boundaries 
and hierarchies – emerge whenever we try to base politics on identity.  
(Wilchins, 2002, p. 29) 
Introduction 
Among non-binary people, there is a vast heterogeneity of experiences and self-
conceptualisations. Despite such differences, a striking commonality was observed 
amongst participants – insecurity in relation to gender40. This could manifest as an 
internal uncertainty in being trans enough, or anxiety over not being seen as trans 
enough by other people. This chapter will explore this phenomenon, whilst considering 
how hegemonic gendered expectations impact not only the ability to socially exert, but 
also the ability to internally formulate a non-binary gender identity. This exploration cuts 
across the original research questions, as feelings of insecurity were manifested in 
relation to experiences of queer community interaction, everyday experiences, and 
accessing (or concern over accessing) medical support. Further, intrapsychic 
interaction (with the self) through introspection was, perhaps predictably, strongly 
influenced by societal norms of gender (both within and outside queer communities), 
which could be internalised, or resisted, or both simultaneously. 
I begin this chapter by highlighting how non-binary people could view those who 
access gender affirming medical services as ‘more legitimate’, even if not wishing for 
medical transition themselves. Simultaneously, participants could have a strong sense 
that such feelings are problematic, illustrating critical self-reflection. Whilst individuals 
were themselves concerned with being trans enough as non-binary, participants were 
clear that they respected the self-identification of others – highlighting how the anxiety 
of ‘realness’ often operated at the level of the self. Participants were inconsistent with 
the standards by which they judged their own validity relative to how they judged others, 
                                            
40  Whilst I say ‘despite’ because of insecurity being endemic across different 
experiences of non-binary identification, gendered idiosyncrasy may potentially 
contribute to this phenomenon, as affinities with each other’s experiences may be less 
pronounced. 
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generally being harsher with themselves. This may be suggestive of difficulties with, or 
low self-esteem in relation to, gender identity (Neff, 2003; Brown, 1986).  
I then argue that hegemonic medicalised narratives of what it ‘means to be transgender’ 
have impacted queer community interactions. I show how community tensions can 
manifest around non-binary people being made to feel ‘not trans enough’ by other 
members of the trans community. Binary transgender people could potentially exhibit 
hostility towards particular identities, or construct implicit hierarchies of legitimacy in 
order to self-validate. Such practices serve to evidence the problematic nature in which 
transgender identities of all kinds are often only validated (by doctors, legally, by family 
or friends, or in the social interactions of the day-to-day) once potentially difficult social 
processes have been navigated or performed. These include, but are not limited to, 
vocal and repeat performances of ‘coming out’, name changes, and alterations of 
gendered presentation, as well as accessing hormones and surgeries. 
Participants also voiced anxieties over not being seen as trans enough when accessing 
(or wishing to access) gender affirming medical services. This was navigated by some 
participants by presenting themselves to clinicians as binary transgender individuals, or 
by discussing their non-binary experiences of gender in binary terms in order to render 
themselves more compatible with clinical precedent. This impacted the support 
individuals sought from queer community networks, and correspondingly shaped 
strategies of empowerment, resistance, and navigation of medical services.  
The Impact of a Binarised Medical Narrative on Non-Binary Feelings of Validity 
As outlined in chapter one, hegemonic Western transgender narratives were 
constructed and constrained through processes of medical gatekeeping. Whether a 
participant wished to access gender affirming medicine or not was significant in 
shaping how gender was considered:  
Ben: Have you ever had feelings of not being trans enough? 
Jess: Yeah all the time (laughs). I think partially it’s because I don’t 
really feel a great need to access hormones or surgery. That I… don’t, I 
often feel like I’m some sort of fraud. Operating within this woman’s 
space – or within a trans space because I don’t really... I’m not really 
that bothered about changing my body. I kind of feel like my body is my 
body? And that it is what it is. I wouldn’t be against changing it, but on 
balance it’s probably more effort to change it than not to. Maybe that 
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balance will shift over the years, especially if my hair decides to fall out, 
I might be more interested in taking hormones or whatever. But 
essentially because of my ambivalence towards these medical 
interventions, I do feel like I’m often not trans enough. And especially 
as somebody who’s working in trans healthcare, as an activist and on 
the scene, I feel like people often expect me to be wanting to engage or 
be going on some sort of binary transition pathway or something like 
that. Sometimes I do think, what am I doing here, why am I claiming 
trans, why am I claiming womanhood, why am I claiming non-binary 
when I’m not particularly interested in changing my body? But being 
called he, being called my birth name, whatever, does make me feel 
uncomfortable. So, I do have some form of dysphoria, but it doesn’t 
seem to be as soul destroying as a lot of peoples’ physical dysphoria 
can be. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Thus, Jess had a sense that her ambivalence over her embodiment had produced self-
doubt, due to how central and ubiquitous narratives of embodied dysphoria41 have 
been. It is also apparent that different aspects of embodiment hold differing levels of 
significance, as evidenced by the feeling that experiencing (male pattern) baldness 
would likely cause ‘the balance to shift’. Hair and hairstyles function as significant sites 
through which gender can be socially enacted (Duesterhaus et al., 2011; Lawson, 
1999). Mentioning how hair loss might particularly affect her feelings with regards to 
hormones may be due to baldness being positioned as a signifier of maleness. Thus 
how this particular gendered, embodied trait shifts over time was positioned as 
potentially altering Jess’s medical wishes. 
By emphasising that “my body is my body”, Jess implicitly articulates that being ‘really’ 
transgender need not rest upon narratives of desiring to alter the body – typically 
assumed to be the result of also loathing the body, or at least parts of it. This has been 
centralised in medical diagnosis, as shown by the criterion of the 10th edition of the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-
10, the current edition), which particularly characterises Gender Identity Disorder as 
                                            
41 I use the term ‘embodied dysphoria’ to refer to negative feelings that transgender 
people may experience specifically relating to their body itself – such as the presence 
or absence of primary or secondary sexual characteristics, or genitals. I use this term 
to differentiate from dysphoria caused by social interactions with other people, whereby 
the body is subjected to gendered interpretations which may be distressing 
(misgendering, etc.) 
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comprising “The desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, 
usually accompanied by the wish to make his or her body as congruent as possible 
with the preferred sex through surgery and hormone treatment” (Meyer III et al., 2002, 
p. 6).  
To not desire embodied change is discursively and symbolically positioned in medical 
policy as ‘unusual’, even whilst practitioners in GICs frequently and increasingly 
encounter individuals who desire hormones, but do not desire surgical intervention. 
Similarly, it remains comparably rare and difficult to access surgeries without, or prior 
to, hormones, even as it has become possible for such a desire to be met. In terms of 
diagnostics, this has come about through the construction of a standard that individuals 
trying to access gender affirming treatments may be held to. In order to be medically 
legitimised, transgender people are required to conform to (binarist) medical norms. 
Not doing so risks rejection, or increases the time taken to receive a diagnosis. This 
illustrates the power which medical practitioners possess, and their potential to exert 
social control (Salzmann-Erikson and Eriksson, 2012; Waitzkin, 1989; Freidson, 1960).  
Charlie articulated a related concern in their diary – “A brief thought – am I still trans if I 
don’t want to transition?” – further emphasising that the approach to understanding 
what trans ‘is’ remains connected to an assumed desire for medical transition, even 
among some non-binary people. This is particularly conceivable for individuals in the 
early stages of exploring their gender identities – who are less likely to have 
experienced the rich community discourses of what transgender and non-binary can be 
taken to mean. Alex discussed how when they met a partner who identified as trans, 
this was the first time they had knowingly met a trans person: 
This person is choosing not to socially transition for their own personal 
reasons, but I hadn’t known you could do that. I kind of thought it was 
all or nothing? You know how you get that trope of like uneducated 
people saying ‘oh have you had the operation yet’? And that was kind 
of my understanding of it until I got to know more people. (Alex, 20, 
diary) 
Alex’s experience illustrates how connecting with other binary and non-binary 
transgender people can expand an individual’s potentiality of gendered self-conception, 
through accessing discourses previously unknown to them. This also shows how Alex’s 
relative community/knowledge position now means that they associate their past self 
as uneducated, rather than merely inexperienced. Further, it also emphasises the 
109 
 
 
 
importance of interpersonal interactions in gaining knowledge and awareness about 
non-binary/transgender communities, which can impact the intrapsychic interactions 
that allow for negotiation of the self.  
Communities can share politicised knowledge that resists hegemonic positioning of 
homogeneous, historically situated narratives of coming out, and both social and 
medical transitions. For example, when individuals explore communities for the first 
time, they may be introduced to deconstructions of maleness and femaleness, in order 
to help reassure individuals of the validity of their identities. An example would be 
Jess’s recognition of experiences of dysphoria that are not situated in the body, 
resisting an essentialised model of transgender and allowing for a more varied 
possibility of gendered narratives. This however may then lack intelligibility within 
clinical settings. Hal made the point that transgender communities are something that 
people are more generally aware of than specifically non-binary communities. Finding 
similar individuals with whom to bond or receive support over identity negotiation may 
therefore begin more generally, before becoming more nuanced. Indeed, Alex 
demonstrated this through admitting their comparative ignorance when first interacting 
with other trans people. 
Non-binary self-conceptualisation was not universally tied to a transgender identity. 
Whilst almost all participants discussed their non-binary identities as either explicitly 
transgender or being situated under ‘the transgender umbrella’ (Currah, 2006), Zesty 
expressly distanced themselves from the label of transgender, due to associating the 
term with medical transition: 
Oh, I don’t identify as trans. If someone were to make that mistake I’d 
just correct them and be like ‘no I’m not trans’. From what I’ve 
gathered, being trans is that how you think isn’t how your body actually 
is, so they change the body more towards how they think. (Zesty, 22, 
diary) 
Zesty’s conceptualisation rests on acceptance of a ‘classic’ trans narrative - ‘feeling 
trapped in the wrong body’, and experiencing embodied dysphoria. Thus being 
desirous of embodied change is positioned as central to being transgender. By Zesty’s 
understanding, having a non-binary identity is not connected to desires for embodied 
change. There is a certain parallel with how Alex conceived being trans prior to 
meeting trans people. As Zesty discussed being well situated in queer community 
110 
 
 
 
involvement, such a view is not necessarily a product of lack of contact, but may also 
potentially change over time. 
Whilst the narrative of transgender people being considered as men or women ‘trapped’ 
in ‘women’s or men’s bodies’ has been critically deconstructed (Bettcher, 2014), 
Rachel subverts the hegemonic interpretation that this produces uncomplicated, 
negative feelings. This is illustrated by figure 3, taken from Rachel’s diary 
 
Figure 3: Image of lips,  from Rachel’s diary. 
Rachel’s diary was digitally produced, and comprised entirely of short passages of text 
overlaid on images that were thematically connected to the context of the text as a 
multi-media form of expression. Whilst Rachel does experience embodied dysphoria, in 
articulating that they find their body “comfy and pretty and safe” they challenge a 
narrative that constructs transgender bodies as exclusively problematic and negative 
for the trans individual. This is a narrative which can result in oversimplification and 
erasure of how trans/non-binary people negotiate their relationships with their bodies.  
Rachel also highlights the importance of recognising trans people who have (at least 
partially) positive relationships with their bodies prior to, or without, hormonal and 
surgical changes. The image of lips wearing red lipstick, with the teeth biting the bottom 
lip is open to a wide possibility of interpretations. Whilst the lipstick may incite the 
viewer to instinctively gender the lips as female, the accompanying text allows for the 
reflexive reinterpretation of the image – recognising the fact that there is no available 
information to make a confident attribution of gender to the disembodied lips. There is 
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concordance between text and image in that both challenge assumptions that might be 
made in relation to gendered discourse.  
Finn experienced uncertainty over their gender in different terms. Whilst it was shown 
that Charlie doubted their ‘transness’ due to not feeling a need to access gender 
affirming medical services, Finn doubted their right to access medical transition 
services on the basis of not possessing a binary gender identity: 
Too often I fall into the trap of thinking ‘well I don’t identify as a man so 
I shouldn’t really be medically transitioning’ but that’s ridiculous. Just 
because I don’t fit nicely into a binary trans narrative, doesn’t mean 
that I shouldn’t be able to get access to a body I will be much more 
comfortable in and that will align more with my inner image of what I 
actually look like, so that I’ll be able to navigate the world and people 
will really see me. (Finn, 22, diary) 
Finn’s description of what they hope for from medical transition resonates with 
historically traditional binary trans narratives (McGuire et al., 2016), which position the 
‘inner image’ as stable and constant (Eliason and Schope, 2007). Non-binary and 
binary trans motivations for transition may thus be similar – yet potentially still broader 
than medical hegemony is comfortable recognising (Baril and Trevenen, 2014). 
Ash (33) was the only participant to explicitly state that at this stage of their life, they 
never felt ‘not trans enough’, stating “I’m about as trans as most people get!” This may 
be explicitly related to Ash’s extensive history of accessing hormones and a wide range 
of gender affirming surgeries. It is notable that this feeling was dynamic. In having 
altered their body, Ash has fulfilled the requirements of a (problematic) discourse of 
trans legitimisation. Surgery may then serve to provide even greater feelings of 
legitimacy than hormone access, due to being seen as ‘more major’. In their diary, Ash 
shared a self-portrait of their body in order to provide a physical map of embodied 
change, also functioning to some extent as a timeline of their gender-related medical 
interventions: 
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Figure 4: Image mapping the body, from Ash’s diary. 
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Ash had by far the most experience of gender affirming surgical interventions of all 
participants. They also occupied the relatively rare position (for someone never 
diagnosed with an intersex condition) of simultaneously identifying outside of the 
gender binary and also possessing a combination of physiological structures that are 
typically socially positioned as ‘female’ (breasts) or ‘male’ (penis). Extensive 
engagement with medical services synergised with long-term involvement with queer 
communities to result in strong feelings of legitimacy and validity for Ash in relation to 
being both transgender and non-binary. One can argue then that extensive medical (in 
particular, surgical) access is significant in Ash’s security as non-binary and 
transgender.  
It is important to note that whilst some participants expressed discomfort with aspects 
of their bodies and others did not, the general idea that accessing a medical transition 
allows one to be viewed as more authentically trans cut across these different non-
binary experiences. Further, some participants, such as Finn, would challenge their 
own feelings as problematic and remind themselves of political arguments that 
transgender status need not rest upon embodied dysphoria. This bears a striking 
overlap with findings by Catalano (2015) who found that a sample of trans male 
undergrad students could rely on medical discourse, even whilst critiquing it. Others 
such as Zesty consolidated their understanding through highlighting how they 
personally understood and used particular terms in relation to themselves. Jamie wrote 
that: 
I knew I wasn’t female but thought I couldn’t be “really trans” because I 
hadn’t experienced dysphoria etc. consistently for long enough… of 
course I’m both non-binary and trans, if you have to see them as 
separate things which I don’t believe you should (I tend to think you’re 
either cis or not cis). It drives me mad how well that story of repression 
and “coming to terms with” my trans identity and going through a ‘NB 
stage’ works: it reaffirms everything that’s wrong with the way people 
think about gender. It drives me mad too, that when people hear it 
they’re super relieved to be able to use male pronouns for me and 
never have to deal with these pesky gender-neutral ones again. And it 
drives me maddest of all that experience keeps proving that that story 
is the only way to get people to take my seriously, to actually try hard 
with pronouns, to pay more than lip service to the pain being 
misgendered causes me. (Jamie, 24, diary)  
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This quote from Jamie illustrates again how an uncertain relationship with dysphoria of 
the body troubled their ability to embrace a transgender identity. Further, the use of 
language around dysphoria not being ‘consistent’ or for ‘long enough’ resembles a 
medicalised consideration of the assessment of symptoms in relation to illness. 
Individuals are thus more likely to feel insecure of the ‘validity’ of their gender identities 
when less certain that they are fulfilling medically validated discourses of transgender.  
In addition, Jamie’s relationship with pronouns (preferring singular they, but also 
accepting ‘he’, at the time) meant that in circumstances where explanations of ‘singular 
they’ as their pronoun might be too difficult – that is, emotionally exhausting or posing a 
risk of disenfranchisement, ridicule, or violence, they possessed an intelligible and 
personally acceptable option. Jess also navigated gendered interactions similarly, 
using both ‘they’ and ‘she’, though without particular preference. She pointed out: 
I give ‘she’ or ‘they’ as pronouns. And I say use them equally, I pretty 
much exclusively within the trans community get called she. And this is 
because I think even if trans people were… we want to be in the binary 
or want to put people in the binary. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Jamie and Jess’s narratives show how constructing an understanding of dysphoria that 
is broader than a medicalised perspective resting on the body, allows for a sense of 
validation and inclusion. By constructing their negative feelings around being 
misgendered as a form of dysphoria, this utilises pre-existing diagnostic language 
(gender dysphoria) to challenge and resist any internal sense of inadequacy or 
fraudulence. 
Jess’s example emphasises that even in transgender communities, binarised language 
can be preferred when the choice is given. This positions gender neutral pronouns as 
harder to use and easily erased, especially where permission has been given for a 
binary pronoun to be used. This emphasises the potential difficulty in navigating being 
non-binary and intelligible, even in queer spaces. The sense of feeling ‘trans enough’ 
was thus not exclusively rooted in internal policing or insecurity, with some participants 
reflecting upon how community interactions could foster or stimulate a sense of not 
belonging. 
A Hierarchy of Transness within Trans Communities 
Jen expressed feeling that whilst labels had helped her to articulate her identity, they 
could also act to make her feel like an outsider. Her relationship with ‘trans’ further 
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illustrates the connection between feeling ‘trans enough’ and medical transition, whilst 
introducing how those feelings can impact interactions within the trans community: 
I often feel like an outsider among trans people because I can't 
transition. So if I'm in Girl Mode and I choose to present as female, and 
I'm with a bunch of transwomen, I feel like the odd one out. 
Transwomen are usually transitioning or have transitioned. Of course 
they are. They aren't drag queens (no offense to drag queens). If I'm 
not transitioning, am I really a transwoman? I guess the answer is no. 
I'm a guy in woman's clothes, which isn't the same thing. I don't think 
that's entirely true (I don't feel like a guy at the time) but that's how I 
feel in terms of being an outsider. (Jen, 29, diary) 
At the time of the research Jen identified as bigender, experiencing her gender as 
shifting between what she termed ‘boy mode’ and ‘girl mode’. Jen expressed that she 
cannot medically transition, because she felt that whilst she would want physiological 
traits associated with being female when in ‘girl mode’, she would want her body to 
remain as it is when in ‘boy mode’, such that no physiological configuration would be 
satisfying at all times. An androgynous or mix of physiological traits would also not be 
what Jen wanted, as she understood her gender in distinctly bimodal terms. 
Experiencing gender differently from (medically constructed and validated) narratives of 
transgender caused Jen to doubt her ‘transness’. This echoes Charlie’s insecurity over 
being trans if not transitioning. Jen was amongst several participants who articulated a 
sense of a ‘trans hierarchy’ within queer community spaces between those accessing 
or wishing to access medical transition services and those not:  
I still get some problems from some trans people, but in this comment 
I’m meaning more people who are understanding loosely what trans is 
and are okay with Caitlyn Jenner42, they’re like ‘what are you then, 
because you’re obviously not a trans woman’. You’re just faking it, or 
not sure? (Jen, 29, diary) 
Jen’s articulation of a bigender identity meant that she felt that, by the standards of 
those interacting with her, she was ‘obviously not a trans woman’. Being confronted 
with questions such as ‘you’re faking it, or not sure?’ within transgender communities 
                                            
42  Caitlyn Jenner won the 1976 Olympic men’s decathlon title, and established a 
television career most associated with Keeping up with the Kardashians prior to her 
heavily publicised gender transition, in 2015.  
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illustrates that there is not always an equivalent sense of awareness, acceptance, or 
sensitivity towards non-binary people. Those trans individuals who most closely fit a 
narrative that does not challenge any aspects of the clinical expectations of what being 
transgender ‘is’ are those also positioned as ‘most sure’ or ‘most real’ within some 
trans communities. Binary trans people43 are thus positioned as less likely to be viewed 
as ‘faking it or not sure’ than non-binary people, in Jen’s view. However, discourses of 
binary trans women as ‘gender deceivers’, particularly as a form of transmisogyny, 
have been recognised and explored (Serano, 2007). Further, community members’ 
feelings on transgender hierarchies of authenticity have been previously recognised 
(Hines, 2007a), and found to stress the need to move beyond such practices. Jen’s 
feelings may be better explained as an intrapsychic interaction where she ascribes 
meaning to herself and the trans women she sees, rather than other community 
members acting to delegitimise her.  
Even when ‘not being seen as trans enough’ was not a factor, anxiety over other 
community members’ thoughts could impact how participants felt, evidencing how 
anxieties over being viewed as ‘real’ might affect an individual’s experience of queer 
communities: 
Ben: Have you ever had feelings of not being trans enough? 
Frankie: Oh lord yes. Oh lord yes. I think I have to be honest – 
hormones were a really validating experience in that sense. Prior to 
hormones, I had those feelings constantly. That was a real demon that 
I was battling for a long time. There is a hierarchy of transness 
amongst trans communities, there just is. And it’s really damaging and 
really hurtful and really horrible.  
B: In that people are seen more real when they access medical 
services? 
F: Abso-fucking-lutely. And whether there’s been an internalisation of 
that I think it’s pretty apparent there has.  (Frankie, 25, interview) 
Frankie’s experience of medicine as validating reemphasises how her experience prior 
to accessing medicine felt less stable, that she felt more vulnerable to being seen as 
                                            
43 Or at least trans people choosing to access medical services and ‘pass’ as male or 
female in a normative fashion, as Caitlyn Jenner typifies. Some individuals who 
strongly identify as non-binary may choose or desire to ‘pass’ as binary some or all of 
the time, for example, Ash.  
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invalid or illegitimate by other trans people. Rachel’s diary also emphasises how 
insecurity due to not accessing a medical transition need not only be rooted in 
ambivalence towards embodied changes, but may well illustrate important 
considerations such as how disabilities may intersect with accessibility or desirability of 
medical transition. This discussion is expanded in chapter six. David illustrated a 
different connection between medicine and insecurity over being accepted as trans: 
Ben: Have you ever had feelings of not being trans enough? 
David: Oh god, all of the time. 
B: What causes that? 
D: I think largely, the lack of any medical transition, ultimately the only 
thing people have to go on with me describing myself as trans is my 
word. I have no evidence for it whatsoever. Not even… I don’t even 
have any official documents in the name that I go by, because I’ve 
changed my name a couple of times now and it’s a hassle and I can’t 
be arsed. And because I think that I might be in ‘name transition’ at the 
moment? So I might yet change it again. And I don’t want to have to go 
through the entire process again. So yeah, but it is mostly the medical 
stuff that makes me feel like… I think if I was on hormones no-one 
would ever question it. (David, 31, interview) 
It is worth recognising how David’s use of language – not having ‘evidence’ of their 
transness – mirrors that of evidence-based medicine, sometimes concerning itself with 
‘proof’ to legitimise an individual’s identity (for example, surgeons can demand this 
before performing gender related surgeries). This evidences how medical practices and 
medical knowledge have impacted upon queer communities, shaping community 
discourses. This may then feeds back, through how trans people interact with their 
doctors. Likewise, Frankie’s mention of hormones as ‘validating’ relates to how 
experiences of ‘treatment’ validates and legitimises ‘illnesses’, as within Parson’s Sick 
Role paradigm (Parsons, 1951). This highlights the significance of the medical 
establishment in the production of transgender narratives, and how they may impact 
how individuals think about and express their conceptualisation of selfhood. Further, 
whilst even clinical sites of knowledge production are increasingly explicit that being 
transgender is not an illness or disorder (Richards et al., 2015), this can fail to 
adequately recognise how practices of treatment access are rooted in and (re)produce 
discourses around trans as if dis-identification with the gender assigned at birth were a 
pathology.  
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Finn stated how they felt the view of not feeling trans enough due to not accessing 
medical services could be reinforced through the beliefs of some binary transgender 
people: 
I think there’s a lot of problems in trans communities of like, oh well if 
you’re not dysphoric then you can’t be trans, like being non-binary isn’t 
a thing, non-binary people don’t belong in trans communities. (Finn, 22, 
diary) 
This adds traction to the ways in which Jess and Jamie constructed their feelings of 
discomfort over being misgendered and deadnamed 44  through the language of 
dysphoria specifically. By articulating distress in relation to language used to address 
them as dysphoria, this justifies inclusion under the transgender umbrella to those who 
may attempt to police boundaries of transness in terms of distress and discomfort. 
V discussed how he views it as important that those with normative45 transgender 
identities and experiences do not ‘set a standard’ for the community as a whole: 
I’ve certainly heard it, and I think [hierarchies in trans communities are] 
a bit insidious in some of the groups without being overt; you get a 
feeling certain people switch off when you start being a bit more 
nuanced about it. Because all they’re bothered about is being read as 
blah. As a stereotype, and that’s it. And then they want to get on with 
their lives. And they’re not really interested in the nuance of identity; 
they just want to be comfortable and not hassled, which is fair enough. 
But again, that sort of thing is not helpful to the community at large. If 
that’s how you want to be, that’s fine. But don’t make that the structure 
of transness, or the social acceptance of transness. Interestingly, I 
recently came across someone who said they’d got hassle as quite a 
binary trans person for being binary, from people who were non-binary! 
And I have honestly never heard that before. Never heard that before, 
that they… normally it’s the other way around […] So that was quite 
                                            
44 ‘Deadnaming’ is a term originating within transgender communities to refer to the 
practice of calling a trans person by the name they were given at birth, after they have 
taken a new name and asked to be referred to only by that name. For more detail of 
the political ramifications of deadnaming, see: http://fusion.net/story/144324/what-
deadnaming-means-and-why-you-shouldnt-do-it-to-caitlyn-jenner/  
45 Who may be more likely to identify within the gender binary, but not necessarily.  
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interesting because a little part of me felt that perhaps they’d said that 
because they felt a little bit, I don’t know, insecure about people being 
non-binary. And that’s sort of the impression I got from them as a 
person, talking to them. That their identity was affirmed in a very binary 
way and so being non-binary they kind of didn’t connect with, and felt a 
little bit threatened by, perhaps, or just not comfortable with it. Which 
you know, is alright but it’s a bit… to kind of promote that socially is 
uncomfortable I think. (V, 28, interview) 
V argues that it is important for trans people not to articulate a sense of validity and 
self-affirmation through the denigration of other people’s gender identities and 
expressions. Non-binary people will be inherently disadvantaged in any situation where 
individuals appeal to historically-legitimised transgender narratives as more certain, 
real, or stable, due to the relatively recent recognition of non-binary identities within 
policy or medical practice. Further, whilst Jen had previously articulated insecurity due 
to a comparative lack of acceptance and intelligibility from binary trans people, V 
highlights the possibility of binary transgender people feeling threatened by, or negative 
about non-binary identity labels and expression.  
Transgender rights have a cultural and legal history of being hard-won (Hudson-Sharp 
and Metcalf, 2016; Green, 2010). Thus, inclusion of individuals under the transgender 
umbrella who have identities and/or gender expressions that challenge the gender 
binary and cisnormative hegemony may sensitise or even anger those binary trans 
people who possess more conservative notions of how gender operates. This 
suggestion is borne out through Jamie’s description of interactions with some members 
of a trans support/social group they attend. Jamie contextualises by describing a 
particular older transgender woman, who regularly interrupts others and dominates 
discussions. She is characterised as conservative, resulting in tensions with some 
younger members who problematize such an ideology. Jamie explains how: 
[She] not last night, but the time before, went on a rant about the word 
‘queer’ – because it was used as an insult when she was young. And 
said ‘and there’s this booklet over there which says you can identify as 
‘genderqueer’, and I want to rip it up!’ and my friend who identifies as 
genderqueer got really upset and said ‘you can’t do that, you’re 
erasing peoples’ identity’ and at that point I would have wanted 
someone in charge to step in and say ‘just to remind people everyone 
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has the right to identify how they like’ but they didn’t. People who were 
nominally in charge were just sitting in the corner awkwardly and this 
really quite heated discussion going on. And [she was] interrupting 
everyone, expressing this unpleasantly privileged way of socially 
interacting. (Jamie, 24, diary) 
Thus, tensions regarding the reclamation of language (‘queer’ historically functioned as 
a slur, though now also as an identity category), and how that has become 
incorporated into identity politics can illustrate not only a lack of understanding but 
catalyse hostility that can be difficult to manage. This example illustrates the possibility 
of heterogeneous community spaces as disputatious. There is potential for trans 
people whose validation has been achieved within normative terms to exercise 
community-surveillance, and sanction non-normative behaviour. This may be 
compared to homonormative policing particularly within communities of gay and 
bisexual men (Eguchi, 2011; Taywaditep, 2002)  
Within the same community group, Jamie shared another anecdote in order to illustrate 
that they felt they were “really forcefully reminded of how little most trans people seem 
to actually understand about gender”. At a meeting of the same group, Jamie was 
criticising a particular form sent out from a Gender Identity Clinic (GIC), which 
contained a tick-box question for ‘biological gender’: 
The phrase makes literally no sense! I said this at [group] as an 
example of “look how obviously self-evidently awful this form is” – and 
like I said, thank god [friend] was there. They laughed immediately; 
other people looked confused; some made ‘ah well, they can’t get 
everything right’ sort of noises; [name] (who now seems to see himself 
as some sort of coordinator, I think it’s his personality) started saying 
kind of performatively as if explaining to the group “well, yes, some 
people would say sex instead…” SOME PEOPLE?! Yes, those 
apparently very few people who know what words mean! I wasn’t 
raising this as a concept up for debate, I was trying to draw on shared 
knowledge, but once again I’d forgotten that even the trans community 
don’t know what on earth to make of non-binary people. It’s partly a 
generational thing, and I understand why they might not have been 
exposed to the idea before identifying as trans, but why not after? It’s 
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not like it’s even complicated. (Jamie, 24, diary, underline and 
capitalisation original). 
Jamie’s understanding of the form rests on the demarcation of ‘sex is biology, gender is 
social’, which can be critiqued in and of itself as an oversimplification, which Jamie 
recognised (Westbrook and Saperstein, 2015; Butler, 1988; West and Zimmerman, 
1987). They attempted to gain catharsis through critical expression in an environment 
they hoped would both understand and be sympathetic to their concern over language. 
However the lack of mutual understanding, which they thought they could presume on 
the basis of transgender identity, was taken by Jamie as illustrative of a lack of 
intelligibility of concerns with gender that non-binary people in particular may have.  
Mark’s view of transgender communities was that some individuals could validate 
themselves through reliance on comparison to other community members, such that 
some individuals would justify their identity though an exclusionary politics of being 
‘more real’. Mark drew a parallel with his experience of veganism: 
Ben: Do you find there can be quite a lot of conflict in group settings? 
Mark: Oh absolutely. I mean even in our little group, we have like 8-10 
people along, I don’t think I’m breaking any confidences here when I 
say for some, they identify in a very binary way, and that’s how they’re 
going through their transition, that’s how they are knitting everything 
together for themselves. And we have probably 2 or 3 people… in 
addition to myself who would probably identify as non-binary, and it 
can be sometimes that… it’s not so much conflict, as I say, we’re 
drinking cups of tea and eating Victoria sandwich, so there’s not going 
to be any pitched battles, but there is a bit of one-upmanship almost. 
[…] everybody’s I suppose… trying to kind of… grab the label for 
themselves; that makes it seem very conscious, and I don’t think it is. 
But we all want to be right, don’t we. […] In the kind of ‘transgender 
world’… there’s such a kind of chorus of people who are singing more 
or less the same song, off a similar sort of hymn sheet, but maybe 
using a different key! None of which is wrong. And that, well, very little 
of which is probably wrong, but that’s where the trouble comes, it’s 
very difficult to say to somebody else, ‘I’m sorry, you’re wrong about 
your transition’, you can’t say you’re non-binary for reason X Y Z. 
B: Well there’s never any reason to do that. 
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M: I would hope not, but I think sometimes in the mission to find 
ourselves we kind of do it by stomping on other people, either 
deliberately or not. (Mark, 43, interview) 
Jess considers the difficulty in disconnecting a transgender identity from a medical 
transition to be the product of medical institutionalisation, exerting a hegemonic binary 
of ‘medical transition’ or cisgender: 
I think transness has kind of been stolen from us really. There’s a 
whole wide range of gender experience that you could classify as 
being trans. And I think that what has happened is those experiences 
have been pathologised by the medical establishment and been forced 
into a psychopathologised binary medical pathway. Which forces you 
to be essentially a binary trans person, or forces what is essentially a 
spectrum to become a yes or no question. And so I wouldn’t want to 
put that on the queer community, I don’t think that’s a queer 
community… I think we’re living under the shadow of that rather than 
creating it. But I think there’s a few things that we do which 
perpetuates the ‘common sense’ we’ve received from above. So we 
often expect people to want to engage in medical interventions. We 
often expect a certain type of presentation. We expect people to 
operate in those kind of ways. So yeah. I think that there’s stuff that the 
queer community could be working on within themselves as well as 
engaging with non-queer community. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Jess’s explanation shifts the focus of critique away from binary transgender people or 
other members of transgender communities who may perpetuate narratives that are 
legitimised by operating relatively easily within medical diagnostic paradigms. Instead, 
Jess emphasises how the community ‘lives under a shadow’ of medicalisation which is 
responsible for intra-community policing, as well as internalised senses of not feeling 
trans enough in relation to how an individual does or does not access gender affirming 
medical services. This shifts the modality of oppression away from individuals within a 
marginalised population, and towards the structural constraints of the medical 
establishment, and the hegemonic discourses which are internalised and propagated.  
Feeling Not Trans Enough in Relation to Medical Service Access 
There was a sense amongst participants that non-binary gender identities could lack 
cultural intelligibility (Butler, 1993a) – the ability to be recognised or understood – even 
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within transgender communities. This concern was far stronger in relation to concerns 
over whether medical practitioners would be affirming, or aware of non-binary 
identifications and articulations even at GICs – despite the nature of secondary and 
tertiary care practitioners working in relation to transitions requiring more specialised 
knowledge and sensitivity46. Multiple participants who were starting a process of trying 
to access gender affirming medical services articulated that they felt binarised medical 
gatekeeping is a common occurrence, and would prevent their non-binary transgender 
status from being legitimised if they were entirely candid.  
Have I therefore made up my gender story? Yes, a bit, to concrete the 
impression I’ve given to my doctors. But not in the essentials. (Mark, 
43, diary) 
I’ve been having a lot of very difficult feelings surrounding my gender, 
mainly due to knowing how hard it is for non-binary people to get 
treated at Gender Identity Clinics, and wondering if I should lie and say 
I’m a trans guy (which I probably will end up doing). (Finn, 22, diary) 
Ash: I think it is [different for non-binary people to access GICs]. 
Because when you go into an exchange with a medical professional 
who’s assessing you for some sort of treatment, you… probably have if 
not a certainty about what you want to do, at least the idea that you 
don’t want to actively cut off your options by admitting that you’re not a 
trans binary person. Because once they decide that they’ve assessed 
you and you’re not transsexual you definitely won’t get any hormones 
etc. so there’s a defensiveness and a realisation that if you go in and 
let them know how uncertain you are or how non-binary you are that 
you’ll just cut off all your options for the future. I think a lot of us, if we 
don’t lie we really deliberately present all the stuff that makes a good 
case for treatment because that’s what we want to do, and we can 
                                            
46 It is important to note that different expectations of knowledge may be had of those 
secondary and tertiary care practitioners whose work clearly relates to transition-
related healthcare (such as endocrinologists, and GIC practitioners), in contrast to 
secondary and tertiary care practitioners in unrelated specialties. Transgender 
awareness and sensitivity should be incorporated into the training of ‘gender unrelated’ 
secondary and tertiary practitioners, as for all primary care GPs, so that trans status 
does not cause problems with equal treatment access and experience. 
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always change our mind and not have the treatment. But once they’ve 
said no to the treatment we can’t change our minds about that, not too 
easily. So that’s what makes it difficult to be honest. 
B: So do you think people try to keep their options open by presenting 
more binary than they maybe are? 
A: Yes I think so. More binary, more certain. More… yeah. Absolutely. 
More like… the narrative of ‘typical transsexual’ experiences known to 
have worked. (Ash, 33, interview) 
There is a sense amongst non-binary people that existing medical criteria make it more 
difficult for non-binary individuals to be recognised clinically and to access gender 
affirming services than for binary transgender people. Ash explained how when they 
accessed hormones and surgeries initially, they identified as a binary trans man, and 
then had great difficulty in accessing further services in relation to their articulation of a 
non-binary identity. They explained how:  
When I went on the waiting list for breast surgery, I imagined that I 
wasn’t actually going to have it. I did it because it was expected of me, 
and if I did everything that was expected of me, I’d get a prescription 
for testosterone. And I imagined I’d probably just go ‘oh I changed my 
mind’ and not having it done. (Ash, 33, interview) 
However, Ash found the experience of ‘becoming more butch’ very interesting, and 
explained how their curiosity over being read socially as male resulted in continued 
medical access, which they felt positively about. These factors together also strongly 
influenced how they constructed their body outside of a clinical setting, articulating how 
through extensive exercise they cultured a muscular, masculine physique. Despite 
enjoying this period of their life, after 10 years they decided they wanted to articulate a 
more feminine appearance. Negotiating this with medical professionals was extremely 
difficult, with Ash explaining that due to not following a ‘typical’ trans narrative, they 
were turned away by at least ten surgeons before finding a private doctor in Poland 
who agreed to operate. Ash expresses an unambiguous happiness about their breasts, 
despite having previously accessed a double mastectomy. They were also happy 
during the period of their life where they possessed a muscular, pectoral-emphasising 
chest that was viewed as masculine. This serves to disrupt hegemonic transgender 
discourse, whereby a physiological configuration on one side of the gender binary is 
anathema, whilst the other is idealised. Two points (that are often implicitly positioned 
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as axiomatic) are challenged by this – firstly that gender, once truly reflected upon and 
understood, does not and cannot change, and secondly that the presentation and 
articulation of gender that an individual feels correctly reflects their sense of self 
reflects the whole gendered self, rather than potentially a part. This experience of 
embodiment illustrates potential ‘fuzziness’ around gender (Tauchert, 2002). In other 
words, Ash’s shift in embodied desire does not evidence remorse for their time spent 
presenting as masculine, nor does it imply that the allowances for medical intervention 
were misplaced. Further, Ash’s experience also highlights the necessity of recognising 
that feelings around gendered embodiment can be renegotiated or change over time, 
yet not fit within a narrative of ‘de-transition’.  
The desire and action of Ash to modify their body in relation to how they felt regarding 
gender at different stages in their life defies the expectations of gender identity clinics – 
that gender affirming procedures are expected to be embraced permanently. This 
expectation is due to the ‘common sense notion’ that if something is impermanent, it is 
‘less real’, which influences the standards that are considered ethical within medical 
practice. Thus, there is a lack of clinically intelligible narratives where individuals have 
continued transitioning, or re-transitioned, without it being characterised as ‘regret’. 
Ash’s experience also emphasises how happiness with embodiment has profound 
impacts beyond the internal interactions with the self. Ash is a sex worker, and thus 
embodiment for them is also connected intimately to economic capital. It is also clear 
from Ash’s narrative that they did not approach medical services attempting to 
articulate a binary transgender narrative whilst identifying as non-binary, but rather 
came to their non-binary identification over time, post-medical access.  
The clinical standards that need to be met (particularly through NHS GICs, though also 
through private medical practice) are such that members of the non-binary community 
can view certain narratives as more likely to ‘succeed’ than others: 
Jamie: I think medically speaking, I don’t think GICs would accept you 
just saying ‘this makes me happy, but I’m not super unhappy now’ 
Ben: You have to be pathologically unhappy? 
J: Which is why again, you end up hyping up these experiences which 
maybe you would prefer to diminish. Because you’re aware, or you 
think you’re aware given there’s no transparency, of what they want to 
hear. And you’ve got to strike a balance between telling that and telling 
the truth (Jamie, 24, interview) 
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Jess (26) also explained how access to medical resources can become “a competition” 
as who can fulfil clinical expectations “in the quickest and most attractive way”. Jamie 
and Jess both share the view that current medical policy inherently produces a 
hierarchy between binary and non-binary transgender people, because of the belief 
that non-binary identities are less likely to be accepted as ‘needing treatment’. One can 
argue that within the context of the NHS, whilst doctors are limited by available budgets, 
they have a utilitarian responsibility for individuals experiencing pathological distress to 
be prioritised (Pencheon, 1998). However, as the multiple participants experiencing 
dysphoria that would be alleviated by gender affirming medical services illustrate, 
patient need cannot be assessed through consideration of whether identity is 
constructed in binary or non-binary terms. Further, the existence of binary transgender 
people who do not wish for hormones or surgeries has long been recognised, through 
the historical demarcation between the ‘transsexual’ and the ‘transgenderist’ (Ekins and 
King, 2005; Prince, 1978). Historically, those not seeking medical transition could be 
clinically positioned as ‘simply crossdressers’, with this fundamental demarcation used 
to maintain ‘transsexuality’ as the only category necessitating medical transition, which 
required a particular performance of gender in order to be diagnosed as such.  
It is important to recognise that doctors, as with all other members of society, are 
subject to influence by structural, societal gendered norms (Turner, 1995). Participants 
could fear being judged as ‘not trans enough’ by doctors because of being less 
culturally intelligible to them (as clinical sensitivity on transgender patients remains 
uncertain on non-binary identities, even in specialist contexts), and because non-binary 
treatment has considerably less precedent with which to be clinically justified. This is 
discussed in further detail in chapters six and seven.  
Frankie, who has successfully accessed an NHS GIC and been discharged due to 
having accessed all that she currently wished to, articulated positive feelings about her 
experiences. Despite this, Frankie did also say that her overall sense of other trans 
peoples’ experiences was not good, and that there exists “a lot of misunderstanding, 
[and] a lot of barriers put up to medical assistance”. Other participants, who articulated 
positive experiences personally, also believed there was a negative status quo overall:  
You hear really awful stories, like, oh god, but that hasn’t happened to 
me, I’ve been fortunate. (Mark, 43, diary) 
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My non-binary friend, they’ve just been under the gender clinic, and 
they’ve had a really tough experience. And I think that’s fairly typical 
from what I know. I have been incredibly lucky. (Ricky, 43, diary) 
Frankie and Ricky’s positive experiences are particularly important because they both 
identified themselves as non-binary to their GICs throughout their transition processes. 
This demonstrates that negative participant conceptions of GIC practice for non-binary 
people cannot be taken as universally representative, and as Frankie also notes, “you 
don’t normally hear people being particularly vocal about the good experiences they’ve 
had, the ones you do hear about tend to be the negative ones”. This follows, in that 
services perceived as problematic by the trans community inevitably garner more 
attention than less problematic cases, in order to seek their improvement. In addition, 
for those community members seeking information from other trans people prior to GIC 
access, interest in negative cases can be a mechanism so as to avoid an undesirable 
outcome, and to prepare for a ‘worst case scenario’. The above quotations from 
Frankie, Mark, and Ricky suggest a pattern whereby non-binary people with positive 
clinical experiences view themselves as exceptions to the rule – “fortunate” and “lucky”, 
as they all had anecdotal evidence of problematic transgender treatment (at all levels 
of care) from others.  
It is possible however that Frankie’s positive experience was dependent on the manner 
in which she articulated her non-binary identity, such as through binarised language 
(such as ‘more female than male’). Frankie even postulates that her experiences may 
have influenced how her identity changed over time from non-binary to more binary: “to 
be honest maybe that’s part of the reason for my kind of identity shift. Maybe I wouldn’t 
rule it out that I’ve internalised some… GIC”. Frankie also reported that during one of 
her appointments, one of her secondary care practitioners said: 
That I was moving (I think the words he used were ‘slowly drifting’) 
towards a place that was much easier to ‘treat’ from the GIC’s greater 
NHS perspectives because it had a treatment history. Much as I can 
understand this, it’s a bit of a blow to hear it put like that. (Frankie, 25, 
diary) 
By implying then that non-binary service users are ‘more difficult’ due to lack of 
historical precedent, it can be appreciated why non-binary people may feel the need to 
police how they communicate with GICs in order to make the process as quick and 
easy as possible for themselves. This is a product of a more general logic in medicine 
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of symptom identification, diagnosis, and treatment, being applied in an arguably 
under-critical manner in the context of gender – such that articulations of gender with 
less socially visible (and therefore medical) history are discursively positioned as 
having less medical need. This explains the commonality of some participants wishing 
to avoid or minimise mention of their non-binary identification within the GIC. Exhibiting 
a common and precedent-bearing profile could, however, be done, even if identifying 
oneself openly as non-binary. Ricky said that it was: 
Surprisingly easy [to be out as non-binary in medical contexts], but I 
think that I probably had enough of a typical trans man’s narrative to 
make it a fairly straightforward process, even though… they were very 
respectful of my pronouns, and of my letter finally granting me 
testosterone has me recorded as a non-binary trans person, with ‘they’ 
pronouns. But having said that, I’ve gone on a fairly standard route. I’m 
going on testosterone, I have no desire at the moment for surgery, but 
that might change as my body changes. […] So yeah, I don’t know 
whether my experience as a non-binary person in the gender clinic is 
typical of other non-binary people who might have slightly less 
standardised needs. I was talking, and toying with taking a lower dose 
of testosterone, which they’re quite resistant to at [clinic]. But in the 
end I decided to go for a full dose, just because the changes… 
apparently if you take a lower dose of testosterone you get the same 
changes, just more slowly. And to be honest at my age, the changes 
will happen pretty slowly anyway. (Ricky, 43, interview) 
The language that Ricky uses further emphasises the point that positive clinical 
experiences are positioned as something to be thankful for, rather than something that 
can be relied upon. Ricky positioned the ease with which they were out as non-binary 
as ‘surprising’, though ameliorated this by suggesting this was through their clinical 
requests fitting within binary precedent – the “standard route”.  
Participants exerted control over their relationships with GICs through methods other 
than obscuring their non-binary identities, or through policing the manner in which they 
spoke about their identity. Despite both coming to this project independently and both 
electing to be anonymous, V and Jamie were open in their interviews about knowing 
each other and being friends. Jamie expressed how they had received support and 
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advice from V, who had positive experiences of accessing a particular clinic. Jamie 
chose this clinic on the basis of V’s recommendation, but still remained guarded: 
I haven’t self-defined as non-binary to the NHS. When I say I picked 
[clinic] because V says they’re non-binary friendly, I mean I won’t worry 
about going in in flowery shirts and earrings in both ears; that’s all. 
That’s the limit of my honesty – I’m just going to tell them I’m not 
female; that’s not a lie. (Jamie, 24, diary) 
The concern expressed by individuals accessing GICs goes beyond the desire to be 
respected and recognised by practitioners in the setting of consultation meetings – 
extending to contexts outside of appointments, such as clinical forms. Jamie discusses 
and deconstructs this within their diary: 
So this [clinic] form. 19 pages long. Includes a section where you label 
almost every body part with a rating of how you feel about it, including 
‘beard’ (is that ‘not satisfied’, ‘I want one’, or N/A?) and ears (literally 
this has made me feel dysphoric about my ears, ffs)47. A section on 
anxiety/depression, where you mark how often in the past week you’ve 
had a variety of anxious thoughts, which of course triggers all of said 
anxious thoughts. A section that seems designed to see if you have an 
eating disorder, with three slightly differently worded questions asking 
whether you think your buttocks are too big (if I say yes, will they think 
I just have an eating disorder and am not really trans?) And a section 
that maybe designed to test if you’re autistic, I dunno – you have to 
rate the extent to which you agree with statements like “I would rather 
go to a library than a party” (is it a nice library? Who will be at the party? 
Did I get enough sleep the night before?) and most bizarrely “I find it 
easy to remember long strings of numbers, such as car number plates”. 
That one caused a lot of anxiety at [group] because it sounds gender 
related inadvertently or not: ‘masculine’ brains are stereotypically 
supposed to remember numbers better. That’s the problem with asking 
seemingly irrelevant questions in a context where there’s so little trust 
between practitioners and patients: we start wondering why the 
questions are being asked, how they’re relevant to the issue at hand, 
and what the “right answer” that will result in us getting access to 
                                            
47 In this context, ‘ffs’ stands for ‘for fuck’s sake’.  
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treatment is. As if the process wasn’t hoop-jump-y enough, and as if I 
didn’t already feel obliged to lie about my NB identity, now I have to 
agonise over what ratio of library-to-party preference makes me trans 
enough. (Jamie, 24, diary, underline original) 
There is a lack of transparency over how such forms are produced, why particular 
questions are included, and what particular purpose questions serve; which as Jamie 
articulates, can cause experiences of anxiety over what criteria the GIC are attempting 
to scrutinise. In the recent past, (binary) transgender activists have given examples of 
service users being expected to ‘completely comply’ with directions over gendered 
appearance and to obtain ‘proof’ of gender expression within the workplace (PinkNews, 
2009) illustrating the possibility that some GIC interactions are intended to explicitly 
police gender. 
The responses from the trans community in relation to this clinical form, which Jamie 
illustrates, raise multiple questions. The first of which are whether (and if so, to what 
extent) questions are justified through evidence-based research. The inclusion of 
questions pertaining to ‘systemising’ ability – such as memorisation of car number 
places – may relate to theorisation within experimental psychology, postulating that 
brains are gendered male and female in and of themselves, which are then 
demarcated as ‘systemising’ and ‘empathising’ (Baron-Cohen, 2004)48. This work has 
since been heavily criticised for possessing fundamental methodological flaws and 
enforcing stereotypical notions of gender (Rivers and Barnett, 2013; Fine, 2010; Eliot, 
2009). Lack of transparency over the production of such forms also means it is unlikely 
(or at least, unknown) as to whether transgender service users were consulted as to 
their potential impact. There are also ethical implications should such data be used for 
research purposes even with the informed consent of service users – due to the 
potential for patients to feel under duress, or fearing being potentially denied transition 
access should such forms not be fully completed – to not fulfil the role of a ‘good 
patient’ as optimally as possible. 
                                            
48 As there is no way to access the definitive purpose of questionnaire questions, this 
potential explanation is inevitably a speculation. However, it remains salient because of 
how trans service users engage in similar processes, in order to try and approach the 
questions ‘correctly’. Indeed, Jamie suspected these questions to be connected to 
autism, and Simon Baron-Cohen’s work on gendered brains specifically relates to a 
model of autism in terms of gender – such that even if this is not the actual clinical 
usage of the question, it is how some patients base their interactions with it. 
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This section has explored some perceptions and experiences of accessing gender 
affirming medical services. Opinions on GIC sensitivity and their ability to treat non-
binary people effectively were low, both amongst those who had and had not accessed 
them. However, personal experiences were broadly positive – illustrating how it is 
possible that potentially small numbers of negative experiences may dominate 
community discourses, resulting in greater levels of anxiety and distrust. Alternatively, 
whilst interactions with clinicians may be broadly found satisfactory, the discourses 
around the clinic – that is, expectations of resistance or having to prove oneself as 
‘trans enough’ – lack of transparency, and anxiety over the potential of a distressing 
interaction limit how positively the clinic may be regarded. Further, the happiness and 
relief later experienced by individuals who are successful in accessing hormones 
and/or surgeries may potentially ameliorate more negative views they held at the time. 
This relates back to my methodological discussion of the potential limitation of 
retrospective discussions. Frankie’s data is thus particularly interesting as she 
experienced a GIC appointment during her diary-keeping period.  
It must also be noted that individuals with positive interactions in the clinical setting 
may still problematize the reasoning or efficacy of GIC policies or practices. Whilst 
clinicians may be respectful and helpful, this can be recognised as occurring 
simultaneously with a lack of transparency, extensive waiting times (UK Trans Info, 
2016), lack of universal clinic guidelines, and lack of non-binary protocols (Richards et 
al., 2016). It can be claimed that fear of being judged ‘not trans enough’ to access 
services is a serious concern for many, and relates to how communities have 
internalised a discourse which associates medical access with legitimacy. Thus, fear of 
rejection by medical providers may be also connected to fear of then being unable to 
be recognised as ‘authentic’ in community interactions. Medical transition services can 
emphasise that aspects of hormonal therapy and surgeries are permanent changes, 
and associate this with arriving at a static and fixed gender identity, which Ash’s 
experience defies.  
Conclusion 
Through this chapter I have illustrated how common feelings of ‘not being trans enough’ 
can be amongst people with non-binary gender identities. This has significant 
discursive interplay with the consideration of, and interaction with, queer communities 
and medical services oriented around gender transition. Not feeling trans enough is 
commonly connected to either not desiring, or having not yet accessed medical 
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services. This shows how the centrality of medical diagnoses and discourses to the 
history of transgender communities shapes contemporary experiences of identity 
formation. This is despite resistance to medicalisation amongst transgender 
communities (binary and non-binary alike), and shifts in language amongst medical 
practitioners and diagnostic manuals over time, as recognised in chapter one.  I have 
used the concept of ‘embodied dysphoria’ to differentiate between those who 
experience distress with their bodies and those who do not, and have drawn attention 
to how the language of dysphoria is used by non-binary individuals to justify 
themselves as transgender, even whilst resisting the imposition of medical power.  
I have used data to illustrate that tensions can sometimes manifest between members 
of transgender communities, including sometimes due to differences between binary 
and non-binary transgender people. Reasons for this have included generational 
differences in language use, and how an understanding of one’s own and other’s 
genders are subject to many sociocultural factors, constructing what individuals 
perceive as ‘valid’ or ‘real’. In some contexts, insecurity around one’s gender may also 
lead to attempts at self-validation through the denigration of others, which is 
problematic and entwined with medical access. This is also most likely to be at the 
particular expense of non-binary individuals; as if a binary trans person adopts a 
medical paradigm to affirm themselves, non-binary identities are then correspondingly 
accorded less precedence, and greater association with uncertainty, indecision, 
impermanence, flux, and difficulty to understand and/or ‘treat’. 
Whilst there is a guarded and strongly negative sense of the ability of GICs to 
unproblematically provide services to non-binary people, those participants who had 
accessed hormones and surgeries described their experiences as broadly positive. 
Historical context of how transgender people have been treated within medical contexts 
may somewhat contextualise how negative sentiment is propagated through 
community networks. Increased scrutiny and emphasis on cases where people have 
discussed negative rather than positive experiences by potential service users may 
also be a potential explanation. Regardless, this chapter has sought to elucidate the 
relationship between insecurity of non-binary gender identity, medical access, and 
community interplay.  
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Chapter 5 – Non-Binary Times, Non-Binary Places: Communities and their 
Intersections 
While community spaces can be seen to constrain queer subjectivities, 
then, queer identifications are also negotiated, vocalised and 
performed within community politics and locales. 
(Hines, 2010, p. 608) 
Introduction 
Whilst the naming of this chapter is inspired by Halberstam’s In a Queer Time and 
Place (2005), the chapter is otherwise not directly connected to the locus of 
(postmodern, futurist) work linking queerness with temporality (Muñoz, 2009; Edelman, 
2004; Warner, 1993). Also the chapter does not function to construct a model of time or 
space as non-binary in and of themselves. Rather, I draw attention to times and places 
that recur as sites of significance for non-binary people, and the negotiation of identity. 
I argue that the symbolic meaning ascribed to particular times and/or places will be 
fundamentally informed by the interactions had within them. I use time and space as 
concepts to collectively consider and connect aspects of lived experience through a 
sociological lens, rather than to specifically construct postmodern theory. In partial 
response to the non-empirical postmodern production of queer theory which the 
majority of the literature around queerness and temporality follows, Stein and Plummer 
argue that:  
There is a dangerous tendency for the new queer theorists to ignore 
"real" queer life as it is materially experienced across the world, while 
they play with the free-floating signifiers of texts. What can the 
rereading of a nineteenth-century novel really tell us about the pains of 
gay Chicanos or West Indian lesbians now, for example? Indeed, such 
postmodern readings may well tell us more about the lives of middle-
class radical intellectuals than about anything else! Sociology's key 
concerns – inequality, modernity, institutional analysis – can bring a 
clearer focus to queer theory.  
(Stein and Plummer, 1994, p. 184) 
In emphasising the pragmatic goals of an analysis informed by symbolic interactionism, 
this work not only does not seek to, but cannot be in dialogue with such works that are 
ultimately highly abstracted from lived experiences. This is due to a disconnect 
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between this study’s and the aforementioned literature’s respective philosophical and 
methodological axioms. This quotation of Stein and Plummer also highlights how 
queerness and queer theory are often implicitly deployed at the milieu of sexuality, 
which would have limiting ramifications if applied uncritically to the context of this work. 
Time vitally intersects with non-binary identity negotiation across different forms of 
social interaction. Time spent introspecting can and does result in changes in self-
conceptualisation, and time spent interacting with others can endear or alienate. How 
an individual responds to, interacts with, is affected by, or contributes to a particular 
queer community is dependent on the relationship an individual has with themselves. 
This changes over time, and may be shaped by communities. Further, time is a critical 
and direct factor in particular circumstances that intersect with non-binary narratives, 
such as how long an individual may wait for an appointment with a GIC, or how long an 
individual has benefitted from (or lacked) community support. Space is unavoidably 
connected to time in such contexts; for example, in cases where an individual may be 
‘out’ in some settings but not others. The family home or the workplace may be spaces 
that restrict autonomy of expression, whilst queer community spaces may enable 
(exploration of) such.  
I begin this chapter by considering how non-binary identities are negotiated over time, 
and how differences in subject positionality (particularly as related to communities and 
medical practice) inform such a process. I explore how participants felt regarding the 
notion of non-binary identities potentially operating as a ‘stepping stone’ with which to 
explore gender, and how some might then potentially ‘arrive’ at a binary transgender 
identity. In such a case, one’s status as non-binary may then be retrospectively 
positioned as transient, or a time of flux. This does not necessarily mean that non-
binary identification is revised to having been ‘less real’ than a later binary identity. 
Rather, that self-conceptualisation and comfort with symbolic gendering of the self may 
exhibit greater or lesser plasticity for different individuals, and the extent of this 
plasticity may also change over time.  
Many participants recognised how non-binary can shift to binary – and importantly, two 
of the participants explained how this was specifically true for them. Participants also 
proposed that due to the lack of intelligibility of non-binary genders within queer 
communities, as well as wider society, binary transgender identities may be ‘found first’ 
– particularly prior to community involvement that may expand awareness of gendered 
possibilities. This is part of a process allowing the development of, shift towards, or 
reinterpretation of gender in non-binary terms. Thus, non-binary identities may also be 
135 
 
 
 
arrived at following a binary trans identification. This ‘direction’ of identity development 
(from binary to non-binary) was also experienced by some participants. 
Following on from the analysis of demarcated non-binary narratives, I move to consider 
different contexts of community interaction that participants discussed. Some of these 
communities were not LGBTQ in focus specifically, yet could involve challenging 
gender norms or interacting with gender in ways that participants explored within the 
context of being non-binary.  
Identity Shifts over Time – Coming to Identities through a ‘Stepping Stone’ 
Process 
Experiences of feeling delegitimised by doctors, other members of queer communities, 
or other individuals can be rooted in problematic assumptions that being non-binary is 
a ‘phase’. This infers that individuals identifying as non-binary will at some later point, 
identify within the binary as (trans or cis) men or women, and that consequently non-
binary identification is inherently ‘unstable’. This bears a striking parallel to the 
disenfranchising pressure placed on bisexual people to ‘pick a side’, else be 
stigmatised as confused, greedy, indecisive, or in denial (Callis, 2013). Jess noted with 
some frustration how:  
I’ve met a lot of especially older trans women… who have quite almost 
patronised me, come over to me and been like ‘oh okay, well when 
you’re ready to come to terms with being a trans woman, come to me 
and I’ll help you navigate the process’, or whatever. And quite often 
this is trans women who have actually been out as trans, navigating 
that system for a lot smaller amount of time than I have. So you know, 
I’ve been, I came out as genderqueer when I was 18, I’m now just 
coming up to 27, that’s 9 years of operating as trans and being out as 
trans. You suddenly have binary trans people who have been a couple 
of years into their transition leaning over and going ‘oh come to me 
when you’re ready’, it’s intensely patronising. So for a lot of the time it 
is seen as a stepping stone. And you know, actually, it can be a 
stepping stone. And there’s nothing wrong with that. (Jess, 26, 
interview) 
Jess’s feelings of being patronised are connected to having been out as trans for a 
considerably longer time than the women who offer their advice and support. The trans 
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women speaking to Jess implicitly position Jess’s non-binary identity as transient or 
unstable, a product of ‘not being ready to come to terms with being a trans woman’, 
and liable to collapse as their presumed ‘true female identity’ then emerges. Such 
communication functions as a microaggression (Chang and Chung, 2015; Sue, 2010), 
denying the validity of Jess’s account of her non-binary identity as fixed. Further, there 
is an ironic sense of role reversal – as the older individuals attempt to advise the 
younger, yet Jess is more experienced, having been out for longer and navigating 
social interaction as transgender – older, in a sense ‘as trans’.  
Jess’s nine years out as genderqueer/non-binary positions her non-binary identity as 
not representative of a time ‘in flux’, although not necessarily as inherently rigid. It is 
important to recognise how identification as non-binary need not be permanent in order 
to be respected. This is iterated through Jess’s belief that the utilisation of non-binary to 
come to a binary (or more binary) identification is not in itself a problem (“and there’s 
nothing wrong with that”) – and thus that those with a non-binary identity have no 
reason to feel threatened or undermined by those who previously identified as non-
binary, but no longer do.  
Pig’s answer to the question “do you think people use non-binary identities as a 
stepping stone to binary identities” was particularly interesting, because they firmly 
articulated the belief that it was “the opposite way around” – that is, some people use a 
binary transgender identity as a stepping stone to a non-binary identity. Following this, I 
explicitly incorporated consideration of this position into future interviews, which yielded 
significant support for Pig’s claim: 
So my colleague on the committee is post-transition for about a 
decade, probably a little bit more than that. He’s 50 odd. And he has 
told me on more than one occasion that had non-binary been an option, 
if he had known about it before he transitioned, he may not have 
transitioned, or he may have adopted this as his identity. And he’s 
really not sure at all that he is a man, trans or otherwise post that 
transition. And I think that’s an incredibly difficult position to be in after 
you have spent so much time and effort. (David, 31, interview) 
This example from David acts as support for Jess’s conviction that trans people who 
are positioned as ‘de-transitioning’ may often be better understood as experiencing 
gender in a non-binary manner. Results of (social or medical) transition considered 
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imperfect and uncomfortable by such individuals may be at least partially a result of 
available options, particularly historically, being highly constrained in binary terms.  
I think that probably the majority of people who previously defined as 
binary who then go through a transition process to then de-transition 
are actually non-binary, and they’re not de-transitioning to a binary 
gender which was the gender they were assigned at birth, but they are 
re-transitioning to somewhere else. I think that if basically, if healthcare 
wasn’t binary centred we would be able to explore non-binary as an 
option and it not be seen as a stepping stone to binary people, but 
actually as a valid destination in and of itself. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Jess articulates how it is a significant problem that the possibility of non-binary as a 
consistent state of being can fail to be given space, but also acknowledges the 
necessity of recognising that gender identity can function in a transient manner. This 
deconstructs the further potential binary of permanence versus transience. The implicit 
links that can be made between permanence equalling stability, and stability equalling 
good mental health (and conversely, transience meaning instability, and instability 
meaning mentally unwell) are challenged. This is particularly true when related to 
medical transition, where trans individuals’ ‘change of gender role’ is expected to be 
permanent and until death in order to be accepted as real, and in order to access 
gender affirming medical procedures. This is arguably not only due to the hegemonic 
sense that gender identity is fixed for the life-course, but that traditionally within medical 
terms, transition is positioned (if not explicitly labelled) as the ‘cure’ for gender 
dysphoria that may be associated with trans status (Pauly, 1974). The complexity of 
gender is simplified and erased when an individual re-negotiating their relationship with 
gender and the body is taken to imply ‘regret’, or that the past transition was 
necessarily erroneous. Greater attention is needed to the temporally-dependent 
context of articulated gendered desires.  
In the case of David’s friend, the inability to articulate a non-binary identity may have 
been connected to his age, and accordingly the years when he negotiated gender 
transition. Non-binary identities were virtually unintelligible until relatively recently (as 
discussed in chapter two). This supports and offers a potential explanation for evidence 
produced by Harrison et al. (2012), which collected survey data from 6,456 transgender 
individuals and found 89% of those identifying outside of the gender binary were under 
the age of 45 (p.18), as was every member of this study (Mark and Ricky were the 
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oldest participants, both being 43). The spreading of discourses of non-binary gender 
identification, particularly across society generally rather than specifically within queer 
communities, has allowed individuals to question whether they identify as neither male 
nor female prior to, or without being limited to only considering the possibility of a 
binary trans identity. It has taken time for individualised conceptions of genderqueer 
and non-binary identification to gain greater intelligibility (primarily within transgender-
specific and LGBTQ communities), and to now be mobilised as an identity category 
that may be demarcated. 
Contrary to David’s friend, the reality of non-binary identification functioning as a 
transient step to negotiating binary identification is highlighted by Frankie and Jen. Both 
entered the project with non-binary identities, as specifically required within recruitment 
literature, but would later articulate a more binary, and an exclusively binary identity 
respectively. Frankie communicated this during the interview, whilst Jen made contact 
later via email having reflected upon her interview experience. Throughout the diary 
and interview Jen described herself as bigender, and articulated that her self-
expression (with regards to gendered presentation and desired embodiment) was 
dependent on whether she was in ‘boy mode’ or ‘girl mode’, but other aspects of her 
personality were not. Jen explained how the process of discussing identity and feelings 
regarding medical transition services, through this project, catalysed a process of 
introspective self-critique which led her to the conclusion that she had been in denial 
over being a binary trans woman. Jen renegotiated her experiences of fluidity as more 
accurately describing the extent of her dysphoria, rather than her gender itself at a 
given time. The significance of the correspondence necessitates its inclusion in full 
(additional permission was obtained from Jen to use this quotation): 
Just want to say thanks again for the diary project and the interview. 
It's been really important for reflection. You were the first person to ask, 
in person, if I’d thought about HRT49 or surgery before. I’m sure I said 
something like “yes, I’ve thought about it, but I’d never do it” or 
something, but that conversation has had a big impact. Because you 
asked, out loud, I think it made me think differently about it. It’s hard to 
explain but I guess I suddenly felt it was okay for it to be an option. Or I 
felt I was allowed to consider it. It’s taken a long time to get from that 
conversation to here but I feel a lot clearer about several things. But I 
                                            
49 Hormone Replacement Therapy. 
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also feel kind of bad because in some ways I’ve been lying to myself, 
so that’s reflected in my diary and interview.  
Basically my description of sometimes feeling male and sometimes 
female is just not right and never has been. I think I’ve just told myself 
that so many times I kind of believe it. What’s really fluid is how 
extreme the effects of dysphoria are (assuming I have gender 
dysphoria, I’m pretty sure I do but I haven’t been diagnosed). What I 
call girl mode is me being female and having a really shit time with 
anxiety etc. what I call guy mode is me also being female but my 
mental health coping better. I still think of myself as female, I always 
want to transition, but because the dysphoria sort of comes in waves I 
can just keep my head down and get on with it. At first that meant 
pretending nothing was wrong. Then it meant coming out as non-
binary. Then it meant describing myself as genderfluid so I could 
express myself but still have the option of “being normal” (yes I hate 
myself for that). 
But really I’ve been asking myself the same question you asked me for 
months now and I feel like I’ve been in denial my whole life. I’ve gotten 
really good at telling myself I’m male. Anyway, I’m sorry if this messes 
up anything. I wasn’t intentionally trying to deceive… it’s more that I 
was lying to myself. I don’t sometimes want to present as male and 
other times as female. I always want to present as female. It’s just I’ve 
learned to present as male to get on with it. So if anything I’m 
presentation-fluid rather than genderfluid. Or to simplify further, I’m a 
transwoman in denial. 
It is valuable to note that involvement with this research project assisted Jen in re-
negotiating her identity in a manner which she found to be illuminating. This evidences 
the transformative positive impact of research participation, and in this case, of the 
interview specifically (Mertens, 2010; Hutchinson et al., 1994). When comparing this 
message to earlier text in Jen’s diary, she was explicit in communicating that non-
binary fit for her at that time. However, aspects of Jen’s diary gain additional 
significance in the light of her ‘confessional’ email, such as “I’d love for people to see 
me the way I feel, which is female”, and “I don’t feel I fit in as non-binary, or trans, or 
bigender”. This also highlights how not only the passage of time, but how one is 
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engaging during that time has great potential to impact and allow for gendered 
development, as the interactions within the research interview provided catalysis.  
Jen recognises that non-binary identification was, for her, part of a process of 
negotiating feelings of dysphoria, anxiety over not being trans enough, and as she puts 
it, denial. These were significant factors in constructing and constraining Jen’s 
experience of her time (socially, and to herself) as non-binary. This also illustrates how 
the symbolic meaning an individual associates with their identity can be quite different 
from another individual who experiences a sense of connection with the same term50. 
That is, Jen’s renegotiation of identity and her relationship with gender cannot be taken 
as indicative of others’ experiences of bigender identification. The individual’s 
relationship with an identity category can easily transmute as factors influence the 
relationship/fit between label and sense of self, over time. This also reflexively 
emphasises how the time spent reflecting whilst producing diary entries was 
inescapably time that brought non-binary into greater emphasis or focus (or scrutiny), 
and the interviews also served to carve out and create additional time and space for 
non-binary identities. Frankie’s experience, however, was instead tied quite directly to 
the progression of her medical transition: 
Frankie: So, I think when I was writing the diary I had a much more 
kind of, my non-binaryness was very apparent, relatively apparent. I 
think when I was writing the diary it was just at the start of kind of a bit 
of a shift? Which I think is evident as I kind of go through to an extent. 
But in the last few months I’ve become very grounded in actually a 
more binary identity. A non-conforming female identity ultimately for 
me. 
Ben: I think you did start to say that coming to the end of the diary. Do 
you still identify as non-binary? 
Frankie: To a small extent. I would call myself non-binary on occasion, 
but it’s much, much less frequent than it used to be.  
B: Why do you think it is that you moved away from that? 
F: I’m really not sure. I think… changes in my body? Definitely a 
catalyst. In terms of kind of feeling a bit more grounded in things. 
                                            
50 This can also be seen in relation to Zesty’s identification with non-binary but not with 
transgender, as discussed in chapter four. 
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B: Do you think it gave you a sense of more ownership over inclusion 
in womanhood? 
F: Yeah I think it did. I think kind of remapping my body… yeah. In a 
way that I felt a lot more comfortable with than before. (Frankie, 25, 
interview) 
Access to hormones allowed Frankie to feel able to take ownership of an identity that 
resonated with her experiences of womanhood. In one sense, prior to medical 
intervention, Frankie’s identity was constrained by feeling unable to claim being 
‘woman enough’. This further evidences the point discussed in the previous chapter 
that due to the impact of medical discourses on trans identity narratives, feeling unable 
to claim particular forms of transness can be rooted in a lack of medicalised, embodied 
change. Further, in Frankie saying that she would call herself non-binary “on occasion” 
implies that context may alter how one wishes to articulate one’s gender identity, such 
that binary and non-binary identification are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
 
 
Figure 5: Model of non-binary identity as a ‘stepping stone’ process. 
Figure 5 illustrates how gender identity as a ‘stepping stone’ process may be conceived. 
All individuals unavoidably have their early years constructed in relation to the gender 
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they were assigned at birth. Those who are cisgender never (need to) question this 
assignation, even whilst great variation in gender conceptualisation, relationships with 
gender norms, presentation, and behaviour exist within this ‘box’. Those people who 
come out as transgender (at least to themselves) may articulate their identity as binary 
or non-binary, whether using these terms explicitly or not. The large overlapping ovals 
signify fields within which an individual may be situated, such that different individuals 
may identify with the same generalising term (binary or non-binary trans), yet still then 
articulate or experience gender very differently. The ovals overlap so as to signify the 
possibility of identification with binary and non-binary conceptions of gender 
simultaneously – such as identifying as a non-binary woman, as Jess did, and Frankie 
did to a certain extent.  
Jen’s and Frankie’s narratives both follow the bottom arrow of the diagram, with initial 
negotiations of gender identity being into non-binary terms (yet very different from each 
other, so occupying different points within the right oval), prior to continued negotiation 
that led to identification as binary. Whilst Jen positioned herself exclusively as woman, 
because Frankie said she would call herself non-binary in some situations, this allows 
her identity to be positioned in the overlapping section of the ovals, or on the edge of 
being/becoming ‘only binary’. Other participants (such as Ash) negotiated both identity 
and transition in a binary manner before revisiting changes to embodiment and social 
positionality years later, which would follow the trajectory of the top arrow in the 
diagram. A necessary caveat to this model is that it centralises a contemporary 
Western perspective, positioning non-Western gender identities as analogous or 
subsumed within the dichotomy of transgender categorisation in terms of ‘binary’ and 
‘non-binary’. Being in a transitional state or at the boundaries of identities can be 
encapsulated by the concept of liminality, which is explored within the following section. 
Betwixt and Between: Understanding ‘Inbetweenness’ Using the Concept of 
Liminality 
The origin of the concept of liminality was in the anthropological study of social rituals, 
to describe the intermediate phase of a symbolically transformative process or 
transition, a Western example being baptism (Van Gennep, 1960). The concept was 
later expanded to consider a wider range of transformative social processes 
intersecting with temporality, such as puberty – in between adult and child, or war – in 
between systems of stable rule (Turner, 1969). Monro discusses how early transgender 
scholars “describe transsexuality as a place outside duality” (Monro, 2007, p. 10), and 
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the connection with ‘rituals of becoming’ has been reiterated in the positioning of non-
Western third gender categories, as permanently liminal (Monro, 2007; Mageo, 1996; 
Nanda, 1993; Fulton and Anderson, 1992). Liminality has been deployed in the 
analysis of a wide range of sociological contexts rendered ‘in-between’, that resonate 
with non-binary negotiations of queer communities and healthcare. These include the 
chronically ill or disabled as neither ‘sick’ nor ‘well’ (Jackson, 2005; Little et al., 1998; 
Murphy et al., 1988), identity reconstruction (Beech, 2011), and experiences and 
events (Szakolczai, 2009).  
Liminality has been implicitly and explicitly deployed in the study of transgender. In 
their work on the sociology of trans bodies, Ekins and King (1999) recognise narratives 
which ‘transcend’ the gender binary, creating a practically infinite, fluid interpretations 
of gender that occupy a third category. Wilson has discussed the conceptualisation of 
liminal transgender identities, where she recognised the possibility that “gender 
identities will not necessarily shift within this liminal phase, rather one’s physical, 
behavioural and psychological self will be remodelled to ‘fit’ with one’s supposedly 
‘transgressive’ gender identities” (Wilson, 2002, p. 432). It is important to note that all 
trans participants of Wilson’s study identified as either transsexual or as cross-dressers, 
but that she “found participants often grappling to identify themselves within the limited 
categories and scripts available to them” (2002, p. 431). Wilson additionally models 
transgender community spaces as liminal, because of the possibility for trans people 
(who are not ‘out’ in their daily lives) to become ‘something else’ for a limited time 
specifically in that space. 
Connecting liminality and motion to gender transition narratives, Carter (2013) 
discusses how in the historically significant phrase ‘anima mulieris in corpore virilis 
inclusa’ the Latin word inclusa, which is translated to ‘trapped’ in the phrase meaning ‘a 
woman’s soul trapped in a man’s body’ may instead be interpreted as ‘enclosed’, 
‘included’, or otherwise allowing the possibility of motion rather than stasis. Medical 
transition is accordingly reconceptualised as not the escape from the constraints of the 
body, but development and movement of identity over time, in relation to embodiment, 
that allows for multiple directions, or motion backwards and forwards in a manner that 
defies hegemonic medical conceptualisation.   
Both Frankie and Jen were clear that identification as non-binary was not viewed as a 
stepping stone or transient at the time; non-binary was, then, the label they felt most 
accurately described themselves. Frankie said: 
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It certainly didn’t feel like [a stepping stone] consciously. Whether there 
was an element of that at a less conscious level is a debate, and I 
would say maybe there was an element. There’s probably an element 
of truth in that. Whether people do that consciously or not, I think it’s 
fine? Obviously. And you know, if people need certain identifiers and 
terms to be able to come to terms with their journey, more power to 
them for finding them and owning them at that point. I don’t know, I 
would be surprised if anybody went into identifying as non-binary with 
a view that would then change, but maybe people do. (Frankie, 25, 
interview) 
Frankie’s and Jen’s experiences as non-binary can be understood as liminal, as this 
identification for them was an intermediary phase, an identity between (binary) 
identities. That Jen and Frankie contrast with Wilson’s model of liminality (in not forcing 
themselves to fit identity, but renegotiating identity) may reflect the great increase in 
access to a multiplicity of gender descriptors and identities. Wilson’s conception may 
be critiqued in potentially implying an overly-static, or essentialised model of gender 
identity. The suggestion that behaviours, presentation, and embodiment may be 
changing are important, but this does not imply that identity does not, or cannot, also 
do so. Whether gender identity itself is felt to have changed, or an individual comes to 
better understand and ‘reveal their true gender’, is dependent upon how the individual 
conceptualises their own gender, and is therefore tied to idiosyncratic 
conceptualisations of ontology and epistemology. This is seen in Frank’s (1993) work 
on different self-change narratives in illness contexts – ‘(re)discovering the true self’, a 
selfhood in the process of becoming, or rejecting ‘newness’. The processual nature of 
selfhood is well established (Clarke and James, 2003), but not in terms of genders 
beyond the binary.  
 Support and validation from within trans communities may also be fundamental in 
allowing individuals to feel like they can renegotiate how they wish to be understood, as 
whilst not reflective of their experiences, both Jess and Frankie stated how consciously 
claiming an identity temporarily was entirely acceptable. Communities thus not only 
provide increased access to lesser-known discourses of trans, but the encouragement 
or security necessary to consider their relevance to one’s own life, and acceptance that 
such relevance may be impermanent, without being of lesser validity or importance. 
Liminality was of particular importance to Finn (22), who began their diary with this 
collage (figure 6):  
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Figure 6: Image of collage on liminality, from Finn’s diary. 
The dictionary definition of liminality which Finn provides implicitly positions the 
boundary in question as the gender binary. There is the potential for a reading of 
gendered symbolism in the surrounding tissue paper, shattered pieces of the now-
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classically gendered pink and blue. The central square box is comparably ordered, 
allowing for the interpretation that embracing a liminal state or identity that 
simultaneously occupies “a position at, or on both sides of, a boundary or threshold” 
may grant stability. Whilst the coloured tissue is fractured and disorganised, it is 
notable that Finn did not include a third colour (such as purple). This fits with how non-
binary presentation or embodiment may challenge a demarcation of what constitutes 
male and female (or masculine and feminine), yet struggles to be regarded as an 
intelligible category without reference to such constructed phenomena. Finn follows by 
discussing liminality, in saying: 
I don’t see my identity or experiences reflected in either 
heteronormative or LGBT media… I felt such a relief when I found the 
term ‘non-binary’… but it also feels like I’m very much having to 
embrace my life as an ‘other’. (Finn, 22, diary) 
This highlights that the time of coming to, or ‘arriving’ at an identity which satisfies 
cannot be simplistically viewed in only positive terms. There is also a sense of liminality 
with non-binary identification providing relief and sense-making of the self, yet 
simultaneously being uncomfortable due to its unintelligible and marginalised status. 
Feeling that one has to “embrace life as an ‘other’” can be understood as another form 
of constraint. Whilst catharsis may be found in identification, stigmatisation and 
violence may be associated or risked. In slight contrast to an understanding of liminality 
in relation to time (the middling, transitional point between beginning and end states), 
Finn’s definition in the collage relates their existence as a non-binary person to the 
gender binary, and also to existence within physical space – as they navigate a 
binarised world, whilst being outside of the gender binary. The conception of selfhood 
transcending, breaking, or deconstructing binaries may also be a source of 
empowerment and validation, despite the difficulty that can be experienced in being 
recognised or respected.  
A further example of liminal identification can be seen from Ash, in relation to 
embodiment. They said in their diary how “I was particularly hoping to bleed this month 
so I could feel like a woman on National Women’s Day… But my body didn’t co-
operate and on National Women’s Day I conceded it was an important day but not my 
day, not about me”. During the interview I followed up on this diary entry, to which Ash 
replied: 
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I don’t think [bleeding is] essential, I think if I really was a woman who 
was transgender or had a hysterectomy or whatever, I could totally 
accept that. But I think because I’m genderqueer, any sense of being a 
woman or a man is fleeting or unstable, and little things my body does 
can make a difference to how I feel in a particular moment. I think that 
would’ve just pushed it over the edge and I would’ve felt a part of 
something even though I’m only in some way a woman and not in 
every way. (Ash, 33, interview) 
Whilst challenging the notion of biological essentialism in relation to claiming 
womanhood (Hale, 1996), it is nonetheless clear that physiological factors impact Ash’s 
feelings regarding gender embodiment, in conjunction with their fluidic, genderqueer 
identity. This connects back to how biological change through hormones and surgery 
could impact feelings of validity as discussed in the previous chapter. Ash also 
acknowledges that their sense of being genderqueer can also accommodate “fleeting 
and unstable” senses of being a woman, or a man. Ash’s overarching non-binary 
identity can thus include situated feelings of maleness and/or femaleness, which figure 
5 accommodates through the overlapping middle section. This particular example also 
highlights how diaries benefitted the interviews, by allowing for the emergence of 
discussion points that I would not have incorporated into topic guides had interviews 
been used alone.  
Whilst Ash is no longer undergoing any gender affirming medical treatments (which 
historically would be associated with ‘becoming’ a man or a woman) their temporally 
specific experience in relation to National Women’s Day relates their experience of 
gender to Finn’s definition of liminality. Ash occupied a position at ‘the threshold’ of 
womanhood, with the absence of bleeding being preventative of their self-
conceptualisation as woman, when viewed in the full context of Ash’s gender history, 
rather than as a stand-alone phenomenon. Such a discourse also opens the possibility 
of non-binary identification being conceivable as a ‘permanent liminality’ – constantly in 
a state of becoming or flux, but without the conception of a static end point. Non-binary 
gender identification then, through the lens of liminality, can be potentially conceived as 
a constant, unending process of ‘becoming’, but with points or periods of particular 
impact. This is no ‘more or less non-binary’ than a fixed, stable sense of being neither 
man nor woman. However, it is also worth noting that due to the manner in which 
individuals change over time generally, and the centrality of gender to social interaction, 
the claim of ‘an unending process of becoming’ could also be applied to individuals 
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regardless of gender identity (albeit so as to ignore the specific phenomenon of ‘non-
binary flux’ that I draw attention to).  
There is precedent in the empirical study of non-binary people for fluidity in non-binary 
identification to be recognised. McNeil et al. (2012) asked the question “which of the 
following best describes you” as a method to divide data in the 2012 Trans Mental 
Health Survey for analysis, and included the possible answers “have a constant and 
clear non-binary gender identity” and  “I have a variable or fluid non-binary gender 
identity” (p. 6). This illustrates how modelling non-binary in potentially liminal as well as 
static terms may be beneficial for the operationalisation of data and interpretation of 
non-binary lived experiences.   
Charlie explored the concepts of flux and time using the outlet of poetry: 
I was woman 
once 
and woman I may be 
again 
 
but for now 
take me to the sea 
take my organs from me. 
take it all. 
 
And leave a tail 
and clamshell bra 
and give me power 
and let me swim. 
 
let me roam 
a world 
unruled 
by genitals (Charlie, 21, diary) 
In positioning themselves as ‘woman once’, Charlie challenges the (sometimes 
strategically) essentialising narratives (Spivak, 1985) of being ‘born this way’, utilised 
by LGBTQ activists in order to demand respect and equal treatment due to being fixed 
and permanent in nature, which is discursively positioned as ‘natural’. Likewise, the 
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necessity of positioning one’s gender identity as now fixed is also resisted, in 
acknowledging that they ‘may be [woman] again’. There is ambiguity in the ‘organs’ 
that Charlie is referring to – whilst mastectomy is commonly associated with 
identification and embodiment of transmasculinity, elsewhere in their diary Charlie 
expressed not desiring such a surgery, supported by the next verse (still) wishing for a 
clamshell bra. The organs could potentially be the uterus and ovaries, and their 
connection to biological processes such as menstruation may, as with Ash, be 
connected to a sense of ‘femaleness’, though undesirably so in this context. 
Alternatively, ‘organs’ may be less specific; an interpretation particularly justified by the 
line ‘take it all’. This may be connected to the idea of death (and rebirth), where vital 
organs are taken (due to disease, or after death in order to be donated) to allow life, 
potentially disrupting the temporally-based binary of life and death as well as gender – 
and that being able to escape being positioned as ‘woman’ is to be able to articulate a 
new life.   
The poem’s ultimate focus is on recognising the distress and desire felt in the given 
moment, whilst recognising the possibility of changes in future desires. This forces the 
themes of time and liminality to be necessarily recognised more within medical 
transition practice, as service users may need access to ‘what is correct for them now’, 
rather than ‘correct’ for them in an absolutist sense. The refusal or inability to perform a 
position of guaranteeing they will wish to embrace any medicalised change for the rest 
of their lives can thus position such trans people as ‘uncertain’, making access more 
difficult. Should an individual articulate a fluid non-binary identity, and not feel able to 
definitively comment on future embodied desire or distress, this may result in denial of 
currently-desired treatment, even if the patient fully comprehends the significant and 
largely irreversible nature of hormonal and/or surgical interventions. This is contrary to 
practice guidelines which state “patients are presumed, unless proven otherwise, 
capable of consenting to treatment” (Wylie et al., 2014, p. 14). The assumption that 
gender is a fixed and singular experience across the life-course deeply underscores 
current medical practice, such that narratives which resist this assumption struggle to 
be afforded equally valid status.  
Despite ultimately coming out as a woman, and renegotiating her prior bigender identity 
as ‘denial’ (or a liminal period), Jen articulated a point in her interview that may partially 
explain why she came out as non-binary first. She stated that “it seems more extreme 
to come out as a trans woman”. Thus, with having feelings of not fulfilling socially 
constructed criteria of womanhood enough, non-binary may have felt like a ‘more 
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reasonable’ identity claim to make, when not (yet) possessing the ‘legitimisation’ of 
medical intervention. This connected with V’s account of having seen this in friends: 
Partly because of what I’ve said about the binaryness historically of the 
trans community, they’ve come out as non-binary first, and then when 
they’ve felt like their identity is legitimate enough in themselves they’ve 
sort of… transitioned to a binary, or started to use pronouns relating to 
a more binary gender. And literally only because of not feeling that 
they’d be accepted as trans if they turned up and didn’t really hold to 
binaries. (V, 28, interview) 
Thus V’s experience of the insecurities that trans people can encounter through fear of 
their experiences of gender variance being positioned as ‘[not] legitimate enough’ is 
connected with the change in an individual’s sense of their own gender over time. This 
allows for the potential claim that transgender communities that (inadvertently or not) 
reproduce or reify the gender binary as ‘more’ real, legitimate, or accepted, may impact 
how individuals negotiate identity. This is not to be confused with the additional 
possibility of individuals ‘passing as binary trans’ (whilst not identifying as such) to 
avoid de-legitimisation. Rather, a sincere renegotiation of identity, which may be rooted 
in the additional difficulties of hierarchies of transness and lack of intelligibility as non-
binary. As Plummer articulates in his analysis of sexual stories (1995), the possibilities 
of identity are modified by the social environments in which they are negotiated. 
Further, this is not to imply that resultant binary identification arrived at by Jen and 
others is inevitably related to conscious or unconscious forms of social pressure. This 
is evidenced by individuals negotiating the reverse; where a binary identity (adopted 
through limited access to trans narratives, or through social pressure) is dis-identified 
with in favour of a non-binary identity. 
There is a commonality between discourses of people coming out as ‘non-binary 
before binary’ as V (indirectly, giving accounts of friends), Frankie, and Jen all 
articulate, and expressing identity as ‘binary before non-binary’, as Ash, Mark, and V 
(directly, discussing himself) did. This is the development of greater awareness of 
selfhood and gendered possibilities over time. This is potentially through accessing 
community support, or awareness of new terms and language, gaining the confidence 
to re-declare one’s identity, or resist anxieties of being viewed as illegitimate. Such 
anxieties may be through not feeling trans enough to be binary, or through non-binary 
identification being positioned as unstable. As Alex (20) put it in their interview, “I think 
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people sort of view [non-binary] as a fake identity? You know, like a ‘teenagers on 
Tumblr want to be different’ identity”. The liminal instability of non-binary is here 
connected to the liminal instability of adolescence, whereby both are positioned as 
immature, in development, and a (temporary) phase (Turner, 1969). This iterates how 
the gender binary can be positioned as so fundamental as to be unassailable, such that 
claims which destabilise it are relegated to ridiculousness, or motivated by adolescent 
‘attention-seeking’.  
Alex expressed the view that a person’s identity should be respected regardless of 
whether one believes it to be fundamentally untenable, with the conversation drawing 
comparison to Otherkin51, and ‘adult babies’52 within kink53 communities. Alex added:  
It’s a form of self-expression, and I feel like those people have that 
need for self-expression and this wouldn’t be an issue if we would just 
recognise everybody’s right to be who they are in every way, then we 
wouldn’t be having this ‘oh well that’s taking away from trans people’ 
thing. Because you know, people need to express themselves in 
different ways. (Alex, 20, interview) 
Alex was explicit in their view that the question of ‘reality’ is irrelevant when compared 
with the necessity of respect for identification (regardless of how transient). It was their 
view that with acceptance as a default position rather than needing to be earned or 
proven by minorities, hierarchies of ‘realness’ would no longer exist.  
Building on the idea of respect for temporary identification as no ‘less’ than identities 
positioned as permanent, Frankie also specifically recognised the possibility of shifting 
back to a more non-binary identity in the future. Like Ash, this illustrates that some 
individuals maintain openness to fluidic change throughout life with regards to gender. 
This is not necessarily only the case for those individuals who experience a shift in 
identity conceptualisation, as individuals who feel fixed and static in their non-binary (or 
binary) identity may recognise potentiality to feel differently in the future.  
                                            
51 Otherkin are individuals who identify as partially or entirely non-human. This may be 
as either animals (e.g. ‘foxkin’), or even as mythical creatures (e.g. ‘dragonkin’). 
52 Recognised as a sexual fetish and clinically referred to as ‘paraphilic infantilism’, this 
practice involves role-playing a regression to the state of a baby or young child. This 
may be accompanied by nappy-use, bottle-feeding, or other infantilised behaviour.  
53 Generally understood as any ‘unconventional’ sexual practices, in the context of ‘kink 
communities’, this refers to a shared interest in BDSM – Bondage and Discipline, 
Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism. This may encompass a wide 
range of sexual or erotic fantasy and practice, often accompanied by a sense of ‘taboo’.  
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Some individuals may come out as having a binary identity rather than (or prior to) a 
non-binary identity because of perceiving greater difficulty being accepted, or in 
navigating gendered interactions. Although Jamie came out as non-binary, he did 
express some regret of having done this: 
The thing is, partly with me, it was a stepping stone. If I was coming 
out at work again now, I think I was really naive to think anyone would 
understand me when I said I’m non-binary and would actually treat me 
like I deserved any of the protections of the equality act. If I was 
coming out to people now I’d say ‘I’m transgender’ and only if they 
asked would I say I’m non-binary, and I would let people just assume 
I’m just the ‘opposite’ of what I was assigned at birth. But I very much 
needed to go through a stage almost of saying ‘I’m not trans, I’m non-
binary’ because I didn’t feel allowed to identify as trans, to get to the 
point where people identifying me as male socially is fine and makes 
me quite happy. (Jamie, 24, interview) 
There can consequently be a space between how one wishes to (or does) identify in 
particular spaces, and how one identifies personally, or with people or in other spaces 
deemed to be more safe and supportive. This differs from strategic essentialism 
(Spivak, 1985) in that an epistemological primacy is not being utilised, though what 
Jamie wishes he had done may be conceived as ‘strategic simplification’. In presenting 
themself not as explicitly non-binary but as transgender in an umbrella sense (Currah, 
2006), Jamie would have desired to strategically rely on individuals they interact with to 
interpret ‘transgender’ in binary terms, for the sake of social legitimacy and respect.   
The experiences of identity negotiation over time in liminal terms can all be situated 
within the proposed model (figure 5), where individuals can be situated within 
heterogeneous categories, and potentially move within/between them. This speaks to 
(the potential for) changes over time, but not how interactions in different spaces can 
have particular significance for individuals, which will now be examined. 
Heterogeneity in Community Involvement 
The relationship between being non-binary and the value of queer communities is 
neatly introducible through David’s discussion of how queer interaction affects their 
feelings about their identity. David articulated how the comfort queer spaces gave them 
affected their perception of what was ‘normal’: 
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I’ve got a group of university friends who are currently having a WhatsApp 
conversation about us getting together, there are 7 of us and I’ve just realised 
they’re all straight! Everybody’s going to be married very soon, and a couple of 
them have kids, and I’m like… I’m not sure what to do with this, really! You’re all 
so… conventional! (David, 31, interview) 
Queer time and queer space are conceptualised by Halberstam (2005) as a framework 
for understanding queer experiences of difference, in relation to heteronormative 
practices of reproduction, marriage, and how they are timed and expected in relation to 
the life-course. David’s sense of disconnect from the pressures and expectations that a 
queer life course can give from heteronormative family construction supports 
Halberstam’s model of queer time, and highlights the importance of queer communities. 
However, David also added that “you can’t trust the LGB community to not be 
transphobic, because they quite blatantly are”, highlighting the inevitable tensions that 
also exist in queer spaces, and how their accessibility is partially dependent on the 
specifics of an individual’s gender and sexuality54. Yet this does not eliminate the 
possibility of identifying trends in community behaviours and the experiences of them 
by non-binary people.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, tensions could arise within transgender 
communities through experiences of the boundaries of transness being indirectly 
policed, such that some non-binary individuals could feel excluded through a sense of 
not being trans enough. LGBTQ community behaviours could also serve to alienate 
non-binary participants through more general problematic behaviours. After articulating 
discomfort with an LGBTQ society, Alex explained this was due to some members: 
Just having very strong views which are not flexible, and you know, 
how I feel is that pretty much everyone’s gender identity is unique, you 
can’t say ‘this is how gender works’ and then if people do say that, it 
annoys the heck out of me. And it also invalidates me when I’m 
different. (Alex, 20, interview) 
Alex expressed frustration with individuals who had understandings of gender that 
essentialised gender norms, or risked erasing the breadth of gendered possibility 
                                            
54 This also raises the point that many LGBT spaces, such as clubs, bars, or saunas, 
may be very (cis) male dominated, and not particularly welcoming for cis lesbians or 
bisexual women, in addition to the dimensionality of transgender awareness. 
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associated with postmodern, queer deconstructions of gender. Leon found that some 
trans-focussed spaces could be particularly binarised, which they found alienating: 
I’d been to FTM55 London and I hated it, it didn’t have any space for 
non-binary identities at all. I remember going to one meeting, and they 
had some people from Charing Cross talking, and it was packed out. A 
psychiatrist and an endocrinologist - and the endocrinologist was 
basically saying ‘you’re all just men without testicles’ and I was like 
‘this is just wrong’ and I left half way though and never went there 
again. (Leon, 34, interview) 
Leon’s feelings about FTM London were not isolated. David, who had also 
independently attended the group, had recognised, as a non-binary person not seeking 
medical transition, how the group presented information in a way that assumed the 
interests and identifications of members in a homogenising manner: 
I worry that there might be people in the room going ‘oh my god, I’m 
not interested in chest surgery, I’m not interested in hormones, why 
are you pushing me towards this?’ (David, 31, interview) 
Further to specific concerns related to non-binary identification, Leon and David also 
discussed experiences with queer communities which did not recognise inclusion of 
any trans people, within or outside of the gender binary. Leon explained how when 
trying to work with an ‘LGBT’ swimming group, they were told ‘we don’t have any trans 
people’. David discussed in detail negotiations with the LGB group at their place of 
work, highlighting how the conspicuous absence of the ‘T’ positioned them as both out 
of touch and failing to offer an inclusive space. The fact that the swimming group 
positioned itself as LGBT, yet within both their interactions and club information only 
discussed the possibility of gay men and lesbian women, illustrates how presence of 
the ‘T’ cannot be taken to assume awareness and inclusion of transgender people56. 
Dean Spade has dubbed this exclusion through the collapse of LGBT to ‘sexuality only’ 
as “LGB fake-T” (Spade, 2004, p. 53). Despite not necessarily requiring specific 
                                            
55 Female to Male. 
56 As a non-binary sexuality, in that it disrupts a binary of ‘gay/straight’, bisexuality can 
similarly be erased. Inclusion of the ‘B’ within an LGB or LGBT acronym associated 
with a queer community or organisation is not enough in and of itself to signify definitive 
conscientiousness towards bi-specific issues.  
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policies in the same way as trans people, the collapse of LGBT to gay men and lesbian 
women is also an example of bi-erasure (Barker and Langdridge, 2008; Yoshino, 2000). 
David recognised the problem of interactions being derailed by basic issues of 
transgender (though particularly non-binary) respect, through a fictional conversation 
recorded in their diary which they used to illustrate the point: 
“Isn’t it a beautiful day today? I hope X enjoys it, she is always saying 
how much she loves the sunshine” 
“Actually, X uses the pronouns “they/them/their”. But it is a very 
beautiful… 
“Oh God I am so sorry, it’s just so difficult for me. But now that we are 
talking about this, can I ask you about gendered pronouns? What’s a 
pronoun anyway? How can ‘they’ be singular? […] 
Etc. etc. ad nauseam and, in the meanwhile, the beautiful day has 
been forgotten and the day is all about pronouns now. (David, 31, diary) 
This allegory by David can be used to understand the potential educational and 
emotional labour (Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007) that may be expected as a direct 
response to being openly non-binary. This is most acutely felt within mundane social 
navigations (interactions with non-queer people and the micro-interactions associated 
with, for example, shopping). However it is significant that during spaces and times 
when a non-binary person might hope to be able to presume their intelligibility and 
respect, this cannot be taken for granted in the contexts of many queer communities 
either.  
There were multiple participants who specifically mentioned cisgender gay men as a 
particular source of tension or intolerance in their experiences of queer communities. 
Hal said: 
With the queer community, gay men, they can be really dismissive. 
You go from straight guys who are just being ‘oh that’s queer’ to those 
who say ‘oh that queen is giving us all a bad name. Why can’t you 
keep it together and be normal like the rest of us?’…I get it most from 
guys who call themselves straight acting, their masculinity is very 
important, and they don’t like people saying deviation is perceived as 
part of the same group. (Hal, 42, interview) 
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The pressure to ‘be normal like the rest of us’ speaks to a respectability politics 
produced through an assimilatory homonormativity that may be found amongst some 
queer people, to the detriment of those positioned as most (visibly) transgressive 
(Hines, 2009; Duggan, 2002). Charlie and Frankie give further particular examples of 
behaviours they have associated with cis gay men, and responses to their gender 
identities: 
Ben: Do you see much of that within the context of queer communities, 
queer people policing other queer people? 
Charlie: I see some of it, especially in the university LGBTQIAA+ 
society. I don't especially like to be a part of that group of people 
because whilst some of them are really great, with such a wide and 
varied group of people there will be people with some negative 
opinions of non-binary people, or people that if they’re non-binary 
they’re not subverting the binary enough they feel. 
B: Do you see that sort of negativity coming from particular 
demographics at all? 
C: Yeah. It’s often… some of it’s been a lot of cisgender white gay men. 
But also there are transgender people who are more binary in the 
group who say things like that, and yeah. (Charlie, 21, interview) 
Ben: so have you ever had experiences where your identity is being 
challenged or invalidated by other queer people? 
Frankie: Yeah. I think assumptions have definitely been made, I think 
in the past when I used queer as a term to describe myself, the 
assumption was made that I was a cis gay male. And people thought I 
was talking about being interested in men, and it very much came from 
a sexuality assumption, looking through a very cisnormative lens. 
B: What sorts of people were making that assumption?  
F: Mostly cis gay men? (Laughs). To be honest, but occasionally 
others as well. Usually always… I say usually always cis people, but 
some trans people as well. (Frankie, 25, interview) 
In these examples, different responses to non-binary people within queer spaces could 
function to cause tensions. For Hal, who discussed experiencing being mistaken as a 
gay man exhibiting femininity, gay men whose sensibilities are informed by 
homonormative values could stigmatise them. This is explained through Stryker’s 
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analysis that gay and lesbian assimilation may be threatened by non-normative 
transgender articulations and needs (Stryker, 2008b).  
The cultural dominance of gay men within many LGBTQ spaces may also help explain 
why despite its deliberate and subversive ambiguity, the subtext of certain queer 
spaces may assume a ‘sexuality exclusive’ reading of queer. This runs contrary to an 
active recognition and inclusion of gender-variant people, even whilst drag artistry is 
often embraced. We also see from Charlie that through a lack of cultural intelligibility or 
through transphobia, cisgender members of queer communities are by no means 
necessarily recognising or supportive of non-binary people. Charlie also raised the 
possibility of non-binary people being challenged for ‘not subverting the binary enough’. 
This relates to Mark and V’s discussions in the previous chapter, where it was 
recognised how some individuals could challenge the authenticity of others in order to 
gain a hierarchical sense of self-validation. With non-binary positioned sometimes as 
particularly ‘subversive’, it is worth recognising how non-binary people may engage in 
such negative practices to other non-binary people also.  
Whilst cis men were highlighted more frequently than any other demographic, Ricky 
particularly discussed coming out as non-binary in the context of a lesbian community: 
There was a lot of… ‘How are you different from me?’ with lesbian 
friends. A lot of competitive stuff as well, of like, you know ‘well I 
identify as a woman, but I’m way more masculine than you, so how 
dare you identify as something nearer male than I do!’ (Ricky, 43, 
interview) 
This illustrates that some queer individuals (such as the butch lesbians Ricky is 
referencing) may problematically construct their sense of validity of masculinity or 
femininity in a comparative, competitive, and oppositional manner to other community 
members. Additionally, ‘masculinity’ and ‘maleness’ may be conflated, such that 
claiming of a non-binary identity from AFAB 57  individuals who are not particularly 
masculine may anger or offend masculine, butch women who are not alienated from 
being assigned female. Members of lesbian communities have articulated that not only 
may lesbian identity formation be disrupted by queer and trans discourses, but so may 
the ability of lesbian communities to produce effective social activism (Shugar, 1999). 
Such tensions along boundaries of identification may feed into a sense of insecurity 
over being trans enough, or in the context Ricky raises, not masculine enough to ‘enter 
                                            
57 Assigned Female at Birth. 
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into’ transness (Halberstam, 1998). The affronted response of some butch lesbians 
was a result of their perception of dissonance between Ricky’s identity, and the butch 
lesbian’s expectations of masculinity and femininity in relation to gender identity. With 
butch lesbians articulating masculinity but without rejecting femaleness, there was a 
sense that non-binary people (as ‘less female’ than them) ‘need’ to be correspondingly 
more masculine. Ricky was considered negatively for failing to be adequately 
masculine to claim non-binary, from the butch lesbians’ position. This also continues to 
situate non-binary identity (particularly in the context of AFAB individuals) as an 
incomplete, partial, or lesser trans masculinity, rather than as a state of being that does 
not exist in a hierarchical relationship with binary trans identification.  
It is, however, important to emphasise that this collection of experiences does not 
reflect a universal dissatisfaction with LGBTQ spaces for non-binary people. Rather, 
they highlight that navigating non-binary in queer communities can cause difficulty or 
alienation, through the cultural unintelligibility of non-binary extending well into some 
queer spaces – rendering them uncomfortable, or creating obstacles for feeling 
included, understood, or respected. Further, the manifestation of tension can depend 
upon the specific context, such as whether it is a generalised LGBTQ group, or with a 
more specific target demographic (be that age, such as a student group, or 
gender/sexuality intersection, such as a lesbian group). Multiple participants used the 
potential broadness of the term ‘queer’ in discussing their experiences of queer 
communities to go beyond typical understandings of LGBTQ – queering spaces that 
are not inherently focussed on gender and sexuality minority identification. This also 
raised the significance of additional community groups for non-binary identity 
negotiation. 
Within kink communities, the importance of consent both in and beyond sexual activity 
is such that it is positioned as an essential community norm beyond the individual 
(Barker, 2013a). Alex illustrated how consent culture58 (Barker, 2013b) had positive 
ramifications for their feelings of validation and respect with regards to gender: 
When I was kind of struggling with my gender identity a bit, someone 
referred to me as a lady at a kink event, and I said ‘I’m not a lady, I’m a 
barbarian’. And there were some people, who, because they didn’t 
                                            
58 Whereby consent does not exclusively operate at the level of the individual, 
interpersonal interaction, but is embedded across the community such that 
responsibility for ethical practices and avoidance of harm is shared.  
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know if I was serious or not, they referred to me as a barbarian ever 
since. […] They were willing to do that, even though I was just kind of 
being stupid… That’s amazing. I love getting that sort of thing from 
people. People are obviously much less questioning of things like 
clothing choices in that community. (Alex, 20, interview) 
Despite speaking favourably of the kink community, Alex also told the anecdote of 
everyone at a particular event being asked to write their names down on a piece of 
paper with ‘male/female’ columns, and that “a bunch of us wrote our names down the 
middle, and then they stopped doing it”. Alex also drew attention to the kink events 
taking no action in relation to male and female toilets being the only available options 
(such as creating temporary labels to indicate gender neutral bathrooms). Further, Alex 
articulated that they felt the dress code of the kink group they engaged with was 
transphobic “because it’s got to be kink wear, and kink wear is very different for female 
or male bodies”. Despite it being entirely permissible for an assigned male at birth 
individual to wear fishnets and heels as an example, they explain: 
Alex: The men have to wear formal clothing. But then I just wander 
around in tracksuit bottoms and I can get away with it because I get my 
tits out. And I don’t think that’s okay. I don’t mind because I want to 
wear suit trousers but I don’t think that should be a rule.  
Ben: So for example, a trans woman couldn’t wear the bottoms that 
you’d want because of how they’d be read? 
A: Yeah. (Alex, 20, interview) 
The point Alex is making is that whilst the group has rules that a particular level of 
formality is required, those individuals with breasts can easily ignore such rules for the 
clothing on the lower half of their bodies, precisely because of their breasts, which Alex 
positions as unfair. Thus the symbolic reading of the bodies of trans people may result 
in being treated differently (in a manner that delegitimises their genders) from cis 
individual’s bodies. This would likely be dependent on transition or point of transition – 
the trans woman without breasts having her experience differentiated from the trans 
woman (or cis woman, or pre or non-operative trans man) who has. The non-binary or 
transmasculine body with breasts is thus also positioned as female by the community’s 
cisnormative perceptions of bodies in clothing associated with kink. This links back to 
how trans bodies which have received medical interventions are more likely to allow for 
identity to be respected and positioned as ‘(more) real’.  
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Relatedly, Bobby discussed their involvement with the Lolita community59, and how the 
openness of the space towards different gender identities allowed individuals to explore 
their relationship with femininity through a hyperfeminine oriented style and subculture. 
Bobby illustrated this style in figure 8:  
 
Figure 8: Sketch showing Lolita fashion, from Bobby’s diary. 
There’s a load of ‘Brolitas’ which is like cis male Lolitas that have all of 
the dress and the bows and fells and usually have a wig. I think a lot of 
people go through the stages of working out where they are on the 
[gender] spectrum, by going out one stage at a time like ‘I am a cis 
person, but I am just going to wear this item of clothing’ and ‘oh I’m not 
sure anymore, maybe I am a non-binary person or whatever’. (Bobby, 
23, interview) 
Bobby’s drawing was included in their diary in part as a conscious effort to ensure that 
the researcher/reader would comprehend the community being discussed. This raises 
the consideration that participants, to greater or lesser extents, may have constrained 
                                            
59 In this context, a Lolita is an individual involved with the Lolita fashion subculture, 
which originated in Japan. The community is centred on the construction of modest, 
hyperfeminine, identifiably stylised garments to create a ‘Lolita look’.  
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or structured their diary entries on the basis of their perceptions or assumptions of my 
knowledge of views. Bobby’s Lolita community differed from an LGBT-specific 
community in that involvement in the former did not imply any particular relationship 
with sexuality or gender identity, yet still provided a space for gendered exploration – 
indeed, a form of exploration not specifically possible in an LGBTQ setting, due to the 
differences between constructing a ‘Lolita look’, and wearing drag. In being structured 
exclusively around style, the Lolita group produces different discourses than 
‘crossdressing’ in specifically LGBT community contexts.  
Both Ricky and Ash highlighted their positive experiences with bi communities. Ash 
shared the view that “most, if not all” people in bisexual communities were aware of 
and friendly towards trans and non-binary people. In explaining what it was about the bi 
community that made it more “ambiguity positive”, Ricky explained: 
I think for a start that once if you recognise that you’re attracted to 
more than one gender then I guess you’re possibly more open to the 
idea that there isn’t this ‘there are two genders and they’re the 
complete opposite of each other and never the twain shall meet’ – I 
think that’s part of it. I think the bisexual community is much more open 
to the idea of fluidity and flexibility and ambiguity, whereas hetero and 
gay spaces tend to be, you’re either one thing or the other. (Ricky, 43, 
interview) 
Bisexual identification has experienced a history both within and outside queer 
communities as being relegated to a temporary (‘you are just not sure’) or immoral 
(‘you are being greedy’, ‘bisexual people will cheat’) state (Monro, 2015a; Alarie and 
Gaudet, 2013; Hemmings, 1999). It is intuitive then, that a sense of recognition and 
solidarity would be seen between individuals breaching the gay/straight binary of 
sexuality and the male/female binary of gender. A valuable point is that community 
spaces are also changing over time in direct response to voices and forms of 
resistance within them. Ash gave the example of how the intersection between gender 
identity, race, and sexuality has been addressed at an annual bisexuality convention: 
An example was at bi-con. I went to one of the workshops… there was 
exclusive spaces for trans people of colour, and those people came 
together… and they started to talk about the ways they experienced 
racism in bi-con specifically. And then they started to send somebody 
out to liaise with the organisers, talking about ways to make it better. 
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Trying to educate some people about how to be better and more 
respectful, and actually what they were talking about this year was the 
great extent to which that’s been achieved now, and people are 
coming into the space not with an awful lot of grievances that need 
correcting but generally quite happy with the space. So just talking how 
that’s good, and how useful it was to have that exclusive space and 
come together with people who understand, talk about the problems, 
and when they’ve got something coherent they want to ask for, come 
to the rest of bi-con and ask for it. So that’s an example how that 
space was rubbish but has improved. (Ash, 33, interview) 
This exemplifies that within a time/space for queer community, a demarcated area 
amplifying more marginalised voices and engaging with intersectionality served to 
address wider issues of awareness. The similarities and differences between the 
struggles of the civil rights movement and of LGBT liberation have been compared in a 
legal context, in terms of what the latter can learn from the former (Neal, 1995). One of 
the central points of import in this analysis was how LGBT rights must “take care not to 
exclude, either by acts of commission or omission, people at the fringes of the 
movement” (p. 681). Whilst it would be a mistake to assume that non-binary people are, 
by necessity of their relatively recent increase in recognition ‘at the fringes’ of queer 
communities, Ash’s example does serve to show how sincere and significant efforts by 
organisers to create space for more marginalised voices can serve to improve the 
community’s reputation more generally. Community practices in particular spaces, or at 
particular times, can thus bring greater particularity to member’s needs (Hines, 2006). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have focussed on recognising how binary and non-binary transgender 
identities can each function to lead to the other, and how this may be catalysed through 
personal embodied desires connected to medical transition. This was related to 
negotiations of the self over time, such that the experience of being binary or non-
binary can be understood as liminal – that is, either existing on two sides of a boundary 
at once, or occupying a fluid, evolving, transitional middle point in a social process. 
Whilst in older literature being trans could generally be conceived as liminal due to 
binary medical and social transition being all but compulsory, the nuances of non-
binary may mean that a continually fluidic sense of self may mean some individuals are 
‘permanently liminal’, or that community spaces are regarded as such as people enter 
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and drop out of them continually over time, or use them at particular times or in 
particular ways.  
I moved on to explore how participants viewed non-binary identities as a stepping 
stone to binary identities, and vice versa. Participants gave varied accounts and 
explanations showing both scenarios occurring amongst the trans population, as well 
as demonstrating the possibility of identifying simultaneously with and outside the 
gender binary. I constructed a model in order to visually illustrate how the motion of 
identity over time is an important dimension in gaining a nuanced understanding of 
individuals. This also emphasises how ‘trans’ can be a transition not only of the body 
as emphasised in medical literature, but of identity through and over time, and of how 
one is socially interpreted and interacted with. Transgender negotiations of the self in 
relation to gendered expectations  is a story that has historically been told in a manner 
focussing on embodiment and surgery, which had notable and tangible effects even for 
those not attempting to access medical intervention, but simply social recognition, 
validation, and equal treatment. Exploration of non-binary identity with reference to the 
theme of liminality has highlighted the potential benefits for medical practice in more 
explicitly recognising how an individual’s relationship with embodiment may change 
over the life course, and that not all individuals are static in their sense of identity or 
desired embodiment.  
Likewise, changes over time in the needs communities have of their spaces have also 
been apparent in this chapter. The binarised or medicalised focus of some trans 
communities, and potential for off-putting, un-inclusive views among some members, or 
names, official information, or practices that erase trans or non-binary lives can create 
difficulties or tensions. However, community groups that are not trans focused, or even 
necessarily LGBTQ focused can be of great importance and benefit to non-binary 
people, and demonstrate reflexive and intersectional practices of inclusion.  
I conclude that regardless as to whether individuals experience non-binary identity as 
liminal, fluid, or static, it is useful and accurate to consider identity formation as a 
temporal process which has no fixed end. Many of the positive and negative 
experiences that different participants reported were linked to particularities of space, 
and who occupies the space – often informing the levels of sensitivity and knowledge 
that could be expected during interactions. Further, as time passes, individuals are able 
to adjust, explore, and become comfortable with these important factors relating to non-
binary. This chapter has served as a foundation for the consideration of non-binary 
clinical interactions, as experiences occurring over significant lengths of time, and with 
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community interplay, are deeply significant for understanding trans healthcare. In the 
following chapter, I thus move on to consider how interactions within the context of 
primary care relate to non-binary identity negotiation.  
165 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Views of the Clinic: Non-Binary Perceptions of Primary (and Non-
Transition Related Secondary) Care Services 
Those who identify ‘beside’ the gender binary will still be situated 
within it by others whose worldviews are bounded by the discourse of 
binary gender, such that it is impossible to escape this discursive 
framework altogether. 
(Sanger, 2008, p. 50) 
Introduction 
This and the following chapter will focus upon non-binary perceptions of healthcare in 
the UK. This includes primary60, secondary61, and tertiary62 (specifically gender related) 
care. In this chapter I address primary care services for the most part (with some 
mention of secondary care), focusing on the experiences and views participants 
reported of interactions with doctors and other staff – such as nurses, and 
administrators.  
Primary care is exclusively addressed in this chapter, whilst Tertiary (GIC-oriented) 
care is the subject of chapter seven. GPs are responsible for referring patients to GICs 
before gender affirming medicine can be accessed, centralising this process as 
bridging primary and tertiary care. Secondary care practitioners whose fields are 
unrelated to gender transition will have, on average, similar knowledge of transgender 
healthcare needs as primary care practitioners. Such discussions are addressed within 
this chapter. Further, the motivation for a non-binary service user to access such 
secondary care may be very broad, and comparable to cisgender service users. This is 
not the case when a secondary care service has been accessed, for example, on the 
advice or referral from a GIC. Secondary care services that are routinely used as a 
consequence of GIC access (such as some endocrinologists and psychiatrists) will 
have experience and approaches in closer alignment to tertiary care gender specialists. 
Therefore, these medical experiences are addressed in chapter seven.  
I begin this chapter by considering how participants judged the non-binary community’s 
overall view of care when going to a GP. This is followed by specific accounts and 
                                            
60 Frontline, day-to-day healthcare provision, typified by GPs and nurse practitioners.  
61 Specialist services, such as dermatologists, or cardiologists. Patients are typically 
seen by referral. 
62 Specialised healthcare which is consultative, but with specialised facilities. 
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examples of individual’s experiences of primary care, for appointments not related to 
gender transition. This begins with experiences of ‘gendered medicine’ – healthcare 
which is differentiated in gendered terms, such as smear tests. This is followed by 
generalizable healthcare experiences, such as arm pain. Some experiences resonate 
strongly with binary transgender experiences of primary care (Dewey, 2008; Feldman 
and Goldberg, 2006). Responses from doctors to patients that may be ideal for a binary 
trans person have the potential to be appropriate, or instead, deeply uncomfortable for 
a non-binary patient. Some participants did discuss positive views of general medical 
practice, whilst simultaneously reporting an overall negative and guarded sense 
regarding medical practice in the community.  
This leads to an important sub-group of non-binary clinical experiences, those who 
experience chronic illness and disability, and the interplay that has with individual’s 
experiences of gender. Finally, this chapter addresses how clerical administration in 
medical institutions may affect non-binary patients. This includes discussion of how 
names and pronouns are used and recorded, and medical forms specifically discussed 
by participants – including feedback forms and documentation related to tertiary care. 
Whilst this chapter is structured around primary care, the cross-practice nature of 
administration renders a general discussion that cuts across all forms of care 
appropriate. Discussion of the key administrative process of referral brings this chapter 
to a close. This section also serves to link to the following chapter on GIC care, much 
as the referral acts to bridge from the GP to GICs within practices of care.  
Non-Binary Views of Primary Care 
In addition to considering the discrete examples of interactions non-binary participants 
had experienced in primary care, more general views of the non-binary community’s 
perceptions of primary care were also expressed. Participants communicated views of 
primary care that were not connected to a single discrete clinical interaction they had 
experienced. Some participants made it clear that positive (but unspecified) 
experiences shaped their view: 
My experience has been overarchingly positive in terms of the NHS. 
Medical staff seem concerned with functionality, and unconcerned with 
social labels. True, not so long ago medical systems couldn’t cope with 
assigned a male pronoun to a patient owning a vagina. However, this 
is different now. (V, 28, diary) 
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V was keen to highlight how differences could be seen between the present and the 
recent past, emphasising the importance of how changes over time in medical practice 
influence individual’s views, which links to the discussions of temporality in the previous 
chapter. Frankie had positive and negative feedback to share, but reported her belief 
that other people’s experiences tended to be negative: 
[Trans peoples’ experiences of medical practice is] not good! Generally 
not good. That said, you don’t normally hear people being particularly 
vocal about the good experiences they’ve had. The ones you do hear 
about tend to be the negative ones, especially in my line of work. Yeah, 
just a lot of misunderstanding, a lot of barriers put up to medical 
assistance. Accessing things that need to be accessed, or that have 
been accessed for a long time but because someone’s changed their 
circumstances, moved GP or something; they have to go through a 
whole lengthy process again just to get their prescription moved, and 
this that and the other. So yeah, generally not good, but then that 
might be kind of slightly tainted by the fact that I work in wellbeing, 
work with trans people, generally have to deal with difficulties rather 
than positive experiences. (Frankie, 25, interview) 
Frankie recognises the possibility of being exposed to a particularly negative view of 
medical care through working with transgender people accessing support. This 
recognition may have potentially been nucleated due to the negative accounts that 
comprised the majority of the views Frankie had heard, clashing with her own broadly 
positive experiences. When asked their thoughts on the medical establishment’s 
interactions with non-binary people, Alex said: 
I think it’s very bad at recognising them. There’s a lot of misgendering. 
I’ve had quite good experiences with that personally, but I know there 
is a lot of people who report being misgendered, who report having 
poor interactions, with the medical establishment based on that. (Alex, 
20, interview) 
This reiterates the theme that even when having positive experiences personally, 
participants did not then dismiss or play down what they heard through community 
networks of other people’s negative experiences. Therefore the relative impact of 
negative experiences on an individual’s conception of medical service provision is 
higher. Relatedly, it has been found that those individuals who associated or 
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experienced stigmatising behaviour coming from healthcare practitioners would 
anticipate this more generally (Earnshaw and Quinn, 2012), implying that negative 
experiences will have a deeper impact on views within a community than positive 
experiences. This will be considered in more detail with regards to gender transition-
oriented care in chapter seven.  
One specific critical view of primary care practitioners that was aired by multiple 
participants was the tendency for other medical conditions or diagnoses to be ignored 
in transgender individuals, instead connecting unrelated complaints to gender identity. 
Some participants highlighted this through a comedic yet exasperated tone:  
Got acne? It’s because you’re trans* 
Aching muscles? It’s because you’re trans* 
Headaches? It’s because you’re trans* 
Bruised toe? Because you’re trans* 
Stress? Trans* 
Trans* 
Trans* 
Trans* (Mark, 43, diary) 
I didn’t have good experiences with doctors at uni at all. They don’t 
ever believe anything’s wrong with you, they just think you’re stressed. 
Or at least my doctor it was always ‘are you feeling stressed, are you 
getting enough sleep, are you eating enough’, it’s what people say 
about being trans; you’ve got a trans broken leg! (Jamie, 24, interview) 
Further, Jess gave evidence to the Women and Equalities Committee63 held by the 
government on 8th September 2015. She stated: 
We call it the trans cold. If you go to your doctors with a cold it will be a 
trans cold. Quite literally, my housemate has had a throat problem for 
                                            
63  On 27th July 2015, the Conservative UK government launched a new select 
committee to examine the issue of transgender equality. A formal government 
response was published July 2016 which recognised various forms of inequality, but 
was extensively critiqued by a collaboration of transgender organisations. See Andry, K. 
et al. 2016. No Excuses: Inclusion and Equality for all. Our critique of the Government 
Response to the Women and Equalities Committee Report on Transgender Equality. 
[Online]. [Accessed 16/10/2016]. Available from: http://nonbinary.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/No-Excuses.pdf. 
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the last year or so and has been taken to Ear Nose and Throat, and 
the doctor diagnosed her with ‘transgender problems’, that’s literally 
the words he wrote on the piece of paper. 
(Women and Equalities Committee, 2015, quotation at time mark 11.52.08).  
These incidences serve to highlight the sense within the transgender community that 
primary care practitioners may articulate an inappropriate fascination with an 
individual’s transgender status, which may negatively impact the ability of transgender 
people to access medical services as easily for medical issues unrelated to trans status. 
The potential fear of voyeurism from primary care practitioners regarding transgender 
status risks alienating some individuals from accessing healthcare in a timely manner 
(King, 2016).  
In addition to descriptions and discussions of how experiences of primary care related 
to their genders, some participants talked about how they felt alienated from their GPs 
because of the impression they received of them more generally. Participants could 
extrapolate their concerns; such that they felt there was an unacceptable level of risk 
regarding communicating being non-binary with their GPs. Hal went into detail when 
relating how they felt they should make an appointment to discuss ADHD64 medication, 
but had misgivings: 
I realised it’s not just the stress and workload that is keeping me from 
booking an appointment with my doctor. It is also the fact that he is 
very conservative… His nurses and staff also make me uneasy. 
Uneasy enough that I have to prepare myself mentally before I go to 
the clinic; make sure that there are no traces of nail polish or mascara 
visible on me and dress carefully in what I call my “office drag”. It 
doesn’t make me feel good. It actually feels awful to be so afraid of 
these people judging me at a moment when I feel pretty vulnerable 
already. I should get another GP. (Hal, 42, diary) 
By ‘office drag’, Hal is referring to a normative, masculine appearance in order to ‘pass’ 
as cisgender. Articulating this as drag indicates Hal’s sense that this presentation is 
affected and performed, as a protection against potential stigma in this context. Hal 
connected the Conservative political affiliation of his physician with a morality and 
worldview that made them “afraid of these people judging me”. Fear of stigma when 
                                            
64 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. 
170 
 
 
 
already feeling vulnerable significantly impacted Hal’s willingness to attend the doctors 
at all, which compounded with the stress and workload they initially mentioned, to 
render primary care considerably less accessible. Frankie had a similar experience: 
My GP made a big point of being like ‘we don’t know anything about 
this, we’re a very conservative community’ as if that somehow meant 
that they didn’t need to know about it. (Frankie, 25, interview) 
Frankie’s GP also made demands of her to “explain what being a trans person is”, 
emphasising the unrecognised educational and emotional labour that can be 
demanded of trans patients. Jess expressed the same anxiety as Hal, having not seen 
a “doctor, or a dentist, or a medical health professional of any kind” in the nine years 
since she came out as non-binary. Jess explained this in relation to multiple 
overlapping loci of negative medical associations. Firstly, she explained how she felt if 
she went to the doctors she would “have to start that conversation about gender” which 
could “rope [me] into a binary transition pathway which I’m not sure I want”. This 
concern expresses an anxiety with potential lack of agency in the doctor/patient 
interaction (Newman and Vidler, 2006; McKinstry, 1992). Jess and Hal’s feelings 
illustrate a sensitivity both to the views that doctors (may) hold, as well as the view, or 
clinical gaze (Singer, 2006) that the clinician exerts over the non-binary body 65 . 
Discussion of the hegemony of the gender binary within transition pathways will be 
developed in the following chapter.  
Secondly, Jess’s activist work training doctors around transgender healthcare means 
that they “see it behind the scenes”, and are apprehensive to receive insensitive or 
substandard care on the basis of being non-binary. Like Frankie, Jess is exposed to a 
great deal of negative narrative, but without the mitigating positive personal experience 
Frankie recounted. Finally, Jess alluded to negative experiences as a disabled child 
accessing medical care for their impairment, highlighting how intersections with chronic 
health and disability concerns must be recognised when considering transgender 
health.  
As Jess and Frankie’s accounts have alluded, it is important to recognise that not all 
perceptions of primary care that non-binary people experience will be from the position 
of being a patient. Whilst the cohort of participants did not contain any medical doctors, 
                                            
65 Not to be confused with the intersex body – the non-binary body is non-binary by 
virtue of being the body of a non-binary identified individual, rather than a reflection of 
the specific physiology an individual does or does not have.  
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Alex (20) discussed their experiences as a student nurse, and working in healthcare as 
a non-binary person in their diary. In particular, they discussed that a department they 
worked in made an accusation of problematic relations with others, which was sent to 
their academic tutor. These were not acted upon, but Alex articulated how they were 
positioned as being uncommunicative, and not engaging in their departmental 
handover process. Alex explained their belief that this was due to how they interacted 
with their nursing colleagues/instructors socially, rather than professionally. It was 
Alex’s view that due to being positioned as/assumed to be female, they were 
accordingly held to gendered social norms. When not offering expected cues in 
response to “conversation about celebrities, when they all talked about ‘being good’ 
and watching what they ate”, this was from Alex’s perspective the reason they were 
judged accordingly negatively, despite holding that “by male standards I was fine; it’s 
just unusual for ‘women’ to not conform to certain behaviours”. 
This experience highlights the gendered nature of the workplace (Holmes and Stubbe, 
2003), and how negative experiences on the basis of gender identity can be connected 
to an older feminist literature that problematizes the differential and unequal treatment 
of men and women in places of work (Heilman, 1995; Williams, 1989). Alex was also 
able to provide a view of medical practitioner language and behaviour in a context 
without a patient present: 
We had on one placement I was on… there was someone who, 
certainly on records was a man, and who was presenting male, but 
who had somewhat effeminate mannerisms and a little bit of a high 
pitched feminine tone of voice and pattern of speech. Which – so what? 
And as soon as they [the patient] were gone out the room [nursing 
colleagues said] – “do you think that’s a woman? I bet that’s a woman! 
I bet it’s a woman that’s just like – being a man, or it’s a tranny!” And I 
was like “No, if it was someone who was transitioned and was on 
hormones as you’re suggesting then their voice would be lower, 
surely?” I was trying to like, logic it, because telling your boss that 
they’re a bigot doesn’t work. And they were like “oh maybe they forgot 
to take their medication this morning” I was like, you can’t change 
someone’s voice box in a day by missing your medication! (Alex, 20, 
interview) 
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This demonstrates that whilst power dynamics position patients as more vulnerable, 
practitioners also need to be mindful regarding the assumptions and gendered 
practices that can manifest when interacting with colleagues. In addition, even if 
successfully performing a professional persona and negotiating a positive interaction 
with a transgender service user, cultural practices that allow for the normalisation of 
slurs (such as ‘tranny’) and voyeuristic, overt speculation regarding patients’ genders 
are deeply problematic. Such delegitimising practices must be challenged, and their 
cultural normalisation dismantled, in order for NHS practice to be able to be responsive 
and sincerely trans-sensitive.  
The most consistent view among participants was a sense that primary care 
practitioners were unlikely to understand or be confident over what ‘transgender’ 
means, and even less likely to be specifically aware of the existence of non-binary 
gender identities. Even in the context of studying to become a health professional, Alex 
said that the general attitude amongst healthcare staff is: 
As a whole, the attitude is that it’s [non-binary identification] not 
something that’s particularly real, it’s not something that’s particularly 
important as well. You know, ‘we don’t need to worry about that’. 
People that are trying to maintain their non-binary identity, I feel, are 
viewed as often sort of causing trouble, trying to get attention, that it’s 
not an okay thing for them to do. Even with doctors who are really 
understanding, one once said to me ‘don’t you think you’re letting your 
identity define you a bit’? It’s like well, yeah… it’s my identity! But 
obviously a cis person wouldn’t get that. Because they wouldn’t have 
to constantly defend their identity. But the medical establishment 
seeing it as we are wrong to be trying to defend them all the time – that 
we’re overreacting. (Alex, 20, interview) 
Alex emphasises the differential attitudes of healthcare practitioners to the gender 
identifications of trans patients, compared to cis patients. Whilst gender when cis is 
unquestioned, the act of working to claim a gender different from that assigned at birth 
serves to emphasise gender. From a cisnormative position where no emphasis on 
gender is needed, this correspondingly may seem to be an ‘overemphasis’, to explain 
the physician’s failure to appreciate why Alex raised the topic of gender in order to be 
accurately recognised and respected.  
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Whilst binary transgender narratives have an established medical aetiology (through 
the constructed sexological discourse of transsexualism), non-binary articulations do 
not, despite current guidelines being worded in such a way that non-binary inclusivity is 
at least technically possible. Jess has experience of training medical practitioners 
through activist work, and so, whilst having not attended personal medical 
appointments, stated: 
I think that probably 99% of clinicians, of doctors, of nurses whatever, 
don’t know what a non-binary person is, so is therefore very much 
more likely to get things wrong, to make mistakes, to force somebody 
into a binary gender and generally behave in a way that is not 
conducive to the patient’s welfare, but is also pretty shitty in other ways. 
Of the people who know about non-binary, then a lot of people think it 
might be a phase. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Jess’s view that many of the practitioners aware of non-binary identities view them as a 
‘phase’ links with discussion in the previous chapter – how transgression of binaries 
can position one as ‘unstable’ which undermines the status of one’s gender as real. 
The medical framework for considering gender essentialises the property of ‘being 
static’ to gender, which troubles equal status for those with fluid experiences of gender. 
Those individuals whose experiences of (trans)gender fit with the paradigm legitimised 
by the medical gaze are correspondingly more likely to be afforded belief in their 
stability and realness. Transgender support networks are well-recognised to not only 
provide emotional support, solidarity, and advice, but to highlight negative medical 
experiences within the community (particularly in relation to transition-oriented care) so 
that others may navigate clinics with as little issue as possible, or so as to avoid 
practitioners who gain a negative reputation (Kosenko et al., 2013; Hines, 2007b).  
Beyond the Gender Identity Clinic: Specific Experiences of Primary and 
Secondary Healthcare for Non-Binary People 
Some participants recorded particular experiences of accessing primary healthcare 
during the diary-keeping period. I will begin by considering examples of primary care 
that involve what I term ‘gendered medicine’ – those procedures or experiences which 
are explicitly gendered in and of themselves as a result of the gendering of bodies and 
their parts, such as the examination of genitals or breasts. Such healthcare, in this 
context, is not specifically connected to medical transition. This will be followed by 
discussion of clinical experiences which are not so explicitly connected to gender –
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even though perceptions of gender or transgender status still influence the doctor-
patient interaction (Bertakis, 2009). 
Jamie illustrated the extreme discomfort of being a non-binary person undergoing a 
cervical smear test without a trans-sensitive medical practice, and showed how 
potentially harmful the gendering of medical processes can be. In his diary, Jamie said 
“it took a lot of strength to ring a friend when I got home instead of just taking a knife to 
my wrists” following from this experience with his primary care practice.  
Jamie gave a thorough account of his medical experience, which began with his 
interaction with a member of reception staff. After being addressed by his previous 
name (a destabilising and unpleasant experience, and triggering of dysphoria) he 
produced his deed poll to attempt the record change, for the fourth time. Previous 
attempts by Jamie to formally have his name changed on medical records were not 
acted upon, despite possession of a deed poll, and allowing the practice several 
months to enact the change. The interaction then involved the receptionist having a 
telephone call with patient central, during which (despite the context of a first name 
change and gendered title change to ‘Mr’) they referred to Jamie as “a lady”, “she” and 
“her”. Whilst a more detailed consideration of the role of administrative processes in 
medical care will be considered later in this chapter, this context is important because 
of the emotional impact this interaction had on Jamie before entering the space of the 
examination room, and the gendered negotiations with the nurse performing the 
cervical smear.  
Jamie made a point of telling the nurse in the examination room that he is transgender. 
However, the nurse gave no clear indication of having registered or understood the 
relevance of this for the interaction. Instead she simply continued by replying “Okay. 
Have you ever used sex toys? It [the speculum used during screenings] is no bigger 
than a dildo…” This gave Jamie considerable anxiety, uncertain whether the nurse 
“thinks I was assigned male at birth and have had lower surgery and am worried about 
my neovagina being hurt or something?”. Whilst the nurse did express sympathy in 
response to perceiving anxiety, Jamie characterised her response as very general in 
nature and did not suggest awareness that Jamie’s specific, (dysphoric) anxiety was 
informed by transgender identification, being misgendered, and the lack of practitioner 
awareness.  
Further, the symbolic use of sex toys to make a point about the speculum is noteworthy. 
It is unlikely that this comparison would be used by the nurse for all individuals 
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attending a smear test because of the possibility of offense, due to the potential for sex 
toys to be symbolically connected to deviancy by patients (Kay, 1992). In terms of 
making the point about size, the nurse could have easily shown the speculum, or made 
a comparison that did not involve the asking of an intimate question. Whilst this has 
been recognised in women’s healthcare (Moore et al., 2000), the specific context of 
transgender carries different requirements for sensitive practice that have lacked 
specificity and discussions of interactions within existing literature (Unger, 2014). There 
is also the potential that the nurse made the speculum-dildo comparison due to 
discursively connecting sex toys and transgender as sexually deviant. Most 
problematically is how Jamie recounted the exchange during physical examination: 
Nurse: So how do you cope with your period? 
Me (thinking, WHAT THE FUCK?! Why do you think this is a) 
appropriate or b) at all likely to calm me down?! Are you seriously 
trying to dispel my anxiety by bringing up the precise dysphoria I’m 
currently desperately trying to dispel?!?!?!): Badly. (Jamie, 24, diary, 
capitalisation original) 
This illustrates unambiguously how lack of awareness regarding transgender 
experiences means that practitioners risk causing extreme discomfort for transgender 
patients through inappropriate interactions. The phrasing of the question, and the fact 
that the nurse did not ask for any more information following Jamie’s response of 
“badly” shows that this question was not asked out of medical necessity. The 
inaccurate collapse of ‘people with cervixes’ to the social category of ‘woman’ results in 
a blanket-style approach to particular healthcare interactions that have the potential to 
be delegitimising and upsetting for binary and non-binary transgender individuals.  
Mark’s discussion of his (gendered, but not GIC-related) secondary care experiences 
with a gynaecologist provides another perspective: 
On paper, I’m very scary apparently, I’m told. [According to] the 
gynaecologist that was checking me out… I’m having trouble with my 
digestive system actually, but when it first came up it was assumed to 
be an ovary. So that meant a trip to the gynaecologist. And he 
apparently, somebody really hadn’t felt very comfortable dealing with 
me… and I thought ‘what’s wrong with me?’ but I think when I get in 
there and they realise that I’m first of all quite personable, I’m not kind 
of going in grunting. I don’t have the testosterone sweats or anything 
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like that! And also that I’m happy within the contexts of what they’re 
doing to be open about being transgender. I had another ultrasound 
recently; they’re trying to tick off what’s not wrong with me at the 
moment, anyway. But of course, the lady doing the ultrasound wanted 
to know what the background was, had I been for one recently, yes, I 
went for one before Christmas, but that was specifically just to check 
my ovaries. Because I’m transgender, and that was fine. That was the 
only conversation that went on about it. But I think if they realised that I 
go in and I don’t have two heads, that hopefully there’s a weird sort of 
educational process going on! That just because someone called Mark 
is coming in to have their ovaries looked at doesn’t mean I’m going to 
be a monster. (Mark, 43, interview) 
Mark is keen to emphasise that through being personable, he is able to dispel much of 
the anxiety that he articulated practitioners expressing in relation to him. It is important 
to recognise the significance of a doctor telling their patient that they found them ‘very 
scary on paper’. Through Mark’s possession and embodiment of a transgender history, 
this is enough in and of itself to cause a fear response in the clinician. One possible 
interpretation of this fear is that of discomfort with Mark, on the basis of ‘transness as 
scary’. This has been explored through feelings of transgender rage at being positioned 
as an artificial creation and monstrously different (Barad, 2015; Stryker, 1994). The 
doctor’s fear instead (or in addition) may not have been located in relation to Mark in 
and of himself, but the fear of failing to provide adequately for Mark – the fear of failing 
as a physician (McLeod, 2003; Caplan, 1994).  
Mark’s initial response of ‘what’s wrong with me?’ highlights how he felt a sense of 
being viewed as ‘wrong’ by the doctor’s reaction. The doctor’s fear may be more likely 
a fear of the unknown, and fear of making mistakes or being ill-equipped as a 
practitioner despite (or perhaps because of) being in the position of power, and thus 
expected to possess relevant expertise. The doctor’s candidness with Mark of his 
feelings may have been ill-advised rather than ill-intentioned. Mark’s response 
illustrates the potential for this to be problematic for a transgender person, even though 
Mark did not place emphasis on the experience as being especially upsetting. This 
example illustrates not only the lack of normalisation that trans bodies can have within 
the healthcare system, but how this process of othering is not recognised as potentially 
damaging to declare. This exists in tandem with the doctor ‘confessing’ his vulnerability, 
and fostering potential for mutual reassurance. This interaction also reminds of the 
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humanity of practitioners, and how their emotions (such as anxiety and stress at the 
prospect of inadvertently causing distress) also have interplay with clinical interactions. 
Mark emphasises that “just because someone called Mark is coming in to have their 
ovaries looked at doesn’t mean I’m going to be a monster”. There is a discursive 
connection between ‘being scary’ and ‘monstrosity’, which has been specifically 
recognised and explored by transgender scholars in relation to their own experiences 
of being socially othered (Nordmarken, 2014; Stryker, 1994). 
These two examples from Mark and Jamie illustrate significant narrative differences, in 
that Mark did not express being upset by how his treatment was conducted or the 
nature of the practitioner’s communication, whilst Jamie did. This may be connected to 
the previous chapter’s theme of time, in that Jamie was in the early stages of 
negotiating his identity whilst Mark articulated considerably more experience and 
security. Further, Mark’s doctor did explicitly recognise him as trans, and engage in a 
discursive act of rapport building (however problematic). The response of Jamie’s 
nurse to Jamie’s act of coming out in the clinical space was symbolic erasure (Namaste, 
2000), through lack of nuanced reaction and subsequent upsetting questions.  
In having his name already registered and used consistently at the doctors (and with 
‘Mark’ being read unambiguously as male), this is a clear indicator that medical staff 
were able to follow up on. The difference also meant that Mark did not share Jamie’s 
experience of trying to have the correct name and title arranged (yet again) before the 
appointment, which functioned to prime Jamie into a vulnerable state. Further, due to 
having already accessed gender affirming medical services, Mark was read socially as 
male more consistently than Jamie – making it considerably easier for Mark to avoid 
being assumed to be female, even within the setting of a gynaecological examination. 
Mark evidenced that earlier in his transition, he was more easily upset and destabilised 
by the behaviours of clinicians: 
A couple of times I have made complaints to practice managers, but 
that was generally in the very early days. And the trouble is of course, 
back when… you have so little to hang on to. You have no 
testosterone, no surgery, you are basically told to get out there and be 
a man. (Mark, 43, interview) 
This adds to the temporally and materially dependent discourse of ‘not being trans 
enough’ as discussed in chapter four. There is potential insecurity in not feeling (or 
being viewed as) trans enough, when an individual has not yet accessed (or does not 
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intend to access) transition related treatment. Further, individuals may feel they lacked 
the catalysis of embodied change, which would not only stimulate confidence in one’s 
transness, but also allow for less problematic negotiation of (gendered) services. 
Unless a trans person who is accessing gendered medicine exhibits unambiguous 
social markers of cross-gender identification or embodiment, their identity, and 
correspondingly their particular socio-medical needs may be rendered invisible if 
nuanced trans-sensitive policy is not in place.  
When not (or not yet) accessing gender affirming medical treatments, it may be 
considerably more difficult, and correspondingly dangerous, to attempt to ‘pass’ socially 
as a gender other than that assigned at birth. Whilst ‘passing’ is unavoidably a 
navigation performed in binary terms, many participants expressed how being read as 
‘the other binary gender’ is considerably preferable to being positioned as they were 
assigned at birth. Avoiding being positioned as the gender one was assigned without 
medical intervention can be difficult for some, and impossible for others. Thus, 
presenting oneself in accordance with one’s assigned gender can be a survival 
mechanism for navigating the world with fewer practical difficulties. In such cases, the 
individual’s gendered appearance is taken at face value, due to medicine operating 
within cisnormative society whereby appearance functions as ‘cultural genitals’ 
(Kessler and McKenna, 1978). Which of these two far from ideal options may be 
pursued is often dependent on the severity of dysphoria, and thus may also fluctuate 
over time (as dysphoria is not necessary constantly the same intensity, if present).  
This also highlights an important difference between some non-binary transgender 
articulations in contrast to binary trans identification. Genderqueer or gender-
subversive presentation often relies upon the blending of categories, however many 
non-binary people do not present in such a manner (certainly not constantly), and 
additionally such presentation does not guarantee recognition of a non-binary gender 
identity. The closer a non-binary person’s gender presentation and social cues are to 
that which they were not assigned at birth, the more likely their transgender status is to 
be recognised (should they either not ‘pass’, or disclose their trans status). That is, 
non-binary gender identities struggle for legitimacy unless following binary transgender 
discourses (Vaid-Menon, 2015), which also remain subject to significant ignorance 
within primary care.  
Only when the medical record of ‘M’ or ‘F’, and gendered appearance are ‘misaligned 
enough’ does an individual have a chance of being regularly recognised as trans within 
medical contexts, although it is also possible that staff may instead presume the 
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gender marker on records to be a ‘mistake’. The potential confusion that trans 
embodiment can cause is also supported by Frankie’s account of receiving an 
ultrasound, after experiencing abdominal pain since starting HRT: 
The clinician was nice enough, just kinda did his thing and then I left. I 
got the impression he might have been slightly flustered about how to 
treat me, looking ‘male’ but with ‘female’ details – think there were a 
couple of questions where he really thought about the wording before 
asking, which was cool. (Frankie, 25, diary) 
The symbolic disjuncture between appearance and records (as with Mark) acted as a 
social cue which the doctor was able to recognise, and modify his interaction 
accordingly. Frankie’s account also illustrates how recognising the act of the doctor 
thinking about how to word his questions may help trans individuals feel more at ease, 
as recognising such an action is evidence of concern for the patient in terms of their 
trans status. It provides evidence of a practitioner with some awareness of gender 
sensitivity and, importantly, an active desire to be respectful and create an affirming 
environment.  
To compare this interaction with Jamie’s smear test, Jamie may have avoided some 
elements of distress had his earlier attempts to change his records been successful, 
but his interaction with the nurse was partly due to her assumption that he was female. 
However, her inappropriate question about how Jamie ‘copes with [his] periods’, asked 
in the context of knowing Jamie’s trans status, was not rooted in medical necessity (but 
rather, curiosity), and did not recognise the potential sensitivity of the situation as 
Frankie’s clinician did. This illustrates how transgender clinical experience may have a 
significantly unpredictable element to it based in the personality and style of a given 
practitioner. Whilst this may also be true from a practitioner perspective (in that trans 
service users are very heterogeneous and therefore not predictable), there is a great 
sense of concordance from the trans community regarding modes of practice that are 
viewed as sensitive, collaborative, and preferable (Ellis et al., 2015; 2014; Dewey, 2013; 
2008) 
In relation to uterine and sexual healthcare experiences, Ash (33) drew an image of 
their internal reproductive structures (figure 9) in order to clarify ‘what they had’: 
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Figure 9: Illustration of non-binary vagina with prosthetic testicles and intrauterine 
device, from Ash’s diary.  
This image literally illustrates non-binary embodiment, and the results of negotiation 
both with oneself and with the providers of medical care. The image shows at least two 
independent medical procedures – prosthetic testicular implants, and an intrauterine 
device. In gendered terms, such procedures would typically be assumed as mutually 
exclusive. Therefore this highlights both the introspective work done in reaching  the 
decision of wanting a non-binary physiology, and the effort required to successfully 
access this through appeals to both identification (Baril and Trevenen, 2014) and 
sexual responsibility. The image also reminds how an individual’s process of 
negotiation can be inscribed upon the body through medical procedures, indicating, at 
least partially, the nature of some of the negotiations experienced. 
In addition to the impact of clinician awareness, sensitivity, and demeanour, 
explanations related to health and diagnoses given by doctors have interplay with 
gender identity. Within their diary, Ash talked about sometimes feeling that their 
reproductive system might be “broken, not as good as that of cisgender people”. Ash 
here illustrates internalisation of the stigma of a body that does not fulfil idealised 
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(cis)gendered expectations. The rendering of the physiological in moral terms (‘not as 
good’) fuses two of Goffman’s (1997) types of stigma. According to Goffman there are 
“abominations of the body” and “blemishes of individual character” (Goffman, 1997, p. 
205), both of which are relatable to trans embodiment.  
Ash’s feelings of being damaged or lesser related to their experience of sexual 
healthcare, as well as their history of receiving HRT. Ash discussed having the 
contraceptive coil fitted and explained how the copper coil tends to make menstrual 
flow heavier, meaning they were bleeding more than they had for years. Contrary to 
experiencing dysphoria in relation to this (as would be expected of a historical or 
hegemonic transgender narrative for someone AFAB), Ash explained they were happy 
about this, because of making them feel less ‘broken’. The coil served to reduce 
anxiety Ash had over a perceived increased risk of cancer: 
When I went to see an endocrinologist and they put me on female 
hormones I asked why I have to do 3 weeks on, 1 week off cycle when 
lots of people (trans women) I know take oestrogen every day of every 
month. The endocrinologist said if you have a womb it is different. You 
should take time off oestrogen to let your womb bleed. If your womb 
does not shed its lining regularly this is bad for you, and you are at 
greater risk of cancer. So after they said that I have often looked at the 
tiny red smear in my knickers each month and felt anxious that it’s not 
enough and I will get cancer. (Ash, 33, diary) 
The act of menstruating, rather than being a simple cause of dysphoria (as it may or 
may not have been in Ash’s past) reassured Ash that their physiology was ‘working’, 
and so it felt to them less likely that they were at risk of uterus-related pathology. There 
is potential for the explanation of the endocrinologist to have been an oversimplification, 
as whilst oestrogen-only HRT may increase the risk of womb cancer (Grady et al., 
1995), combined HRT of oestrogen and progesterone reduces cancer risk (Hill et al., 
2000). Modern contraceptive pills for example decrease womb cancer risk whilst also 
preventing menstruation (Cancer Research UK, 2014), thus flow rate is not in and of 
itself a reliable predictor of cancer risk, and yet Ash was rendered anxious by their 
endocrinologist’s explanation.  
These examples of gendered medicine have illustrated how experiences of gendered 
primary and secondary care may result in non-binary trans people experiencing 
problematic responses, even when not individually dissatisfied with the medical 
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interaction. The following examples are not rooted in gendered physiology per se, yet 
illustrate how social interactions in clinical contexts can be gendered problematically, or 
for transition-related healthcare to be connected to other healthcare experiences.  
Gender could be unnecessarily brought to bear even in very mundane medical 
interactions. Alex illustrated this by explaining in their diary how when expressing 
discomfort at a local anaesthetic injection for the removal of an ingrown toenail, the 
nurse practitioner said “once women have babies they don’t complain anymore”. Whilst 
the nurse’s response implied that she was being glib, one could argue that regardless 
of the patient’s gender this response may be interpreted as dismissive. When Alex 
responded by saying they were never going to have children, the nurse responded with 
“the usual patronising line about how I’m young and I’d change my mind one day”. Alex 
expressed that they found this response annoying to the nurse. Although the nurse did 
not verbally respond, Alex reported feeling a sense of “judgement and disapproval”. It 
is important to note that such an interaction may have been equally offensive to many 
cisgender women, due to the stereotypical assumption of those read as women 
inevitably being positioned as (future) mothers. However, the way in which such an 
interaction also can heighten dysphoria and delegitimise an individual’s gender identity 
entirely, means this has particular significance in the context of transgender 
interactions. 
As a student nurse, Alex was particularly critical of this interaction, because of having 
first-hand experience of how medical professionals are taught and expected to put 
themselves across in a ‘neutral’ manner. This instance not only reinforces how gender 
norms and expectations can be clinically reified, but the significant difficulty of being 
respected as neither male nor female in contexts where that is not the focus of 
attention.  
The following example from Mark runs counter to the example concerned with taking 
oestrogen and bleeding from Ash. In Ash’s case, non-binary contextualisation may 
have iterated the need for a more nuanced, particular response. On the contrary, in 
Mark’s case, his health concern (a sore arm) was demonstrably conflated with his 
gender related medical treatment and dismissed. Binary and non-binary trans people 
who access gender affirming medicine can thus find unrelated health experiences 
being consigned to ‘side effects’ of for example, hormone treatment: 
I have had a sore arm for around 4 years. It actually started before I 
first took T. I went to see a doctor about the pain after a couple of 
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years (you can’t accuse me of over-extending the NHS!) and was told 
that the muscles in my arm were growing, due to the T, and that these 
were essentially ‘growing pains’. “But why just in one arm?” I queried. 
The reply was that as I am right handed, I was using the ‘new’ muscles 
more frequently, so wasn’t experiencing pain. In my poor, slovenly left 
arm, I had pain due to my body not being used to the muscle growth. 
At that point I gave up. (Mark, 43, diary) 
Mark specifies that his arm pain began before he ever took testosterone, yet the 
explanation he received relied upon this prescription as causation. Further, the 
explanation is clearly unsatisfactory for Mark, yet he chose to ‘give up’, due to the 
sense that attempting to challenge the doctor’s position further would be too 
demanding, and likely produce no results. There are parallels here with how other 
stigmatised bodies receive inappropriate medical scrutiny and blame, such as when a 
patient is overweight (Puhl and Heuer, 2010; Foster et al., 2003).  
Mark can be understood to be negotiating his relationship with his doctors so as to fulfil 
the role of the ‘good patient’ (Lorber, 1975), reducing the possibility of conflict. This was 
seen in how Mark navigated the gynaecologist, working to perform a particularly 
amenable persona in order to counteract and diffuse any apprehensions a physician 
may have over trans patients being ‘difficult’. This could be both in terms of how to treat, 
and in terms of patient behaviour as challenging or disrupting the doctor’s presumed 
superiority in the context of the clinic. Mark also previously mentioned his hope that 
“there’s a weird sort of educational process going on”, illustrating how by performing 
the role of an agreeable patient he hopes to further normalise transgender people to 
his clinicians.  
A very different account of gender transition intersecting with additional health 
concerns was described by Ash: 
A couple of years ago I kept pointing out to my doctor that I had the 
symptoms of severe malnutrition and the doctor wasn’t helpful at all – 
just kept saying “eat xyz”, which I was already eating. I was really ill. 
The only thing that made it stop was the GP being confused by my 
gender, and saying he wasn’t willing to prescribe HRT until I’d seen an 
endocrinologist and they had said it was appropriate… I am so lucky 
that being transgender got me diagnosed and treated appropriately in 
this indirect way. I am pissed off that they didn’t take me seriously 
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earlier and I had to feel ill for a couple of years for no good reason… 
During this time I actually went into hospital and had a blood 
transfusion because I had so few red blood cells (anaemia) on two 
separate occasions. They were saying “you must’ve been bleeding 
heavily, how did this happen?” and they didn’t believe me when I said I 
hadn’t. (Ash, 33, diary) 
Ash iterates that they felt lucky that their gender transition meant that they were treated 
appropriately for the nutrient deficiencies they had, however it is problematic for this 
condition to have not been followed up in its own right. Thus this example does not 
suggest it is appropriate practice for secondary care referrals (rather than a simple 
blood test) to be universally required prior to HRT prescription. Ash needed to be seen 
by an endocrinologist, but not because of wishing to start HRT. The assumptions within 
medicine that bodies gendered a particular way perform similarly (in this case that 
people with wombs must bleed) meant that Ash felt medical staff distrusted them, 
rather than entertaining the possibility of another explanation. The importance of 
practitioners trusting patients has been explored (Peter and Watt-Watson, 2002; 
Rogers, 2002), which is particularly valuable in cases with relatively frequent, ongoing 
contact such as with cases of chronic illness (Thorne et al., 2000). The following 
section acknowledges participant experiences of chronic conditions and disability, and 
how this intersects with their gender identities and treatment access.  
Disability, Chronic Illness, and Being Non-Binary 
The last example with Ash highlights how a patient’s condition(s) – in that case, a 
history of mental health diagnoses – can potentially impact interactions with medical 
practitioners. Intersections between experiences of disability and chronic illness were 
raised by multiple participants, and how this impacted their negotiations of non-binary 
gender identity. Further, the impact of medical interactions was multifaceted. Mark 
explained in his diary how he experiences multiple chronic conditions: 
Of my medical files… 
Bipolar (Type 2 – I take lithium) 
Hypothyroidism (caused by lithium. Crap) 
OCD (The diagnosed sort, not the trendy one) 
Gout (bloody painful) 
IBS (maybe – the doctor isn’t sure) 
GENDER DYSPHORIA (well, duh) (Mark, 43, diary) 
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Mark explained how this meant he had a lot of experience with doctors, as well as 
being “well known” at his local surgery. This was to such an extent that “the pharmacist 
just hands over my drugs without asking my name”. Mark further contextualises how 
his mother was a nurse, so he is “not scared” of medics.  
Contrary to this, Ricky’s chronic health problems alienated them to doctors, rather than 
acclimatised them. Ricky detailed how they were diagnosed with ME66 in 1998, and 
how their experiences in relation to this badly soured them towards the medical 
profession. Their determination to access hormones despite this aversion (and the 
symptomatic fatigue of their condition) helped Ricky realise to themselves how serious 
they were, and thus how significant gendered medical intervention was for them. They 
went on to explain how: 
We’re really lucky where we are, because we live in this tiny little old 
mining village. And it’s got a tiny little GP practice which they’ve never 
managed to find a GP to take it over, so it’s been locums for years. 
We’ve got a guy there now who’s been the locum there for a really 
long time. But he’s one of those doctors that you just go in, you tell him 
what you want and he gives it to you. He’s not really that interested, 
he’s just got his feet up, he’s very laid back, and you just go in and go 
‘I’m trans, refer me to the gender clinic’ and he goes ‘okay’ and he 
writes a letter, and you tell him what to write – I can live with that level 
of interaction. If I actually needed a GP that was going to help me and 
talk stuff through with me and investigate something or put their own 
thoughts into what was going on for me, I think I’d be really stuffed. But 
as long as I know what I need, then I can get it. (Ricky, 43, interview) 
Ricky’s account here demonstrates how earlier medical interactions firmly shaped how 
they wished to interact with medical practitioners – both in relation to chronic illness, 
and gender identity. They recognise how their GP’s apparent apathy can be 
problematized, though Ricky does discuss themselves as ‘lucky’ – because of the fit 
between their doctor’s approach and their individual needs and preferences. Ricky’s 
experiences as chronically ill prepared them for assuming the role of the expert patient 
(Taylor and Bury, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; Donaldson, 2003), so as to claim power in 
accessing what they felt they needed: 
                                            
66Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, which, depending upon the medical definitions used, may 
be used synonymously with CFS – Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.  
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There’s no point going to them and saying ‘I’m feeling this, can you 
help me’ I have to go ‘I need this from you’. I think in some ways that’s 
also a process of empowerment really, and has certainly helped with 
being trans, I didn’t go along to the doctor and go ‘you know I think I 
might be’ or ‘I think this is going on’ I just went and said ‘you need to 
refer me to the gender clinic please’, and I think that’s quite 
empowering from that point of view. With my ME I had to take it into 
my own hands, I realised the medical profession just didn’t have 
answers for me. (Ricky, 43, interview) 
The way Ricky represented themselves through their language as confident and certain 
of their needs discursively aligns with stability and validity – and thus greater chance of 
validation by the medical gaze. As previously mentioned in chapter four, diagnosis with 
gender dysphoria is dependent upon trans individuals self-reporting, such that clinical 
interactions that lack confidence (for whatever reason) may allow clinical doubt in the 
service-user, in primary care or GIC contexts.  
Jess explained how her experience of being disabled shapes how she is symbolically 
read, and thus how she is interacted with. Initially, Jess contextualised how her 
impairment affects her speech and gait, such that she went through both speech 
therapy and physiotherapy during childhood. Jess articulates that these aspects of her 
expression that are positioned as “markers of [her] queerness” – their ‘mincing walk’ 
and ‘gay voice’ – are for her, markers of disability: 
I feel like my identity as a disabled person is quite often subsumed into 
my queerness, and kind of consumed by it. It means that a lot of the 
time I’m not seen as disabled at all, which can be quite difficult when I 
need to access disability specific things or talk about disabled people. 
People see it as being about my queerness. And that’s probably 
because it makes me look physically queer. Which obviously puts me 
in danger, and allows me easier access to queer spaces… I think that 
partially it’s the disability, those disability markers are being read as 
femininity, this means that I’m kind of often misgendered as being a 
femme when what they mean is you’re a femme boy, rather than a 
kind of butch woman. I’ve also noticed that as another interesting 
intersection between disability and transness is that I get a significantly 
less amount of harassment when I’m walking with my walking stick 
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than when I’m not. So I often feel like sometimes even if I don’t need it, 
I might take my walking stick out. Because it feels a bit like a foil, 
people see the stick and don’t look at you. You’ve already been 
classified as a disabled person rather than as a trans person or a 
gender freak or whatever. It’s like people can only see you as one 
thing. It means that in general I get an easier time of it. So especially if 
I’m going on long journeys on public transport I’ll take my stick, even if 
I don’t need it, because public transport seems to be where most of my 
misgendering and harassment and sexual assaults and violence 
happens against me but seems to happen less often if I’m walking with 
my stick. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Whilst Jess’s body being symbolically positioned as ‘male’ by social actors is significant 
in their walk and speech being read as queer more so than disabled (Whitney, 2006; 
Sandahl, 2003), by encouraging a disability reading through her use of the stick, Jess 
can feel protected against transphobic abuse (Schmidt, 2013).  
Rachel (28) included material in their diary (figures 10, 11, and 12) raising intersections 
with their experiences as a disabled person: 
 
Figure 10: Image of disabled individuals in wheelchairs, from Rachel’s diary. 
Jess may mitigate experiences of harassment through socially positioning herself in a 
manner which results in her gendered presentation being explained away, rather than 
punished, which resonates with Rachel’s sense that social actors symbolically ascribe 
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disability as the explanation for ‘gender inappropriate’ presentation. That disabled 
people are often socially positioned as either not experiencing or not understanding 
sexual desire is an ableist trope that is well recognised (Esmail et al., 2010; Di Giulio, 
2003). The text overlay in Rachel’s image highlights their insecurity in relation to a 
genderqueer identification. As Rachel did not highlight experiencing any cognitive 
impairment, this question is likely rhetorical as individuals who are physically disabled 
often experience being patronised (Stevens, 2014), and treated as if mentally impaired 
and unable to make ‘appropriate’ choices by themselves (Aiden and McCarthy, 2014). 
There is an important intersectional consideration in Rachel’s account, as whilst 
disabled people may struggle to find clothes that are comfortable, accessible, and 
stylish, a trans identity adds additional constraints to clothing choice. For example, a 
gendered clothing cut may cause pain due to tightness, or gendered clothing may differ 
in the difficulty to take on and off relative to the individual’s body. 
 
Figure 11: Image of pills, from Rachel’s diary. 
This excerpt shows how Rachel’s experiences of chronic illness and their experiences 
of gender cannot be disentangled, in terms of medical treatment as well as social 
interactions. The opiates which Rachel was taking during the diary-keeping period 
served to relieve their gender dysphoria, though were not prescribed in relation to this. 
Rachel explained how they did not wish to discuss gender with their doctors because of 
the potential to disrupt their other carefully managed and highly necessary healthcare 
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interventions. This was also Bobby’s approach to navigating their chronic (mental) 
healthcare: 
Naturally I have not told [the mental health team] any gender stuff… 
they would almost certainly latch onto any hint of gender identity and 
DECIDE that everything I’m going through, all of the mental health 
issues, all of it is entirely based in gender… They will think of my 
gender identity as either the cause or result or both of this crisis. 
(Bobby, 23, diary, capitalisation original) 
This highlights how comorbidities may synergise with perceptions of healthcare 
providers to create additional healthcare barriers for disabled trans people. It is 
recognised that access to mental health care can be limited because of expectations of 
stigmatisation from those with mental health conditions (Thornicroft, 2008), which is 
likely to be exacerbated by intersectional fear and expectation of stigma in relation to 
trans status. Rachel said that “If I can put up with them seeing me as female and using 
those pronouns and stuff it seems like a better option”, because of both the risks and 
the associated labour (in explaining their feelings to non-gender specialists, for 
potentially no gain). Rachel’s healthcare management can also be linked back to how 
experiences of non-binary gender is temporally dependent – as Rachel’s experience of 
gender-related distress is significantly different depending upon the medication they 
are or are not taking at a given time.  
 
Figure 12: Image of breasts in bra, from Rachel’s diary. 
This image illustrates how chronic illness and disability can constrain not only access to 
discussing gender or medical transition with doctors, but also gender presentation, and 
therefore social interactions. Relating back to figure 3, where Rachel stated “I feel like a 
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man trapped inside a woman’s body. Except the body is comfy and pretty and safe” 
shows that there are multiple, somewhat contradictory aspects to their experiences of 
embodiment in particular. Contradiction does not undermine the validity of Rachel’s 
identity, but serves to illustrate how different facets can hold greater or lesser 
significance in a manner dependent on context and time. Rachel iterates that changing 
the way they dress to better match their identity actually makes them feel worse, as the 
disjunction between their physicality and gendered presentation serves to emphasise 
that they are “trapped inside a woman’s body”. This serves to disrupt hegemonic 
narratives of transgender embodiment, which can lack space for experiences such as 
those who are AFAB, who do not bind, with feminine presentation. Such traits, as well 
as experience of chronic illness (ME, as with Ricky) were shared by Charlie.  
Chronic health conditions and disability thus influence the relationships individuals 
have with the medical profession overall. Treatments themselves may also significantly 
impact the experiences of gender dysphoria and/or gendered identity, which feeds into 
negotiations of the social world. Both Ricky and Rachel showed very different 
relationships between chronic health and (not) being referred to a GIC. This important 
administrative process at the primary care level together with the impact of other 
clerical interactions will now be considered.  
Medical Administration – Being Referred, Being Frustrated 
In primary care, experiences with non-medical staff and with administrative systems 
themselves can pose specific difficulties for non-binary people. Jamie’s difficulty 
procuring a name and title change highlighted the potential difficulties and distress that 
can be encountered when negotiating administrative processes within one’s medical 
practice. Following a six month wait, Jamie gave the practice an ultimatum, threatening 
to report them to the Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS – which supports 
formal complaint proceedings within the NHS):  
They rang me on the last day of my ultimatum to say ‘I don’t know if 
you know, but it’s very complicated what we have to do, we have to get 
a new NHS number’ I know! I gave you the guidance of what to do! 
Don’t tell me what you have to do as if I don’t understand how 
complicated it was. (Jamie, 24, diary) 
The nature of this interaction follows a parallel narrative to that of the ‘expert patient’ 
(Taylor and Bury, 2007), which subverts power dynamics through challenging and 
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resisting the supposed expertise of the clinician. In this case however, patient expertise 
is demonstrated in healthcare administrative policy, thus challenging the administrator. 
This expands the role and knowledge of the expert patient beyond healthcare decision-
making, such that an individual becomes a ‘manager patient’. I use this term to refer to 
contexts where rather than (only) demonstrating significant familiarity with medical 
literature and expert status in relation to transgender healthcare, the patient performs 
managerial labour in guiding and instructing medical staff in processes of medical 
administration. Thus, ‘expert status’ can extend beyond the doctor-patient interaction, 
due to the significance of gender in record-keeping that does not intersect with other 
examples of expert patients. However, the patient still lacks the power to enforce their 
knowledge of institutional policy, and remains dependent on staff following their 
instruction – which, Jamie’s circumstance demonstrates, cannot be depended upon.  
This altercation highlights the inadequacy of the current system in allowing for record 
changes. This is not only due to the (arguably unnecessary) complexity of the task 
itself, but the lack of appreciation by administration that the delay in affecting the 
change could result in anything more than mild inconvenience rather than significant 
distress. Leon also experienced problems, specifically stating in their diary that “The 
practice won’t seem to let me go by my preferred name”. This could suggest a lack of 
transparency around name change protocol making it difficult for Leon to access, or 
inconsistency between the policies of different clinics. It also raises the question of 
clinic policy on recording preferred names (for waiting room announcements and 
interactions), and whether administrative systems are built to be able to accommodate 
this universally. The potential impact of dysphoria and stress through administrative 
delays and the excessive patient labour this can demand is emphasised through 
Jamie’s statement that “It’s been really stressful and horrible, because it definitely puts 
me off going to the doctor. It nearly put me off going for a mole which has now been 
diagnosed as possibly melanoma”. 
Conversely, Mark indicated he was impressed with the clinic’s sensitivity of 
communication (from the position of having had his gender marker and name 
successfully changed on his medical records): 
The letter was addressed to Mr. [surname], and used impeccable 
language, which I suspect took someone some time to formulate, 
given that I am a Mr. with a uterus and ovaries. (Mark, 43, diary) 
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Mark praises the nameless staff member who wrote the letter for respecting his title 
and pronouns in a context of writing about his uterus and ovaries, stressing the 
awareness of how the social possibility of ‘a Mr with a uterus and ovaries’ is rarely 
recognised. Mark’s satisfaction may also potentially be influenced by the extensive 
misgendering that practically all transgender people have experienced. Contexts such 
as this, where the respect, and, by proxy, social legitimacy of gender identity is 
threatened (in this case through the explicit juxtaposition with physiology) may result in 
relief when avoiding being misgendered. In a sense, Mark may be grateful for a level of 
nuance rarely found outside of transgender communities, which contrasts with the 
frustration that other participants articulate when expecting and experiencing 
administrative misgendering. This example also demonstrates how a non-binary 
identity is not a reliable predictor of title (or pronoun) usage, with Mark using ‘he’ and 
‘Mr’, rather than ‘they’, and ‘Mx’.  
The fact that Mark’s administrative markers of name, pronouns, and title are all socially 
coded as ‘male’ likely assists in consistent and aware administration, than if potentially 
using the title ‘Mx’ or singular they as a pronoun. Mark also further evidences 
performing the role of a ‘good patient’ in an administrative as well as clinical setting, 
through deliberately articulating a presentation that is more feminine or camp than he 
generally would. This affectation serves not only to position him as non-threatening to 
reception staff “Trying Very Hard to be nonchalant” (note the deliberate capitalisation 
for emphasis from the diary entry), but also to assist in the negotiation of his own 
comfort levels within the setting of gendered medicine. In performing himself as a 
feminine (rather than masculine) male, Mark aims to ease the symbolic dissonance 
staff may view between his identity and embodiment.  
Despite being broadly comfortable with being socially read and positioned as male in 
navigating day-to-day life, Mark explicitly states feeling uncomfortable as male in the 
gynaecologist’s office, alluding potentially to how the space is socially constructed as 
‘for women’. Whilst an explanation in terms of dysphoria is also possible, it is 
problematic to assume this as a/the source of Mark’s discomfort, and would risk further 
reinforcing the clinically constructed, hegemonic, binarised narrative of gender 
dysphoria. 
Frankie (25) used her diary to share her thoughts and feelings concerning primary and 
secondary care administration, particularly her engagement with feedback forms. 
Frankie shared photographs she had taken of feedback forms she had filled in after 
attending particular secondary and tertiary care appointments: 
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Figure 13: Scan of secondary care clinical feedback form, from Frankie’s diary. 
 
Figure 14: Scan of GIC feedback form, from Frankie’s diary. 
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As the first image shows, Frankie rated her overall satisfaction with the experience of 
receiving an ultrasound scan ‘excellent’, although she did also point out in the 
additional comments section how the binary tick boxes for gender did not provide her 
with an acceptable option for her identity at that time. The second image was taken of a 
feedback form following a secondary care appointment with a Gender Identity Clinic. 
Whilst Frankie’s views on secondary care will be further explored in the next chapter, 
this feedback form illustrates how the only aspect of Frankie’s experience that was 
particularly problematic was that of administrative staff. Whilst Frankie felt involved in 
her treatment and confident of her clinician(s), there remained aspects of their 
respectfulness and ability to listen that could be improved upon, despite offering overall 
very positive feedback.  
Secondary and tertiary care contexts produce forms for the collection of healthcare-
related information that is more specific than primary clinical needs. However, Jamie’s 
(24) discussion of one such form highlighted significant problems with its construction 
and resultant impact, as discussed in chapter four. The length of the form meant a 
larger burden was placed on patients who were required to complete it, and the 
ambiguous or uncertain purpose of some questions inspired anxiety. Jamie highlights 
how the psychopathological construction of gender dysphoria has led to clinical 
assumptions that feelings about parts of the body can be articulated in simple positive 
or negative terms, that can be essentialised to thirty-three specific body parts 
(Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, 2016b, p. 9). Jamie demonstrated 
in his diary how flaws in the form’s design render it vulnerable to deconstruction and 
ambiguous interpretation. 
Jamie’s discussion within his diary showed he was scrutinising the questions to assess 
the purpose for which they were being asked, but experienced anxiety due to lack of 
transparency from the Gender Identity Clinic concerning how such information might be 
used by medical practitioners. For example, on reading questions asking whether the 
individual felt their buttocks were too big, Jamie interpreted this as potentially screening 
for the presence of an eating disorder, which could then jeopardise being seen as 
‘really trans’. This provides an example of a phenomenon already observed within 
binary trans navigations of Gender Identity Clinics – significant anxiety concerning how 
clinicians make their assessments, and a desire to fulfil expectations (by performing the 
role of ‘good patient’) as accurately as possible, so as to successfully access desired 
outcomes. For non-binary people this is particularly difficult, as non-binary identification 
in and of itself defies current historical medical precedent.  
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The presentation within the form inspired feelings from Jamie in the diary that “they 
seem like terrifying unknowns designed to trip you up, to trick you into revealing that 
you’re not trans at all”. This resonates with how Jess described her sense of GIC care 
provision processes: 
It is incredibly pathologising and essentially assumes that the person 
being referred to them is a cis person who is having some sort of 
delusions. The kind of process isn’t a process of affirming people’s 
genders but is a process of trying to ‘catch out’ the secret cis people 
who are deluded enough to go through this process. And in that way 
obviously the trans healthcare system is actually entirely built around 
cis people, and ‘saving’ cis people from becoming trans. Which is one 
of the reasons why it’s particularly bad for non-binary people, because 
people have a particularly binary focussed way of understanding what 
trans is, and so if you show any deviation from a binary transition 
pathway or a binary life then you’re likely to be seen as a deluded cis 
person. (Jess, 26, interview) 
That Jamie recounted how his transgender community group engaged in a particular 
discussion of the Gender Identity Clinic’s form illustrates how members of queer 
communities can function to assist each other in navigating healthcare. This can 
influence which clinics trans people choose to access. Finn described: 
I’ve got a [GP] who is more trans friendly/actually knows what to do. 
So I’m going to ask them to refer me to [GIC], because I recently made 
a trans friend who has had a really good experience there. They were 
seen in a lot shorter time, one of his clinicians is trans and I was like 
‘wow that sounds so much better’. And I have a friend in [city] who I’d 
be able to stay with if I needed to. (Finn, 22, interview) 
Thus, Finn’s decision to access a particular clinic was directly informed by the sharing 
of experience from another trans individual. The reputations of clinics (and individual 
clinicians) spread within transgender networks so as to influence patterns of access. 
The remainder of the excerpts addressed in this chapter will relate to experiences and 
views of the referral process from primary to secondary care. As presented within this 
chapter’s introduction, it is not necessary for GPs to make any form of assessment 
before referring individuals to Gender Identity Clinics who make such a request. 
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Guidelines simply state “those who need gender identity services for the first time 
should be referred by the GP” (Wylie et al., 2014, p. 17). However, there was a sense 
amongst participants that getting referred could be an unnecessarily arduous process. 
Jamie stated that his GP felt that “it was important [for him to ask questions], ‘I’m only 
going to refer you if you tell me that you’ve felt like this for years and years’ so I lied”. In 
this context, ‘it’ was the sense that there was a perceived need to ask questions, that 
by the GP’s understanding, the GP’s role is that of gatekeeper. When considering 
referral to secondary or tertiary medical services more generally this is rooted in a UK-
specific historical context of demand management (Loudon, 2008). The ethics around 
gatekeeping practices have been considered, with the potential for under-referral to 
save medical resources, or over-referral in private ‘for-profit’ care being particularly 
problematized (Pellegrino, 1986). The complete absence of pathology in the specific 
case of binary and non-binary transgender identification fundamentally differentiates 
gender identity-related medical interventions from other healthcare referrals. Increasing 
recognition of this through education and trans service user demands is bringing the 
role of the GP into debate (Singh and Burnes, 2010). There was a sense that when 
GPs are asked to provide referral, they can be unfamiliar with what this means:  
They generally don’t have any idea about trans stuff. You know, 
they’re reluctant to do stuff like referring you to GICs, to monitor you 
once they get you back, to even treat you for other medical stuff 
because they get side-tracked by trans stuff. (Rachel, 28, interview) 
So then I went to the GP here, who was utterly clueless about… she 
said outright ‘I’ve never had a trans patient’, in some convoluted way, 
like ‘I have never had a transgender’! (Leon, 34, interview) 
The potentiality of a wide range of GP responses from experience and reassurance to 
ignorance, stigmatisation or rejection may present a significant barrier; as with Hal’s or 
Jess’s more general reluctance to see their GPs (as discussed earlier in this chapter), 
non-binary people are primed to expect an environment within the clinic which does not 
understand them. In Jamie’s case, his GP showed their lack of knowledge of this 
particular care pathway:  
The GP was like ‘I’m so pleased to see you, how many appointments 
have you had’ meaning [Gender Identity Clinic], and I looked at him 
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and said ‘I’m on a 6-8 month waiting list which is one of the shortest in 
the country’ and he didn’t have a clue. (Jamie, 24, interview) 
The extensive waiting lists for GICs are well known within transgender communities. 
From Jamie’s position then, not being aware of a piece of information discursively 
coded as ‘common knowledge’ serves to further undermine trust in the GP’s ability to 
occupy the position of expert in relation to (transgender) healthcare, which the doctor-
patient relationship initialises and assumes. This example further emphasises the 
common need for transgender patients to explain their healthcare requirements and 
experiences to under-equipped practitioners. Finn said: 
My appointment with my GP where I asked for a referral was painful 
but ok – I had to do what felt like a tutorial in gender 101 with her, 
explain my identity, define different terms, and detail why I want 
hormone replacement therapy. I got asked a lot of questions that I 
don’t at all see the relevance of – things about my sexuality, my 
relationships, my sex life. I answered them because I wanted to seem 
cooperative, but all the time I kept wanting to yell “THERE SHOULD 
BE TRAINING FOR THIS, WHY DO YOU NEED TO KNOW THIS, 
JUST REFER ME!” (Finn, 22, diary, capitalisation original) 
This can render the most vulnerable members (who may be significantly distressed by 
such an interaction due to mental health difficulties, and who may thus be unable to 
educate their GP) of the non-binary population even less likely to be referred easily. 
Finn is clearly frustrated by a lack of adequate training on the topic of gender identity, 
such that the labour of educating practitioners can often fall upon transgender patients. 
This is problematic because whether or not such labour is (able to be) performed by 
the trans patient may change the outcome of the clinical interaction. In addition, the 
potential refusal of an uncertain GP to make a referral immediately serves to extend 
the length of time until a GIC appointment can be accessed. This may be a particular 
source of patient anxiety given the extensive waiting lists. Further, wide recognition of 
the potential for problematic interactions may result in trans people lowering their 
standards and expectations of healthcare – such that Finn still describes a “painful” 
appointment as “ok”. The significantly higher rate of attempted suicide in trans people 
with negative experiences of medical care (Haas et al., 2014), and how well-recognised 
significant distress is (through medical interactions or other sources) in the trans 
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community may mean that individuals potentially downplay their negative health 
experiences when they feel that it ‘could have been worse’.  
In making such observations I do not infer that GPs actively demand training from their 
patients. However due to members of the trans community reporting smoother 
outcomes to each other when arriving prepared with NHS guidelines, or prepared to 
perform an educative role, there exists a sense within the trans and non-binary 
community that such actions are advisable, if not necessary. David said: 
We hear lots of really great stories about really excited GPs, people 
come into the group with stories, ‘I told my GP I want a referral to the 
gender clinic, and they were like this is so cool! I don’t know what to do 
about this, I’m going to read all the books, can I google you?!’ 
Sometimes you need to talk them off the ledge! It’s quite bad, and the 
unintentional ignorance, and well-meaning ignorance within the 
medical community towards trans issues unless they are specifically 
working within gender identity that trying to bring in gender identity 
issues on top of that would probably make their heads explode. (David, 
31, interview) 
This unpacks the important point that lack of experience or knowledge of transgender 
healthcare does not necessarily mean that GPs are unwilling or insensitive towards 
binary and non-binary health. A practitioner’s expression of desiring further information 
will have different ramifications, based upon the symbolic interpretation of this by the 
patient. A pattern could be seen in the language used by participants who had positive 
experiences of being referred. Individuals repeatedly emphasised that their experience 
of the system had been ‘lucky’, or ‘fortunate’: 
I have been incredibly lucky, I don’t know why, I’ve had a really easy 
run, I’ve literally got… from the day I went to my doctor to saying can 
you refer me to the gender clinic to the day I took testosterone was 
less than a year, which is astonishing. And I do not know how I’ve 
been so lucky. Just lead a charmed life, clearly. But that is so atypical. 
(Ricky, 43, interview) 
This implies that whilst such participants had personally positive experiences, in 
regarding themselves as lucky, they reveal belief that the majority of trans service 
users have unsatisfactory or problematic experiences of referral. There is a striking 
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parallel with Frankie’s earlier discussion of clinical experience, whereby the positive 
personal experience is subsumed within the acceptance that the community consensus 
is very negative.  
There is the possibility of confirmation bias – that is, negative narratives receiving more 
space and attention due to transgender anxieties over avoiding negative healthcare 
experiences, through learning from those who have come before. However the direct 
recounting of negative experiences together with (an albeit often binarised)  precedent 
within research on transgender health experiences (Ellis et al., 2015; Quinn et al., 2015; 
Ellis et al., 2014; Hagen and Galupo, 2014; Bauer et al., 2009; Bockting et al., 2004) 
means that assertions of negative conditions from those who report positive 
experiences must not be dismissed.  
Mark’s experience of seeking referral supports a general consensus that primary care 
practitioners are uncertain how to respond to patients outing themselves as trans and 
requesting referral. It is notable that rarely do these experiences involve specific 
mention of non-binary identity, likely due to appreciation by non-binary people that this 
could serve to result in a greater burden of education or further trouble their access to 
tertiary care. This would demonstrate the concept of ‘strategic simplification’ introduced 
in the previous chapter. Mark’s account highlights his expectations regarding the 
presence of trans community, which was not met: 
The very first doctor I went to see… well put it this way, my 
expectations going to see a doctor to speak about gender were… I 
would talk about it, and I don’t know, maybe they’d give me a leaflet or 
something, then perhaps they’d give me the details of a local support 
group and off I’d toddle with all my bits of paper, thinking ‘ee, I’ve done 
something!’. Didn’t quite work out like that. Went to see a lovely doctor 
who freely admitted that she didn’t have a clue. But having googled a 
few things, in front of me! Said she would find out. And actually 
somebody finding out about stuff from an honest starting point I had no 
problem with. And actually she was really good, and did get me my 
first referral. I didn’t get my leaflet for a support group, because there 
wasn’t one. (Mark, 43, interview) 
Mark went on to explain how this motivated him to create a local support group. This 
instance still illustrates that interactions with medical care can catalyse involvement 
with community. This may be because Mark felt ready, having taken the (medicalising) 
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step that is discursively linked with legitimacy. This also highlights the additional 
problem that primary care practitioners may be ill-equipped to direct trans patients to 
additional support.  
Lack of education on transgender identities among clinicians, together with unfamiliarity 
with NHS guidelines, and standards of care, is responsible for commonality in (binary 
and non-binary) transgender patients perceiving excessive policing from GPs when 
attempting to be referred to a GIC. It is common for GPs to practice gatekeeping, only 
sending a referral letter if and when the trans patient has adequately performed their 
trans identity. Jamie experienced this directly “he didn’t need to ask me any questions 
but was asking ‘how long have you felt like this’ when I asked to be referred to the GIC”. 
Thus in order to negotiate (undertrained) primary care practitioners, non-binary people 
can utilise a binary narrative, explaining Jess’s assertion that non-binary people can be 
‘forced into a binary gender’.  
Participants could make points about perceptions of practitioners that cut across 
primary and specialist care: 
Everyone who I know who’s trans has had really bad experiences with 
the medical community, both with trans specific healthcare and general 
healthcare. (Rachel, 28, interview) 
This is a significant difference from other patients with specialist needs, who whilst 
frustrated by gatekeeping practices or lack of ability to provide specialised care, are 
more satisfied with interactions with specialists (Lewis et al., 2000; Harrold et al., 1999; 
Kerr et al., 1999; Owen et al., 1997). ‘Coercive binarisation’ and other causes of 
tension between GIC practitioners and non-binary service users will be further 
discussed in the next chapter.   
Conclusion 
The potential for non-binary identification to influence primary care experiences is 
multifaceted and extensive. Of particular note were the erasure of health complaints 
due to overemphasis of trans status, avoidance of clinical checks by participants due to 
negative experiences, or their anticipation, and concerns that raising gender with 
practitioners could negatively influence access to or experiences of other important 
healthcare, particularly in relation to chronic illness. Whilst experiences were both 
positive and negative, participants expressed a universal sense that the non-binary 
population overall felt negatively about medical care, and broadly experienced that care 
201 
 
 
 
negatively. This was particularly related to lack of awareness amongst staff (albeit with 
the caveat from some participants that staff could be well-intentioned), leading to 
additional burdens of education and emotional labour for non-binary patients. 
Participants discussed important trends, such as the inappropriate over-emphasis of 
gender in medical contexts. Views of medical practice from participants situated 
differently than ‘patient’ (such as fellow staff member, or trainer) provided additional 
insights into medical staff’s attitudes and knowledge, when not performing the role of 
expert within the doctor/patient interaction.   
The second section of this chapter engaged with examples of participant experiences 
of primary care. Whilst positive and negative encounters were articulated, the 
intersection of particular social phenomena highlighted serious problems with primary 
care experiences for non-binary people overall. Social processes of gendering are 
internalised uncritically within medical practice, and lack of specific or consistent 
training could leave medical and administrative staff unprepared and unaware of 
important and specific sensitivities relevant to both binary and non-binary transgender 
identification.  
Being recognised by primary care practitioners as transgender can depend upon being 
read as such, which can be particularly difficult prior to, or without accessing gender 
affirming medical treatment. In cases where trans status is recognised, this is uniformly 
within the gender binary, with no evidence shown of specific non-binary awareness. 
Indeed, those participants who were recognised as trans in primary care contexts did 
not press for a non-binary distinction, because of the difficulties with negotiating the 
situation as it already stood – producing feelings of vulnerability as the doctor/patient 
interactions were being managed.  
The intersection of chronic health conditions and disability highlighted the importance 
of intersectional analyses. Experiences spanning the life course could significantly 
impact participant’s feelings regarding accessing medical care. Further, treatment for 
unrelated medical conditions could alter the relationship had with dysphoria, or with 
gender itself. This could then feed back into social interactions that permeate all 
aspects of lived experience, raising many highly specific questions about transgender 
healthcare intersections that have yet to receive any detailed academic attention.  
Finally, administrative systems (including detail changes, feedback forms, and 
secondary care information forms) all demonstrated important problems that impacted 
how non-binary identified individuals went about or could negotiate existing medical 
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practice. It is imperative to note that the heterogeneity of experiences in primary 
medical care will depend upon factors such as whether an individual is ‘passing’ 
deliberately as the gender they were assigned at birth, whether they are regularly 
misgendered and how this affects them, whether they wish to access a GIC, and how 
much experience an individual has with negotiating interactions with the clinic since 
articulating a transgender identity. Such factors also play an undeniable role in the 
negotiation of secondary/tertiary care at GICs, as the next chapter will explore.   
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Chapter 7 – Ticking the Legitimising Boxes? Non-Binary Perceptions of Gender 
Identity Clinics 
“I did once express how I was feeling confused about my gender… 
and they promptly withdrew my diagnosis,” “any sign of ambivalence is 
used as an excuse to delay your transition,” “the fact that I confidently 
voiced uncertainty about my gender with the doctor meant that he 
didn’t take my trans-ness seriously.” This particular issue was even 
more acute for those who did not define unequivocally as male or 
female. 
(Ellis et al., 2015, pp. 12-13) 
Introduction 
There exists a wide body of literature addressing access to medical services for gender 
transition (Dewey, 2013; 2008; Obedin-Maliver et al., 2011; Feldman and Goldberg, 
2006; Keller, 1999). Whilst much of this literature was reviewed across chapters one 
and two, there is a significant lack of empirical sociological consideration of non-binary 
experiences of GICs, which this chapter addresses through attention to participant 
perceptions.  
Echoing the opening of chapter six, this chapter first reports participant views of 
secondary and tertiary care. This includes the perceptions of those non-binary 
participants who have yet to, or do not intend to access such services, as well as 
individual’s views on how non-binary communities as a whole perceive secondary and 
tertiary gender-related care in the UK. I follow by considering experiences had by non-
binary people under the care of NHS-run UK GICs, and private medical care. These 
experiences relate to accessing gender affirming medical services, such as HRT and 
surgeries that are desired in relation to gender. 
Non-Binary Views of Medical Practice Related to Gender Transition 
There was a strong sense of agreement among participants that avoiding any mention 
of non-binary, or claiming a binary identification, would be their best tactical option for 
obtaining access to gender affirming treatments as quickly and easily as possible. This 
is supported in chapter four by Frankie’s (25) discussion of her primary physician 
explicitly positioning binary transgender people as ‘easier to treat’ than non-binary trans 
people. In considering how he would communicate at his first GIC appointment, Jamie 
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(24) noted in his diary that “I’m just gonna tell them I’m not female; that’s not a lie”. He 
went on to say that: 
I haven’t learned anything about their attitudes to non-binary people 
that would convince me to do differently than bend the truth to the max. 
(Jamie, 24, diary) 
That Jamie ‘hadn’t learned anything different’ reminds of the common behaviour 
among trans people looking to access GICs to seek out as much information as 
possible, in relation to what to expect from their practitioners – from both NHS and 
community sources. The reasons why participants felt that even GIC specialist 
physicians were poorly equipped to address their needs sensitively were most often 
rooted in what individuals had gathered from the wider community, broadly similar to 
views participants had of physician trans sensitivity in chapter six: 
I have had it expressed that some doctors are completely blind in this 
area, especially for transitioning, whilst others are more open to it, 
because they’re just… for some reason, especially with doctors who 
are in an area of transitioning, they don’t even know anything about 
that. They always give the wrong gender, say the wrong things… but 
they work in that area. (Zesty, 22, interview) 
Zesty indicates the concern that when specialist doctors working with gender make 
language-based mistakes concerning names and pronouns, trans people accessing 
GICs generally are disheartened and doubt the clinician’s expert status. This is 
because of how validating and respectful use of language is positioned as both 
fundamental and not particularly difficult by the trans community. The importance of 
such social interaction is a significant difference from other examples of tertiary care, 
where the doctor’s expert status would be unlikely to be undermined by the language 
they use. Due to the now heavily interconnected nature of the trans community, many 
accounts of GICs are within intimate interpersonal networks, rather than from 
anonymous or unknown sources, which may be deemed less reliable. Reports from 
trusted friends of inadequate experiences of healthcare are more likely to be taken 
seriously, and negatively impact the reputation of GICs. Community solidarity thus 
means scepticism of positive practice is more likely than scepticism of negative reports 
of doctors from other transgender people, as with negative experiences of primary care 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
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Because of the sense within trans communities of both ignorance and insufficient 
nuance in the medical practice at GICs, the desire to perform the role of the good 
patient (Lorber, 1975) is explicit; the good patient in this context being the individual 
who unproblematically matches prior precedent for treatment, which fits within the 
gender binary and clinician expectations. Further, as in other medical contexts, patients 
must perform the sick role (in this case, fulfilling the practitioner’s view of ‘trans’), as 
introduced in chapter one.  
Stewart and Sullivan (1982) explain how in the context of many chronic illnesses “the 
entire illness behavior process appears to be characterized by definitional and role 
clarity, consensus and harmony. It is proposed that, in contrast, when physicians have 
difficulties diagnosing and treating an illness, as is the case in multiple sclerosis and 
many other chronic illnesses, the entire process is more problematic. The situation is 
less normatively controlled and as a result, social dissensus and disharmony are likely 
to occur” (Stewart and Sullivan, 1982, p. 1397). Therefore, it is not simply good patient 
behaviour that individuals feel compelled to perform, but narratives that allow them to 
be positioned as patients. As already established, binary and non-binary trans identities 
are not chronic illnesses; the value in conceptual comparisons lie in how medical 
treatment pathways model and address them similarly. 
Mark (43) highlighted in his diary how this can lead to internal negotiations and 
performance of gender which can lean towards gender stereotypes: 
The trouble is we soon learn how to jump through hoops. To be 
accepted as a trans man, one is expected (and not just by the 
medical/psychological people) to be a man. Be A Man. And it isn’t just 
the outside world, either. Our internal censor tells us that if we aren’t 
women, then there’s only one alternative…  
 
Figure 15: Stylised drawing of the word ‘man’, from Mark’s diary. 
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By switching from his typical handwriting to draw out the large, angular, capitalised and 
monolithic ‘MAN’, Mark is highlighting his view that to most successfully ‘jump through 
hoops’, that is, successfully fulfil the expectations of the GIC to be found to be in need 
of gender affirming medical services, simply proclaiming one’s gender identity with 
confidence and certainty is not enough. The stylisation highlights the difference 
between being a ‘man’ and being a ‘MAN’, the implication being that the latter 
embodies a desire to fulfil hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). Such reflections 
from Mark resonate with Foucault’s ‘technologies of power’ (Deetz, 1997; Foucault, 
1988), whereby individuals submit their conduct to a particular end, on the basis of an 
unequal dynamic with others. In other health contexts, such as the diagnosis of CFS 
(Chronic Fatigue Syndrome), “a diagnosis is a legitimacy awarded to those who are 
easily medicalized” (Clarke and James, 2003, p. 1389). In the context of gender, 
attaining such validation may be thought to be (or found to be) more likely if one 
positions oneself as undeniable as possible through hegemonic behaviour reproduction, 
producing a ‘supernormal self’ (Rinken, 2000) by exceeding the gendered demands 
made of cis people. The epistemological primacy afforded to genitals at birth in 
situating gender means that greater deviation from norms can be seen in cis people’s 
presentation and behaviour without the ‘truth’ of their genders being brought into 
question.  
It is also clear that Mark recognises such gendered policing as problematic. His method 
of highlighting his view (that hegemonic masculine presentation and attitudes are 
somewhat expected from individuals assigned female at birth) is presented humorously, 
with the literal ‘GRRRRR!!’ parodying and ridiculing rigid gender expectations of 
manhood. Importantly this is not simply directed at clinical practitioners, but also at “our 
internal sensor”. Mark is here expressing his view that the synergy between not 
wanting to be read as how one was assigned at birth, together with doubt or refusal of 
acceptance from others, and the corresponding insecurity and instability this can 
produce, can lead to over-compensation in order to legitimise oneself as trans.  
Finally, even whilst Mark’s non-binary identification is such that he felt the desire for 
inclusion within this project, his view of accessing the GIC makes no mention of this, 
and was entirely in binary terms – supporting the notion that binarised gender 
enactment in the clinic is common, and frequently viewed as necessary among non-
binary people. An alternative possibility for some (as earlier discussion of the ‘stepping 
stone process’ intimated in chapter five) is that non-binary identification may be self-
conceptualised after medical transition has already been successfully accessed. Jamie 
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immediately made reference to ‘what one heard’ from the trans community, in 
reference to their view of non-binary experiences of GICs in comparison to binary trans 
people: 
From what you hear, and this is internet communities now, more 
disbelief, more suspicion, more concern over trans regret. There 
seems to be the assumption that non-binary people just aren’t sure, 
that being non-binary means an unstable identity. (Jamie, 24, interview) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the positionality of non-binary as unstable, liminal, 
or ‘in-between’ male and female (Wilson, 2002; Herdt, 1993) means that the societal 
pressure to fit within the gender binary is an important differentiating point between 
binary and non-binary transgender identity negotiation. Binary trans people can, in 
particular ways, still experience this, for example, those who have difficulty ‘passing’ in 
their identified gender and are stigmatised as a result. However, the desire to be 
viewed as a man or a woman is inherently more intelligible, even as any trans status at 
all can still be problematically positioned by some as outside of being ‘really’ male or 
female (Roen, 2002; Billings and Urban, 1982). 
Jess builds on the suggestions that Mark makes regarding expectations (and evidence) 
of the clinic responding better to more normative articulations of gender: 
In order to get access to these medical treatments, you have to 
conform to cisnormative standards of beauty, you have to conform to 
cisnormative standards of masculinity and femininity. It often becomes 
a competition of who can fulfil these roles in the quickest and most 
attractive way. Even if you’re a binary trans person that’s how it works. 
Even if you’re non-binary it becomes like a mini version of that. Who 
can perform these roles in those ways, but be with a kind of slightly 
sense of edginess which is actually just like a very small socially 
acceptable dissent from that. But actually there’s no real dissent. 
Within the non-binary community, these kind of norms, these kind of 
individualising competitive nature of the trans community which really 
does… which comes from above obviously, but really does undermine 
our community, our sense of solidarity, our ability to provide mutual aid 
and mutual support for each other. (Jess, 26, interview) 
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The current medical system relies upon the clinical judgement and assessment of 
secondary and tertiary care physicians, whereby a diagnosis of gender dysphoria must 
be ascertained before an individual can access hormones or surgeries. Jess’s account 
emphasises her view that this system cannot and does not take account of the socially 
constructed manner in which physicians can harbour gender expectations and 
(conscious or unconscious) biases towards ratifying some experiences of gender over 
others. This can also been seen in the context of CFS, where the material evidence of 
the condition may be disputed. Subsequently, the culturally and temporally specific 
meanings of illness are reflected in practice, so as to discredit lived experiences, and 
disconfirm the possibility of diagnosis (Ware, 1992). Evidence of this can be seen, as 
an example, in the published account of non-binary patients by Dr. James Barrett, a 
lead clinician and consultant psychiatrist at the Charing Cross Gender Identity Clinic in 
London. Barrett summarises non-binary individuals seeking gender affirming medical 
services by saying: 
These patients are very uncommon, and accordingly remain 
mysterious. They seem mostly to be female, and to have either a poor 
ability at (or perhaps a low interest in) interpersonal relationships. 
Certainly, there seems not to be any sexual motivation in what they 
seek. Patients of this sort nearly all had rather cold, schizoid, 
personalities. They have tended to lack humour. Two have been fluent 
in psychological-sounding jargon, yet were unable to draw abstract 
meaning from a common proverb. It is unclear whether there is benefit 
in acquiescing to these patients' requests. Certainly, the numbers are 
so small that there is not even a clinical impression of prognosis. It 
might perhaps by best to comply with the wishes of a group of four or 
five such patients (on the strict understanding that they accept that a 
good outcome can be in no way guaranteed), and then to declare a 
moratorium on all others until the first four or five have been followed 
up for at least 5 years (Barrett, 2007, p. 43). 
It is of course important to note that such views may have evolved, as the visibility of 
non-binary people has increased extensively in the nine years since this stance was 
published. However, the availability of such an assessment of non-binary identification, 
easily accessible through the internet, means that non-binary people may judge this as 
supporting negative accounts reported by other members of the trans community.  
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Barrett here illustrates a pathologising and othering approach through the language 
used to describe his non-binary patients. There has also been historical precedent by 
which attempts have been made to subcategorise (in hierarchical terms) transgender 
people, such as the demarcation of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ transsexuality (Person 
and Ovesey, 1974a; Person and Ovesey, 1974b), and differentiation on the basis of 
sexuality, such as with the conceptualisation of autogynephilia (Blanchard, 1993; 
1989b). Even in the contemporary landscape, it is likely that clinical attempts to 
estimate the proportion of patients who are non-binary will be too low, given the 
likelihood that some of the non-binary population completely obscure or otherwise 
resist divulging their non-binary gender identities. 
Such conceptualisation of trans identification has been extensively critiqued and 
dismantled (Baril and Trevenen, 2014; Serano, 2010; Ware, 2010; Campbell and 
I’Anson, 2007; Eber, 1982). No recognition is given to the potentiality of such 
theorisations (‘transsexualism as ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’, or autogynephilia) as 
problematic within Barrett’s work. Joy Diane Shaffer positions such work centred 
around demarcation and explanation as illustrative of how “academic physicians and 
psychologists were often more interested in validating their own theories of the 
aetiology of transsexualism than in helping transsexuals to live happier lives” (Shaffer, 
in Israel and Tarver II, 1997, p. xi).  
Jess’s point is that, for as long as roles must be performed in order to access gender 
affirming medical services, a hierarchy will favour those able to fulfil the expectations 
and desires of physicians. Whilst normative roles are performed by patients generally 
seeking all kinds of treatments, a non-binary identity inherently positions an individual 
as non-normative. The medical culture of normalisation therefore inherently and 
fundamentally disadvantage anyone with a non-binary identity seeking transition 
services. Whilst changes in social and clinical norms regarding how trans people are 
conceptualised shows that “boundaries of normality can be fluid” (Tishelman and 
Sachs, 1998, p. 48), the lack of clear diagnoses for non-binary people at this time 
troubles the ability to source legitimising discourse from medical professionals. 
Conversely, the increasing challenge non-binary people pose to existing medical 
models encourages professional shifts, such as the revisions to diagnostic manuals.  
Connection between Jess’s views of trans people needing to conform to “cisnormative 
standards of masculinity and femininity” together with Dr. Barrett’s distain at his 
patients being “fluent in psychological-sounding jargon” can be made with an 
experience that Jamie recounted:  
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So for example I read a horror story really, recently about someone 
online who’d seen a private gender clinic and been told ‘oh you seem 
very feminine, (someone who identifies as male) I think people have 
way too much access to information about being trans now, it confuses 
people…’ this is all the stuff that I’m scared about [a doctor saying]. 
Pretty much every time I think about it, try to sleep actually, I start 
thinking ‘god what will they ask me’, how will I strike a balance 
between telling the truth and making sure they think I’m trans enough 
to get treatment? So that involves lying about when I realised it. 
Overemphasising some aspects of my past which I wouldn’t 
emphasise that much, unless I knew that they kind of ticked 
legitimating boxes. (Jamie, 24, interview) 
Here we anecdotally see a physician specialising in gender identity services (though 
working privately) voicing the opinion that “people have way too much access to 
information about being trans now”. This is indicative of the view by some doctors that 
it is (and should be) the role of the physician to diagnose an individual’s ‘gender 
condition’, and that their judgement is more reliable and authoritative than the patient’s. 
This can be understood as a response from doctors to symptoms that are unverifiable, 
and depend entirely upon patient self-reporting. Such a reliance challenges the ubiquity 
of medical control, and inspires mistrust – as seen in the self-reporting of pain by 
patients in prison diagnosed with cancer, and physician suspicion of exaggeration of 
pain as part of drug-seeking behavior (Lin and Mathew, 2005). Whilst illustrating the 
conundrum for practitioners of how to trust self-reporting from patients, the unique 
example of transgender identification can be fundamentally demarcated due to being a 
question of agency over desired embodied change being legitimised, rather than 
treatment of pathology (or the subversion of medical resources under such a claim).   
NHS England adopted the current interim protocol from NHS Scotland in 2013. This 
interim has yet to be updated after over three years, demonstrating how the 
development of protocol and best practice guidelines is, as it stands, too slow, as well 
as problematic in attempting to view gender identity in an essentialised and reductionist 
manner. The physician’s view amounts to a desire for greater passivity in patients, and 
greater deference to physicians’ decision making rather than having to address 
complaints and challenges from expert patient (Taylor and Bury, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; 
Donaldson, 2003; Prior, 2003) members of the trans community.  
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A physician-dominated power dynamic is also implied by the view that there is a lack of 
transparency in GIC practices toward the trans community. Jamie expressed that:  
Jamie: Well nobody knows what the medical community thinks, and 
that’s one of the major problems. We have no idea what they think of 
us. 
Ben: Do you think that scares people? 
Jamie: Yes, very much. There’s no transparency, we said before about 
waiting lists, there’s no transparency about that, about what happens 
at appointments, or the attitudes of different clinics. (Jamie, 24, 
interview) 
This lack of transparency may be linked to notions in the medical community that such 
information would make it even easier for trans people to perform an expected gender 
role. When Dr. Montgomery, former Clinic Director of Charing Cross GIC, was asked at 
the Third International Gender Dysphoria Conference his view on patients prepared to 
“do virtually anything” to access treatment, his response was “if you are prepared to lie 
to get it, then you can’t expect the co-operation of psychiatrists” (Montgomery, 1994, no 
pagination). The age of this quotation means that it is important to recognise significant 
developments in practitioner attitudes over the past twenty-two years. However, this 
quotation does further contextualise the historical tension between transgender 
patients and gatekeeping practitioners – that access to services must be ‘earned by 
good behaviour’. Further, it illustrates how practitioners can deem it appropriate to 
essentially ‘punish’ ‘dishonest’ patients through the denial of service, rather than 
appreciating the social factors that yield patients who feel unable to be entirely candid. 
Once again, this is the employment of gatekeeping practices in retaliation for breach of 
one of Parson’s (1951) sick role criteria – that one is expected to cooperate passively 
with medical professionals to be granted sick role status.  
Pig was very clear that whilst they would ideally like to access a GIC, they were 
unwilling so long as the system continued in its current form: 
With gender services, I would totally be up for talking to people about 
how I feel because I want it to be on record that I exist, however I don’t 
wanna have to pay for the privilege of it, or have to be patronised by 
some middle aged heterosexual wanker with a massive ego. (Pig, 30, 
diary) 
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This also raises a further element of GIC appointments – that non-binary individuals 
have the extra dimension of potentially feeling validated through ‘being on record that 
they exist’. This could be experienced as exciting, or conversely as a burden or 
pressure. This is in addition to the potential to be disheartened by non-binary erasure 
within medical practice. Jess agreed with Pig’s implication that GIC appointments do 
not necessarily centralise the non-binary service user’s experience under current 
practices: 
I’m not really convinced that medical practitioners have non-binary 
peoples’ interests at heart. And again that’s why people end up getting 
spewed out of the NHS system and de-transitioning, because they’re 
forced into binary pathways. I think private doctors are much better at 
non-binary issues. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Whilst private physicians are still bound to ethical practices of care, the interplay that 
may occur between NHS doctors and protocol (be that refusal to act outside of protocol 
guidelines, or the potential for patients to challenge for going outside of guideline 
recommendations) is not present. As appointments are paid for, it is possible for private 
consultations to be considerably faster as there are no waiting lists as there are for 
NHS clinic appointments67. Thus Jess indicates a view that there is a discrepancy 
between private and NHS transition oriented care, indicating how in her view, NHS 
guidelines may be more problematic than beneficial. This may be connected to the 
conceptual shift of patients to consumers (Hall and Schneider, 2008; Hardey, 2001), 
and doctors as facilitators of choice rather than gatekeepers to resources (Tummers et 
al., 2013).  
Private medical practice generally (rather than specifically in the context of transgender 
care) has been criticised in terms of potentially engaging in excessive diagnoses and 
investigations in order to drive up costs, to the practitioner’s benefit (Bhat, 1999). This 
does not translate well into the context of transgender care however, as patients are 
not ‘told what they need’ by clinicians, but either make the requests directly, or 
undertake a process of negotiating what they feel they need (such as through a course 
of psychotherapy). Whilst private healthcare is costly, it does have the benefit of 
avoiding the extensive GIC waiting times that are a central point of criticism and 
                                            
67 Anecdotal accounts of private gender clinic appointments indicate that a first meeting 
can be accessed within several weeks of first contact, with follow-up appointments 
occurring at intervals of several months.  
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frustration within trans communities. More specifically to non-binary individuals, Jess’s 
sense that private doctors are much better than NHS doctors may be due to feeling 
that binarised gendered performance is not (as) necessary in such contexts, as self-
funding re-contextualises the power relationship between service-user and clinician. 
The growth of private healthcare further underscores the discursive shift towards 
patients as consumers and doctors as facilitators of choice.  
Whilst NHS guidelines require that gender dysphoria be “persistent and well-
documented” (NHS England, 2013, p. 15) for hormones to be prescribed, Jamie 
expressed anxiety at the idea of interacting with clinicians who may ask for information 
to determine the legitimacy of his desire for gender affirming medical interventions. 
Jamie expounded on this in their diary: 
There is such a trust issue between the trans community and the 
medical community. No love lost. Everything I read tells me they’re out 
to trip me up, to prove I don’t really want it and haven’t thought it 
through; that they start from a position of disbelief. (Jamie, 24, diary, 
underline original) 
This trust issue that Jamie mentions can be conceptualised ‘both ways’, in that the 
transgender community are very wary of being pathologised or denied by medical 
gatekeepers, whilst doctors (such as the physician discussed by Jamie who expressed 
their belief that too much knowledge is available) can be concerned that individuals, 
who may think they are trans but may later have regrets, will use available discourses 
to ‘trick’ doctors into providing inappropriate treatments.  
One of the reasons why NHS doctors are not very good on non-binary 
issues is because they’re worried basically that non-binary people are 
confused, might de-transition, might come back and sue, or that they 
don’t understand these issues enough. So often it’s a sense of 
covering their own backs really. (Jess, 26, interview) 
Jess’s view here can be connected to how, through the hegemonic nature of 
cisnormativity, there is a sense among some practitioners that the purpose of 
gatekeeping is to protect individuals from inappropriate treatment. This positions ‘not 
requiring treatment’ as the baseline for patient scrutiny and, in doing so, makes the 
assumption that denial of treatment is the ‘safer’ route. Further, under such a system, 
experiences of regret from trans people may be manifested in malpractice cases, such 
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that it is in the doctor’s personal interest to be conservative with treatment 
recommendation. This helps contextualise why there is a modicum of consensus 
among participants that adjusting one’s narrative to more neatly align with narratives of 
trans people who have already successfully navigated treatment access through a GIC.  
In Alex’s diary, they discussed their potential plans for the future regarding GIC access, 
and in the process articulated some of their views: 
I’m thinking I might look into if I can earn enough to use some [money] 
on seeing a private gender clinic. The waiting list for NHS is currently 3 
years on Leeds, and from what I’ve read online they don’t have a great 
reputation for being helpful or easy to work with, especially if you’re not 
someone who strongly and constantly projects the gender norms that 
they want. Which I probably won’t – because even though I’d like to 
access testosterone, I do have a lot of ‘feminine’ interests… and 
sometimes I still cross my legs when I sit – it’s pretty comfortable. 
(Alex, 20, diary) 
Alex here explicitly demonstrates their agreement with Jess’s view that treatment 
access depends upon the ability and willingness to fulfil expectations rooted in 
normativity rather than clinical necessity. They also illustrate a sense of being 
disciplined into the production of a supernormal self, seen through how Alex positions 
‘feminine interests’ and ‘crossing legs’ when sitting as factors which, they feel, could 
place clinical doubt onto their claim of not being female. There was also the sense, as 
from Jess, that private treatment is preferable. The extent of Alex’s sense that they 
would struggle to find the clinic “helpful or easy to work with” may have extended into 
hypercorrection, as they indicate they feel even crossing their legs might affect a GIC 
appointment. Whilst such scrutiny did demonstrably take place to this extent in the past 
(Stoller, 1964), clinics are keen to explicitly state that judgements will not be made on 
factors such as clothing or sexuality (Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation 
Trust, 2016a).  
There have been a large number of claims of improper practice towards trans service 
users in relation to gender, at the GIC level as well as primary care. This was 
encapsulated to some extent by the creation of a ‘Trans Doc Fail’ hashtag on Twitter in 
January 2013, where over 1000 individuals posted to highlight negative experiences. A 
follow-up survey was then created, prompting many of these individuals to formally 
report their experiences to the General Medical Council (GMC). This was summarised 
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in a report by Helen Belcher, one of the transgender activists most centrally involved 
(Belcher, 2014). The GMC indicated that they wished to investigate 39 of the 98 survey 
cases anonymously presented to them, with it particularly noteworthy that 63% of 
complainants had not voiced dissatisfaction through any route before – implying that 
clinical feedback may fail to reflect the number and extent of negative experiences. The 
reasons given for this included fear of treatment being withheld or withdrawn, lack of 
emotional resources to complain, and feeling intimidated.  
This evidence suggests that transgender people not only adjust their behaviour to fit 
with the perceived expectations of GICs, but will also avoid challenging or disrupting 
physician behaviour they find unsatisfactory. Lack of clinical precedence of non-binary-
specific narratives, and overarching cultural unintelligibility are additional potential 
barriers to clinical access for non-binary services users that do not impact binary 
transgender people. Therefore, whilst non-binary and binary transgender people 
experience great overlap in their reasons for negative GIC experiences, there are 
challenges sourced in the particularity of how non-binary is symbolically interpreted by 
clinicians. When asking Alex about their actions and intentions in the follow-up 
interview, they went into greater detail: 
I’ve been trying to see the gender identity service, and I am basically 
preparing to lie to them, because I know that they have certain criteria. 
You know, you have to have ‘socially transitioned’ and changed your 
name, and all that nonsense, so I’m preparing to almost lie to get 
access to what I need to […] I know from talking to people and reading 
people’s experiences that doesn’t tend to go down as well with the 
gender identity services. So I’ve said I’m probably going to just be like 
‘yeah, no, I’m just a man, just a man, just give me hormones’ because 
I think that’s honestly going to be the easiest way to do it. (Alex, 20, 
interview) 
The most recent criteria that Alex could be referencing are the Interim NHS England 
Gender Dysphoria Protocol and Service Guidelines 2013/14 (NHS England, 2013). 
However, the criteria for the prescription of hormone therapy do not formally require 
name change, or social transition. Indeed, the guidelines specifically state “there is no 
requirement for the patient to have commenced a social role transition before a 
recommendation is made for hormone therapy” (NHS England, 2013, p. 15). Social role 
transition is required prior to accessing genital reassignment surgery. There is a 
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significant lack of formal research regarding whether NHS physicians place demands 
on patients in addition to those within NHS protocols, prior to provision of treatment. 
Berg (1998) discusses how because protocols function as tools which restrict the 
autonomy of doctors’ decision making in practice, they may be resisted as 
‘bureaucratic’ or ‘political’. Therefore the existence of protocols and good practice 
guidelines do not necessarily guarantee the standardisation of medical practice.  
This is significant in relation to non-binary gender identity, because of the lack of 
meaning behind “living in the gender role that is congruent with the individual’s gender 
identity” (NHS England, 2013, p. 19) when one considers non-binary people. Whilst 
deconstruction of the concept of gender roles can allow this policy to be problematized 
even when applied to binary trans men and women, there is no obvious way it can be 
implemented in relation to non-binary people, as no ‘non-binary gender role’ is socially 
conceived. Further, current criteria indicate that GICs send a letter of recommendation 
to the service user’s GP, who is ultimately responsible for the prescription of hormones. 
As the prescribing physician is ultimately held responsible, the potential for misgivings 
in primary physicians is likely greater when confronted with any individual (whether 
binary or non-binary identified) if they present in a manner that challenges transgender 
narratives that have been positioned as typical.  
Frankie’s personal development highlights how the demands made of trans people to 
fulfil gender roles may make it more difficult for individuals with particular gender 
(transgressive) expressions to access some treatments. She says that: 
I was never comfortable expressing masculinity from a male-bodied 
perspective. But since there have been changes going on, with my 
body, with my psychology and my frame of mind I’ve found it really, 
really comfortable to start exploring my masculinity. (Frankie, 25, 
interview) 
The vagueness around what a ‘gender role’ is in a clinical context, or how different 
practitioners may subjectively interpret this aspect of protocol, leaves open the 
potential ambiguity for feminine trans men (or AFAB non-binary people) or masculine 
trans women (or AMAB non-binary people) to be found to be lacking the clinical criteria 
for genital surgery in particular, if desired. There is little available evidence that 
suggests clinics are explicitly aware of, and sensitive to, trans people whose desired 
presentation, expression, and identity exploration are not rooted in the ‘opposite’ 
position to the gender they were assigned at birth.  
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Minimisation or erasure of non-binary identification was not the only mode of resistance 
expressed, however. In Jamie’s diary, he made mention of: 
[Friend], who’s been given a three-year wait at [clinic], is basically 
attempting to blackmail the NHS into giving him hormones sooner by 
writing a letter that says “I am going to start taking random hormones 
I’ve bought off the internet which will be super risky for me, so I am 
asking for a bridging prescription in accordance with your harm 
reduction protocol”. If it works, he’s going to put the text online for trans 
people everywhere to use, and we will break the NHS together or 
something… (Jamie, 24, diary)  
This illustrates how many members of the trans community have expert knowledge of 
the relevant guidelines and protocols, as this strategy utilises aspects of the Good 
Practice Guidelines for the assessment and treatment of adults with gender dysphoria 
(Wylie et al., 2014). The guidelines indicate the necessity of medical practitioners to 
consider risks of harm in not prescribing hormones; highlighting the suggestion made 
by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s (WPATH) standards of 
care (Coleman et al., 2012) of a ‘bridging’ hormone prescription whilst awaiting further 
assessment. The importance of community is also illustrated by the fact that the 
individual proposing this resistance to gatekeeping wishes to share the tactic with 
others, in order to challenge what is viewed as a problematic access restriction. 
Jamie’s facetious positioning of this “break[ing] the NHS” is not hostile to the NHS itself 
(on which the trans population is largely dependent). Rather, this phrasing can be 
interpreted as ‘breaking’ the problematic removal of trans agency regarding 
embodiment.  
It is important to also note that views of GICs were not exclusively negative, which will 
be seen more extensively in accounts from those participants who have first-hand 
experience of gender identity clinics in the next section. However, positive comments 
were given, with caveats of the concerns already discussed.  
Some doctors are really quite good in championing the cause, I can 
think of John Dean, the head of NHS England’s gender services, and 
he’s pretty good really for non-binary stuff. He runs the Laurels, which 
is probably the best gender identity clinic for non-binary people. But 
he’s definitely one extreme, and the vast majority of gender identity 
clinicians are either ambivalent or actively antagonistic towards non-
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binary people, in terms of either seeing it as a phase, or not really 
understanding it. I think there are huge problems with non-binary 
people who need to access healthcare who don’t conform to people’s 
binary ideas of what gender should be. So as a non-binary person, I 
would be still more likely to get healthcare if I presented wearing a 
dress, if I changed my name to a girl’s name… I do have a girl’s name, 
but if I did a whole bunch of stuff which is essentially conforming to a 
binary gender. I think what they’re looking for is they’re okay with you 
maybe presenting as non-binary if you essentially tick their boxes of 
what a binary trans person looks like with maybe a little bit of 
acceptable ‘edginess’. But if you aren’t interested in changing your 
name, if you aren’t interested in adopting clothes associated with the 
‘opposite’ gender I think you undergo quite a lot of heavy policing. 
(Jess, 26, interview) 
In comparison to Alex’s earlier discussion of lived experience and name change, Jess 
articulates the view that heavy policing can be expected. This was on the basis of her 
experiences of providing trans sensitivity training to medical staff, familiarity with 
medical policy, and, as with many of the participants of this research, extensive 
networks with many other members of the non-binary trans community. Whilst some of 
the participants whose general views have been discussed have personal experience 
of accessing secondary and tertiary care in relation to gender, many do not (as also 
highlighted by some individual’s discussions of their future intentions). The following 
section will focus on individual accounts, allowing for comparison and contrast with 
these more general articulations. Such a demarcation allows for difference to be 
identified between those who have interacted with tertiary care services directly, and 
those who have interacted only with the discourses around services that exist within 
trans communities.  
Non-Binary Service Users’ Experiences of Gender Affirming Medical Practice 
Some of the participants in this study had a history of hormone prescriptions and/or 
having accessed gender affirming surgical interventions. Because of the significant 
lengths of time accessing such medical services takes and the relatively small size of 
the sample, none of the participants accessed surgeries or hormones for the first time 
during the diary-keeping period. Even when access has proceeded smoothly for 
individuals, there was a recurrence of emphasis on having been ‘lucky’ or ‘particularly 
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fortunate’ that this was the case. When asked his thoughts on the medical communities’ 
interactions with the transgender community, Mark said: 
They’re terribly scared of us! In my experience, which I appreciate isn’t 
universal, I haven’t had any horrendous… you hear really awful stories, 
like, oh god… but that hasn’t happened to me, I’ve been fortunate. 
(Mark, 43, interview) 
Personal positive experiences, or at least absence of significantly negative experiences, 
did not mean that individuals saw GICs as working unproblematically for the trans 
population overall. Ricky also highlights their awareness of disability intersection, as 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Whilst unable to explain the relative rapidity 
of their treatment access (which further emphasises the lack of transparency in GIC 
access as raised by Jamie in the previous section), Ricky did go into more detail about 
their case as being ‘simplistic’ from a clinical perspective, as explained in chapter four. 
The explanation which Ricky gave of their experience being “surprisingly easy” was the 
ease with which their requests, from a physician’s standpoint, could be conceived 
within the gender binary (matching that of a binary transgender man).  
That the clinic was very respectful of Ricky’s pronouns, both in interpersonal 
interactions and when making notes on identity in writing, demonstrates both the 
capacity and precedent for clinical sensitivity in response to non-binary referrals. This 
runs contrary to the concerns of participants who had yet to attend, or did not wish to 
attend the GIC. This does not, however, allow an assessment to be made as to the 
consistency across different clinics, or between the relative attitudes and approaches of 
individual clinicians. Indeed, clinical inconsistency is demonstrable, with 
Northamptonshire GIC having previously stated: 
At present this service is not commissioned to provide treatment for 
persons not identifying as male or female... We would not decline a 
referral, as assessment and formulation of an individual's gender 
disorder may be more complicated than it appears to the referrer or 
indeed the service user.  We may still be able to signpost an individual 
to another service. (Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation 
Trust, 2014, no pagination) 
However, this was brought to the attention of the NHS England Gender Task and 
Finish Group, who took this up with the trust as incorrect, resulting in removal of this 
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text from the GIC website (Huxter, 2016). As Ricky emphasises, their treatment needs 
were met in a manner indistinguishable from some binary trans men. Given that there 
is a lack of empirical difference between the services offered to and accessed by binary 
and non-binary transgender people, this raises the question of what is meant when the 
service positioned itself as ‘not commissioned to treat non-binary people’. One potential 
explanation is that due to the ubiquity of the gender binary in the vast majority of 
discourses, commissioning documentation is likely to make no specific reference to the 
possibility of identification outside of the framework of male and female. That clinical 
exclusion may be based in policy, given that it is not based in medical possibility, is 
particularly emphasised by the willingness of other Gender Identity Clinics to provide 
treatment for explicitly non-binary people.  
Frankie has this dimension to add: 
My experience so far with gender identity clinics has been absolutely 
fine – other than the hideously long wait for appointments. (Frankie, 25, 
diary) 
The significance of waiting times for GICs is an issue that impacts both binary and non-
binary transgender people. NHS England confirmed in January 2015 that “NHS 
England agrees that people accessing gender identity services have a legal right under 
the NHS Constitution to be seen within 18 weeks of referral” (Jeavons, 2015, p. 3). 
Freedom of information requests have been made to the seven adult and one youth 
GIC services in England, four adult and one youth services in Scotland, and one adult 
and one youth services in Northern Ireland in order to establish how many patients 
have been referred to each, and their respective waiting times. For the period of August 
to October 2015 (the most recent available), the average waiting times for a first 
appointment in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland were 44 weeks, 40 weeks, and 
11 weeks respectively, with a 38 week average (UK Trans Info, 2016, p. 4). In addition, 
there has also been a UK-wide increase in adult waiting lists by 12% (UK Trans Info, 
2016, p. 6) and a 19% increase in patients waiting longer than 18 weeks for a first 
appointment (UK Trans Info, 2016, p. 7). This clearly demonstrates how the 
perceptions of long waiting times are empirically verified and not a simple case of an 
unfortunate minority, but the systemic inability of GICs in their current state to operate 
within the NHS constitution. Whilst this is a problem across different medical services, it 
is particularly normalised, expected, and occurrent within the context of GICs. 
221 
 
 
 
The examples in the previous section of participant concerns and plans of how to 
interact within the GIC are vindicated by the descriptions given of interactions by those 
who have already achieved access. Whilst not highlighting problems with GIC staff, 
Mark did say: 
I get my treatment on the NHS, so there is a strong motivation to tick 
the boxes, say what I ‘need’ to say, and then bugger off to be who I 
wanna be. (Mark, 43, diary) 
Mark clearly demarcates ‘who he wants to be’ from how he puts himself across in a 
clinical context – and given that, as a non-binary person, he has negotiated his 
healthcare without major incident, furthers the precedent to other non-binary people 
that engaging similarly can work. This, however, does not take into account the 
heterogeneity of the non-binary population. Whilst obscuring or erasing non-binary 
identification for the sake of access is a viable tactic for some individuals, for others this 
may potentially cause similar distress as other experiences of being misgendered. 
Whilst some participants (who used singular they as their pronoun) explicitly made 
mention that being misgendered with the gender they were assigned at birth is 
considerably more distressing, and that being misgendered as the ‘opposite’ to their 
assignation could even potentially feel positive, this cannot be generalised.   
Frankie discussed her experiences of being out as non-binary within the GIC context, 
and how that was responded to in some detail: 
I’ve been reasonably open about my non-binary-ness from day 1 I 
think, though always used to talk about it within a binary framework. 
(Frankie, 25, diary) 
This statement can be compared to Jess’s critique that GICs will accept non-binary 
people “if you essentially tick their boxes of what a binary trans person looks like with 
maybe a little bit of acceptable edginess”. By utilising a ‘binary framework’ to articulate 
gender (such as through saying ‘I feel more female than male’) the doctor-patient 
interaction is managed, as Frankie has predicted that such an articulation will be more 
readily accepted. Whilst Frankie’s self-conceptualisation shifted to feeling more binary 
than non-binary over the course of the research, Frankie wrote explanations of her 
more personal preferences for gender label use: 
I’m quite happy with the term ‘non-binary’, though not with 
‘genderqueer’. I’m not sure why this is, I’m just one of those anomalies 
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who occupy a place in ‘queer’ communities but doesn’t like the word 
‘queer’ as a self-descriptor. For me I think it says both too much and 
not enough about my sexuality, regardless of whether it has the 
‘gender’ prefix. Other I.D. descriptors I’ve used in the past and 
occasionally return to are ‘androgyne’ (too binary in foundation), 
‘transfeminine’ (too feminine), ‘demigirl’ (sounds kind of inferior or ‘less 
than’), and very rarely ‘woman’ (WAY too complicated!). Recently I 
enjoy ‘tomboi’, ‘bemme’ (butch who’s occasionally femme), ‘hard 
femme’, and ‘riotgrrrl’, and am finding progressively more solace 
weirdly in ‘lesbian’ and ‘dyke’. (Frankie, 25, diary, underline and 
capitalisation original) 
Such flexible and thorough explanation of feelings in relation to identity labels was not 
expressed as something any participants felt comfortable to vocalise in the context of 
the GIC. In relation to some participant narratives this could be thought to result from 
anxieties in delays to or denial of treatment. However it is also important that whilst 
many binary and non-binary trans service users are confident of which services they 
need, others are not: 
When I first got to the GIC I didn’t necessarily want to access 
hormones straight away, I didn’t really know exactly what I wanted, I 
didn’t identify as male and that was a problem. So yeah it [a course of 
therapy] was kind of suggested by one of the therapists and I was like 
‘yeah cool that sounds great, try that’ and to be honest I feel like that 
was a really beneficial, positive experience. Compartmentalising a little 
bit, everything felt very muddled for a long time, and for a long time 
very hazy, it was very difficult to pinpoint what was going on, it helped 
me clarify things, compartmentalise, and work out how to move 
forward, it was brilliant. I can’t thank [name] enough in a lot of ways. 
He was a really great person to do that with, just a really good 
counsellor. (Frankie, 25, interview) 
Frankie’s account here points out how despite the general consensus of trans 
community voices highlighting the need for a reduction in gatekeeping practices and 
the need to challenge practitioners who operate from a position of ‘trying to identify if 
the patient needs protecting from an inappropriate intervention’, trans people also 
cannot be generalised to be expert patients, or necessarily self-assured of their needs. 
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Correspondingly, this does not justify clinical behaviour that disempowers or 
disenfranchises non-binary people of their identities. Frankie noted that of one of her 
physicians (rather than her counsellor): 
The thing I’ve noticed most is pronouns. He uses the pronouns he 
thinks are appropriate not that I think are appropriate. He originally 
used ‘he’, which was pretty uncomfortable. And I didn’t really realise 
this actually until I went abroad, when I go abroad, because I’ve got an 
F on my passport I usually take a couple of GIC letters just in case. 
Just anxiety really, just in case anyone stops me and questions it. 
When I recently went abroad I rifled through some of my GIC letters 
and noticed this, I hadn’t really noticed this before. (Frankie, 25, 
interview) 
This can be related back to Zesty’s earlier point, that despite not having been to a clinic 
themselves, they felt “they always give the wrong gender, say the wrong things… but 
they work in that area”. Despite how Frankie said that her clinical experience had been 
“absolutely fine”, she also said that “no-one wants to be at that fucking clinic any more 
than they need to be”. This shows that rather than universal clinical mistreatment, the 
alienation that trans people experience from the GIC, in practice, can be better 
understood and discussed in terms of the power dynamic between doctors and patients, 
which is structured by cisnormativity in practice – a lack of transparency, and 
inconsistency between different practitioners.  
Leon provided information that demonstrated that, despite existing protocol being 
argued for in terms of patient protection and the prevention of regrets, circumstances 
could arise where an individual with a history of hormone access could still be denied 
continued treatment. Leon explained how they first sought out treatment when living in 
America. Accessing a low dose of testosterone within the American healthcare system 
proved to be straightforward for them, however the prescription was recorded as being 
in relation to suffering from fatigue, which was also accurate. In advance of returning to 
the UK, and with a pre-existing awareness of the extensive waiting times to access a 
GIC, Leon’s American physician provided them with a nine month supply of 
testosterone. On explaining this situation at the primary care level, the GP refused to 
refill the testosterone prescription, with the justification that testosterone is unlicensed 
for the treatment of fatigue in the UK.  
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I’ve realised that my rationing of T (which is the prescription I brought 
over from the USA in September and I won’t get an appointment with 
the GIC until at least May) is leading me back into muscle fatigue and 
exhaustion every month. Not sure what to do about that because I 
really don’t want to talk to my GP about it and I can’t speed up my 
appointment. (Leon, 34, diary) 
There is a lack of recognition among the medical community that hormone 
prescriptions given to transgender patients may also assist with symptoms of 
conditions separate from gender dysphoria (or a more general, unpathologised desire 
for hormonal transition). This is a reflection of the scenario recognised in the previous 
chapter, where medication for conditions unrelated to gender impacted experience of 
dysphoria, such as Rachel’s opiate prescription. As it currently stands, due to lack of 
awareness, trans-specific training, and insufficient nuance within practice guidelines, 
the majority of GPs are unwilling to prescribe hormones without direct and explicit 
recommendation from a GIC.  
Some practitioners will give an NHS prescription on the basis of a private clinical 
assessment (which can save trans service users significant amounts of money through 
NHS prescription costs rather than private costs, on top of assessment appointment 
fees). Leon needed to begin the process of GIC referral and access from the very 
beginning, despite two and a half years of taking testosterone, and only experiencing a 
negative impact upon running out. This indicates the necessity for healthcare 
practitioners (at the primary and secondary/tertiary care levels) to provide continued 
access to hormones when initially accessed internationally. Leon stated in their diary 
that “I need the T to keep hold of a sense of legitimacy and strength”. The notion of 
legitimacy links back to the discourse of not feeling trans/legitimate enough without 
medical access. This in itself is a source of strength (impacting emotional and mental 
health and wellbeing) but may also be interpreted as in reference to the physiological 
relief of fatigue that the testosterone grants Leon – or even the literal ‘source of 
strength’, as testosterone stimulates muscular growth. 
The same argument for hormone prescription, without, or prior to, GIC access may be 
applied in cases where individuals self-medicate through ordering hormones via the 
internet, though none of the participants in this study reported self-medicating. Primary 
care hormone access would allow for hormone levels to be properly monitored over 
time. Indeed, the 2013 good practice guidelines specify that “A harm-reduction 
approach should be taken. Accordingly, hormones should not be stopped. A bridging 
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prescription may be appropriate, and blood tests and health checks are undertaken to 
screen for contraindications” (Wylie et al., 2014, p. 28).  
Such recommendations are reasonable because of the markedly low regret statistics 
associated with accessing hormones or gender affirming surgical interventions. It has 
previously been estimated that 1-2% of trans women accessing surgery experienced 
regret (Lawrence, 2003). This has been then generalised to be a reasonable estimate 
for all trans people (Wylie et al., 2014; Gooren, 2011).  It is also worth noting that at 
least one major meta-analysis study of trans patient satisfaction, whilst recognising the 
low regret rate, also states that available evidence is very low quality (Murad et al., 
2010). One participant did however give an important and nuanced account of regret, 
which was Ash: 
I do regret the phalloplasty. I can’t orgasm anymore and I constantly 
smell of piss. It wasn’t worth it. (Ash, 33, diary) 
In considering Ash’s experience, it is vital that this not be over-simplified, which 
requires contextualisation over Ash’s life course:  
When I went on the waiting list for breast surgery, I imagined that I 
wasn’t actually going to have it. I did it because it was expected of me, 
and if I did everything that was expected of me, I’d get a prescription 
for testosterone. And I imagined I’d probably just go ‘oh I changed my 
mind’ and not having it done, and stop taking the testosterone, I 
thought a couple of years might be enough. But actually I found it so 
interesting becoming more butch, and I was, my curiosity about what it 
would be like to actually pass as male just totally got the better of me, 
and I decided when they said ‘here’s a date’ that I’d accept it. (Ash, 33, 
interview) 
From this account it can be seen that Ash’s original intention was to never access 
mastectomy, but only a prescription for testosterone. That Ash changed their mind in 
direct relation to their experience of navigating the clinic and experiencing the changes 
that hormones produced can be compared with Frankie’s account. Frankie found 
herself feeling more binary after accessing hormones and made this link directly. Ash’s 
identification remains non-binary; however at the time of accessing mastectomy, Ash 
was embodying a masculine presentation and identification. They explained how 
through extensive exercise they experienced a large increase in muscle mass to the 
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extent that their chest measurement was larger than pre-mastectomy. Ash articulated 
experiencing enjoyment in “embodying something completely different, watching the 
way the world reacted to me differently”.  
It is often assumed by doctors and the general public alike that gender identity (and 
corresponding embodiment) remains relatively static across the life course, as 
discussed in detail in chapter five. However for Ash, after a 10 year period they decided 
they wished to return to more feminine embodiment, though without a sense of regret 
in relation to their masculine time and embodiment. Initially they attempted further 
chest surgery to embody a ‘non-binary chest’, with an ambiguous structure that could 
be potentially read as pectorals or breasts dependent on clothing choice. However, 
after negotiating this with their surgeon, the result was unsatisfactory. Ash did not 
articulate this experience as particularly harmful however: 
But… it wasn’t very effective. It just looked kind of like a lump which 
didn’t look properly one way or another, it just looked like a fake lump 
thing in my chest, and I thought, ‘okay if you’re going to do it, do it 
properly’ and I went back and said ‘look, let’s just do breasts’, I’ve 
decided which way I want to go, and it took me a little while to feel 
comfortable with it, but the reaction of [sex work] clients just instantly 
changed. That suddenly they were happy with my chest, and I got 
more business, it paid for itself in a matter of weeks, honestly. And 
because it had made this huge positive difference to my life, I felt 
happier about it than I thought, and I really learned to like it in the end. 
(Ash, 33, interview) 
The intersection with Ash’s profession as a sex worker is also significant here, as Ash 
experienced a significant economic improvement which synergised with their improved 
life quality overall, allowing them to “learn to like it in the end”. This is a significantly 
different narrative to the earlier, NHS-accessed phalloplasty: 
I went in there going ‘okay, I keep being offered this phalloplasty and 
you know maybe it would be nice, but I really have concerns about 
being able to enjoy sex, this is meant to make my sex life even better, 
and it’s pretty bloody good to start with’. So I took some diagrams and 
said ‘could we position things here’, so from being the insertive partner 
I can really feel it, and we went through and it was a little more 
standard and he said yes. Then when I woke up he said ‘we couldn’t 
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do exactly what you said anyway, so I did this instead’. And it 
involved… mutilating quite a lot. I was very unhappy, and he did his 
best to rectify the situation… when I woke up he’d not done what we 
agreed. And there’s no way I could have known that in advance. 
There’s no way I could have known, but if I had I wouldn’t have done it. 
(Ash, 33, interview) 
From Ash’s account, they were quite clear that they had not been coerced or 
manipulated. However, when asked if they thought there were ethical or legal 
ramifications to their surgeon’s action, Ash explained that “it’s a fairly specialist field of 
surgery, and if the guy who’s the biggest specialist said ‘I made a judgement call at the 
time, and that was correct’ everyone else believes that it’s correct because he’s the guy 
that knows”. Further, Ash went on to say how the surgeon had clarified that “under 
normal circumstances the reports you get is this doesn’t ruin things for people… 
statistically I was unlucky”. In comparing to earlier narratives of luckiness, this inspires 
a discourse of powerlessness – that whether one has a positive or negative outcome is 
difficult to have influence over. Here, Ash is internalising and accepting the surgeon’s 
explanation that they were not ‘normal circumstances’, which discursively aligns with 
how non-binary clinical presentations are positions as ‘not the normal case’.  
Ash did not say that they accept their surgeon made the best decision he could. Rather, 
they instead feel that attempting to challenge his authority would be fruitless because 
of his standing as ‘expert’. Ultimately, trans patients (binary and non-binary) are 
dependent upon the views and decision-making of their clinicians, which is problematic 
given the lack of nuanced understanding that trans communities feel (and evidence) 
clinicians have of transgender particularity. Despite their self-assuredness in their 
genderqueer identification, it is particularly poignant that Ash said: 
If I hadn’t had to present myself as a binary trans man in order to get 
some medical help, I wouldn’t have then been repeatedly offered and 
guided in the direction of a phalloplasty. And the worst thing that’s 
really happened to me ever wouldn’t have happened to me, and that 
would’ve had a positive impact on my mental health if that hadn’t 
happened. (Ash, 33, interview) 
This illustrates that discourses of inaccessibility and unequal treatment between non-
binary and binary transgender service users have a significant ethical impact in medical 
practice. These necessitate policy revision and revitalised training programmes in order 
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to mitigate. The details of such potential recommendations will be expanded upon in 
the following concluding chapter. That Ash had even turned surgery down multiple 
times but kept being offered it, meant Ash “kept thinking maybe I am missing out on 
something, maybe my life would be better”. There was also a critical queer community 
interaction to this experience, as Ash explained that at this time they were trying to date 
gay men, but experienced rejection – which may have been due to a phallocentricity 
among those Ash interacted with – “I thought it was that I hadn’t had the surgery, and 
didn’t have what they were looking for”. This demonstrates how the immutability of 
gender as a binary, within queer community and medical discourses can lead to 
multiple directions of pressure upon non-binary individuals to force themselves to 
pursue or perform embodiment and identity in undesirable (binarised) ways.  
Conclusion 
The chapter voiced that current guidelines force trans people (binary and non-binary) to 
fulfil practitioner expectations, and to invariably compete with each other for limited 
NHS resources – as those deemed most in alignment with physician expectations of 
what being transgender means will be conflated with possessing the greatest need. 
Further, keeping desired treatment within existing frameworks (such as only accessing 
surgery following hormones) also positions a non-binary service user as analogous 
with binary transgender treatment access, and correspondingly straightforward to treat. 
Ease of experience in the clinic was often positioned as ‘lucky’ by participants, further 
reiterating the sense that GICs caused difficulty or distress more often than not.  
Participants also raised the issues of lack of transparency in GIC decision making and 
processes, and a lack of trust between practitioners and service users. This was due to 
a sense that practitioners were concerned with maintaining a hierarchical power 
dynamic in relation to patients, and to protect themselves from potential malpractice 
lawsuits in the case of individuals regretting accessing treatments. The perceived 
bureaucracy of the NHS in the form of protocols, and most critically, long waiting lists, 
also meant that private healthcare could be, or could be viewed as, considerably easier 
to navigate, where affordable.  
Among those who had already accessed gender affirming medical services, there was 
an overall sense that their experiences had been positive. However, the fact that these 
participants still remained critical of GICs’ service for the trans population overall was 
illustrative of additional complexity. There was a sense that experiences were made 
considerably easier by performing or emphasising (more) binary identification and/or 
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expression. It was also made apparent that in resisting medical disempowerment of 
trans people, it is important not to then homogenise service users and risk 
universalising all those desiring treatment as expert patients.  
This does not however mean that top-down power dynamics (that can involve direct 
disrespect of non-binary identification) cannot be addressed in practice. Leon’s 
experiences of being denied testosterone in the UK following years of access in the 
USA illustrated a lack of pragmatic ability to incorporate international synergy into NHS 
practice. Finally, Ash’s case highlights how rare cases of post-treatment regret might 
be better understood as resulting from a complex interplay of social factors, rather than 
lack of understanding or rash decision-making. Regretful outcomes may be further 
minimised, not by tightening the access to gender affirming treatments, but by 
recognising a wider range of gendered possibilities as valid, such that gendered 
medical discourses are less likely to impact patient choices.  
In reflecting on this chapter, it is interesting to note differences between the views 
participants had of GICs depending on whether they had direct experience with them, 
or not. Overall, participants communicated that there is a great deal of distrust and fear 
within the non-binary population of practice within GICs. This was explained with 
reference to a wide variety of points, including how practitioners’ understanding of 
gender remains heavily biased towards the gender binary. This is a product not only of 
how fundamentally socially engrained the gender binary remains, but how lack of 
precedence/visibility of non-binary patients discursively positions such individuals as 
‘non-standard’. In order to appease physician expectations, patients can feel the need 
to obscure or entirely erase their non-binary status through the construction of a 
supernormal binarised self, or through strategic omission so as to feel they are 
maximising their chances of accessing gender affirming medical treatments. The 
conclusion of this work will address the themes in chapters four to seven so as to 
suggest recommendations in the light of this research.   
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Conclusion  
I certainly believe that we can move toward de-regulating gender and 
still engage in important corrective practices like gender-based 
affirmative action. I am not arguing for a gender-blind society in which 
all people are similarly androgynous, but instead for a world in which 
diverse gender expressions and identities occur, but none are 
punished and membership in these categories is used less and less to 
distribute rights and privileges. 
(Spade, 2003, p. 29) 
Summarising the Narrative 
This thesis has sought to address how non-binary gender identities are negotiated, 
within the contexts of queer communities and medical encounters. Whilst doing so 
through an empirical sociology that utilises symbolic interactionism as a theoretical 
framework, the academic foundations for this research have been found in both the 
sociology of health and illness, and transgender studies (most notably, an empirical 
sociology of transgender).  
Throughout this work, sociological conceptualisations used to understand illness (such 
as the sick role) have been redeployed within the context of non-binary transgender 
identities. It has been important throughout that such theoretical usage does not imply 
that trans identities are modelled as pathologies. The nuances present, particularly in 
contexts where non-binary people seek access to gender affirming medical services 
through GICs, highlight differences in how transgender health interactions function 
when compared to healthcare relating to conditions unproblematized as illness. 
I began the theoretical contextualisation of this work in chapter one by examining the 
history of medical sociology, and how it developed into the sociology of health and 
illness. This saw the expansion in the social roles of physicians, from not just curing 
disease, but in helping individuals maintain ‘good health’ and ‘good health practices’. 
This was significant because of how narratives of the socially constructed ‘normal’ are 
tied into judgements of health, as doctors both influence and are influenced by the 
social world. This chapter recognised the relevance of the sick role, biographical 
disruption, and expert patienthood in pertaining to transgender health interactions. 
Further, I contextualised how many studies of trans people and their genders have 
been rooted in a pathologising history of medical scientific interest. Much of the 
231 
 
 
 
research in medicine which scrutinised transgender identities has been significantly 
problematized and rejected; such as autogynephilia, primary and secondary 
transsexualism, and discourses that position gender variance as disordered in and of 
itself. Research of medicine, and its intersections with trans lives, has been of central 
concern in much of the (more recent) literature that collectively forms an empirical 
sociology of transgender health. In distinguishing between research in medicine (of 
transgender), and research of medicine (and transgender), I paralleled Straus’ (1957) 
distinction between sociology in/of medicine.  
It was important to recognise the limitations of considering transgender narratives 
exclusively in terms of interplay with gender affirming medical services, and processes 
of medical transition. In chapter two, I further contextualised the study of and 
interactions with the trans population over the last 50 years, by addressing the 
contributions of ethnomethodology, and tensions and synergies with feminist 
discourses. Consideration of transgender communities included reflecting on activist 
and legal scholarship, and recognition of (intersectional) social stigma and inequalities. 
In considering this very broad and multi-faceted range of literature pertaining to 
transgender lives, I have highlighted elements hinting at non-binary identities or 
potentiality. The explicit literature on non-binary or genderqueer identities and 
experiences however, remains very small. This thesis aims to significantly contribute to 
filling this gap, so as to also draw attention to and disrupt assumptions of a ubiquitous 
and unproblematized gender binary – in both transgender studies and wider social 
contexts.  
The research questions that were centralised within this study asked how non-binary 
people are involved with, and integrated into queer communities. In accessing such 
narratives over time through participant diaries, and also further reflections within semi-
structured interviews, the research allows for broad consideration of how the increasing 
visibility of non-binary people within queer communities is accommodated (or not). 
From this, changes, or necessary developments may be implied for the organisation of 
communities and activism that is centralised within and around such communities. 
Further, this project’s research questions examined how non-binary people negotiate 
access to and use of medical services, at both the level of general, primary care for any 
ailment, and in the context of medical gender transition via a GIC. Concerns and social 
meaning ascribed to such interactions were considered broadly, such that discourses 
within the non-binary population were engaged with whether currently seeking or 
accessing particular forms of medical care or not. The experiences and perceptions of 
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the non-binary participants allowed for assessment of how current healthcare 
provisions for the non-binary population are viewed or experienced, and what 
implications this has for future provisions and potential methods of improvement.  
Chapter three began by explaining the epistemological logic that underpinned this 
project, and how the framework of symbolic interactionism was adapted for the study of 
non-binary gender identities (inspired by its previous use in the study of sexuality). The 
practical details of fieldwork deployment were explained, together with the 
methodological justifications for multi-method research comprised of mixed media 
diaries, and semi-structured interviews. I entered into a discussion of the importance of 
reflexive practice within research, which strengthened both ethical practice and 
processes of rapport development during fieldwork. Participant demographics and the 
limitations of elements such as recruitment methods were discussed prior to engaging 
in analysis of research data.  
Some participants discussed their gender identities in terms of being static articulations 
of a third gender category. Others emphasised the fluidic nature of non-binary 
identification. Some participants were keen to acknowledge that, whilst they were 
happy in how they conceptualised their genders in the present moment, they accepted 
the possibility of having different feelings in the future (regarding making changes to 
embodiment, social presentation, or more personal conceptualisation).  
Medical transition services had been accessed by some participants. Others wanted to 
and were attempting to navigate such processes. Yet others wished to, but had not 
approached any service providers, whilst some did not desire to access medical 
services and instead negotiated their non-binary identities in relation to their 
embodiment as it stands. Explicit cases were identified of participants whose self-
conceptualisation had changed from binary trans to non-binary trans, or vice-versa. It 
was also seen that participants could embrace a non-binary identity whilst at the same 
time preferring to use titles, pronouns, and presentation that positioned them as being 
socially interpreted within the gender binary. This is amongst the first work which 
highlights particularity and demarcates differences between members of the non-binary 
population.  
A wide range of themes were identified throughout participant diaries and interviews, 
so as to create knowledge that establishes a framework for understanding negotiations 
and navigation of being non-binary. As ‘non-binary’ functions as an umbrella term, 
including many individuals with disparate feelings about embodiment, presentation, and 
233 
 
 
 
what interactions function to distress or validate, any essentialising answers to these 
research questions would be significantly limited. However, trends were identifiable that 
allow for original recognition of discursive influences, connecting interaction with 
medical service providers and queer communities.  
Chapter four was constructed around the theme of participants ‘not feeling trans 
enough’, which allowed for exploration of feelings of insecurity, or instability in gender 
identity. How this manifested could vary, in some individuals being indicative of internal 
self-doubt about the reality of one’s status, or potentially more in relation to how one is 
viewed by other people (including other trans community members, medical 
practitioners, or more general social actors). A strong link could be seen between the 
discursive dominance of medical interventions in hegemonic transgender narratives, 
and struggling for self-acceptance when not performing such narratives even if 
consciously recognising this as problematic. Whilst participants frequently doubted 
themselves as ‘not trans enough’ by their own standards, or the standards they feared 
may be imposed upon them, self-definition was sufficient for participants to accept 
others, thus highlighting a disjunction between how binarised norms of gender affected 
judgement of the self versus others.  
Historically constructed (particularly medicalised) narratives of transgender could be 
resisted in how participants articulated their relationship with embodiment, such that 
diagnostic criteria and language (such as gender dysphoria) could still be fulfilled in 
order to justify being trans enough, both to the individual and to others. The social 
difficulties in having to claim a gendered position that resists the proclamation of 
gender assigned at birth can fuel problematic hierarchies of realness within trans 
communities (among both binary and non-binary trans people). Lack of intelligibility or 
awareness of non-binary identification within some trans communities could also lead 
to practices or organisation that served to be uncomfortable or inaccessible for some 
non-binary people. Such accounts served to address how non-binary people are 
involved with and integrated into some queer communities; however these experiences 
only represented some of the highly heterogeneous examples of community 
organisation. 
Chapter five engaged with themes that were collected under the broad idea of time. It 
was recognised how the passage of time, and the gradual process of identity 
reformulation – with particularly significant events (especially GIC interactions) 
correlating with adjustments to the relationship with gender identity. I proposed a visual 
model by which coming out processes, and renegotiation of identity from binary to non-
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binary and vice versa may be visualised. The theme of identity as a stepping stone 
process was related to the resources that participants may have access to in naming 
and processing their feelings around gender (that could be age or community-
dependent). The theme of liminality provided a framework for conceptualising the 
potential fluidity or ‘inbetweenness’ of some non-binary articulations. This served to 
accommodate personal identity conceptualisations that demonstrated binary and non-
binary overlap, which could be temporally or spatially situated, in terms of how identity 
was emphasised or expressed. It also re-renders medical transition as not necessarily 
having a ‘fixed end point’ (as binary gender transitions regularly assume), as gender 
cannot be assumed to be universally experienced as static over the life course simply 
because desirous or deeply necessary medical interventions have been accessed. This 
allows for reconceptualization of narratives and concerns around ‘transgender regret’ 
that may be potentially used to legitimise transgender access to gender affirming 
medical services.  
Further, particular barriers were expressed for non-binary people with chronic health 
conditions or disabilities. In some cases, extensive interaction with health services 
unrelated to gender identity primed individuals to expect problematic interactions when 
seeking assistance. Participants could be concerned that raising a discussion of 
gender identity could disrupt treatment for their other conditions, positioning such an 
action as unacceptably hazardous for them. Highly specific interactions also 
recognised the potential for interaction between conditions and transness – through 
medical interventions (such as Rachel’s experience of taking opiates and their 
incidental impact in mitigating dysphoria) or social navigations (such as Jess’s 
sometimes-strategic use of her walking stick).  
Finally, in chapter five, the heterogeneity of non-binary involvement in queer 
communities was explored, showing how a particular focus on transgender people was 
not necessarily indicative of a politics of non-binary inclusion. Communities that might 
be particularly associated with defying normative practices or roles (such as Lolita 
fashion, or BDSM68 communities) or which challenge a gay/straight binary model of 
sexuality (notably bisexual communities) were explicitly highlighted as spaces 
appreciated by non-binary participants. This implies that the commonalities between 
non-binary gender identification and norm/role/binary disruption may equally be a 
source of affinity and support as communities oriented around transgender status. 
Indeed, due to the breadth of possibility under the transgender umbrella, tensions may 
                                            
68 Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism. 
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readily manifest between different individuals. Whilst a non-binary identity may 
currently be associated with anti-normative gender politics, having a binary trans 
identity cannot and does not indicate an individual’s beliefs or approach towards 
gender, with the potential to be conservative and reject queer or non-binary 
articulations, as was also expressed by participants who had observed this.  
Participants shared a multiplicity of rich and nuanced views, and direct accounts of 
medical care. Experiences included examples where participants were impressed by 
service provider’s efforts and sensitivity, or significantly distressed by their 
inadequacies. Accounts were divided into those not pertaining to medical transition 
related services in chapter six, and those which were, in chapter seven. Of those which 
were not, many examples still related to ‘gendered medicine’ – services that inherently 
depended upon, related to, and differentiated on the basis of how physiology is 
gendered, but through assumptions of concordance with the social categories of ‘men’ 
and ‘women’.  
In primary care (or secondary care unrelated to gender transition) contexts, non-binary 
patients were highly aware of how symbolic readings of them (or their genders) could 
impact their experiences of healthcare. Whilst some participants were clearly 
determined in ensuring a change of gender be recognised on records, it could be that 
removing association with the gender assigned at birth was of greater criticality than 
whether this was corrected to a binary or non-binary marker – in terms of distress 
mitigation. Participants expressed that anxiety over the perceived likelihood of lack of 
understanding or potential stigma in primary care contexts could delay them from 
scheduling important medical checks or condition management, or even result in total 
avoidance of ever engaging as a patient.  
Problems could be encountered with medical practice prior to doctor-patient 
interactions. Administrative processes, documentation, and exchanges with clerical 
staff could erase identities. Such difficulties could require significant patient labour in 
order to be recognised, or place an individual into a vulnerable state prior to a medical 
appointment. Participants expressed how trans identification could be inappropriately 
conflated with, or distract from, independent health issues. This point reiterates how 
some social and medical experiences are similarly experienced by binary and non-
binary trans people, however appreciation of specificity may produce necessarily 
different approaches for improving a given problematic interaction. Valuably, some 
participants were able to offer interactions with healthcare providers in contexts where 
they were not (at that time) positioned as a patient. This raised issues such as the 
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potential for problematic or offensive behaviour from staff when patients are not within 
earshot, evidencing a cisnormative culture within medical practice.  
The referral process, whereby primary care practitioners formally have a patient placed 
on a waiting list for an appointment with a particular GIC, was of significance to many 
participants who wished to access a medical transition but had not yet done so. 
Examples were given where GPs would attempt to assess participants prior to referral, 
which in addition to being unnecessary under best practice guidelines, inadvertently 
reinforces the binary gender hegemony that virtually all medical practitioners 
uncritically reify in patient interactions.  
The theme of obscuring or omitting non-binary identification carried into tertiary care 
contexts, as explored in chapter seven. It is notable however that whilst participants 
with positive experiences in their receipt of gender transition related care did not want 
to imply that services were without (systemic) faults, they did discuss positive aspects. 
Those who had not accessed clinics directly were highly concerned with negative 
experiences that were discussed within transgender community contexts. There has 
been extensively problematic treatment of trans people in clinical contexts, under now 
antiquated modes of practice. Lack of transparency in methods of assessment and 
medical decision making means that shared community knowledge nucleates from 
those trans individuals who pass through GICs. As all service users wish to conclude 
their interactions with the GIC as quickly and easily as possible, there is significant 
focus on performing those gendered roles that best satisfy clinicians. This can be 
significantly more difficult when openly non-binary, due to lack of historical clinical 
context. Insecurity related to not being trans enough was observed in relation to all 
three subdivisions of interaction under an SI framework. These are not feeling trans 
enough by one’s own standards (intrapsychic interactions), anxiety over being seen as 
trans enough by other community members (interpersonal interactions), and being 
considered to be trans enough to correspondingly be given access to medical services 
by clinicians (cultural, or structural interactions). Further, the anxiety over the 
uncertainty of a ‘smooth transition’ means that communities are likely to focus on 
negative narratives over positive ones, in order to ‘be prepared’ for clinicians with 
particular reputations.  
It was demonstrated that at least some tertiary care practitioners do not engage with 
non-binary articulations of gender identity as being equally valid to binary transgender 
identities. Concerns with non-binary patients being ‘more difficult to treat’ were 
grounded in a reliance on clinical precedent rather than holistic engagement with the 
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individual. In addition, such practice risks assuming that desired medical interventions 
for non-binary people are necessarily able to be demarcated from binary trans desires, 
when no particular medical treatment (or lack thereof) is essentialised to, or defines, 
binary or non-binary identification.  Transgender expert patienthood (supported by 
interactions and resources shared within transgender communities) was obtained in 
order to manage practitioner expectations and the medical gaze. However, 
performances of gender not only served to fit into the role of a ‘good patient’, but 
necessarily as patient at all, in the first place. The necessity of a distress-dependent 
experience oriented around embodied dysphoria in order to be deemed ‘diagnosable’ 
by physicians limits the narratives that can be safely explored in a clinical context due 
to the anxieties surrounding the potentiality of service provision denial.  
Recommendations from this Research 
One of the most fundamental recommendations for medical practice that can be made 
is inspired by those communities that non-binary people expressed affinity with, such 
as bisexual and kink communities. Such spaces were sensitive and reflexive to gender 
plurality, and tended to construct language and space to be more fully inclusive. 
Gendered assumptions rooted in cisnormativity should be challenged within medical 
practice. Much of this may be attained initially through the provision of training to both 
medical students and existent medical staff and administrators. The significance of 
language in erasing non-binary genders and potentially triggering dysphoria is such 
that the use of gender neutral forms of address (‘good morning’, rather than ‘hello sir’, 
for example) when individual preferences/needs are unknown may be normalised in 
practice towards all patients. This would also benefit binary trans people who are pre-
transition, or who do not pass as their identified gender. 
Practices in gendered medicine may be similarly adjusted at the administrative level to 
improve preventative health screening for trans individuals. An example being who 
receives letters reminding of the necessity of smear tests. At present, this relies upon 
the flawed conflation of the categories ‘women’ and ‘people with cervixes’. This benefits 
more of the population than binary and non-binary transgender individuals, such as 
people with known intersex conditions, and women who have had mastectomies or 
hysterectomies. Systemic changes would also need to be accompanied by 
standardisation of training on transgender healthcare within medical and nursing 
degrees, as well as staff training for administrative roles. Such actions would render 
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transgender identities generally as more intelligible, and equip staff in delivering 
medical practice that has been clipped of gendered assumptions.  
With regards to gender affirming medical services, good practice guidelines stipulate 
that “patients are presumed, unless proven otherwise, capable of consenting to 
treatment” (Wylie et al., 2014, p. 14). The fact that individuals referred to GICs are 
required to undergo a process of third party scrutiny prior to being able to access HRT 
illustrates how patient competence and willingness are insufficient under current (NHS) 
provision. I particularly draw attention to HRT because of the comparable simplicity of 
its administration in comparison to surgeries, and that a significant proportion of 
transgender people (binary and non-binary) are highly confident of their desire for HRT, 
whilst surgery may be uncertain or unwanted. Even were it not the case that culturally 
constructed and maintained binary norms of gender influence tertiary clinical practice, 
such that non-binary identified patients are potentially coded as more difficult or more 
complicated, it is problematic that any transgender transition-oriented care does not 
grant autonomy over how an individual wishes to negotiate their embodiment. Further, 
this is in a context whereby gender identity services are seeing significant increase in 
demand, without corresponding growth in resource allocation or staffing.  
Given constraints on NHS budgeting, there is clearly a finite amount of funding 
available to assist GIC patients. Therefore, there are at least two critical factors 
indicating that the current healthcare system results in patients being positioned as 
competing for resources. Firstly, there is the necessity for patients to fulfil imperfect 
diagnostic protocols and subjective clinician expectations. Secondly, resource 
limitations, partially a result of more general underfunding of the NHS (Pym, 2016; 
Campbell, 2015), inefficiencies (Niemietz, 2016), under-recognition of the importance 
of GICs, and the rapid growth of the transgender population trying to access services.  
For as long as the patient population continues to grow without proportional resource 
allocation, tertiary care providers will only be equipped to facilitate a limited number of 
transitions over a given period of time. Whether individual waiting times are adjusted on 
the basis of clinical urgency (at the discretion of practitioners) is unknown, due to lack 
of transparency concerning clinical practices. There is a need for assumptions around 
non-binary people being viewed as ‘less certain’, or as experiencing less significant 
dysphoria than binary people, to be explicitly addressed.  
Non-binary and binary trans hormone access equivalence could be established and 
significant relief granted on GIC resources through the allowance of hormone access 
without the absolute necessity of a GIC appointment. This does challenge the doctor’s 
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role as gatekeeper as it has been constructed in the context of transgender health and 
many other examples of healthcare provision, however trans identity is unique in 
depending entirely on self-reporting in all cases, whilst also being now accepted as a 
non-pathological state of being (Richards et al., 2015). In the context of hormone 
provision, a primary care practitioner would review expected physiological changes, 
and any associated health risks. A blood test is taken in order to establish initial 
hormone levels and a consent form is signed. A simple, non-specialised psychological 
evaluation may also be performed in order to eliminate the rare possibility of mental 
health conditions that can sometimes present with delusional cross-gender 
identification. Such practices all currently occur at the primary care level in health 
provision contexts for cisgender patients.  
These tasks are all within the remit of primary care provision. By centralising patient 
agency, deference to gender specialists (who do not have specific or particular training 
in how they respond to service-user reports of being trans) is no longer necessary. 
Correspondingly, individuals who desired access to HRT only (or initially, only) would 
no longer need GIC referral, such that waiting lists would be significantly reduced. The 
fact that patients already require primary care appointments to obtain referrals, and 
receive hormone prescriptions from primary care practitioners on the recommendation 
of GICs, means no additional burdens would be placed on the primary care context. 
Further, the transparency with which such a model could be implemented would mean 
that any delays or denial in hormone provision for an individual can be easily justified 
and contextualised, such that anxiety around lack of transparency in practice may be 
mitigated (O'Reilly, 2012). 
Recommendations for community organisations are inevitably less structured. Difficulty 
may be experienced by administrators who encounter tensions between group 
members, especially when feeling unequipped to diffuse or police such interactions, 
and indeed, the total elimination of intragroup tensions is not feasible. Being mindful of 
the potential harm of self-validation through comparison to (less ‘successful’) others, 
and of the risks in assuming the homogeneity of transgender identities (such as 
wishing for surgeries) would likely improve community experiences for non-binary 
people. This may be attained through increased communication between community 
leaders and organisers, which is significantly easier through digital community spaces 
such as via the websites Facebook, and Tumblr.  
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Cautions, Limitations, and Future Directions 
Recognition that this research has served to offer a snapshot of non-binary 
experiences and views within a particular cultural context and at a particular time is 
important in considering this work’s impact. Formal policy, medical training practices, 
the cultural intelligibility of non-binary identities, and community norms and practices 
continue to develop and shift. Recognition of non-binary narratives is essential for 
queer communities and medical practice to be inclusive of gender plurality. 
Problematizing cisnormative cultural practices, whereby all individuals are assumed to 
be cisgender by default – and correspondingly therefore, that trans individuals may be 
necessarily visibly identified – is a macrosociological observation. However, examples 
within the data drew attention to individual acts of practitioner and community member 
insensitivity. I argue that this is illustrative of widespread issues on the basis of social 
context in addition to participant accounts, but this is not generalisable to all healthcare 
practitioners, or queer community members who are not non-binary. Whilst it is 
undeniable that there exist individuals who engage in discriminatory and offensive 
behaviours, the significance of the lack of awareness of non-binary gender identities in 
particular cannot be overstated. At the level of the individual, education initiatives that 
challenge simplistic and assumption-oriented judgement-making in social interaction 
would have a marked impact, yet the structural constraints of gatekeeper-oriented 
healthcare that has been recognised and criticised particularly within trans communities 
will still remain. From this research, it is not possible to make definitive inferences as to 
whether the negative views of medical care within the non-binary population are 
entirely rooted in examples of problematic practice. These certainly occur to a 
disproportionate standard, as supported by existent transgender health studies (Ellis et 
al., 2015; Hagen and Galupo, 2014; Kosenko et al., 2013; Bradshaw and Ryan, 2012; 
McNeil et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2009; Dewey, 2008; Bockting et al., 2004). However, 
aspects such as the potential for individuals to be sensitised by communities to expect 
poor experiences, or for non-binary people to articulate poor experiences as 
acceptable because of exceeding especially low expectations, require more detailed 
attention.  
With regards to the demographics of the sample, as discussed in chapter three, all 
except for one participant were white; therefore the sample did not reflect the 
experiences of gender diversity that may be found amongst different ethnicities. All but 
one participant had attained (or were in the process of earning) a degree. Extrapolating 
on the basis of educational attainment and the overall contexts that researcher-
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participant interactions have allowed, I therefore suggest that the sample is skewed 
towards middle class representation. Whilst Harrison et al. (2012) evidence that non-
binary people (in their North American sample) had above average educational 
attainment, my sample is nonetheless not necessarily broadly comparable to the 
overall UK population. This is likely a result of some of the avenues used in the 
recruitment process, such as university-based LGBTQ societies, and the potential for a 
homogenised sample as a result of snowball sampling.  
Limitations associated with the methods used in this research were also articulated in 
chapter three. However, the extensive labour involved in diary-keeping was certainly 
apparent in seven out of twenty-five original participants withdrawing from the project, 
many due to feeling unable to commit to the extent of participation required. Further, 
the number of participants with prior diary-keeping experience suggests that the 
method may have played some role in self-selection; non-writers may have become 
less accessible due to this. Whilst one goal of the diaries was to access day-to-day or 
more routine aspects of non-binary life and experience, the interviews emphasised 
more demarcated, unique happenings such that relatively recent interactions were 
possibly overemphasised, particularly if compared to the roles of queer community or 
medical practice in participant’s lives prior to the diary keeping exercise.  
This study did not target any particular sites of medical practice, GICs, or community 
organisations for scrutiny of their interactions with non-binary people. Therefore, 
recommendations cannot be made in relation to any specific organisation’s current 
policies, as it is unknown to what extent participant experiences would necessarily be 
representative for a given set of service users. However, the data does allow for a 
more general approach to service improvement, which if borne in mind could see policy 
becoming more standardised, whilst care may become both more efficient and more 
holistic.  
With regards to future research directions, an enormous amount of possibility remains 
open for research in relation to gender beyond the binary. Lack of quantitative data on 
non-binary people beyond very rudimentary extrapolated estimations from community 
members renders population studies difficult. Adjustment of census questions so as to 
be able to record people identifying outside of the gender binary, and also with a trans 
identification more generally, would open a wide range of research possibilities. 
Intersections between non-binary gender identities and different forms of social 
inequality would also provide excellent sites for academic scrutiny. In the contexts of 
other disciplines, there is a significant absence of culturally competent and sensitive 
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medical research considering transgender health experiences that transgress historical 
norms (such as the impact of lower doses of hormones in different bodies at different 
ages, for example).  
We’re Here, We’re Genderqueer, Get used to it! 
In summary, the integration of non-binary individuals into queer communities is most 
apparent in the specific contexts of transgender communities, more so than broader 
LGBTQ examples. Some participants indeed highlighted cis gay men as a group more 
likely to express intolerance or lack of understanding of non-binary identities, in a 
manner which may alienate. There were multiple examples of non-binary involvement 
and integration with various sexuality or gender-related communities, but with the 
commonly shared trait among community members of being particularly accepting of 
differences in gender identity and expression. 
The negotiation of existing medical practices is currently fraught with anxieties and 
potential difficulties for non-binary individuals, perhaps most centrally a lack of 
intelligibility amongst the majority of healthcare practitioners. The specific 
circumstances of care may necessitate different forms of educational or policy 
intervention in order to see improvement. Whilst experiences were certainly not 
universally negative, the recent cultural emergence of non-binary identities means that 
health services need to respond quickly in order to avoid risk of harm to this significant 
minority group of service users.  
For queer community organisations, non-binary identity emergence implies that 
recognising the necessity of resisting the uncritical incorporation of gendered norms 
into community practices is required for pluralistic, inclusive, and inviting spaces and 
events. It can be argued that the relative social disempowerment of cisgender gay men 
and lesbian women (when compared to the trans population) has considerably 
lessened since the new millennium (McCormack, 2013). This, together with the 
fracturing of queer solidarity along the lines drawn through identity politics can mean 
that non-binary identities risk being stigmatised. This may nucleate through 
homonormative ideals, or depoliticised and over-simplistic internalisations of gender by 
some members of the community. That said, there are also examples of non-binary 
individuals being celebrated and embraced by communities, and also the creation of 
increasingly specific and nuanced groups and networks, particularly in synergy with 
digital technologies. 
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In the context of trans/queer healthcare, non-binary gender identities suggest that 
discourses are shifting so as to render the sustained inclusion of arbitrarily rooted and 
uncritical gender roles within medical practice increasingly untenable. Non-binary 
identities highlight the importance for all medical practitioners to have a basic 
appreciation of the potential problems and limitations of gendered assumptions in any 
social interaction, particularly in the prospective situation of engaging with a vulnerable 
individual. Non-binary gender identities also provide a valuable avenue for the 
reinterpretation of many narratives of de-transition. This further suggests that holistic 
transgender healthcare is not possible without full acknowledgement of the possibilities 
of gender plurality, particularly as individual’s needs change over time. 
This thesis has made clear the relationship between non-binary identities, queer 
communities, and medical practice of all kinds. In doing so, it is hoped that the benefits 
of sociological analysis can be harnessed to pragmatically impact upon both systemic 
cultural norms, and individual lives for the better.   
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Appendix 2 – Template email to organisations 
To whom it may concern, 
I am emailing to enquire whether it would be possible to circulate the attached flyer to 
your group’s membership.  
I am a PhD student researcher at the University of Leeds, and I am working on a 
project titled ‘Non-Binary Gender Identity Negotiation – Roles of Queer Communities 
and Medical Practice’.  
I am seeking participants who would be interested in keeping a ‘mixed media diary’ for 
a period of four months between February and May of 2015, with a follow-up interview 
to be arranged after this period. I can provide further information for anyone who might 
be interested.     
This project has received ethical approval from the University of Leeds, and has the 
ethics reference of AREA 14-044. Should you wish to contact my PhD supervisor, her 
name is Sally Hines and can be reached at s.hines@leeds.ac.uk 
Thanks very much and best wishes, 
 
Ben Vincent  
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Appendix 3 – Participant consent form 
Participation Consent Form 
Title of Project: ‘Non-binary Gender Identity Negotiation – The Roles of Queer 
Communities and Medical Practice’ 
Name of Researcher: Ben Vincent  
Please initial the box to the right of the corresponding statement to indicate that you 
agree.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet dated _____ explaining the above research project, 
and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the 
project. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw until 1 month following interview 
without giving any reason, and without there being any 
negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to 
answer any particular question or questions when 
interviewed, I am free to decline without giving any reason 
and without there being any negative consequences.  
 
 I consent to the follow-up interview being recorded by 
Dictaphone in order to be transcribed for the PhD project. 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw consent to use particular 
material from my diary and/or interview  until one month 
following the date of the interview, after which point 
completion of the PhD thesis would be jeopardised by the 
need to remove data after this point. I understand I may 
not withdraw consent to utilise information from my diary 
and interview at any point following one month after the 
completion my interview (which I will be notified of). 
 
 
 
284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please underline ONE of the following two statements to indicate your preference: 
1. I wish to be anonymised in this research. 
2. I wish to be identifiable by first name in this research. 
 
If you have underlined choice 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I agree to take part in the above research project and will 
inform the named researcher (Ben Vincent) above should 
my contact details change. 
 
 I understand that I may ask any questions at any time by 
contacting Ben Vincent by email at ssbwv@leeds.ac.uk, 
and that if I have a complaint concerning the research 
procedure I can contact Sally Hines by email at 
s.hines@leeds.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 I understand that my responses will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
 
 I give permission for the above named researcher to have 
access to my responses in full before anonymization. I 
understand that my name will not be linked with the 
research materials, and I will not be identified or 
identifiable in the report or reports that result from the 
research.  
 
 I understand I may change my mind and be made 
identifiable (and accept the conditions contingent with this 
choice) at any time until 3 months after the date of my 
interview. 
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If you have underlined choice 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________             _____________             _______________ 
Name of participant Date                                        Signature 
 
_________________             _____________             _______________ 
Researcher Date                                        Signature  
 I understand that I may be potentially identified as the 
source of my responses and diary entries. 
 
 I give permission for the above named researcher to have 
access to my responses in full. I understand that my name 
will be linked with the research materials, and I may be 
identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result 
from the research.   
 
 I understand I may change my mind and be made 
anonymous (and accept the conditions contingent with this 
choice) at any time until 3 months after the date of my 
interview. 
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Appendix 4 – Information sheet for participants 
Information Sheet 
This document provides an outline of the project ‘Non-Binary Gender Identity 
Negotiation’, so as to provide guidance for participation, explain what is involved, and 
what you are consenting to. 
 
What is this project investigating and why? 
This project looks at important factors that may influence how non-binary people 
experience their gender identities – queer communities, and medical practice. In doing 
so, the factors that influence what being non-binary means for individual people may be 
better understood. There may also be important findings which could influence the 
policy formation for both medical practice and LGBTQ groups, in order to better 
recognise and serve the needs of non-binary people.  
 
What criteria do I need to fulfil to be involved? 
 18 years old or more at the time of participation 
 A current resident of the United Kingdom  
 Fluent or near-fluent written and spoken English 
 A non-binary gender identity 
A non-binary gender identity generally refers to any identity other than simply ‘man’ or 
‘woman’; though whether you fulfil this criterion is simply for you to decide. This project 
wishes to involve any and all people whose gender identities are situated outside of the 
gender binary, in whatever way or to whatever extent. 
 
What will participation involve? 
Participants will be keeping a ‘mixed media diary’, in order to give insights into 
experiences of, and/or thoughts concerning LGBTQ communities, and experiences of 
medical practice. Following this, participants will also take part in a single interview with 
the researcher to discuss the contents of the diary. 
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How long will the study last? How much time does it need from me? 
Diaries will be kept for a period of four months. This will be between 1st February and 
31st May 2015. 
The researcher will make weekly email contact to help maintain engagement with the 
project, and to also offer potential ideas if you find coming up with things to write about 
difficult. 
The follow-up interview which will be arranged after the diary keeping period is 
complete will take approximately 1 hour, plus any travel time to meet at the location 
which we agree upon. 
 
What are my rights? 
You will be asked to consent for the interview to be recorded (audio only, by 
Dictaphone) for later transcription and use by the researcher. You have the right to ask 
for a copy of this recording if you so wish, and to request that any particular parts of the 
interview are not referenced or used in any academic research.   
You have the right to be made anonymous when quotations or images from your diary 
and/or interview are used in academic research. You have the right to choose your own 
pseudonym if you wish.  
If you so choose however, you also have the right to be identified as a participant within 
this research (by first name only). Private information (such as your address) would 
remain confidential. The researcher cannot be held responsible for any unforeseen 
negative circumstances resulting from the choice to use one’s real first name within the 
research.  
If you wish to withdraw from the study completely you have until 1 month following the 
completion of your interview. If you have chosen to be identifiable but change your 
mind, you have the right to request anonymity until 3 months following completion of 
your interview.  
None of the data produced in this project (your diary entries, the audio recording of 
your interview, or the interview transcription) will be shared with any third party, for any 
reason. Any personal correspondence between you and the researcher will also remain 
confidential. The only conditions in which confidentially may be breached are if I am to 
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believe you pose a serious threat to yourself or others, or if it would be illegal not to 
breach confidentiality. 
Once the PhD being written from this project has been completed, you will have the 
right to request a digital copy. You may also at this point request to have your diary 
sent back to you if you so wish. 
 
How long will my diary and interview transcript be kept? 
In keeping with the RCUK Common Principles on Data Policy, your diary and transcript 
will be kept for 3 years from the end of data collection, or 2 years from publication, 
whichever is longer. This is to ensure that work utilising the data can be completed fully 
with faithful reference to the data collected.   
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Appendix 5 – Guidance Included with Diary 
Guidance for engaging with the diary project 
Thank you once again for engaging with this project. Below are some details which you 
may refer to if you struggle to think of what you could write (or produce through other 
means!). If you have any problems with the project, please email me at: 
ssbwv@leeds.ac.uk 
Here are some questions that may help you produce diary entries: 
 How are you involved with LGBTQ communities? 
 What are your experiences with other LGBTQ people, with regards to your 
gender identity? 
 What are your thoughts on other LGBTQ people’s attitudes to non-binary 
people, generally or with regards to your personal experiences? 
 What are your thoughts on medical practitioner’s attitudes to trans people, and 
specifically non-binary people? 
 What have your experiences been of using medical services, in relation to your 
gender? 
 
LGBTQ communities 
This is defined very broadly, so as to potentially include any interactions with other 
LGBTQ people. This could include your partner or partners (in private or public 
settings), or experiences of an LGBTQ/gay/queer/trans scene. It may include time with 
a friend or group of friends, or experiences working with or being supported by LGBTQ 
charities, clubs, or other organisations. 
This list is by no means exhaustive. If you have any particular interactions in which you 
find your gender to be relevant, made relevant, or otherwise brought to mind, this may 
be a great topic to consider making a diary entry about. Include as much or as little 
descriptive detail of places, people and/or events as you feel allows you to best 
express yourself. You may wish to focus on how things make you feel, and why that 
might be.  
Medical Practice 
This is also defined broadly. Consider if you have previously accessed, are accessing, 
or may consider accessing in the future any form of gender affirming medical service 
(such as hormones, or surgery).  
290 
 
 
 
If this isn’t relevant to you, don’t worry! If, during the diary keeping period you access 
any other kind of medical service (for example, seeing a GP due to injury or illness, 
chronic or acute) – was your gender made relevant to the situation by another person, 
or did you think about your gender in relation to this experience in any way? 
Relevance 
If you are not sure whether writing about something is relevant, it’s completely fine to 
include it anyway. The use of diaries is to try and view a ‘snapshot’ of your lived 
experiences. The process of keeping the diary aims to be a positive one for you (as a 
form of enjoyment, interest, or catharsis). Please remember you are not compelled to 
produce entries about anything you do not feel comfortable about.  
Other Points 
With the diary you have received an addressed envelope. This is for the diary’s return 
(after 31st May). Please keep it safe until then, though if lost this can be replaced. 
If you lose, or complete all the pages of your diary during the research period, please 
be in touch by email – I will provide a replacement.  
You do not have to use the diary every day (but if you want to, please do!). I would 
estimate that using the diary at least weekly is necessary.  
Remember that you may produce entries however you wish. Consider: 
 Drawings 
 Poetry 
 Collages 
 Video 
 Audio 
 Play-like dialogues 
 Others…! 
If you wish to use a computer instead (or as well as) this diary, that is fine. Please save 
digital text entries in one document, preferably Microsoft Word, with dates separating 
entries. Any non-text entries done on a computer can be saved separately – please 
use your name and the date of the entry as the file name. These can be returned by 
email after the diary keeping period finishes. 
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If you want to use bigger pieces of paper for entries than the pages, simply date them 
and include them in your return envelope. Please write the date (and time if you wish) 
with each diary entry. 
Any further questions, please be in touch! 
 
Ben Vincent   
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Appendix 6 – Interview Framework: General Questions 
 Tell me about your interactions with the queer community. Do you use it for 
specific things? 
 Do you have many queer friends? 
 Does queer interaction affect how you feel about your identity? 
 Do non-queer people do things which undermine your sense of identity? 
What/how? 
 Do queer people ever do things which undermine your sense of identity? 
What/how? 
 How do you deal with these things, respectively? 
 Do you feel your identity has changed over time? How? What might have 
affected this? 
 How do you talk about gender with different people in your life? What are your 
feelings about these interactions? 
 How do you feel LGBTQ communities could improve? 
 Has interaction with queer communities affected coming out experiences for 
you? If so, how? 
 Have coming out experiences affected your queer community interactions? If so, 
how? 
 How has queer community interaction shaped your feelings on:  
Pronouns? 
Public bathrooms? 
 Have you ever had feelings of ‘not being trans enough’ or ‘not being non-binary 
enough’?  
 Do you think people view non-binary identities as a stepping stone to a binary 
transgender identity (in queer communities, and by medical practitioners)? 
 Is the gender binary manifest in queer spaces/interactions? If so, how? 
 Do you experience dysphoria? 
 What are your thoughts on the medical community’s interactions with 
transgender people? How about non-binary people in particular? 
 How do you feel about GPs and medical staff more generally? 
 Do you feel your identity impacts your experience of accessing medical services 
for non-gender related issues? 
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 Do you wish to access gender affirming medical services? Do you feel being 
non-binary affects this? 
 What have your experiences been of medical administration? How has this 
affected you? 
 How do you feel medical practice for non-binary people could be improved? 
